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2ABSTRACT
This study examines the kapitan Cina institution in Batavia, 
its place in the Dutch East Indies administration, and the 
role played by the Chinese officers in their own community. 
The Chinese inhabitants of Batavia and the Dutch practice of 
segregation are considered in chapter 1, devoted to 
describing the plurality of Batavia’s population under the 
VOC. Chapter 2 traces the original concept of the kapitan 
system, dating back to the pre-colonial indigenous kingdoms 
of the archipelago. It indicates that the kapitan institution 
was an indigenous arrangement, later adopted by western 
colonists to rule the non-indigenous inhabitants of the 
colony. The main focus of this study is in the last five 
chapters. Chapter 3 examines the establishment of the 
kapitan Cina, or Chinese officers, its nature, structure and 
relationships with the local authority of Batavia. The 
Chinese officers were members of the Chinese Council 
through which the local Chinese administration was 
performed. This is considered in chapter 4, on the Chinese 
Council. Chapter 5 considers the role of the Chinese officers 
in the context of the Chinese movement from the early 
twentieth century, and the changing attitude of the Dutch 
towards the Chinese. Given that Chinese officers were 
wealthy members of their community, given the significant 
role played by the Chinese in the colonial economy, the 
economy aspect of the Chinese officership is discussed in 
chapter 6, which also examines the peculiar position of 
Batavia in Dutch economic policy and practice. The last 
chapter discusses the Dutch plan to abolish the institution 
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7PREFACE
The term kapitan Cina is familiar in the history of the 
Chinese in Southeast Asia. Yet the institution has been 
little studied.
In the Dutch East Indies, in Batavia in particular, the 
kapitan Cina institution lasted until the last days of Dutch 
rule. And whereas in other parts of Southeast Asia, such as 
the Straits Settlements, the kapitan Cina was an unofficial 
position, in the Dutch East Indies it was an integral part of 
the colonial administration.
Despite the long history of their settlement in the 
region, studies of the Chinese of Batavia are very few: I J 
Moerman, In en Om de Chineesche Kamp,1 J Th Vermeulen, De 
Chineezen te Batavia en de Troebelen van 1740,2 C Salmon & 
D Lombard, Les Chinois des Jakarta; Temples et Vie 
Collective ,3 G J van Reenen, De Chineezen van Jakarta; 
Beschrijving van een Minderheidsgroep,4 and L Blusse, 
Strange Company; Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the 
the Dutch in VOC Batavia.5
Moerman gives a detailed account of Chinese socio­
cultural life, customs and belief; almost the day-to-day life 
in the former Chinese quarter in Batavia. His work is a 
classic introduction to the study of the Chinese of Batavia. 
However, as the first edition was published in 1929, his 
views on the institution of the Chinese officers were 
formed when they were still the subject of lenghty debate.
Verm eulen’s writing, which was originally a 
dissertation, was the first academic work on the Chinese 
riots in Batavia in 1740. Although there were earlier
1 (1932. Second edition. Batavia: G Kolff & Co).
2 (1938. Leiden: E J Brill).
3 (1980. Paris: Etudes Insulindiennes-Archipel, vol. I).
4 (1981. Leiden: Leiden University, Institute of Cultural and Social Studies).
5 (1986. Dordrecht: Foris Publications).
articles written on the subject,6 Vermeulen explained their 
background, noting that the massacre was a consequence of 
the Chinese riots inside and outside the city, and of the 
feuds within the Dutch VOC. It is interesting to note that 
Moerman had already raised the question as to how far the 
peranakan were involved in the riots, and were they also 
among the victims of the 1740 massacre in the city?7 
Blusse put the same subject into a wider context. He 
observed that the deteriorating situation, preceding the 
massacre, was due more to the declining socio-economic 
condition of the Chinese and to the failure of the Chinese 
officers to maintain their authority over their community. 
However, Blusse’s work on Batavia is not purely on the 
Chinese. The book is a compilation of previously published 
articles. Nevertheless it gives a comprehensive view of the 
Chinese economic networks and their relationships with the 
VOC authorities in Batavia. Blusse’s work is more a social 
history of the Batavian non-indigenous communities under 
the VOC, with the Chinese playing a significant role.
C Salmon & D Lombard survey the existing Chinese 
temples in Jakarta, to provide an overall view of Chinese 
community life. Salmon & Lombard’s analysis of the role of 
the Chinese Council is limited to this aspect only. This is ^  
understandable as the research was ~undertaken in the 
1970s, although the writers give a historical description of 
the Batavian Chinese community back to VOC times. As 
membership of the Chinese Council was open only to Chinese 
officers, considerations of the Council’s role was also 
limited to its place in^jDublic ceremonies and religious 
duties. Salmon & Lombar’s work leaves out other essential 
aspects of the Chinese in Batavia, particularly their 
management of their community.
6 W R van Hoevell, “Batavia in 1740”, Tijdschrift voor Neerlands-lndie, 
vol. 3, no. 1, 1840, pp. 447-557; B Hoetink, “ Ni Hoe Kong; Kapitein der 
Chineezen te Batavia in 1740”, Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde 
van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. 74, 1918, pp. 447-518.
7 I J Moerman, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch Oost Indie ( 1933. Batavia: P 
Noordhoff), p. 19.
9Van Reenen’s socio-anthropological work on the Chinese 
community in Jakarta is a brief study of the contemporary 
Chinese in Jakarta, particularly changes within the 
community under the New Order.
There are four articles on the kapitan Cina under the 
VOC, all by B ^HcetLnkr8 Hoetink’s work limits itself to the 
Dutch administration’s point of view, and does not pay 
attention to the inner workings of the Chinese officers 
institution. Apart from the work of Hoetink, limited to the 
VOC period, the Chinese officers under the Dutch are very 
little studied. Other works of the Indonesian Chinese, 
particularly by Lea E Williams, O verseas Chinese  
Nationaiism; the Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in 
Indonesia, 1900-1916,9 and James R Rush, Opium to Java; 
Revenue-Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial 
Indonesia, 1860-1910,10 although involve discussion on the 
role of the Chinese officers, do not pay specific attention to 
Batavia.
Williams examines the involvement of the Chinese 
officers in the early years of the Pan-Chinese movement 
and limits his observation to the non-peranakan Chinese or 
singkeh-totok’s point of view. Rush studies the involvement 
of the Chinese officers in opium-farming but does not 
extend to the practice of the opium farm in the Batavia 
region. In other words, although partly discussing the 
Chinese officers, both studies exclude the Batavian officers 
or do not describe the officers in Batavia in detail.
My study is therefore distinctive in terms of subject, 
period and the area covered. It examines the Chinese 
officers in Batavia from 1837 until 1942.
8 B Hoetink, “So Bing Kong; het Eerste Hoofd der Chineezen te Batavia, 
1619-1636”, Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van 
Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. 73, 1917, pp. 344-414; “Ni Hoe Kong; Kapitein 
der Chineezen te Batavia in 1740”, op.cit.; “Chineesche Officieren te Batavia 
onder de Compagnie”, Bijdragen, vol. 78, 1922, pp. 1-136; “So Bing Kong; 
het Eerste Hoofd der Chineezen te Batavia: eene Nalezing”, ibid., vol. 79, 
1923, pp. 1-44.
9 (1960. Glencoe, III.: The Free Press).
10 (1990. Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
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Despite the generic term kapitan Cina, the thesis focuses 
on the highest position in the institution; the Chinese 
jm jo jV -  which was first granted in Batavia in 1837 and 
lasted until 1942 when the colony was taken over by the 
Japanese. Focussing on the role of the officers exposes the 
political and economic dimensions of their position, not 
limited to their administrative function as the chiefs of the 
Chinese community.
The main discussion emphasizes the relationships 
between the Chinese officers and the Dutch, and between 
the officers and the Chinese community in Batavia. 
Examination of the relationships between the Chinese 
officers and the Dutch authorities shows the workings of 
the organization itself, and explains the position of the 
Chinese local administration within the Dutch East Indies 
administration. Examination of the relationships between 
the officers and the Chinese community in Batavia 
demonstrates the peculiarities of the Chinese in the region, 
mostly peranakan, and the Dutch policy of favouring them.
As the Chinese local administration was an integral part of 
Dutch local government in Batavia, my study greatly relies 
upon Dutch archives and records. I used the correspondence 
between the Batavia local authorities and the Dutch East 
Indies central government offices, particularly the office of 
the Governor-General, the Department of Home Affairs and 
the Advisor for Chinese Affairs.
Chinese matters were taken seriously by the Dutch East 
Indies government: Dutch records and archives on the 
Chinese are fairly extensive. This is shown in the richness 
of the Algemeen Secretarie collection, which preserves 
papers of the office of Dutch governor-generals. The 
B in n e n la n d s -B e s tu u r  collection holds papers of the 
Department of Home Affairs and the office of the Advisor 
for Chinese Affairs. The archives of Batavia and Tange rang 
holds papers, reports on local matters, even letters from 
the members of the community.
Materials in the Dutch archives in The Hague, particularly 
the Mailrapporten, classified as gewone or geheime, make it 
possible to trace the main lines of Dutch policy regarding 
the Chinese.
To seek a comparatively fair point of view, my reliance 
on Dutch sources is balanced by excerpts from the 
peranakan Chinese-Malay press, published in Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, and Dutch reviews on them in De Indische Gids 
and Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-lndie.
NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION
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For Chinese peranakan names, as they are of Hokkien origin, 
I have used the Hokkien spelling, as written in the Dutch 
archives, in order not to confuse the reader with modern 
Mandarin spellings.
Names of districts, especially in Batavia, are as 
employed by contemporaries; thus Weltevreden, Molenvliet, 
Meester-Cornelis, Buitenzorg.
I have used the local terms ‘peranakan’, ‘singkeh-totok’, 
‘sahbandar’, ‘kapitan Cina’ in their original forms.
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1 THE POPULATION OF BATAVIA UNDER THE VOC,
1619-1800
The Background
By May 1619 the settlement which is nowadays known as 
the city of Jakarta had been taken by the VOC and 
subsequently inaugurated as Batavia. This was the initial 
step towards setting up a strong foothold of Dutch power in 
Java which then expanded to other parts of the archipelago.
Over time Batavia became the centre of Dutch power, and 
the city administration was placed directly under the VOC 
bureaucracy. And in common with many other Western 
colonies in the East, the colonial administration adopted a 
policy of segregation, which created social stratification 
based on race and religion. The city’s population was divided 
into western and non-western and on a religious basis, 
Christian and non-Christian. These divisions were reflected 
in the laws. In terms of civil status, members of Batavian 
society were either Company officials, free men or slaves. 
As well as in Batavia, this practice of segregation was also 
very apparent in other main cities, like Semarang,1 
Surabaya and Makassar2 owing to their demographic 
configurations. The Batavia city population was divided into 
three main groups as follows: (1 ) European, including
German, Swedish, French, Danish, British, Portuguese and 
others; (2) Vreemde Oosterlingen or Foreign Asistics, i.e. 
Chinese, Arabs, Armenians, Indians, Persians and others; (3) 
Natives, namely Javanese, Balinese, Ambonese, Buginese, 
Timorese, Malays and many others.
Each group also had its own internal classification such 
as the Indies-born European for those of European origins,
1 See D. Lombard, "Une Description de la ville de Semarang vers 1812 
(d'apres un manuscrit de I’lndia Office)", Villes d'lnsulindes II, Archipel, no. 
37 ,1989 , pp. 2 6 3 -2 7 7 .
2 See A. Reid, "The Rise of Makassar", Review of Indonesian and Malayan 
Affairs, double number, 1983, pp. 117-160.
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the Indies-born Chinese or Arab for those of Chinese or Arab 
origins, while the Natives were categorized as either free 
man or slave. It should be noted here that during the VOC 
regime the term of Vreemde Oosterlingen also applied to 
natives from the eastern parts of the Archipelago. As these 
Ambonese, Balinese, Buginese, Malays, Timorese and others 
were not actually indigenous to Batavian, they were 
categorized as 1v re e m d e ' or foreign, and the term 
1oosterlingen ' or easterners came from their origins in the 
eastern islands.3 However, after the return of the colony to 
the Dutch, the legal term Vreemde Oosterlingen as stated 
in the Regulation of 1818 was rigidly applied to foreign 
Asians, particulalry Chinese, Arabs and Moors.
The civil status of a person living in the Dutch-East- 
Indies applied to his status as a civil servant of the 
VOC, vrijb urgh ers  (freeburghers), or v re e m d e lin g e n  
(foreigners). To be considered a freeburgher, a person should 
fit into one of the following categories:4
(a) those Portuguese who had been given permission to stay 
in the colony, being married and having given the oath in 
obedience to Dutch authority; (b) descendants of Portuguese 
from marriage with native women or liberated female 
slaves; (c) the Papangers (for further description see page 
37); (d) the Mardijkers (a further description on pages 36- 
37); (e) those civil servants of the VOC who, after their 
resignation, were unable to return to their country of origin 
due to their marriage to a non-European woman; (f) 
descendants of those in category (e); (g) colonists coming 
from other parts of the country; (h) the so-called smalle 
v r ijlie d e n  (lower class of free folk), or liberated 
Macassarese, Balinese and Ambonese slaves; (i) those 
natives who had received the vrijbrief, or letter granting 
them the status of free man. In reality the status of 
freeburgher afforded no privileges, although most of them
3 W.E. van Mastenbroek, De Historische Ontwikkeling van de 
Staatsrechtelijke Indeeling der Bevolking van Nederlandsch-lndies (1934. 
Wageningen: H. Veenman & Zonen), pp. 22-23.
4 Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-lndies, vol. Ill, pp. 422-423.
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were engaged in trade, especially those who made their 
living in Batavia.
The Dutch government did not discourage marriage 
between people of different ethnic origins. Consequently in 
subsequent years the various categories of freeburgher 
became mixed. As a result there were only two categories 
of freeburgher after 1832, namely the Europeesche burgers 
(European burghers) and the Inlandsche burgers (Native 
burghers). The latter were no more than a tusschenklasse 
(intermediate class), not European, yet considered as being 
above the common natives. The Inlandsche burger in Ambon 
and Menado was called in the local language Orang Borgor or 
Orang Bebas, meaning free man, whereas such a name was 
not found in Batavia.
Depending on their length of stay in the Indies, Europeans 
might be called blijvers  or trekkers . Blijver refers to a 
person who chose to spend his life in the Indies, while a 
trekker is someone who came to the Indies to work and 
later returned to their own country. Sometimes the term 
trekker was applied to those Chinese going back and forth to 
trade in the Indies.
During the first decade of the VOC's establishment in 
Batavia, the main feature dividing the settlements within 
the city walls (Intramuros) was the Ciliwung river; called 
the Groote Rivier (Great River) by the Dutch and the Kali 
Besar by the natives. Along the east bank of the Great 
River were located the large mansions of European 
residents, while the west bank was mostly occupied by 
Foreign Asiatics. However, prior to 1740 the Chinese might 
live anywhere in the city.
Those natives who were suspected by the VOC of having 
an attachment to Bantam and Mataram (as the war with both 
kingdoms continued) were not permitted to dwell within the 
city walls. They lived in kampongs on the outskirts of the 
city, in an area called the Ommelanden. As these natives did 
not originate from areas near to Batavia they established 
their own compounds administered by their own chieftains, 
who were later officially included within the colonial
16
administrative bureaucracy. A similar system of ruling 
members of ethnic groups through their own chieftains was 
also applied by the VOC to Foreign Asiatics in Batavia and in 
other important cities like Semarang and Makassar. The 
origins of this policy date back to the Hindu and Muslim 
kingdoms in the archipelago, and will be further discussed 
in chapter 2.
For present day Jakartanese, remnants of those native 
settlements are known only through the names of their 
kampongs, such as kampong Jawa, kampong Bali, kampong 
Melayu (Malay kampong), kampong Manggarai (people from 
the western part of Flores island), kampong Ambon, 
kampong Sasak (people from Lombok island), kampong Bugis 
and kampong Makassar. Previously these kampongs were 
situated in the area known as the Ommelanden but in the 
current Jakarta city map they are included in the city itself 
- either in East Jakarta (kampong Ambon, kampong Bali, 
kampong Melayu, kampong Manggarai, kampong Makassar) 
Central Jakarta (kampong Bugis, kampong Bali), West 
Jakarta (kampong Jawa, kampong Bandan/people from Banda 
island), and South Jakarta (kampong Sasak).
Other ethnic legacies may be found in traditional Betawi 
cookery such as the cakes and sweets that bear the name of 
ethnic groups, like kue bugis, bika ambon, pacar cina and 
guia jaw a.s Furthermore, it is interesting to note that 
among the Orang Betawfi themselves, the existence of non­
natives in former Batavia is marked by nicknames such as 
Arab-Pekojan, Blanda-Depok and Cina-Benteng, which are 
sometimes used derogatorily to refer to certain habits and 
characteristics. Pekojan in present West Jakarta was the 
former concentration of the Arabs; Depok, twenty miles 
from South Jakarta, was the former concentration of
5 Kue bugis, made of glutinous rice and coconut milk with coconut jam inside. 
The paste is steamed and wrapped in banana leaves. Bika ambon is made of 
sago flour, aren palm, sugar and coconut milk. The cake is baked and 
yellowish. Pacar cina are small colourful cubes made of glutinous rice, boiled 
and eaten with sweetened coconut milk and ice. Gula jawa is round shaped 
made of pure dark brown palm sugar.
6 For further description of Orang Betawij see pages 38-40.
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liberated slaves who later were granted equal status to the 
Dutch; Benteng7 refers to Tangerang, thirty miles from West 
Jakarta, the large settlement of the Indies-born peranakan 
Chinese.
Given that this thesis is concerned with the non-Western 
groups, the following description will focus on the Vreemde 
Oosterlingen  and the native communities, and will not 
extend to the Dutch or other Europeans. Moreover, as the 
specific focus is the Chinese, it is justified to give a rather 
lengthy sketch of those members of Batavian society.
The Vreemde Oosterlingen or Foreign Asiatics
The Foreign Asiatics in Batavia were comprised of the 
Chinese, Arabs, Japanese, Persians, Armenians, Moors, 
Bengalese, and a few others. Some of them had been coming 
to the Indies long before the Dutch founded the city. Indian 
influences had been very much absorbed by the time of the 
Hindu-Javanese kingdoms, as had Arab and Islamic 
influences during the pre-colonial Muslim sultanates in 
Sumatra, Java, Celebes (Sulawesi) and the eastern islands 
of the archipelago.
The Chinese. When the first Dutch fleet under the 
commander of Cornelis de Houtman landed on 13 November 
1596 at the small harbour of Jakarta, it found a kampong 
located on the east bank of the Ciliwung river which was 
inhabited by Chinese who cultivated rice and distilled arak. 
These Chinese had long been granted this piece of land by 
Pangeran Wijaya Krama, or the "Coninck van Jakarta" as the
7 Benteng was the earliest Dutch fort on the east bank of the Ciliwung river, 
located next to the oldest Chinese settlement. The natives of Batavia called 
these Chinese, Cina-Benteng, which when used by the present-day Orang 
Betawi refer to the old established peranakan Chinese on the outskirts of 
Jakarta, or Tangerang in particular. For the establishment of this Dutch fort, 
see J.A. van der Chijs, De Nederlanders te Jakatra (1860 . Amsterdam: 
Frederick Muller), p. 10, and for the Chinese settlem ent, see 
"Chronologisch Geschiedenis van Batavia, geschreven door een Chinees", 
Tijdschrift voor Neerlands Indie, vol. I, 1842, p. 62.
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Dutch called him, who ruled over a principality of the 
Bantam sultanate.
Close contact between the Chinese and the Indonesian 
kingdoms dated back to the mid-ninth century. The Chinese 
had settled in Java, establishing several important port- 
cities along the northern coast such as Gresik, Tuban and 
Surabaya.8 These pioneers belonged to the first generation 
of Chinese emigrants to the South Seas but as generation 
succeeded generation, inter-marriage led to new mixed- 
race Chinese generations born of native women. Many of 
those who had converted to Islam intermarried with the 
daughters of important princely families. The ruling elites 
of seaport towns in Java consisted of families with mixed 
blood, mostly Sino-Javanese and Indo-Javanese.9 The Malay 
Annals of Semarang and Cerbon note that the ancestors of 
Muslim rulers in Demak and Cheribon appear to be of Chinese 
origin.10
Much of the literature concerning the Chinese in Indonesia 
refers to the Indonesian-born Chinese as peranakan, yet it 
should be borne in mind that until the nineteenth century 
the term peranakan meant those Chinese who had converted 
to Islam, in other words, a peranakan  was a Chinese 
Muslim. Until 1828 this group was administered by their 
own chieftain, called kommandant der Parnakkan Chineezen. 
The position appears to have been occupied by a certain 
family of Tamien Dossol.11
8 W.P. Groeneveldt, "Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca, compiled 
from the Chinese Sources", Verhandelingen van Bataviasch Genootschap van 
Kunsten en Wetenschappen, vol. XXXIX, part I, 1880. pp. 41, 47-50.
9 H.J. de Graaf, Islamic States in Java 1500 - 1700  (1976. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff), p. 23.
10 M.C. Ricklefs, Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15th and 16th Centuries; 
the Malay Annals o f Semarang and Cerbon (1984 . Melbourne: Monash 
University), pp. 82, 125.
11 See Regeerings Almanak voor Nederlandsch-lndie 1817 -1830, and F. de 
Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. II, Platen Album (1935. Bandoeng: A.Nix & Co). Other 
writings on this peranakan Chinese Muslim, are D. Lombards, "Une 
Description de la ville de Semarang", p.264; H. Chambert-Loir, "Muhammad 
Bakir; a Batavian Scribe and Author in the Nineteenth Century", Review of 
Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, vol. 18, Summer 1984, pp. 49-50, 64; E.U. 
Kratz, "Hikayat Raja Pasai; a Second Manuscript", Journal o f the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, part I, 1989, pp. 1-2.
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The Chinese settlement in the principality of Jakarta was 
located on the east bank of the Ciliwung river, and 
apparently it was administered by its own chieftain, 
W atting.12 In January 1611, a contract was made between 
Jacques I'Hermite and Pangeran Ariawijaya Krama to 
purchase an area of land of 50 square 'vadem' (fathom) 
which was located near the Chinese settlement in Jakarta. 
The price agreed was 1,200 reals (about 3 ,000 guilders), 
after which the Dutch began to build a small factory at the 
mouth of the Ciliwung river. From this time onwards, Dutch 
penetration and domination was to become an undeniable 
part of the modern history of Indonesia and in the city of 
Batavia.
Before the first landing of the Dutch fleet in Bantam in 
June 1596, the Chinese had held a dominant position in the 
pepper trade and played a large role in the flourishing Asian 
market network in this region. While Jakarta at that time 
was small compared to Bantam, it still provided vegetables, 
pepper, sugar and rice. Jakarta was actually no more than a 
small port where the Dutch could stop for refreshment, in 
particular where ships' crews could buy the arak which was 
manufactured by the Chinese. In due course, especially after 
the VOC conquered the city in May 1619, Batavia grew to be 
a huge entrepot for VOC trading activities in the eastern 
hemisphere.
Having been in the Company's service since he was 
twenty-years old, the Governor-General, Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen (born in Hoorn in 1587) planned to establish a powerful 
Dutch colonial city in the East, as the Portuguese had done 
in Goa, Malacca and Macao. Coen, a man of insight and keen 
foresight, looked at the flourishing neighbouring port of 
Bantam: his wide experience of the East convinced him that 
the city's prosperity was partly due to the commerce and 
industry of the Chinese. However, Coen's idea of creating a 
colonial realm in the East was not encouraged by the Heeren
12 J.A. van der Chijs, op. cit, p. 10; B. Hoetink, "So Bing Kong; Het Eerste 
Hoofd der Chinnezen te Batavia, 1619 - 1636",Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land- 
en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-lndie,(hereafter BKI), vol 73, 1917, p. 
348; F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 10.
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Seventien [Gentlemen Seventeen], for his letters of request 
were left unanswered. He admitted that "daer is geen volck 
die ons beter dan Chineesen dienen11 [there is no other people 
who serves us better than the Chinese].13
Driven by his intention to establish Batavia, which many 
years later was gloriously known as the Koningin van het 
Oosten [Queen of the East], Coen persuaded the Chinese 
from Bantam and other neighbouring coastal areas such as 
Cheribon and Japara to move to the city. It has even been 
remarked that he ordered his army to kidnap Chinese.
As the city grew, the Chinese flowed into Batavia and 
were immediately engaged in commerce, market-gardening, 
rice-planting, fisheries, and also such as artisans, 
plumbers, carpenters, timbermen, woodcutters, shopowners. 
They were employed in the construction of houses and VOC 
offices, digging canals (grachten) and building ships. Some 
of them investigated the surrounding hinterland, the 
Ommelanden, and cultivated land for sugar plantations and 
arak-distilleries.
There were about three to four hundred Chinese in Batavia 
in October 1619. In July 1620 the number had grown to eight 
hundred. By 1621 there were 2,100 and in 1627, 3,500; but 
in 1629 the number was reduced to 2 ,000 . Numbers 
fluctuated due to the coming and going of junks.14
According to statistics in the Daghregister gehouden van 
't Casteel Batavia [Daily Records kept at the Castle of 
Batavia] which kept a record of the movement of vessels at 
Batavia, there was a notable increase in the number of 
Chinese in the period of 1719 to 1739. Hoetink noted that in 
1719 there were 4,068 Chinese in the inner city and 7,550  
Chinese living in the outskirts. By 1739 there were 4,368  
Chinese in the inner city, while 10,574 were settled in the 
Ommelanden, 15 Another scholar, L Blusse suggested a lower
13 Cited in J. Moerman, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Oost-lndie (1933 . 
Groningen: P.Nordhoff), p. 7, and F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 10.
14 B. Hoetink, "So Bing Kong; Het Eerste Hoofd der Chineezen", p. 350.
15 B. Hoetink, "Ni Hoe Kong; Kapitein der Chineezen te Batavia in 1740", 
BKI; vol. 74, 1918, p. 454.
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number, 4,199 Chinese in the inner city by 173916, a year 
before the notorious Chinese massacre of 1740.
As has been mentioned earlier, Chinese had been involved 
with the Indonesian archipelago for a long period of time, 
and from these first generation Chinese migrants there 
emerged the Indonesian-born Chinese, nowadays called 
peranakan. Because Chinese females did not migrate many 
Chinese male migrants married native women, preferably 
Balinese. This preference can probably be explained by the 
Balinese adherence to Hinduism, in which, unlike the 
Muslims, they are not hindered by restrictions on diet.
The first migration of Chinese was originally from 
Hokkien in the province of Fukien in South China, and landed 
in Java from the harbour-city of Amoy. The migrants spoke 
Hokkien dialect, and their language, customs and cultural 
traditions have over time become mixed with native local 
traditions. Hokkien influence on Betawi culture may be 
identified in 'Bahasa Betawi1 (mother language of the 
Jakartanese) especially the words concerned with food and 
local dishes.17 Aspects of Hokkien culture can, to some 
extent, still be recognized in peranakan culture in Java.
Other emigrants came from the Kwantung province (called 
Hakka), from Canton (called Punti), the Hoklo from Swatow, 
the Haifoeng from Hainan island (called Hai-lam) and from 
Formosa. The Hokkien of Fukien province came originally 
from either the western part (they were called Tjiang- 
tjsioe) or from the northern part (called Tsoen-tsjioe) of 
the region. The Hakka, who came from Kwantung, landed and 
settled on the west coast of Borneo (Kalimantan) and in 
Sumatra. The Punti, who were a minority, settled in the 
Kwitang area of Batavia (now Central Jakarta) and became 
known as timbermen and furniture makers. The Hoklo, who 
came from Swatow, went to West Borneo, Riau and Deli on 
the east coast of Sumatra, as did the Haifoeng and the Hai-
16 L. Blusse, Strange Company. Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the 
Dutch in VOC Batavia (1986. Dordrecht: Foris Publications), p. 83.
17Phillip Leo, Chinese Loanwords spoken by the Inhabitants o f the City of 
Jakarta (1973. Jakarta: LRKN-LIPI).
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lam. The Chinese from Formosa migrated via Hoenan and 
worked in the Indies as teachers in Chinese schools.
The fact that the Chinese migrants came from the 
southern provinces of China and that they originated from 
different areas and spoke different dialects was reflected 
in the diverse effects of their cultures within Indonesian- 
Chinese society.
Subsequent generations of Chinese migrants were mostly 
concentrated in the Outer Islands, such as Sumatra and 
Borneo. As they came in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, these Chinese were fittingly called singkeh  
which means new visitor or guest in the Hokkien dialect. In 
contrast with the early generations of Chinese emigrants 
who independently found occupations in the Indies, these 
later generations (who were coming up until the 1930's) 
were mostly bound by contract to large-scale agricultural 
enterprises in Sumatra and mining in Borneo. They provided 
abundant manpower for tobacco and rubber plantations in 
Deli and Riau, mining in Bangka-Biliton and on the west 
coast of Borneo. Those areas saw a big concentration of 
singkeh, especially in West-Borneo (Pontianak, Singkawang, 
Sambas, Landak, Mapawa and Montrado).
The Chinese population in Indonesia therefore comprised 
two groups - the singkeh and the peranakan. The singkeh or 
the totok represented the larger group, and settled in the 
Outer Islands, whereas the majority of the smaller 
peranakan group lived in Java.
Both groups are easily distinguished. The peranakan no 
longer speaks Chinese and has been absorbed into the 
Indonesian way of living. The peranakan in the Dutch East 
Indies in the early twentieth century tended to be Western 
instead of Chinese-oriented. Many of them had been 
educated in Dutch schools.
The Chinese of Batavia played a very significant role in 
the development of the city as they were closely involved in 
the VOC's economic activities, both in internal and external 
trade. They performed a service for the city as skilled 
labourers, artisans and as market-gardeners to supply the
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needs of the VOC; indeed all agriculture around Batavia 
depended upon the Chinese.18
Even though they were the only group in the population at 
that time who had to the pay poll tax (hoofdgeld) for their 
residence in Batavia, the position of the Chinese in trade 
and commerce was still rather privileged. There were 
complaints from 270 burghers in 1647 and in 1652 saying 
that the Batavian government favoured the Chinese over 
them. With the monopolistic practices of the VOC, the 
freeburghers1 trade became increasingly restricted, by 
contrast the Chinese were free to trade through their intra­
archipelago and overseas networks which reached as far as 
China and Japan.19
As early as October 1620, the Chinese of Batavia were 
liable for the poll tax, the administration of which was 
under their own captain. Such arrangements had been in 
place since the initial assignment of the first Chinese 
captain of Batavia, Souw Beng Kong (Bencon to the Dutch) in 
October 1619. The poll tax was to be paid monthly to the 
Chinese captain at his house. The last day of payment, 
usually the first day of every month of the Roman calendar, 
was marked by hoisting a flag at the front of the Chinese 
captain's residence.20 After the post of Chinese wardmaster 
[ Chineesche wijkmeester] was set up in 1685, the Chinese 
inhabitants paid their poll tax to the wardmaster. As they 
were no longer required to pay the poll tax directly to the 
captain, the Chinese were obliged to appear for an audience 
at his house once a year.
Not only did the Chinese dominate trade and commerce but 
they also proved economically beneficial to the VOC through 
taxes and leases, revenue-farming or pachten. Details on 
the practice of pachten  will be given in Chapter 6. It is 
fair to say that Batavia from 1619 to 1740 was,
18J.L. Cobban, "The City in Java; an Essay in Historical Geography" (1975. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Berkeley), p. 93.
19 L. Blusse, Strange Company, p. 83.
20 The natives of Batavia called the neighbourhood of the Chinese captain's 
residence Kampong Tiang Bendera (Hoisting Flag compound), presumably 
referring to such custom.
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economically speaking, a Chinese colonial town under the 
Dutch protection.21
After a rather glow description of life in the city of 
Batavia, Francois Valentijn in his famous traveller account, 
Oud en Nieuw Oost-lndie, concluded that "...if there were no 
Chinese here, Batavia would be very dead and deprived of 
many necessities ...n.22
The growth of the city attracted still more Chinese; not 
only were there vast numbers of them within the city walls 
( binnen s ta d , Intram uros), but they also grew 
overwhelmingly in the outskirts ( Ommelanden). The peace 
treaty with Bantam in 1683, the opening of the Ommelanden 
and the rapid development of sugar cultivation in the area 
meant that more manpower was needed and this increased 
the number of Chinese migrants even further. Although the 
VOC government tried to check these migrants by setting 
quotas for passenger transport, this just led the skippers to 
bribe the port officials. In order to avoid registration at the 
captain's house, they landed at the Thousand Islands - 
located in the bay of Batavia - or in other places beyond 
government control along the northern coast.
These unregistered migrants were undoubtedly illegal 
workers, and because of this situation often found 
themselves at the mercy of the Chinese potchias (owners 
of sugar mills by lease). By 1710 there were 130 sugar 
mills belonging to 84 entrepreneurs, 79 owned by the 
Chinese. The potchias or lease-holders of sugar mills were 
obliged to pay the poll tax to the Chinese captain on the 
personnel they employed; but as the captain's domicile was 
a great distance from the Ommelanden areas, it is not hard 
to see why many did not properly fulfil this obligation. In 
addition, even though in 1715 the O m m elanden  was 
administered through a commissioner for Native Affairs [De 
Commissaris tot en onder de Zaken van Inlanders], whose
21 L. Blusse, Strange Company, particularly chapter V.
22 Cited by J.L. Cobban, "The City of Java; an Essay", p. 93; and S. 
Abeyasekere, Jakarta; a History (1989. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press), p. 24.
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function was to keep in touch with the headmen who lived in 
the kampongs or villages, this commissioner was not 
responsible for the Chinese dwelling in the same areas.
In many ways, neither the VOC nor the Chinese captain 
was able to provide a reasonable degree of supervision over 
those Chinese living in the Ommelanden. The Dutch sheriff, 
who did not exert sufficient control in the distant regions, 
could easily fall into corrupt ways, with potchias offering 
bribes that would be to the satisfaction of both parties.
The situation grew worse as the collapse of sugar on the 
European market meant that it was no longer a profit- 
making commodity. The closure of many sugar mills 
resulted in many jobless, uncontrolled, Chinese in the 
Ommelanden, soon fell into banditry, vagabondism and other 
illegal activities. In order to overcome the worst of this, 
Gustaaf Willem Baron van Imhoff, a member of the Council 
of the Indies [Raad van lndie]f who had previously been 
Governor of Ceylon, issued an edict on 25 July 1740  
requiring all Chinese to hold a resident's permit 
( p e rm is s ie b r ie fje ). Any Chinese found not to be in 
possession of such a permit would be deported to Ceylon. 
Rumours spread that, while en route to Ceylon, these 
deportees were being thrown overboard; this so alarmed the 
Chinese that they began to arm themselves. When some 
Chinese outlaws from surrounding areas forced an entry 
into the inner city, Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier 
(17 39 -1 7 4 1 ) issued orders to arrest suspicious Chinese, 
and the growing tension then led to riots, followed by 
massacres on 8-10 October 1740. Afraid of any intrigue or 
conspiracy against their authority, as had happened in 
December 1721 when a plot led by Pieter Erberveldt23 had 
been discovered, the VOC took severe action against any 
disturbance.
The outbreak of the Chinese riots in 1740 put paid to the 
prestige of the Chinese captainship. Ni Hoe Kong, the captain
23 P. Erberveldt was a mestizo, whose father was a German shoemaker. He 
was alleged to have plotted with the Chinese and natives of Bantam, Cirebon, 
Bali and Kartasura to overthrow the VOC in Batavia. He was severely punished 
before being beheaded and his skull hung at the city gate.
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who had held the office since September 1736, had to pay 
for the actions of his people. He was arrested on 9 October 
1740 and imprisoned in the castle. It proved rather difficult 
to discover his part in the Chinese riots - though he might 
take responsibility - for the original documents from his 
trial have never been discovered.24 Ni Hoe Kong was later 
exiled to Amboina in the Mollucas, where he died.
Thus for three years the post of Chinese captain was 
vacant, and the VOC set up a Committee for the incoming 
Chinese [Gecommitteerde over de aankomende Chineezen], 
consisting of a Chinese captain of Cheribon, a Chinese 
merchant from Semarang and a European, probably of 
mestizo blood, Henry Abbit. After the position of Chinese 
captain of Batavia was reinstituted, Lim Beengko was 
appointed on 25 June 1743.
The Chinese riots of 1740 were caused by various factors, 
such as unemployment, closure of sugar mills, excessive 
numbers of Chinese, crime and the impotency of the Chinese 
captainship. Ni Hoe Kong was not the only person to blame. 
It was said that there was a personal feud between the two 
key persons in this case, Gustaaf Willem Baron van Imhoff, 
a powerful member of the Council of the Indies, and Adriaan 
Valckenier, the Governor-General. In the Indies colonial 
administration, the key decisions lay in the hands of the 
High Government [Hooge Regeering], which comprised 
members of the Council of the Indies and the Governor- 
General, who was also a member of the Council. However, 
members of the Council of the Indies divided into groups 
which sometimes involved the Governor-General. The feud 
between Van Imhoff and Valckenier can be said to have 
started on the election of Abraham Patras (17 35 -17 37 ), 
Valckenier's predecessor as governor-general. Patras was 
old for such a high position - he first came to the East as a 
soldier in 1690 - yet it was due to Van Imhoff's strong 
opposition that Valckenier lost the nomination at this
24 B. Hoetink, "Ni Hoe Kong, Kapitein der Chineezen", p. 463.
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time.25 The fact that Valckenier subsequently achieved the 
office did not erase the tension between these two Dutch 
officials. The feud continued when Van Imhoff was sent to 
Batavia - he was a former governor of Ceylon - to restore 
VOC fortunes in the Indies. The books for 1683 to 1710  
show that the company faced serious financial problems, 
for out of 23 offices in Asia, only three showed profits. 
Ambon, Banda, Ternate, Makassar, Bantam, Cirebon and the 
northern coastal posts of Java were not included in the 
profitable offices.26 Van Imhoff's arrival in Batavia would 
surely not have been welcomed by Valckenier. Van Imhoff 
placed the entire blame for the 1740 Chinese massacre on 
Valckenier, saying that his policy against the Chinese had 
not prevented the plunder in Batavia. But as the man 
occupying the highest position in the Indies, Valckenier was 
able to arrest Van Imhoff and send him back to Holland 
under military escort. In their ignorance of these events, 
the Gentlemen Seventeen, in the meantime, appointed Van 
Imhoff as the next governor-general. So as soon as he 
arrived in Holland, Van Imhoff was promptly sent back to 
Batavia. Learning of Van Imhoff's appointment in 1741, 
Valckenier gave in his resignation and sailed home. 
Johannes Thedens took over, ad interim , the office of 
Governor-General in Batavia.
In May 1741, Van Imhoff arrived back in Batavia, and 
after receiving the office from J. Thedens he immediately 
sent an order to the Cape of Good Hope to arrest Valckenier. 
Valckenier was brought back to Batavia and in November 
1742 he was put in jail until his last days. A trial, which 
was manipulated by the vindictive Van Imhoff,27 sentenced
25 E.S. de Klerck, History of the Netherlands East Indies (1938. Rotterdam: 
W.L. & J. Brusse), vol. I, p. 363.
26 M.C. Ricklefs, A History o f Modern Indonesia (1981 . London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd.), p.83.
27 He was called " .... de drijver, die haar tot de goede opwerkte en aanvuurde
 " [the driver, who worked out and stimulated it to his own advantage]; see
W. van Hoevell, "Batavia in 1740", Tijdschrift voor Neerlands Indie 
(hereafter, TNI) vol. I, 1840, p. 532. In "Chronologische Geschiedenis van 
Batavia geschreven door een Chinees" he was indeed the immoral hero of these 
disturbed times ["... hij was inderdaad de onzedelijkste held van deze 
onrustige tijden ... "], TNI, op. c it , p. 78.
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Valckenier to death, but he managed to avoid such a severe 
punishment by appealing to Holland.
The Chinese riots of 1740 also had repercussions for 
internal feud which was taking place within the royal court 
of Mataram. Indeed this dispute lasted until the division of 
the Mataram kingdom in 1755. The king of Mataram, who 
took the title Sunan Paku Buwana II (1 7 2 6 -1 7 49 ) was a 
rather meek personality dominated by his mother. He was 
much upset that the Dutch failed to inform him of the 
activities of the Batavian Chinese. In fact, being driven out 
of the city, the Batavian Chinese fled to Bantam and Central 
Java, seeking assistance. In Bantam they were refused. 
Indeed the Sultan of Bantam sent 3 ,000  of his men to 
prevent the Chinese entering his kingdom. But in Central 
Java they attacked Japara and occupied Semarang. In the 
meantime, no consensus had been achieved among the royal 
adm inistrators. The p a t ih  [ch ief adm in istrator], 
Natakusumah, who very much disliked the Dutch, proposed to 
help the Chinese. Other adipatis [lords of coastal Java] 
wanted to be rid of Mataram’s domination. Because of the 
various treaties between Mataram and the VOC, which 
allowed the Company trading rights, the lords of coastal 
Java preferred to be directly under Dutch rule. As no clear 
decision was forthcoming whether to assist the Dutch or 
side with the Chinese rioters, some of the princes, who 
fished in troubled waters, informed the Dutch about 
Natakusumah’s secret mission to assist the Chinese in 
Semarang. By doing so they hoped to win the Company’s 
favour. The Dutch seized the Chinese in Semarang, and Paku 
Buwana II sent for his patih Natakusumah, to be arrested. He 
was then sent into exile in Ceylon by the Dutch.
Nevertheless, the weakness of Paku Buwana II earned him 
great contempt from his regional lords. Their strong wish to 
be released from Mataram’s authority drove them into 
rebellion. In the meantime, Raden Mas Garendi, grandson of 
Amangkurat III (1703-1708), claimed the throne, and with 
the Chinese as allies, attacked the court, putting Paku 
Buwana II to flight. With the help of the Dutch, Paku Buwana
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II was able to gain his throne, and Mas Garendi was arrested 
in 1743; the Sino-Javanese rebellion collapsed. Yet this did 
not mean the end of internal disputes in the Mataram 
kingdom. Dissatisfied parties continued their opposition, 
leading to a series of rebellions which ended with the 
division of the kingdom into the Yogya and Solo courts in 
17 5 5 .2 8
To prevent any further Chinese insurrections, the VOC 
regime issued a regulation that after October 1740 Chinese 
were no longer permitted to live within the city walls, and 
that they should be settled in an outside area, called 
Diestpoort. This was in the area of Jakarta now known as 
Glodok. They were confined to this Chinese quarter until 
1911. One reminder of the black days of 1740 for the 
present day Chinese of Jakarta is in the name Ang-kee (red 
river), which refers to the blood that flowed along this 
river during the massacre.29
After the 1740 riot the population of Chinese in Batavia 
fell: there were only 3,431 person, of whom 1,442 were 
traders or merchants, 935 were agriculturists, market- 
gardeners or ran arak-distilleries, another 728 were sugar- 
millers and wood-cutters, whilst 326 worked as artisans. 
However, the loss of Chinese labour meant a setback for the 
VOC's economic activities, particularly in the city. By 1741 
the VOC was no longer discouraging the arrival of fresh 
Chinese immigrants, an abundance of whom immediately 
restored the economic success of the city and its outlying 
areas.
Due to its rapid physical growth, the city, in the course of 
time, deteriorated. With an unpleasant climate and lack of 
fresh water, diseases spread frighteningly. The canals were 
no longer able to accomodate transport and sewage brought 
pollution to the surrounding areas. The city walls could not 
prevent a growing population which needed ever more living
28 For an extensive study of the division of Mataram, see M.C. Ricklefs, 
Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749- 1 792. A History of the Division 
of Java (1974. London: Oxford University Press).
29 J. Moerman, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Oost-lndie, p.8.
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space and shelter. The effort to dig the Mookervaart canal to 
better regulate the water-supply to the city in fact brought 
illness and death to the m odder-Javanen  (the Javanese 
navvies employed here) and to the population of the 
kampongs in the neighbourhood. The sudden increase in 
mortality transformed the 'Queen of the East1 into the 
'Graveyard of the East'.
The decay of Intramuros had been taking place since the 
1730's, yet the decision to move to Weltevreden was not 
put into effect until 1800, by Governor-General Pieter 
Gerardus van Overstraten. It seemed that seventy years 
were needed to calculate the feasibility of moving the 
centre of power to Semarang or Surabaya. Or the delay could 
have been due to the miserable condition of the bankrupt 
Company.
In fact, the outside areas, Molenvliet and W eltevreden , 
which were located near the city walls, had been developing 
into more agreeable living districts for VOC officials, 
where they built huge mansions and country-houses. 
Therefore when the colonial government left Intramuros in 
the early nineteenth century, a new era of Dutch 
administration began. This was the epoch of Netherlands 
Indies' rule, in which the colony was administered by a true 
government, and not by a commercial trading enterprise as 
was the VOC, which was liquidated on 1 January 1800.
The Chinese, in common with many other inhabitants of 
Batavia, quickly adapted themselves to the growing city. 
Some continued to live in and develop the rural surroundings 
of Batavia, Tangerang in the west, and Cibinong to the south. 
While many remained concentrated around the Chinese 
quarter, others moved to Molenvliet, Tanah Abang, Senen, 
Pasar Baru and Meester Cornelis. They became more urban- 
oriented and carried on their occupations in commerce and 
the retail trade. They opened shops along the main road, 
Groote Zuider Weg (great southern way) from Senen to 
Meester Cornelis and also at Pasar Baru, which was later 
called de nieuwe Chineesche winkelbuurt (the new Chinese 
shopping neighbourhood).
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In the early twentieth century, the young generation of 
Chinese who had obtained a better education than their 
parents, or some Western schooling, emerged as a new elite, 
together with the new Indonesian elites. They entered new 
fields of occupation, being more interested in professions.30 
Many of them became politicians, others doctors, lawyers, 
journalists, teachers, nurses, or clerks, cashiers, bank- 
employees, secretaries and the like.
The Moors and the Arabs. These groups actually had 
different origins; they are placed together here merely 
because they were Muslim.
The Moors were originally Indian Muslims from Kalinga, a 
region of northern Paliacate, situated on the Coromonadel 
coast. They settled in Batavia in the area of Pekojan ( koja 
or choja means black Muslim) which was later inhabited by 
the Arabs. The Moors had a very strong Islamic identity, 
wearing long robes and having their own mosque, known as 
Mesjid Pekojan in the downtown area of present day 
Jakarta. They were engaged in the coastal trade together 
with the Arabs. In contrast with other non-Christian 
inhabitants of Batavia, the VOC allowed the Moors to form 
their own schutterij (civic guard) of freeburghers in 1751, 
their request having been originally forwarded in 1704. The 
first Moorish captain was appointed in 1753. This is said to 
be of great economic advantage to the Moors.31
Although by the early twentieth century, the Arabs 
formed the second largest group of Foreign Asiatics in 
Indonesia, sources concerning their origins and life are 
rather scarce, compared to those on the Chinese. For 
whatever reason, Arab communities are under-represented 
in the study of Indonesian society.
The growth of the Arab community in Indonesia was 
largely due to natural increase rather than immigration. It 
is said that ninety percent of the present Indonesian-Arab
30 This will be discussed in Chapter 5.
31 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, p. 378.
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or Indo-Arab or peranakan Arab population, have been either 
born and/or raised in the archipelago.32
The Arabs emerged as a group living in Batavia mainly in 
the mid-nineteenth century, yet their influence is strongly 
expressed in the culture of Kaum Betawi nowadays.33 They 
became concentrated in the areas of Krukut, Pekojan, Tanah 
Abang, Kwitang, Cawang and Meester Cornelis or Jatinegara. 
Most of those who came to Indonesia came from the 
Hadramaut part of southern Arabia, the majority of them 
from the masikin class in Hadramaut, groups of common 
folk which included itinerant traders. It may be noted that 
the word masikin probably found its way into the Indonesian 
language as m is k in , meaning poor, small, or of no 
significance.34 However, some claimed to be Sayyids  
(descendants of the Prophet) and others Syech (scholars of 
the religious nobility of Hadramaut), and were highly 
honoured by the Arabs themselves as well as by the 
Indonesians.35
Yet a popular differentiation was made by the natives, 
especially among the Orang Betawi, whose daily close 
encounters taught them how to distinguish forang Arab1 (the 
Arab) and 'orang Hadramaut1 (the Hadramaut). As a simple 
native of Cawang (now East-Jakarta) said: "de orang Arab, 
mijnheer, dienen wij te eeren, daar zij afkomstig zijn van 
het land van onzen Pro feet en hun ilmoe daardoor grooter is 
"[the Arab, sir, served to be respected as his origin was 
from the land of our Prophet, and his knowledge, therefore 
is greater] but: "een orang Hadramaut lang niet hetzelfde als 
een orang Arab en zeker niet als een Sayyid" [a Hadramaut, 
not nearly as an Arab was and certainly not as a Sayyid
32 J.M. van der Kroef, "The Arab Minority", in Indonesian in the Modern 
World (1954. Bandung: Masa Baru), part I, p. 250.
33 Pauline D. Milone, "Queen City of the East; the Metamorphosis of a Colonial 
Capital" (1966. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, 
Berkeley), pp. 211-212, gives no further explanation of the origins of the 
name Kaum Betawi. Actually it derived from a political association called 
Sarekat Kaum Betawi, founded by M.H. Thamrin in May 1923.
34 J.M. van der Kroef, "The Arab Minority", p. 255.
35 Pauline D. Milone, op. cit, p. 212.
33
w as].36 This distinction probably derived from a gradually 
developing pattern of social discrimination, which 
differentiated between those Arabs whose predatory 
trading methods and rapacious money lending activities had 
led to their unpopularity in many an Indonesian village, and 
those who did not engage in such sharp practices but were 
revered as Muslim teachers and scholars, and were thus 
more truly representative of the traditionally respected 
'orang Arab1.37
Apart from money lending, many Arabs were involved in 
batik trading and house rental. Although there were two 
obstacles to their money lending activities, the prohibition 
on 'riba' (interest) defined in the Quran, and Dutch 
government rulings against usury, the Arabs usually 
managed to find suitable ways to evade both.38
The Japanese. The Japanese involvement with the Dutch 
probably started in 1612, with their being employed as 
soldiers, serving in the VOC army or working on board ship. 
It was not uncommon for Japanese soldiers to be in service 
with British, Portuguese or Spanish companies as well, 
armed with bows and arrows.39 After resigning from the 
VOC service, many Japanese found other occupations and 
settled in Batavia. They formed a group of Japanese 
burghers in 1620. F. de Haan noted a kapitein der Japanners 
[captain of the Japanese] already in position in 1616 .40 
There were 130 Japanese burghers living in Batavia in 
1623, although nine years later their number had fallen to 
8 3 .41 A large number converted to Christianity and took 
Dutch-Christian first names,42 such as Michiel, Abraham,
36 See B.Th. Brondgeest, "Een Zonderlinge Appreciatie de Hadramieten bij een 
Deel de Bataviaasche Bevolking", Djawa, vol. II, 1927, p. 117.
37 J.M. van der Kroef, "The Arab Minority", pp. 255-256.
3 8 ibid.
39 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 376.
40 Ibid.
41 Seiichi Iwao, "Japanese Emigrants in Batavia during the 17th Century", 
Acta Asiatica, no. 16, March 1970, p. 6.
42 Several examples on these Japanese-Christians were recorded in the
Daimia archives in Japan. Those were encouraged to convert Christianity in
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Jeronimo, Jan, Simon and the like. Some of them held 
contract-leases on taxes, others engaged in sea trading or 
were involved in house-leasing for profit. In many cases 
they bought and rented houses for their own residence.
Most of the Japanese migrants in Batavia resided along 
the Tijgersgracht and Heerengracht, on the eastern bank of 
the Great River, Ciliwung. Others had houses at the 
Malaccastraat and Jonkerstraat, situated on the west bank 
of the river. Although the Batavia Government operated a 
segregation policy, dividing the areas of residence for its 
inhabitants, this did not completely apply to the foreigners, 
the Japanese and the Chinese. The Japanese, being 
freeburghers, probably found no hindrance in this case. It 
was said that before 1740 the Chinese resided anywhere: 
"zij bewoonen overal in de stad de beste plaatzen" [they 
occupy the best places in the town].43 Very little material 
exists regarding the residential segregation of the Moors 
and Arabs, except that they preferred to live on the west 
bank of the Ciliwung, closer to the natives kampongs.
As a freeburgher, a Christian Japanese could ascend the 
social scale much as a European would. A notable example 
was Simon Simonsz van der Heijden from Hirado, a full 
blood Japanese, who strangely adopted a Dutch name. This 
name was probably derived from his personal achievements 
during his service to the Company, in which he worked his 
way up from licensed master, shahbandar [harbour-master] 
to opperkoopman [upper-merchant], or in the highest 
position in the VOC social strata in the Indies. He was also 
involved as Diaconie [Deacon], Ouderling [Eldership], Boedel- 
en Weesmeester [Board of Property and Orphanage]. He died 
in 1673 as burgerkoopman [civil merchant].
A typical phenomenon in the social order of colonial 
Batavia, especially among the rich burghers (European,
order to have the knowledge or secrets of firearms manufacture from the 
Western, see C.R. Boxer, "Note on Early European Military Influence in 
Japan, 1543-1813" in Dutch Merchants and Mariners in Asia, 1602-1795  
(1988 . London: Vartorium Reprints), p. 70. For those who settled in 
Batavia, becoming a Christian would legally receive better status than the 
non-Christians.
43 F. Valentijn, cited by F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, p. 382.
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Foreign Asiatics) or even the native chiefs, was to have a 
number of slaves in the household. The number of slaves 
held by the Japanese, compared with Europeans or native 
chiefs, was by no means slight. Michiel Murakami 
Buzayemen from Nagasaki had thirty-three slaves, Jeronimo 
Marino Haru kept seventeen, while twelve were in the 
possession of Isabella from Nagasaki.44
As with many of the other inhabitants of Batavia, inter­
racial marriage with natives, foreigners and Europeans, 
mostly Dutch, was not unusual for the Japanese. The Batavia 
civil registry of 1618-1659  shows that 106 marriages 
were entered into by Japanese - 73 male and 33 female. 
Eighty-four of these were mixed marriages, the remaining 
22 being among the Japanese migrants themselves. Thirty- 
two of the people who registered their marriages were born 
in Nagasaki, fifteen were from Hirado, while the others 
were from various parts of Japan.45
The Japanese presence in Batavia during the VOC period 
was rather a short one, probably due to the Shogunate policy 
of exclusion in 1635, which closed Japan from contact with 
foreigners. In June 1636 the Shogun decreed that all 
Japanese residing overseas were barred from re-entering 
Japan, and, three years later, in June 1639, another decree 
banished all those Japanese women who had borne children 
of Dutch or Englishmen to Batavia with their offspring.46 
Although the policy of exclusion resulted in a rapid decline 
of Japanese towns and settlements in many parts of Asia, a 
different situation was experienced in Batavia. Since most 
of the Japanese were freeburghers and, economically 
speaking, not dependent on their native country, the policy 
of exclusion served to stabilize and promote their social 
activities overseas. Indeed the years 1625-1697 were the 
most successful period for Japanese migrant society in 
B atav ia .47 Records of the burial in 1735 of Abraham
44 Seiichi Iwao, op. c/'t., p. 9.
45 Ibid., pp. 2, 20.
46 L. Blusse, Strange Company, p. 185.
47 Seiichi Iwao, op. cit, p. 19.
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Schermon, a descendant of a Christian-Japanese captain, 
Itsemon or Michiel Eijtemono, should be noted, for they 
reveal the last traces of Japanese settlement in Batavia. 
Dutch records after the eighteenth century scarcely mention 
them.
The Mardijkers, G.E. Rumphius, the seventeenth century 
German naturalist who laid the foundations of Dutch 
knowledge of the East Indies, noted that the Mardijkers 
were foreign inhabitants of Batavia. The name originated 
from the Sanskrit, m ahardhika , 48 which later became 
m ardika , expressing that they were free men ( m ardika  
means free) not slaves.
There is an area in present day North Jakarta called Tanah 
Merdeka which in the Indonesian language means land of the 
free; this is the area that was formerly granted by the 
Company exclusively for the use of the Mardijkers. When 
Coen brought additional forces from the Mollucas to break 
the joint attack by the English and Pangeran Wijaya Kramafs 
troops in 1619, there were among them the so-called 
'swarten Christeneri49 (black Christians). These people were 
the product of previous Portuguese contacts in the eastern 
islands of the archipelago; the term Mardijkers was often 
mentioned in Ambon and Ternate after 1616. Thus the 
Batavia Mardijkers spoke neither a native language nor the 
Dutch, but Portuguese. They also distinguished themselves, 
particularly from the indigenous inhabitants, as they were 
Christians, not slaves, and through their European style of 
dress - wearing hats, shoes and socks. It is interesting to 
note how the Mardijkers adopted either Portuguese or Dutch 
names, as they were previously freed slaves from Bengal, 
Arakan, Malabar or the Coromandel coast. Portuguese names 
were usually adopted in remembrance of a godfather when 
they were baptized, from which the names of Pareira, da 
Costa and others came. Dutch names were taken from a 
sponsor of christening: for instance, a certain Pieter from
48 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, p. 392.
49 Ibid., p. 404.
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Malabar converted to Christianity and having been freed 
with a Jan Willems as his sponsor, was therefore called 
'Pieter Willems', receiving the status of burgher. His wife, 
Maria van de Cust, meaning she was from Malabar, changed 
her name to Maria Pieters.50 Therefore it was not surprising 
to find many Dutch names in the marriage registers of the 
Portuguese Reformed Church in Batavia, even though their 
owners had not a drop of Dutch blood or spoke Dutch. For 
example, the above-mentioned Pieter Willems signed his 
notarial papers in Tamil characters.51
As Christians, the Mardijker had more privileges than 
non-Christians. As an example of such discrimination, a 
regulation of 1642 said that payment for a non-Christian 
who was to be sold as a slave due to debt should be less 
than the amount of the debt. Although this ridiculous law 
was abolished in 1766, it was re-issued in 1778. And after 
1770 Christians who were in debt were no longer put in 
handcuffs, or subjected to chained punishment at all after 
1773. Even in prison Christians received better food than 
n o n -C h ris tia n s .52 Owing to his privileged status, a 
Mardijker burgher could achieve a social prestige which 
surpassed the European. This was the story of Augustijn 
Michiels who was known as 'de laatste der Mardijkers’ [the 
last of the Mardijkers] and as the richest landowner in 
Java .53 From a father who was a Portuguese hawker, 
Augustijn Michiels managed to build a fortune as a 
landowner in many areas of Batavia and Buitenzorg where 
his famous Indies mansion, Tjitrap,54 was located. He owned 
117 slaves, 48 free servants, 24 stable boys, 28 grass- 
cutters, 20 persons working in the bakery, one smith and
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 405.
52 Ibid., p. 413.
53 F. de Haan, "De Laatste der Mardijkers", BKI, vol. 73, 1917, p. 225; for 
his exuberant life-style, see also Mona Lohanda, "Majoor Jantje and the 
Indisch Element of the Betawi Folkmusic", The Dutch-lndonesian Historical 
Conference, June 1980 (1982 . Leiden-Jakarta: Indonesian Studies 
Programme), pp. 378-392.
54 V.l. van der Wall, Indische Landhuizen en Hun Geschiedenis (1932. 
Batavia: G. Kolff & Co).
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one saddle-maker, four ronggeng  dancers, two topeng  
dancers and two gamelan  orchestra players. Augustijn 
Michiels was also 'kapitein der Papangers' [captain of the 
Papangers company] in the VOC army, and after 20 years in 
service he asked for retirement in September 1807. He was 
granted the honorary rank of major in the Papangers 
company. No one was appointed after him to the position, 
and he died in January 1833.
The Papangers probably came from the Papango region, 
one of the richest provinces in the island of Luzon in the 
Philippines, located close to the bay of Manila.55 They were 
renowned as brave soldiers, serving in the Spanish army 
after the conquest of Pampango in 1752, and their presence 
in the Moluccas dated back to 1613. From the outset, all 
Asian soldiers of the Spanish and Portuguese armies were 
taken as prisoners of war by the Dutch company, when the 
European powers were rivals in the region. It is said that in 
1633 there was the first Papanger in Batavia.56 After being 
in military service for many years in the VOC, they were 
freed and received civil status as burghers.
The Mestizo. There was a clear distinction between the 
Mestizo and the Mardijkers, based on their origins. The 
Mestizo, more or less, had European blood, while the 
Mardijkers were purely Asian born, though both were 
Christian.
In the final quarter of the eighteenth century, the name 
Mardijkers was no longer commonly encountered in the daily 
life of Batavia, it was now the Mestizo, whose culture 
displayed a mixture of life-styles in the Asian colonial 
city, a mixture in which the European was combined with 
many indigenous elements. This was the Mndisch culture*57 -
55 John Crawfurd, A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Archipelago & 
Adjacent Countries (1971. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. First 
published in 1856. London), p. 324.
56 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 399.
57 See J.G. Taylor, The Social World o f Batavia; European and Eurasian in 
Dutch Asia (1983. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press) and Pauline 
D. Milone, "Indisch Culture and Its Relationship to Urban Life", Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, no. IX, July 1967, pp.407-426.
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neither pure European nor pure Indonesian - which continued 
throughout the next two centuries until independence.
As far as civil rights were concerned, it is important to 
note that the Mestizo suffered a certain amount of social 
discrimination. If the widow of a Dutch civil servant 
applied for a pension, she was questioned on the colour of 
her skin: fair, light or black complexion. The more pigment 
she had, the less payment she would receive.58 In charity- 
houses, it is said that the European obtained better 
treatment than the Mestizo, while the Mardijkers got even 
less.
However, there were some notable Mestizos in the history 
of Batavia, such as the notorious Pieter Erberveldt for his 
conspiracy in December 1721, and Andries Teissiere, a 
leading member of the Batavia Association for Art and 
Science [Bataviaasch Gennootschap van Kunsten en 
W e te n s c h a p p e n ] who wrote several articles on the 
Ommelanden of Batavia when he became a land surveyor and 
opened sugar farms there. Another famous Mestizo of 
Batavia was Frederick Ribald, who died in 1695, formerly a 
chief surgeon in the Company service, who then became a 
rich burgher. The land on which he lived in the old part of 
the city, now in West Jakarta, was known as gang Ribal 
(Ribald passage) by the indigenous Batavian. Among the 
governor-generals of the Dutch-East-lndies, there were 
individuals with mestizo blood such as Willem van Outhoorn 
(1 691 -17 04 ) and Dirk van Cloon (17 3 2 -17 35 ) who were 
born and bred in the Indies.
The Natives
It is generally agreed that the present Orang Betawi, the 
original Batavia/Jakarta people, were descended from a 
mixed blend of elements: Balinese slaves, Dutch or European 
soldiers, Chinese or Arab traders, Buginese or Ambonese 
soldiers, Malay captains, Javanese prajurits  (soldiers) of 
Mataram, Sundanese free men or Mestizo freeburghers. The
58 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 422.
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formation of this ethnic group took place after the arrival 
of the Western powers and also Asian visitors involved in 
the coastal trade of Java, leading to the emergence of the 
Orang Betawi by the mid-nineteenth century. The vocabulary 
of their mother tongue consists of words from Javanese and 
Sundanese, Balinese, Dutch, Portuguese, Chinese and Arabic. 
Its grammatical structure, thought to be based on low or 
bazaar-Malay, has the affix in, deriving from Balinese.59 The 
present Bahasa Indonesia is regarded as bahasa Melayu- 
Tinggi (high Malay) by the common Orang Betawi, despite 
sharing a related linguistic root, Malay.
For the Betawi Muslim, religion constitutes a strong 
identity, as it represents the contrast between them and 
non-Muslims such as the Dutch and the Chinese. It was very 
rare to find Orang Betawi in the early twentieth century 
who had received a Dutch education, as most of their 
schooling consisted of religious teaching, such as the art of 
reciting the Quran, Islamic law and customs. In 
correspondence with this strong religious identity, Arab and 
Malay influences have given particular Islamic 
characteristics to many Betawi traditional customs.
On the other hand, the Chinese also asserted their 
cultural influence on Betawi culture. Among the peranakan 
Chinese living in Java are the so-called Cina-Betawi who, 
due to their long establishment in this region, have 
contributed Chinese elements to Betawi traditional arts, 
and whose influence is also encountered, in theatre, dance, 
language and cookery. European influences, such as those of 
the Dutch and Portuguese, have been absorbed by the lndos.Q0
To discuss the main elements in shaping the Orang  
Betawi, one has to consider the social structure of the VOC 
period, namely slaves, soldiers, free men and traders. The 
first two, being mainly natives of other islands in the
59 C. Lekkerkerker, "De Baliers van Batavia", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1918, 
p. 412.
60 For further information see Paul W. van der Veur, "Cultural Aspects of 
the Eurasian Community in Indonesian Colonial Society", Indonesia, no. 6, 
October 1968, pp. 38-53.
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archipelago, played the largest role in shaping the Orang 
Betawi.
Before the Muslim kingdoms of the early fifteenth  
century, slaves were unknown in both the Javanese and 
Sundanese traditions. Kings and royal court families kept 
abdi dalem [abdi =loyal attendant,dalem =court, palace], a 
service which was based on devotion and traditional beliefs. 
Later, slavery became known through Dutch trading 
activities. On the other hand, slaves and slavery were 
common in the traditional customs of the peoples of 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali and the eastern 
islands. A person could become a slave for his debt, or as a 
punishment for customary law offences, or as a prisoner of 
tribal wars or because of marriage; (someone who married a 
slave was regarded as a slave), or because of his/her 
birth.61
During the siege of Jakarta, all the native Sundanese 
inhabitants of this small harbour fled, leaving the city with 
no manpower; thus the VOC had to repopulate the city. Apart 
from CoenTs effort to persuade the Chinese to move to 
Batavia, the VOC transferred slaves from Malacca and the 
Malabar coast to the city, and later from Bali and Sulawesi 
too .62 In the following years VOC raids to various parts of 
the archipelago made it possible to transport slaves from 
the eastern islands such as Timor, Flores, Sumbawa and 
from South Kalimantan. Balinese female slaves were in 
great demand for European households and for the Chinese. 
Many Chinese male migrants preferred to marry Balinese, 
mostly slaves, who afterwards received the status of a free 
person. European households kept Balinese female slaves for 
domestic work or even as part of a dowry.63 According to 
the census of 1673, of the total population of 27,068 in 
Batavia and its vicinity, there were 13,278 slaves; and in 
the year 1788, 30,620 of a total population of 134,328
61 Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. Ill, p. 803.
62 M.L. van Deventer, Geschiedenis der Nederlander op Java (n.d. Haarlem: 
H.D. Tjeenk Willink), p. 242.
63 C. Lekkerkerker, "De Baliers van Batavia", pp. 415-416.
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were slaves. The number of slaves decreased during the 
governorship of Thomas Stamford Raffles, from 18,972 in 
1814 to 14,239 in 1815 .64 Female slaves had a higher 
financial value, especially if they were young and had a good 
figure. But male slaves of a strong posture were also at an 
advantage, becoming soldiers in the VOC army. A notorious 
example of the story 'from slave to soldier' can be found in 
the person of Surapati, a Balinese slave in Batavia who 
subsequently joined the VOC army; he was given the name 
'Untung' which means luck. He was involved in murder, so he 
took refuge in Bantam. His courage brought him to Mataram, 
where he was welcomed by the Court. He established his 
authority in Pasuruan, East Java, and for about twenty years 
(1 6 8 6 -1 7 0 6 ) he was regarded as a tough, undefeatable 
enemy of the VOC.65
Recruitment of native soldiers into the VOC army was 
common, in which each native soldier became a member of 
their ethnic company. There were Ambonese, Balinese, 
Menadonese, Madurese, Bandanese, Sumbawanese, Malay and 
Buginese companies in the VOC forces. As there were both 
Christian (Ambonese, Menadonese, Timorese) and non- 
Christian (Malays, Madurese, Balinese, Sumbawanese and 
Buginese) they were often sent to quell uprisings, riots, any 
kind of native disturbance in many parts of the archipelago.
A captain of the Ambonese company in Batavia, Jonker 
from Manipa island, who had fought for the VOC in Timor, 
the north coast of Sumatra, Celebes, the north coast of 
Java, Palembang, Bantam and even in Ceylon, was granted 
the land of Marunda (in present North Jakarta). The name of 
the canal street, Jonkersgracht, was probably taken from 
his former residence, located on the west bank of the 
Ciliwung river. However, the last few years of his life were 
spent in conflict with the VOC, and he was killed in 1669.66
64 Ibid., pp. 4 1 7 -4 1 8 .
65 For a comprehensive study of Surapati, see Ann Kumar, Surapati, Man and 
Legend; a Study of Three Babad Traditions (1976. Leiden: E.J. Brill).
66 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 372.
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Other notable persons in this category of native soldier 
were Aru Patuju from Bone and Arung Palakka from Soppeng. 
Both were members of royal families in Celebes who joined 
the VOC army to fight against Sultan Hasanuddin of 
Makassar. Aru Patuju and his followers settled in kampong 
Petojo (now in Central Jakarta) which was named after him. 
Arung Palakka, after being restored to his throne in 
Soppeng, later turned to fight against the Dutch.
The only Sumbawanese noted in the Dutch records was the 
captain of the ethnic company, Abdullah Saban. He had a gold 
medal and honorary sword bestowed on him for his courage 
in breaking the British blockade at Batavia in October 
1800 .67 In 1807 he recaptured a Dutch brig from the British, 
which resulted in his being made a first lieutenant in the 
Royal Dutch Marine.68 He died in 1813.
As the Sundanese, Javanese and Malays were the earliest 
Indonesians to have close contacts with Jakarta and later 
Batavia, the background needs to be examined.
Given the geographical position of old Jakarta, formerly a 
harbour-city of the inland kingdom of Pajajaran in West- 
Java (known as Tanah Sunda - land of the Sundanese) it is 
quite clear that the roots of the Orang Betawi are 
Sundanese.69 This may explain why there is no kampong 
Sunda in Batavia, though kampong Jawa and kampong Melayu 
still exist in the modern city.
The obvious Javanese and Sundanese influences, 
especially in the Betawi language, probably owe their 
origins to Mataram soldiers sent by Sultan Agung (1613 - 
1645) to attack Batavia in 1628 and 1629. One of his 
commanders-in-chief was Dipati Ukur70 from West Java. 
There is no doubt that Sundanese prajurits  were also 
numerous among the Mataram troops. Although the Mataram 
attacks were unsuccessful, a great number of Javanese
67 P.A. Leupe, "Dapper Gedrag van den Commandant der Sumbawareezen, 
Abdullah te Batavia 1800", BKI, vol. 3, 1879, pp. 337-338.
68 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 375.
69 Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. I, p. 186.
70 See E.S. Ekadjati, Ceritera Dipati Ukur: Karya Sastra Sejarah Sunda 
(1982. Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya).
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soldiers did not return to their homeland but settled in 
Batavia instead. Some of them made their dwellings in the 
areas to the east of the Ciliwung river, leading to the Great 
Southern way. The Dutch called them de ooster-Javanen, 
meaning the Javanese of the eastern kampongs, while those 
who settled in the western areas of the river were called de 
w e s te r -J a v a n e n ,  or the Javanese of the western 
kampongs.71
It is rather difficult to trace the origins of the Malays in 
Batavia, whether they came from Riau, Sumatra, the Malay 
peninsula or Patani. There is a need for further study of 
local Malay writings. However, as the Betawi people have no 
tradition of written documentation, despite the fact that 
the older generation of Orang Betawi were familiar with 
Jawi (Arabic-Malay), sources on the Malay elements may not 
easily be discovered.
From Kasteelplein to Waterlooplein
Kasteelplein (Batavia castle square) and Waterlooplein (or 
Waterloo square)72 in W eltevreden , now Central Jakarta, 
were the two places that symbolized the movement of the 
Dutch centre of power. Kasteelplein represented the period 
of Company rule, 1612-1800, concentrated in the old city, 
or Intramuros; it was in the Waterlooplein compound that 
most of the government offices of the Netherlands Indies 
were concentrated.
In the history of the city of Batavia, the movement of the 
Dutch administration from the northern part, the Castle of 
Batavia, to the southern area of Weltevreden may be 
explained in terms of the city's hinterland relations, which 
were operated by the VOC.
A port city such as Batavia could achieve growth only if 
the surrounding countryside was pacified and then 
exploited, to sustain the needs of the city. But in the case
71 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 369.
72 This square was named by Governor-General H.W. Daendels (1803- 
1811) in memory of the battle of Waterloo.
45
of Batavia the exploitation of the Ommelanden was mainly 
to support the trade policies of the VOC and not the city 
itself. Particularly as there was no separate administration 
of the city of Batavia from the central authority of the VOC. 
Therefore in terms of self-maintenance, Batavia was never 
an independent city. The Batavia freeburghers desired a city 
which was not be manipulated by VOC officials. This idea 
was also held strongly by the founder, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 
who was impressed by the endurance of Portuguese colonies 
in Asia, which despite being cut off from the mother 
country were still able to maintain economic independence. 
Yet to the Gentlemen Seventeen in Holland an independent 
city government was considered a threat to their own 
interests. The idea was brushed aside. The decision was 
made that all administrative organs in Batavia were to be 
directed by VOC officials, mostly members of the Council of 
the Indies, thereby binding the city's functions to the 
business of the Company.73
Since its establishment, the VOC had to cover its running 
costs in the Indies. This turned out to be a severe 
undertaking for the Company, and its enormous expenses 
drove it to demand more and more from the Javanese 
authorities. These demands, which were stated in various 
treaties, led to further resistance and rebellion which 
incurred even more expense.74 And although the VOC was in 
the red, its officials were not really concerned since the 
Company was to them a great source of wealth. They took 
advantange of their position as VOC officials to engage in 
private trade and smuggling, or make investments with 
embezzled funds.75
The Company also suffered from pirate attacks in 
Indonesian waters, which damaged the monopolistic policy 
of the VOC as the so-called 'zeerovers' were often engaged 
in trade with local authorities. In addition, wars with the
73 L. Blusse, Strange Company, p. 25.
74 M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia, p. 83.
75 E.S. de Klerck, History of the Netherlands East Indies, vol. I, p.429; L  
Blusse, op. cit, p.20.
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English caused the loss of valuable cargos, and for almost 
three years before 1800 no vessels, troops or funds 
arrived76, the Company could hardly continue trading 
without the support of the home country.77
As a trading company which later came to rule the 
country, the VOC came to derive its income more from 
taxes, tolls, leases or contracts than from commercial 
activities as in the past. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the Company's trade had practically ceased in 
Java.78 Threats from outside were not the only cause of the 
downfall of the Company. Internally the administration was 
rotten, and it was mismanagement and corruption that 
finally sunk the wreck. In its financial management, the 
Company kept double books which were accounted 
separately, vessels were overloaded with the goods of VOC 
officials to be sold at good prices, its dividends bore no 
relation to the profits, and the income was divided among 
the Directors and their friends79; administration was 
executed at luxurious expense. VOC then no longer stood for 
the Vereenigde Oost-lndische Compagnie [United East Indies 
Company] but 'Vergaan onder Corruptie' (ruined by 
corruption). On 1 January 1800 the famous Dutch trading 
enterprise in Asia came to an end, with debts of about 
134,000 ,000  guilders. As for its territories in the Indies, 
these were to be temporarily ruled by the Council of Asiatic 
Possessions [Committee voor Aziatische Bezittingen].
It is interesting to note that the end of VOC rule in 
Batavia was also marked by a decline in the use of 
Portuguese in the city. Until the second half of the 
eighteenth century, Portuguese was still the means of 
communication between the various ethnic groups in 
Batavia, both Western and non-Western. It is said that its 
use was more common than that of Malay: it came to be
76 E.S. de Klerck, op. cit, vol. I, p. 429.
77 Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java (1966. 
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. First published in 1904. London: 
The MacMillan & Co.Ltd.), p.75.
78 E.S. de Klerck, op. cit, vol. I, p. 429.
79 Ibid., p. 433.
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identified with the middle-class, those between the 
sovereign ruler and the ruled.80
The importance of Portuguese in Batavia for almost the 
entire period of VOC rule is demonstrated by the fact that a 
public order, Ordonnantie voor de Wijkmeesters in de Stad 
en Zuijder-Voorstad which was issued on 19 December 1747 
in Dutch had to be translated into Portuguese in order to 
make it publicly known81 and better understood. However, to 
James Cook, who visited Batavia in 1767, the language 
sounded like a Portuguese Creole; it was more Malay than 
genuine Portuguese.82 By the end of the eighteenth century, 
this 'corrupted' Portuguese was taught only in orphanage 
schools as these children did not understand Dutch. By 1807 
the Notary Public no longer filed Portuguese texts with 
their transactions, although prior to 1815 the catechism of 
the Portuguese Reformed Church of Batavia might still be 
used. The last appearance of Portuguese in Batavia was a 
farewell announcement in a newspaper on 28 June 1823.83 
Together with the fading of Portuguese, the Mardijkers also 
disappeared. The leading roles now came to be played by the 
Dutch and the Mestizo, increasingly known as Indos, the 
Indies-born Dutch of native mothers.
80 Ronald Daus, Portuguese Eurasian Communities in Southeast Asia (1989. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), p. 32.
81 F. de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol.l, p. 407.
82 Ibid; see also his "De Laatste der Mardijkers", p. 236.
83 Ronald Daus, op. cit., p. 34.
2 THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE KAPITAN SYSTEM
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This chapter aims to trace the origins of the system by 
which the non-indigenous communities were ruled in the 
various port cities of the archipelago. The long established 
institution of sahbandar was already in place long before 
the arrival of westerners. It is my argument that the Dutch 
adapted the idea of the s a h b a n d a r  to their k a p ita n  
institution. The sahbandar was an official dealing with 
mercantile and foreign relations; the form was taken over 
by the western colonists (Portuguese, Dutch and later 
British) and utilized to rule the non-indigenous inhabitants 
in their colonies. This will be discussed in the last part of 
this chapter.
Much writing on trade in the Eastern seas mention the 
existence of the sabandar, shahbandar or syahbandar 
without any further explanation or description other than a 
definition of port officer1, or havenmeester.2 Accounts of 
journeys undertaken by western travellers also mention the 
same official, written in their own spelling, such as 
Xabandar,3 shahbandar* or sabandar, 5 as John Davis noted 
during his visit to Aceh in 1599.
Although the initial establishment of the sahbandar will 
never be precisely known, as no one can clearly indicate 
exactly when trading in the archipelago first commenced, to 
trace its early existence it is necessary to go back to the
1 R. Winstedt, Malaya and Its History (1966. London: Hutchinson Library), 
p. 36.
2 H. Djajadiningrat, Critische Beschouwingen van de Sadjarah Banten (1913. 
Haarlem: John Enschede & Zoon), pp. 23, 42.
3 A, Cortesao, The Suma Oriental o f Tome Pires and the Book of Francisco 
Rodrigues (1944. London: The Hakluyt Society), vol. II, pp. 265, 270, 273.
4 John Anderson, Missions to the East Coast o f Sumatra in 1823 (1971. 
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. First published in 1826. Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood), p. 47.
5 A.H. Markham (ed), The Voyages and Works of John Davis, The Navigator 
(1880. London: The Hakluyt Society), pp. 142, 143, 150.
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years of the coastal kingdoms or port cities of the 
archipelago. This involves examining either local traditional 
writings or the accounts of journeys made by the first 
western travellers, supplemented by the documents of 
Dutch and Portuguese officers during their first contacts in 
the Eastern seas.
The Sources
The archipelago at that time is understood to cover the 
states along the Malacca Straits, through to the eastern 
parts of contemporary Indonesia. The sources originating 
from those coastal kingdoms, consist of Malay traditional 
writings, particularly those with a historical emphasis 
such as sejarah, sya ir ,6 salasilah , tarikh  and h ikayat. 
Unfortunately, these traditional writings cannot be counted 
as sources for the establishment of the sahbandar. Sejarah, 
salasilah, tarikh, hikayat are literary forms mainly devoted 
to the Rajas and Sultans and their families. For the greatest 
part, they describe the royal surroundings, royal disputes, 
court life or war with other kingdoms. This is quite 
understandable, as such writings were executed under the 
Sultanfs orders. Although there are sometimes a few lines 
relating to the trading activities of the kingdom, they do 
not say much about how trade was conducted or how the 
person in charge of foreign commerce performed his duties. 
I discovered this by examining the Sejarah Melayu 
(Sulalatus Salatina),7 Kronika Pasai8 and Adat Raja-Raja 
Melayu $ Syair dealing with Dutch attacks on Makassar and 
Siak mentioned the involvement of the sahbandar, yet there 
was almost nothing on how his authority functioned.
6 Descriptions of specific events or with a historical background, such as 
Sya’ir Perang Mengkasar, Sya'ir Perang Siak, Sya'ir Welanda Berperang 
Melawan Cina, Sya'ir Singapura Dimakan Api, and many others.
7 A. Samad Ahmad, Sulalatus Salatina (1979. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa 
dan Pustaka).
8 T. Ibrahim Alfian, Kronika Pasai, Sebuah Tinjauan Sejarah (1 9 7 3 .  
Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press).
9 T. Hadidjaja, Adat Raja-Raja Melayu (1964 . Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka 
Antara).
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Another form of Malay traditional literature was the 
u n d a n g -u n d a n g , or law. Again, this was not very 
enlightening; there are various references to sahbandar but 
without further explanation. The most outstanding is the 
Undang-Undang Melaka, which consists of two parts: the 
undang-undang darat (land law) and the undang-undang taut 
(m aritim e la w ).10 The Undang-Undang Melaka  was 
established and completed during the golden years of the 
Malacca Sultanate under Sultan Mahmud Syah (1424 -1444) 
and Sultan Muzaffar Syah (1445-1458). However, problems 
in consulting the Undang-Undang Melaka, particularly its 
undang-undang laut, relate to the fact that it has never been 
established which of the various versions is the complete 
text, and also that very few fasal or chapters are devoted to 
the institution of sahbandar. Nevertheless, comparison of 
one version with the others, might yield slightly more 
information about the sahbandar. In terms of nature and 
content, a similar form to the Malay hikayat or sejarah is 
the babad, a form of Javanese traditional writing.
Whereas the roots of the Malay tradition lie in the 
Malacca Sultanate, the genesis of the Javanese tradition 
lay in the kingdom of Majapahit, and the later Sultanate of 
Mataram. Both Javanese kingdoms, Majapahit and Mataram, 
were hinterlands, concentrating on agrarian production, 
especially of rice, salt and other foodstuffs, commodities 
which led the Javanese to trade in the Eastern seas. Yet this 
involvement was not attached to the royal court, as was the 
case with the coastal adipati of Eastern Java and parts of 
Central Java, which actively took part in commerce and sea 
trading. The adipatis might be independent rulers,11 but they 
still paid an annual tribute to the Sultan of Mataram. On the
10 Liauw Yock Fang, Undang-Undang Melaka; A Critical Edition (1976. The 
Hague: H.L. Smits), p. 1. The Undang-Undang Melaka was adopted in many 
parts of the Malay Archipelago, which had their own versions, such as 
Undang-Undang Melayu, Undang-Undang Negeri, Undang-Undang Johor, 
Undang-Undang Pahang, Undang-Undang Kedah, with striking resemblances to 
the original.
11 B.J.O. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian 
Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century", in Indonesian 
Sociological Studies, (1955. The Hague: W. van Hoeve), vol. I, pp. 3-82.
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other hand, the inland Javanese courts paid little regard to 
money-making, which may explain why the sahbandar is 
hardly mentioned in their babad keraton.
The famous Nagarakertagama written by Prapanca in 
1362 mentions various high ranks in the Majapahit kingdom, 
yet no title involved in trading activities. Although the text 
includes an incomplete "Ferry Chapter of 1358", there are 
only a few lines touching on sea trade: "....further if while a 
ferryman has put on board the cart of an akalang (trader), 
whatsoever the merchandise, then that merchandise falls 
into the water, then that ferryman shall not be charged, but 
then he shall not be given ferriage if that merchandise is
lost ”.12 Other lines of this "Ferry Chapter" deal with
customs and taxes. Yet in his commentary and 
recapitulation, Pigeaud offers enlightening notes on the 
socio-economic activities of Majapahit.13
As has been mentioned earlier, Javanese sea trading was 
undertaken by the coastal chiefs, some of whom might be 
bupati pasisiran whilst others were from the noble ranks. 
Coastal areas under Mataram were known as pasisiran; 
therefore it is probable that the babads  written in the 
residences of bupati pasisir [coastal regents] should contain 
accounts of trading activities and Javanese port-cities. In 
fact there are some babads concerning the pasisiran areas, 
such as Babad Demak Pasisirant Babad Gresik, B abad  
Pasuruan and others. Flowever, in the field of Javanese 
philology more attention has been paid to the babad keraton; 
studies of the babad pasisiran are still in their infancy.14 
Lack of skill in old Javanese, especially in written texts, 
discouraged me to go beyond this.
The coastal kingdoms of West Java, Bantam and Cirebon 
do not disclose much information on the sahbandar either. 
Bantam was known as the harbour-kingdom of the 
(Indonesian) archipelago together with Aceh and Makassar.
12 Th.G.Th. Pigeaud, Java in the 14th century; A Study in Cultural History 
(1960. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), vol. Ill, Translation, pp. 160-161.
13 Ibid., vol. IV, 'Commentaries and Recapitulation' (1962 . The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff), pp.38-39, 290-292, 494-504, 500-504.
14 Personal communication with Ben Arps, 7 May 1991.
52
Cirebon was less well known but was one of the oldest port 
cities in Java along with Demak, Japara, Tuban and Gresik, 
according to Chinese sources.15 Both the Babad Cirebon and 
the Tjarita Purwaka Tjaruban Nagari are mainly concerned 
with the silsilah  or a s a l-u s u l of the royal families, 
especially Fatahillah, Falatehan and Sunan Gunung Jati, as is 
the Sejarah Banten, though the latter also consider the first 
encounter with the Dutch and the peace treaty made 
between Bantam and the VOC in 1659.16
The Buginese, who are renowned seafarers, codified their 
maritime law in the seventeenth century, although their sea 
trading activities had been flourishing since the early 
sixteenth century. The Buginese code of maritime law was 
compiled by Amanna Gappa in 1676 and was still in force in 
the Indonesian Archipelago until 19 37 .17 The code is, to 
some extent, still used in an adapted form by Buginese 
nakhoda or sea-captains within the South Celebes Sea. 
Amanna Gappa was the third Matoa or chieftain of the Wajo 
people who lived in Makassar in the seventeenth century; he 
compiled the maritime law in conjunction with other 
Buginese Matoa. As was the customary practice in those 
days, this maritime law was repeatedly copied, with the 
result that many versions have subsequently been found.
According to Ph.L.Tobing there are eighteen lontaras  
(Buginese manuscripts which were originally written on 
palm leaves) of the Buginese maritime code, which are kept 
in the custody of the Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan 
(South Sulawesi Cultural Association)18 in Ujungpandang. 
Most of the codes are covered in 31 fasal or chapters
15 P. Groeneveldt, Notes on the Malay and Indonesian Archipelago from the 
Chinese Sources (1974. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
16 Babad Cirebon, translated by S.Z. Hadisutjipto (1982 . Jakarta: Balai 
Pustaka); Atja, Tjarita Purwaka Tjaruban Nagari (1972. Jakarta: Ikatan 
Karyawan Museum) stenciled text; for Sejarah Banten, see H. Djajadiningrat, 
op. cit.
17 For the maritime law of Amanna Gappa, see J.L.J. Caron, Het Handels-en 
Zeerecht in de Adatrechtsregelen van den Rechtskring Zuid-Celebes (1953. 
Bussum: C.A.J. van Dishoeck).
18 Ph.LTobing, Hukum Pelayaran dan Perdagangan Amanna Gappa (1977. 
Ujungpandang: Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan), p. 25.
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relating to sea trading, navigation, ship’s crews, sea- 
captain, shiploads, ship equipment, debt and disputes among 
traders, but only three of the eighteen lontaras mention the 
code for sahbandar.19
The sahbandar’s office in the twin kingdom of Makassar 
(Gowa and Tello) was formerly chaired by a tumarilalang [a 
position similar to Bendahara in the Malay sultanate]; by the 
mid-sixteenth century the office of sahbandar was, for the 
first time, filled by an officer called I Daeng ri 
Mangalekana. 20
My examination of other Buginese traditional writings 
such as chronicles, diaries21 and syair (written by the 
Malays) did not supply much further detail on the sahbandar. 
The general lack of data on the sahbandar in the sources 
from the local harbour kingdoms led me to a more extensive 
examination of non-local sources - namely the accounts of 
the Dutch and Portuguese.
The earliest non-local sources on the Malay archipelago 
include accounts of the first contacts made when western 
travellers visited the region. Although these travellers’ 
accounts do not specify the sahbandar’s function, there are 
some indications as to how the sahbandar went about his 
work. Other sources are written documents or archives of 
the early Dutch period in the archipelago, such as the 
Daghregisters gehouden in het Casteel Batavia [Daily 
Records kept in the Castle of Batavia] of the 17th-18th  
century, the Generate Missiven van Gouverneur-Generaal en
19 Ibid., pp. 30, 31, 34; R. Winstedt & J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong, in "The 
Maritime Law of Malacca", JMBRAS, vol. 29, no. 3, 1956, pp. 22-59 say 
nothing about sahbandar, neither does P.A. Leupe in "Wetboek voor 
Zeevarenden van het Koninkrijk Makassar en Boegies op het Eiland Celebes", 
7M, vol. I, 1849, pp. 305-317.
20 The title Daeng ri Mangalekana shows that the sahbandar had his seat in 
Mangalekana, where mostly Malay inhabitants settled in Makassar. Sahbandar 
in Buginese is sabannara; see Mattulada, Menyusuri Jejak Kehadiran 
Makassar dalam Sejarah, 1500-1700  (1982 . Makassar: Bhakti Baru- 
Berita Utama), pp. 13, 28-29.
21 For example, the diary of the Kings of Gowa and Tello; see A. Ligtvoet, 
"Transcriptie van het Dagboek der Vorsten van Gowa en Tello", BKI, 1880, 
pp. 1-259.
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Raden aan Heeren XVII der Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie [General Official Letters of the Governor-General 
and the Council of the Indies to the Gentlemen Seventeen of 
the Dutch East Indies Company], and also a compilation of 
treaties and agreements concluded with local authorities, 
in the Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-lndicumzz
The only scholarly writings that directly focus on the 
sahbandar are by W.H. Moreland23 and P. Purbatjaraka,24 
which discuss how the office was carried out or the 
meaning of the title. G.J. Resink in his notes emphasizes the 
position of sahbandar within its legal context and 
international relationships.25 However, an effort should be 
made to obtain a clearer picture of how the office became 
established. Although it seems probable that in its early 
days the office of sahbandar might not have been as 
complicated as it later became, its importance was beyond 
doubt. John Anderson notes: "We moved our baggage into the 
house of a respectable inhabitant, Che Abang, close to 
shabundar Samper’s house. The latter had gone two days 
before to Delli. Naqueda Amal was acting during his 
absence, but nothing could be done, without the shabundar, 
who is the principal man there"26
The Sahbandar
The word was originally derived from the Persian shah - 
bandar which literally means ’King of the Haven', or harbour
22 J.E. Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-lndicum, vol. I, 1596- 
1650, in BKI, no. 57, 1907, pp. 1-551; vol. II, 1650-1675, in BKI, no. 
87, 1931, pp. 1-582.
23 W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas", Journal o f the 
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1920, pp. 517-553; for a 
comment on Moreland's article, see C.O. Blagden, "Shahbandar and 
Bendahara", ibid., 1921, pp. 246-248.
24 P. Purbatjaraka,"Shahbandar in the Archipelago", Journal o f Southeast 
Asian History, vol. 2, no. 2, July 1961, pp. 1-9.
25 G.J. Resink, Indonesia's History Between the Myths; Essays in Legal 
History and Historical Theory (1986 . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) 
especially, "The Law of Nations in Early Makassar", pp. 39-58; 
"Independent Rulers, Realms and Lands in Indonesia, 1850-1910", pp. 107- 
148; "Centuries of International Law in Indonesia", pp. 189-224.
26 John Anderson, Mission to the East Coast o f Sumatra in 1823, p. 47.
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master, the title of an officer found at native ports all over 
the Indian seas. The sahbandar was the chief authority for 
any transactions with foreign traders and ship-masters, and 
was often also the head of Customs.27 Marsden gives the 
additional information that the sahbandar was "in some 
places to manage the trade for the King".28 This function of 
dealing with foreign trade and foreign merchants is
illustrated in Tuhfat-al-Nafis (Precious Gift); " .........  Adapun
Yang Dipertuan Muda selalu lah ia menyuruh pulang-pergi ke Melaka karena 
waktu itu sudah berdamai dan bersahabat antara Yang Dipertuan Muda dengan 
Holanda, dan di dalam Riau pun beraturlah orang besar-besarnya daripada 
Syahbandar dan mata-mata melayani segala dagang-dagang itu serta 
memeliharakan orang-orang dagang, dan penjajab beratus-ratus buah yang 
sedia dan ubat bedilpun membuat sendiri berkoyan-koyan demikian juga
pelurunya  ". [The Viceroy always gives orders to go and
visit Malacca, for peace and friendly agreement had been 
concluded between the Viceroy and the Dutch; therefore the 
nobles of the Riau kingdom decided to assign the sahbandar 
and his officials to be in charge of commerce and trade, and 
to take care of the merchants. Hundreds of fighting ships 
were to be prepared and many koyangs (one koyang is about 
5,320 lbs) of gunpowder were to be made, so too the bullets 
. . . . ] .29
Another illuminating phrase occurs in one of the Bugis- 
Makasarese lontara versions of the Amanna Gappa maritime
code: "  Adapun engkau syahbandar berkewajiban menyuruh mengawasi
pedagang yang baru tiba di pelabuhan negerimu, agar banyak bea (diperoleh) 
negerimu. Oleh karena engkaulah, syahbandar diserahi tugas memasukkan 
hasil negeri ke dalam perbendaharaan raja. Engkau juga lah pengganti diri 
raja, menjaga baik-buruk nya pedagang. Maka dalam hal itu wajiblah engkau 
berhati-hati, bagaikan ibu-bapak pada pedagang. Ladenilah anakmu dengan 
kejujuran menurut hukum pelayaran dan perdagangan, menurut hukum yang 
telah disepakati oleh orang tua, pedagang di bawah angin, yang be mama
27 W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas", p. 517.
28 William Marsden, A Dictionary and Grammar o f the Malayan Language 
(1984. Singapore: Oxford University Press. First published in 1812. 
London), vol. I, p. 200.
29 Raja Haji Ahmad & Raja Ali Haji, Tuhfat-al-Nafis , edited by V. Matheson 
(1982. Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti), p. 164. Translation is mine.
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Amanna Gappa, Matoa orang Wajo beserta dengan Matoa Passer yang 
bersepakat di Makassar menetapkan undang-undang pelayaran, duduk
bersepakat di kampung Wajo  11 [It is you, the sahbandar, whose
duties are to inspect the newly coming trader arrived in 
your land, so that a great sum of money will be gained by 
your country. For that reason, you, the sahbandar, is 
assigned to collect revenues into the King's Treasury. You 
are also the representative of the King to guard the status 
of the traders. Take care of them as you do your own 
children, with honesty, according to the maritime law, 
according to the law agreed by all honourable men; the 
traders from the land below the wind, whose names are 
Amanna Gappa, chief of the Wajo and Matoa Passer, who met 
in Makassar to establish this maritime law, and concluded 
in the kampong of the Wajo ...].30
Having a valuable encounter with the sahbandar of 
Banjarmasin, Captain Daniel Beeckman recalls: "...The 
shahbandar is likewise a Man of a fair character and one 
whom you ought to keep in with. His Business is to collect, 
and look after the Sultan's Customs; you will find him a 
serviceable Man ".31
The land law or undang-undang darat of the Undang- 
Undang Melaka provides three fasal or chapters regarding 
the sahbandar's duties: chapter 9.1., concerning the four 
categories of persons who are allowed to kill; the Chief 
Minister, the Police Chief, the Harbour Master, when he is in 
the estuary (is allowed) to kill anyone who does not obey 
his orders while sailing a perahu or a vessel; at that time 
he does not require a royal order but any order of his has to 
be obeyed. "... Dan ketiga syahbandar tatkala di kuala, barangsiapa tiada 
menurut katanya pada waktu membawa perahu dan kapal itu pun tiada lah lagi 
dengan titah melainkan mana perintahnya juga ...."; the fourth category 
is the Sea captain. Chapter 29 concerning weights and 
measures; "  pada menyatakan hukum segala gantang dan cupak, kati
30 Ph.LTobing, Hukum Pelayaran dan Perdagangan Amanna Gappa, p. 30. 
Translation is mine.
31 D. Beeckman , A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo (1973. London: 
Dawsons of Pall Mall. First published in 1718. Folkstone), p. 137.
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dan tahil dan segala hukum pasar sekaliannya itu pada syahbandar juga, dan 
hukum nakhoda kapal dan jung dan baluk atau barang sebagainya yang 
bernama perahu, mau yang besar, mau yang kecil. Apabila datang sesuatu 
perkataan atasnya atau daripada berkelahi dan berbantah atau luka dan 
melukai daripada samanya dagang, karena utang piutang atau sebab yang lain, 
itu pun berserah atas syahbandar yang menghukumkan dia ...." [rules 
regarding weights and measures such as gantang, cupak, 
kati, tahil and market regulations, these are all exclusively 
vested in the Harbour Master; and also the regulations 
pertaining to the masters of sea-going ships, junks and 
boats and all those vessels which are known as perahu, be 
they big or small. Whenever any law-suit arises which 
involves these rules, be it a fight, a quarrel or stabbing of 
fellow traders because of debt or for any other reason, all 
are delegated to the Harbour Master who will adjudicate 
upon them].
Chapter 44.5 concerned his engagement in trade: 11 Jikalau
syahbandar itu berniagakan timah sebesar-besar seratus tengah tiga belas 
rial harganya. Jikalau s-k-t (sekati?) seratus ribu selaksa sekalipun tiada 
lah lebih daripada itu lagi bilangan itu. Barang siapa tiada menurut dia 
durhaka iah ia ke bawah duli yaitu hukumnya mati dan rumah tangganya
masuk bendahari. 11 [If a Harbour Master engages in trading in
tin, the value shall be at its highest one hundred and twelve 
and a half rial. Even if the s-k-t (sekati?) is one hundred, 
one thousand, or ten thousand, it should not exceed that 
amount. Whosoever does not obey this regulation, he is 
guilty of high treason against His Majesty, that is, he shall 
be sentenced to death and his household shall become the 
property of the Treasury].32
The Adat Aceh,33 especially that part of the Adat Majlis 
Raja-Raja written by Orangkaya Seri Maharaja Lela, 
comprises nine majlis of which the last deals with harbour 
regulations, the Majlis Bandar Darussalam. Apart from a list 
of all functionaries who were entitled to a share of the
32 Liauw Yock Fang, Undang-Undang Melaka; A Critical Edition, for chapter 
9.1., see pp. 76-79; chapter 29, pp. 134-135, and chapter 44.5., pp. 
170-171.
33 G.W.J. Drewes & P. Voorhoeve, Adat Atjeh (1958. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff).
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harbour and clearance dues and of the import duties levied 
at the port, the majlis stated that any foreign ship arriving 
for the first time at Banda Aceh should obtain a stamped 
permit to stay at the port, for which it had to pay various 
sums for the stamps (adat tjap) and for the granting of the 
stamps (adat lapik tjap). Together with the adat lapik tjap, 
all Indian and European vessels had to pay a tax in cloth, i.e. 
adat kain.3A
There was also a regulation that European ships calling at
the port of Aceh should present the Sultan, " ketika dia baru
datang ada menghantarkan persembahan kepada raja supaya boleh kenal
dengan ra ja  ",35 with a roll of cloth and a keg of gunpowder,
while the sahbandar should offer them meat, oil and rice if 
they came to reside in their factories.36 Instead of paying 
dues, traders from the East gave presents which obviously 
fostered corruption among port officials, and provided for 
the vast patronage and wealth which enhanced the 
sahbandar's position and power.37
In settling quarrels or disputes among a ship's crew 
during a voyage, the sea-captain or nakhoda  had the 
authority to make the final decision; but whenever this 
situation arose in a port, the sahbandar would also be 
involved. "Be it known, that at sea the captain of the vessel 
[ n akhoda ] has for the time sovereign authority. The 
steersman and his mate [jurumudi and ju rubatu ] are his 
ministers. After arrival in port, the case is different. The 
nakhoda must share his authority with the port-captain, 
shahbandar, in settling disputes. Should any of the sailors 
while in the vessel have any quarrel, they must report it to 
the two pegaweys [the jurumudi and jurubatu], in order that 
it may be decided expeditiously by the nakhoda ...".38
34 Ibid., p. 24.
35 K.F.H.Langen,"De Inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het 
Sultanaat", BKI, no. 37, 1888, p. 439.
36 G.W.J. Drewes & P. Voorhoeve, AdatAtjeh, p. 23.
37 R.Winstedt, Malaya and Its History, pp. 36-37.
38 Chapter 47 on Voyages of the Code of Malacca, see T.J. Newbold, Political 
and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits o f Malacca 
(1971 . Singapore: Oxford University Press. First Published in 1839. 
London: John Murray), vol. II, p. 284.
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Another example of the sahbandar's authority refers to 
the case of vessels found adrift: 11Pasai yang keenam puluh satu 
pada menyatakan orang mendapat perahu hanyut. Barang yang ada di dalam 
perahu itu, maka hendak-lah dibawa ka jambatan sampai tiga hari. Maka tiada 
juga tuan-nya datang, maka tiada-lah perkataan-nya lagi. Demikian sabda 
Da to' Bendahara. Maka adat ini bersamaan dengan adat yang diberi oleh 
gumadur kapada Dato' Kapitan Shamsuddin. Apabila mendapat perahu dengan 
segala barang yang ada di dalam-nya semua-nya, bawa kepada kapitan dan 
pada Shahbandar; dia-lah memberi adat orang yang mendapat. Dan jika yang 
demikian itu saperti penchuri bagaimana kehendak yang punya boleh
dida'awa-nya f l.39 Newbold's translation of this chapter is as
follows: "Whatever may be found in the vessel shall be 
brought and publicly exposed at the bridge for three days. 
Should be owner not make his appearance, there is nothing 
farther to be said. Both the vessel and cargo shall be then 
brought to the landing place to the shahbandar who shall 
decide according to the Regulations what the finder shall 
get. Persons not acting conformably to this regulation shall 
be treated as thieves".40
Much later the Malacca Code, particularly the undang- 
undang laut or maritime code was developed in Kedah. It is 
called the port law of 1650 - as the first part of the Kedah 
Law, which elaborated the rules and protocol for sea trade, 
including the duties and function of the sahbandar.41
As the first contact between the foreign visitor and the 
region was through the sahbandar, the latter developed 
relationships with a variety of nationalities, including 
visitors from other areas within the Malay archipelago. The 
sahbandar had to welcome any foreign visitor with customs 
such as those described in the following:
"  Maka segala tuan-tuan itu pun datang mendapatkan syahbandar. Maka
ditanya oleh syahbandar, 'Apa pekerjaan tuan sekalian ini ? Utusan dari mana 
dan siapa nama rajanya?’ Maka kata segala orang besar-besar itu, 'Adapun 
kita sekalian datang ini sahaja hendak mengadap duli syah alam hendak
39 T. Hadidjaja, Adat Raja-Raja Melayu, pp. 85-86.
40 T.J. Newbold, op. cit, vol. II, p. 310.
41 See the Malay text of the Kedah port law in R.O. Winstedt, "Kedah Law", 
JMBRAS, vol. VI, part II, June 1928, pp. 15-26. I am grateful to Annabel T. 
Gallop for this information.
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menjadi hamba ke bawah duli syah alam'. Setelah syahbandar mendengar kata 
tuan-tuan itu, maka syahbandar pun mengadap berdatang sembah, 'Ya, Tuanku 
Syah Alam, orang Bentan dan orang Singapura, tuanku, datang hendak 
mengadap ke bawah duli tuanku, maksudnya hendak menjadi hamba ke bawah 
duli syah alam.' Maka titah baginda, 'bawa lah ia kemari.' Maka syahbandar 
pun segera keluar. Maka segala orang Singapura itu pun hadir lah dengan 
segala persembahannya menantikan syahbandar datang juga. Setelah 
syahbandar datang, maka katanya, "Hai tuan-tuan sekalian, masuklah segera 
karena baginda itu suruh masuk; baginda pun sudah keluar di pengadapan
diadap oleh segala menteri dan pegawai. " [Then these gentlemen
came to the sahbandar who asked them, 'What is your 
occupation? What is your mission and who is your King?' 
They answered, 'We have come here to have an audience 
with the King of this country and we want to be in the 
service of the King'. After listening to these gentlemen, the 
sahbandar approached the King and reported; 'Your Highness, 
they are gentlemen from Bintan and Singapore, Sir, coming 
over here to have an audience with You; they want to be in 
the service of Your Highness'. The King said, 'Bring them in'. 
Then the sahbandar went out and the Singaporeans were 
ready with all their presents, waiting for the sahbandar. 
The sahbandar approached them and said, 'Gentlemen, please 
come in, for the King has ordered you to enter'. The King 
entered the audience hall, where all his ministers and 
officers were already present....].42
An almost identical protocol was performed in the Malay 
tradition when welcoming foreign visitors who would have 
an audience with the King. This is described in the Hikayat 
Hang Tuah when the hero is sent by the Sultan of Malacca to 
'benua Keling' [Vijayanagar], China, Siam and Turkey, where 
he was always received with good hospitality. The 
sahbandar would always make the first official contact, 
performing the same procedures, inquiring who the visitors 
were and the purpose of their visit. uDari mana perahu ini datang? 
Apa pekerjaan tuan-tuan sekalian ini? " [Where have these ships
42 Kassim Ahmad, Hikayat Hang Tuah (1975. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa 
dan Pustaka), pp. 14-15. Translation is mine.
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come from? What is your business in coming here?].43
" Dari mana datang ini dan siapa nama panglimanya? Apa kehendaknya
datang ini?" [Where have you come from, and who is your 
captain? What is the purpose of your visit here?].44
The sahbandar also had the duty of entertaining foreign 
visitors before they had an audience with the King; the 
sahbandar would also arrange hospitality: "...Maka syahbandar 
pun bermohonlah kembali menyuruh bermasak-masak nasi dan makanan 
hendak berjamu Laksamana dan menyuruh menyambut Laksamana dan 
Maharaja Setia. Maka pergi lah orang itu menyambut Laksamana. Setelah 
sampai, maka kata orang itu, ' Ya, orangkaya kedua, dipersilahkan oleh 
syahbandar. ..." [Then the sahbandar asked leave to withdraw 
and he ordered his people to cook rice and meals to 
entertain the Laksamana (Hang Tuah) and Maharaja Setia. 
Someone then welcomed the Laksamana. On arrival he said, 
'Both of you, Noble Men, are invited by the sahbandar....].45
"  Setelah sampai ke balai Syahbandar, maka syahbandar pun berdiri
memberi hormat akan Laksamana dan Maharaja Setia, seraya katanya, 
'Silahkan orangkaya sekalian’. Maka Laksamana dan Maharaja Setia pun naik 
duduk dan berjabat tang an dengan syahbandar. Seketika maka hidanganpun 
diangkat orang lah. Maka Laksamana dan Maharaja Setia sekaliannya pun 
makanlah jamunya syahbandar itu. Setelah sudah makan, maka kata 
syahbandar, 'Hai anakku kedua, mari lah kita pergi mengadap Perdana 
Menteri. ’Maka kata Laksamana, 'Silahkan lah bapa hamba, hamba iringkan’;
lalu turun berjalan sama-sama " [When they arrived at the
residence of the sahbandar, he stood up saluting the 
Laksamana and Maharaja Setia, and said, 'Please come in'. 
The Laksamana and Maharaja Setia approached him and 
shook hands with the sahbandar. Then dinner was served 
immediately. The Laksamana and Maharaja Setia and their 
crew ate the meals offered by the sahbandar. After 
finishing their dinner, the sahbandar said, 'My sons, both of 
you, let us go and have audience with the Prime Minister'; 
then they went walking together ...].46
43 Ibid., p. 369, when Hang Tuah landed in 'benua Kelincf; p. 473 in Jeddah; 
p. 450 in Mesir (Egypt); p. 485 in Turkey. Translation is mine.
44 Ibid., p. 391, when Hang Tuah landed in China. Translation is mine.
45 Ibid., pp. 394-395, 473-474, 486. Translation is mine.
46 Ibid., pp. 480 - 481. Translation is mine.
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The presentation of a cordial letter was also included in 
the audience given to foreign visitors, for which in some 
cases, the sahbandar could act as the King's interpreter. Or 
he might also perform the role of 'master of ceremony', as 
was the case when an audience was given to the Sultan of 
Aceh in June 1599: " ....The sabandar tooke off my Hat, and 
put a roll of white linen about my head; then he put about 
my middle a white linen cloth that came twice about me, 
hanging downe halfe my legge, imbroydered with Gold ; then 
againe he tooke the Roll from my Head, laying it before the 
King, and put on a white garment upon me, and upon that 
againe one of red. Then putting on the Roll upon my Head, I 
sate downe in the Kings presence, who dranke me in 
Aquavitae, and made me eate of many strange meates....".47
It is not surprising that this familiarity with foreigners 
contributed to the sahbandar's mastery of foreign languages. 
As Malay was becoming the lingua franca of sea trading and 
commerce, a sahbandar in a non-Malay speaking region like 
Makassar would most probably be a Malay.48 It was Nakhoda 
Bonang49 who asked permission for a Malay community to 
settle in Makassar with various guarantees of freedom, and 
the first sahbandar's seat was at Mangalekana, known as the 
Malay kampong in Makassar.50 Schrieke also thinks that the 
sahbandar was usually a foreigner - presumably because of 
the need for a knowledge of foreign languages.51
47 A.H. Markham, The Voyage and Works o f John Davis, The Navigator; pp. 
142-143.
48 Daeng ri-Boko, who went into battle against the VOC was thought to be a 
Malay rather than a Macasarese. See End' Amin, Sja’ir Perang Mengkasar; 
The Ryhmed Chronicle o f the Macassar War, edited by C. Skinner (1963. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), p. 10. Most sahbandar of Makassar had the title 
daeng, a noble title given to a non-royal descendant; a few were karaeng, 
which is the title of a Makassar royal descendant.
49 A. Reid argues he might be a sea-captain from Java, who took the name of 
Sunan Bonang, one of the Javanese nine waifs (saints); see A. Reid, "The Rise 
of Makassar", Review o f Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, vol. 17, 1983, 
p. 137. Mattulada also assumes that he was a Malay, Menyusuri Jejak 
Kehadiran Makassar Dalam Sejarah, pp. 28-29.
50 See footnote 20.
51 B.J.O. Schrieke, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java", Indonesia Sociological 
Studies, (1957. The Hague: W. van Hoeve), vol. II, p. 238.
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Other sahbandar with a non-indigenous background, apart 
from the Malays in Makassar, were either Chinese or Indian 
Muslims. Chinese sahbandars were found in most of the 
coastal ports of Java and in Balambangan;52 Indian Muslims 
or Gujaratis53 were in charge in Banjarmasin54 and in Aceh; 
indeed the position could be held by any foreigner: "...under 
various titles, apparently dependent on their knowledge of 
languages, and so forth - as intermediaries between the 
authorities of the emporia and the foreign traders. In 
Bantam it was for a long time a keling or Gujarati, later a 
Chinese, in Tuban it was a Portuguese gone over to Islam; in 
Banjarmasin a Gujarati, in Malay Malacca a Javanese and a 
keling, as well as a Gujarati shahbandar ".55
Due to the combination of his ability to communicate 
with foreigners and his trading and commercial activities, 
which were of course the main concern of westerners in the 
Eastern seas, it is hardly surprising that the negotiation of 
early treaties between the western powers and local 
authorities required the involvement of the sahbandar. It 
was with the sahbandar from Banda that Jacob van 
Heemskerck concluded the earliest treaty of the VOC on 18 
March 1 5 9 9 .56 On 4 September 1635, Retna Dij Ratja 
[Ratnadiraja], alias Codia Babouw, represented the King of 
Banjarmasin in signing a treaty  with the VOC in 
Martapura.57 The Dutch noted that the sahbandar was a 
Gujarati by birth. A Malay, Daeng Mapulle,58 who was the 
sahbandar in Makassar, was involved in negotiating a treaty 
on 27 July 1669, before the Bongaya contract was agreed. In 
Sumbawa, as it was under the dominion of Makassar, a 
treaty was negotiated on 12 August 1671 between the VOC
52 D. Beeckman, A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo, pp. 169 - 170.
53 GJ. Resink prefers to note 'Gujarati by birth' instead of using the term 
'keling', Indonesia's History Between the Myths, pp. 215, 419.
54 Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-lndicum, vol. I, pp. 270-271.
55 B.J.O. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian 
Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century", p. 28.
56 Corpus Diplomaticum, vol. I, pp. 11-12.
57 Ibid., p. 270.
58 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 417 -418 . A Reid assumes he was a Makassar 
Mopiah/Mopley; op. cit, p. 140.
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and Makassar, in which one of the representatives from the 
kingdom of Dompo was sahbandar Codjarobo,59 who could 
possibly have been an Indian Muslim.
These treaties demonstrate th a t the sahbandar 
represented the authority of the kingdom - either the Sultan 
or the highest official. A rather distinctive situation 
existed for the sahbandar in the port of Jakarta, for his 
duties were noted in several treaties with the VOC.60
Treaties made with the VOC were seldom concluded in a 
friendly atmosphere, as most were signed after the local 
rulers had been defeated in battle. The sahbandar was not 
only involved in the signing of treaties but also took part in 
the wars with foreign powers. I have been able to examine 
two syair composed to mark wars against the Dutch/VOC. I 
am certain that there are others. In these two syairs, some 
stanzas portray how the sahbandar as a man at war. The 
Syair Perang Mengkasar was written by End1 Amin, a Malay 
living in Makassar, and describes the long war leading to the 
conclusion of the Bongaya contract in November 1669 .61 
The Syair Perang Siak was composed in 1764, three years 
after the kingdom of Siak was conquered by the Dutch.62
Daeng ri-Boko, 'sahbandar jang tua163 fought bravely in the 
battle; "Daeng ri-Boko sahbandar jang tua/sikapnja seperti panah jang dua/ 
Ampun karaeng tidaklah dua/baginda pun termashjur berani djua" [Daeng 
ri-Boko, the senior sahbandar/was like a double-headed 
arrow/Begging your worship's pardon, he had no equal/a 
prince renowned for his bravery].64 Lamentation of his death
59 Corpus Diplomaticum, vol. II, p. 501.
60 Ibid., vol. I, treaty of January 1611, see pp. 85-91; of 21 December 
1614, see pp. 117-119; of 11 March 1619 with Bantam, see pp. 152- 
153.
61 End' Amin, Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar; The Ryhmed Chronicle o f the 
Makassar War.
62 Donald J. Goudie, Sya'ir Perang Siak, A Court Poem Presenting the State 
Policy of a Minangkabau Malay Royal Family in Exile (1989. Kuala Lumpur: 
The Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society . Monograph no. 17).
63 There were two sahbandar in Makassar at that time: sahbandar jang tua 
(Chief Sahbandar) and sahbandar jang muda (Deputy Sahbandar), see End' 
Amin, Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar, p. 88. For Daeng ri-Boko, see also footnote 
48.
64 End' Amin, op.cit, pp. 170-171 (canto 272).
65
was expressed in six cantos (370-375), which show that he 
was well-respected: "Di dengar oleh Sultan di Goa/Daeng ri-Boko 
sabillah djua/titah kodrat itu ia bawa/dikuburkan di dalam kota Goa" [When 
the Sultan of Goa heard/that Daeng ri-Boko had died a 
martyr's death/he gave orders that he should be borne/to 
the cemetery inside the castle of Goa].65
In the Sya'ir Perang Siak, it was the sahbandar Muin, who 
had a fighting ship, who was also noted for his bravery: 
"Syahbandar Muin sebuah penjajab/berapilan di haluan berdinding 
jab /jikalau  do'akan dengan mustajab/sabillilah barang sekejap11 
[Syahbandar Muin had a fighting ship/with gun shields at the 
bow and a wall around/if one prays efficaciously/the path 
to God takes but a moment];66 "Syahbandar Muin panglima 
payu/kapit timbalan mengikut payu/lawan laksana Garuda Bayu/jika 
menyambar sahajakan layuM [Syahbandar Muin, a prized 
captain/also of the second rank and equally valued/in 
contest like the Garuda Bayu/if he swoops the prey must 
fall].67
Clearly sahbandar Muin was one of the Siak war 
commanders, as he was also involved in the war 
preparations: "Setelah lengkap sekalian ditentang/menantikan Wilanda 
jikalau datang/Syahbandar Muin tidak berpantang/baik pagi baik pun petang" 
[When they had completely covered all approaches/they 
awaited the Dutch if they should come/Syahbandar Muin let 
nothing constrain his preparedness/whether morning or 
afternoon].68
Whereas the Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar informs the reader 
of the end of Daeng ri-Boko's life, the Sya'ir Perang Siak 
says nothing further about Syahbandar Muin. As Siak lost the 
battle, lamentation in the syair focussed on the King and his 
royal families. This might be related to the circumstances 
under which the syair was written in 1764, that is for Raja 
Mahmud's children in exile.69
65 Ibid., pp. 172 - 173 (canto 369).
66 Donald J. Goudie, op. cit, pp. 148-149 (canto 272).
67 Ibid., pp. 176-177 (canto 388).
68 Ibid., pp. 196-197 (canto 466).
69 Ibid., p. 71. Raja Mahmud reigned the kingdom of Siak in 1746-1760.
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The Early Kapitan of Batavia
In their early contacts with the archipelago, the first 
Portuguese and Dutch sea captains can have been in little 
doubt as to the importance of the sahbandar. His duties 
involved dealing with foreigners, trade, diplomatic 
relations and in war.
If a sahbandar was of non-indigenous origin (such as 
those who were Chinese or Gujarati by birth) their duties 
embraced domestic matters, as they were likely to be given 
authority over the civilian affairs of their countrymen. In 
this way, the sahbandar became the representative of a 
group of foreign merchants settled in a sea-port or town, 
the appointed head to settle internal disputes, and the 
channel of communication with the local government. It is 
this position that W.H. Moreland defines as a 'consul1.70 He 
might be elected by his fellow countrymen; this would then 
be sanctioned by the local authority and later formalized by 
official appointment.
Therefore when the Portuguese came face to face with 
the Malacca authorities, they saw an administrative system 
that was better developed than their own.71 There were five 
high ranks in the native authority of Malacca, of which the 
fifth was the Sahbandar, 72 The highest rank was the 
Padukaraja [Viceroy]; then the Bendara or Bendahara, who 
was the Chief Justice for civil and criminal affairs, 
controlling the King's revenue and, in practice, governing 
the kingdom. The third rank was Laksamana [Admiral of the 
Sea], and the fourth was T e m e n g g u n g ,  or Chief- 
magistrate.73
70 W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas", p. 520.
71 D.R. Sar Desai, "The Portuguese Administration in Malacca, 1511- 
1641", JSEAH, vol. 10, no. 3, December 1969, p. 504.
72 The Commentaries o f the Great Afonso d ’Aiboquerque, notes and 
introduction by Walter de Gray Birch (1880. London; The Hakluyt Society), 
vol. Ill, pp. 87-88.
73 The Suma Orientalvol. II, pp. 264-265; The Commentaries of the Great 
Afonso d’Aiboquerque, vol. Ill, p.87.
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The position of sahbandar in Malacca was filled by four 
persons - one for the Gujarati community, one for the 'benua 
keling1 or Bengalis, one for the Javanese arid traders from 
the eastern part of the archipelago and one for the 
Chinese.74 Such a position would surely have been held by a 
person who was familiar with the languages of the 
nationalities concerned as well as with the local language. 
This person could be a foreigner by origin or by birth, as in 
the case of the sahbandars in Aceh, Bantam, northern parts 
of Java, Balambangan, Banjarmasin and Makassar, or he 
could be a local person, although this was rare.
Lack of experience and administrative resources led the 
Portuguese to accept and adapt existing practices in their 
newly conquered territories.75 The positions of Bendahara 
and Sahbandar remained almost intact during the early 
years of Portuguese occupation, together with the practice 
of administering the various communities in the quarters of 
the city in which they resided.76 The Malaccans and other 
dark-skinned groups were under a Moorish captain and 
several captains of their own race.77
Parallel to the Portuguese lack of interest in regulating 
the affairs of the indigenous peoples, the Dutch VOC had a 
similar attitude towards the non-indigenous Batavian 
communities, both the Foreign Asiatics ( V re e m d e  
Oosterlingen) and the ’foreign Indonesians1,78 those whose 
origins lay outside Batavia. When the VOC vessels arrived at 
Jakarta, there was already a Chinese settlement located at
74 The Suma Oriental, vol. II, p. 265.
75 D.R. Sar Desai, "The Portuguese Administration in Malacca, 1511- 
1641", pp. 504-505. R. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", JMBRAS, vol. 13, 
part I, March 1935, p. 89.
76 D.R. Sar Desai, op. c/t, p. 505.
77 R. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", p. 89; see also Francisco de Sa de 
Meneses, The Conquest of Malacca, translated by Edgar C. Knowlton Jr. 
(1970. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press).
78 For the term 'foreign Indonesians' see J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and 
Society, Essays in Asian Social and Economic History (1955. The Hague: W. 
van Hoeve), p.139. The VOC also regarded the Javanese and Malays in Batavia 
as 'vreemdelingen' (foreigners), see for example Proclamations of 30 
December 1628 and of 27 April 1629, in Plakaatboek van Nederlandsch- 
Indie (1885. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), vol. I, pp. 241, 245.
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the mouth of the Ciliwung river, headed by its own chieftain 
called Nakhoda Watting. The authority of Jakarta, Pangeran 
Wijaya Krama, granted the VOC permission to build its first 
factory79 near the Chinese settlement. In this first treaty, 
signed in January 1611, there are instructions regarding the 
duties of Jakarta's sahbandar: if someone owed a debt to a 
Hollander, he should inform the sahbandar who would report 
to the King of Jakarta, i.e. Pangeran Wijaya Krama, and in 
addition order the person to repay the debt.80 To deal with 
the payment of port tolls, and transactions involving arak, 
rice and beans, the VOC signed another treaty on 21 
December 1614, at which the Chinese captain, Nakhoda 
Watting and the native sahbandar were also present.81
In contrast to Malacca, which had a strong independent 
government, Jakarta was only a vassal of the Bantam 
sultanate. It was a fierce battle against the brave 
Malaccans that the Portuguese faced in 1511; in the case of 
Jakarta, despite some indecisive help from the British East 
India Company, the Dutch VOC successfully excluded non- 
Dutch elements in Jakarta when they besieged the port in 
1619.
As has been mentioned earlier, the Portuguese, with their 
lack of a well-developed system to rule Malacca and their 
reluctance to involve themselves in native affairs, left the 
positions of Bendahara, Sahbandar and the chiefs of the 
various ethnic communities to the Malaccans themselves. 
Having no manpower to build the city of Batavia, yet driven 
by an obssession to create a Dutch empire in the East, the 
Dutch governor-general for the Indies, Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen, invited the non-native elements, sometimes by force, 
to make a living in this newly conquered port city. Part of 
the non-Batavian elements had already been brought in by 
Coen when he attacked Jakarta with the help of native 
soldiers from the eastern islands of Indonesia. On the other
79 Actually it was 'steenen huijsen' (stone houses), see Corpus  
Diplomaticum, vol. I, p. 86 and J.A. van der Chijs, De Nederlanders te 
Jakatra (1860. Amsterdam: Frederick Muller), p.197.
80 Corpus Diplomaticum, vol. I, p. 91.
81 Ibid, pp. 117-119.
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hand, the Javanese and Sundanese, who might claim to be 
the indigenous peoples, were not trustworthy in the eyes of 
the Dutch VOC. Peace with the two important sultanates in 
Java was attained after their leaders, Sultan Ageng 
Tirtayasa of Bantam and Sultan Agung of Mataram, were no 
longer in power. In these circumstances, the builder of 
Batavia tried to find an administration suitable for a city 
inhabited by non-Batavians. The administrative systems 
adopted by the former harbour kingdoms in the archipelago 
to rule their foreign communities matched Coen's knowledge 
of how the Portuguese had built their colonial empire in the 
East. Coen could find no better model to follow than that of 
the pioneeer European power in the region.
As the Chinese were the first foreign community in 
Jakarta, it is not surprising that the first appointment of a 
chief of an ethnic settlement in Batavia was the Chinese 
kapitein, Bencon or Souw Beng Kong, on 11 October 1619. 
This was later followed by the appointment of captains of 
the 'foreign Indonesians', the Bandanese, the Ambonese, the 
Balinese, the Buginese and the Malays.
Seeing that those first 'foreign Indonesians' were 
soldiers, making their headmen captains was likely to be 
perfectly acceptable. In fact, those native captains were 
generally known as Inlandsche kommandant, rather than by 
their military rank. For example, the well-known Balinese 
captain, Babandam, was frequently referred to in VOC 
letters as the kommandant der Balijers, as was the 
kommandant der Boegineezen for the Buginese. However, 
this practice of appointing headmen on military rank had 
died out by 1 8 2 8 ,82 while the office of kapitan Cina 
survived much longer. In Batavia it lasted until the Japanese 
arrived in 1942.
Souw Beng Kong's appointment as the first Chinese 
captain under the VOC in October 1619, just four months 
after the city was captured, marked his official admittance
82 See "Rapport over de Inlandsche Kompagnie en Inlandsche Kommandanten, 
21 October 1823", in Batavia, no. 16, and Tangerang, no. 206/D . Arsip 
Nasional, Jakarta; see also Regeerings Almanak voor Nederlandsch- 
Indie,l817-1832  (1833. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij).
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into the ruling authority of Batavia. Souw Beng Kong was 
already the headman of the Chinese community in Bantam 
before he and his people moved to Batavia.83 As the Dutch 
referred to Nakhoda Watting, the Chinese headman they first 
encountered on their arrival in old Jakarta, as the Chinese 
captain, it was convenient for the VOC to give Bencon the 
same title.
However, it is interesting to note that although he bore a 
quasi-military title, the kapitan Cina's responsibility 
focussed on mercantile matters, while the Inlandsche  
kommandant were mainly responsible for maintaining peace 
and order in the districts surrounding Batavia. The fact that 
the war with Bantam was still in progress also explains 
why the VOC kept the native settlements outside the city 
walls. Furthermore, placing natives under their own 
chieftain or kommandant, was meant to develop agriculture, 
the chiefs being granted land as their private domains.
In wartime the native commanders were also responsible 
for supplying manpower to the VOC forces. As Coen 
described it, they "could diminish the garrison and be used 
as soldiers against the enemies".84 In this respect, 
therefore, the Dutch adopted the kapitan system as it had 
been used be in sixteenth century Malacca. On the other 
hand, the kapitan Cina had almost no involvement in 
military matters, for members of the Chinese community in 
Batavia were exempt from such services. The Chinese 
appeared to have been satisfied with the arrangement that 
excused them from being civic guards orschutterij. T o 
compensate for this, they paid a capitation tax, the so- 
called Chineesche hoofdgeld, imposed in October 1620;85 
collection was administered by the Chinese captain.
Thus unlike the Inlandsche kommandants, the military 
nature of title  kapitan  Cina did not reflect the
83 Phoa Kian Sioe, Sedjarahnja Souw Beng Kong, Phoa Beng Gan, Oey Tamba 
Sia (1956. Djakarta: Penerbit Reporter), pp. 12-15.
84 J.P.Coen, Bescheiden omtrent zijn Bedrijf in Indie, edited by H.T. 
Colenbrander (1922. 's Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff), vol. IV, p. 596.
85 See Plakaatboek van Nederlandsch-lndie  (1 8 8 5 . Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij), vol.l, pp. 76-77.
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responsibilities of the office. Whereas the native 
commanders were to supply native labour for agriculture 
and for the military, the Chinese captains* responsibilities 
were directed towards commercial activities, revenue- 
farms in particular, on which the government's financial 
base was established.
It is not my intention here to offer further comparisons 
between the office of the Inlandsche kommandant and that 
of kapitan Cina, for the simple reason that the native 
captainship was short-lived, subsequently absorbed into the 
local administration of Batavia. The following chapters will 
concentrate on the kapitan Cina in Batavia.
3 THE INSTITUTION OF CHINESE OFFICERS
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Most of the literature in English1 concerning the Indonesian 
Chinese refers to the Chinese officers, generally known as 
kapitan Cina, although little detailed explanation is then 
given. This is due either to lack of information, as admitted 
by Leo Suryadinata,2 or to a failure to consult Dutch 
colonial records. The only exception is Lea E Williams,3 who 
certainly used colonial sources, although he limited himself 
to the period 1900-1916. In order to provide a thorough 
evaluation of the role of the Chinese officers, the entire 
period of this institution needs to be addressed, not just 
the few years 1900-1916. Among indigenous writers, the 
most distinguished is the peranakan Chinese historian, Liem 
Thian Joe,4 who, in his work on the Chinese of Semarang 
made extensive use of the Chinese Council records. This is 
an indispensable source for anyone interested in the Chinese 
of Java.
The institution of the Chinese officers, dating from 
October 1619 and later known as the Chineesch Bestuur
1 Donald E Willmott, The Chinese o f Semarang. A Changing Minority 
Community in Indonesia (1960. Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Tan Giok- 
lan, The Chinese Community of Sukabumi. A Study in Social and Cultural 
Accommodation (1963. Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project. 
Monograph Series); Mary F Somers, "Peranakan Chinese Politics in 
Indonesia" (1965 . Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Ithaca, Cornell 
University); Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-  
1942 (1976. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); J A C  Mackie 
(ed), The Chinese in Indonesia; Five Essays (1976. London: Thomas Nelson in 
association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs); Charles 
Coppel, The Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (1983 . Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press); James R Rush, Opium to Java. Revenue Farming and 
Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia 1860-1910  (1990 . Ithaca:
Cornell University Press)
2 L. Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 13, footnote no. 21.
3 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism. The Genesis of the Pan- 
Chinese Movement in Indonesia 1900-1916  (1960 . Glencoe: The Free 
Press)
4 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang (1933. Semarang: 
n.p.)
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[Chinese Administration], was obviously a part of the Dutch 
colonial administration. It is therefore necessary to 
examine Dutch administration as a whole in order to gain a 
proper contextual understanding. The failure to use Dutch 
colonial sources often leads to errors and misunderstanding. 
Thus many writers argue that the Chinese officers came to 
an end in the 1930s.5 In fact, on 31 March 1934, Chinese 
officers in Java and Madura, were disbanded, but with the 
extrem ely im portant exception of Batavia. Other 
misconceptions concerning the nature of the Chinese 
officership have resulted from misunderstandings with 
respect to its place in the history of the Chinese in 
Indonesia. Most writings concentrate on the political 
experience of the Indonesian Chinese, placing the leadership 
of the Chinese officers within the context of early Chinese 
nationalism. This gives a false view. With his lack of 
colonial sources, Donald Willmott provides a poor historical 
perspective.6 By primarily relying on Ong Tae He's account 
of the Chinese in mid-eighteenth century in Java,7 
Willmott's writing on the Chinese of Semarang leaves a 
serious gap concerning the Chinese officers, particularly so 
as Ong Tae He gives an outsider's view. Willmott's use of 
nineteenth century sources taken from Liem Thian Joe's 
chronicle8 does not help, as Liem does not discuss the 
nature of the Chinese officership.
For these reasons my study will rely greatly upon Dutch 
colonial government records. However, some words of 
warning are in order. First, Batavia was home for the 
largest Chinese peranakan community in Java. The Batavian
5 Donald Willmott, The Chinese of Semarang, p. 152; G W Skinner, "Overseas 
Chinese Leadership: Paradigm for a Paradox", in G Wijejewardene (ed) 
Leadership and Authority: A Symposium (1968. Singapore: University of 
Singapore) p. 200 also gives the same incorrect dates; L Suryadinata, 
Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 28; he also argued that the Chineesche 
Offcieren was abolished in the 1920s in his Political Thinking o f the 
Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977. A Sourcebook (1979. Singapore: Singapore 
University Press) p. 8.
6 Donald Willmott, The Chinese of Semarang, particularly pp. 147-152.
7 Ong Tae He, The Chinaman Abroad, or a Desultory Account of The Malayan 
Archipelago particularly of Java (1849. Shanghai: The Mission Press)
8 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang.
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Chinese had the earliest contacts with colonial authority, 
as it was in Java that the Dutch first established their 
administration. This fact was important in the Dutch 
decision to keep the Chinese officers until the last days of 
colonial rule. Second, Batavia did not belong to the 
gouvernementsdomeinen, or government properties, except 
some areas in the inner city where government buildings 
were located. Rather it enjoyed the status of particuliere 
landerijen, i.e. private land estates. As such Batavia was 
barely touched by (direct) government control, and was 
practically exempt from the imposition of such colonial 
policies as forced delivery ( verplichte contingenten), the 
Cultivation System and compulsory public labour 
( h e e re n d ie n s te n ). Thirdly, in terms of the historical 
evolution of Batavia society,9 the Chinese community there 
comprised both rural and urban peoples. In contrast to the 
Chinese of Semarang and Surabaya, who were mostly urban, 
enclaves within the dominant culture of the Javanese,10 the 
Chinese of Batavia greatly contributed to the shaping of the 
present Betawi culture.
Later we can see how the formidable group of Batavian 
Chinese managed to resist pressure from the non-peranakan 
Chinese, or singkeh-totoks, as well as from indigenous 
movements during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, a period which witnessed the awakening of 
Indonesian nationalism and Pan-Chinese revivalism. Details 
on peranakan resistance to the singkeh-totok movement and 
to anti-Chinese feeling among the natives, their response to 
Sarekat Islam, will be discussed in chapter 5 concerned 
with the Chinese officers and Chinese political movements.
In this chapter, of the Chinese officership, emphasis will 
be placed on the structure, its establishment from 
candidacy to retirement, and its relationship within the
9 See Chapter I.
10 For discussion on the acculturation of the Chinese in Java into Javanese 
culture, either being absorbed or rejected for the prestige of their Chinese 
traditions, see G W Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture 
Overseas: a Comparison of Thailand and Java", Journal of the South Seas 
Society, no. 16, parts 1 & 2, 1960, pp. 86-100.
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local administration of Batavia. The starting point is the 
promotion of the first major in 1837. For the whole period 
of this study, the Chinese of Batavia had only five majors: 
Tan Eng Goan (1837-1865), Tan Tjoen Tiat (1865 -1879), 
Lie Tjoe Hong (1879 -1896), Tio Tek Ho (18 96 -19 08 ) and 
Khouw Kim An (1910-1918, re-appointed 1927-1942). The 
first and last majors are particularly worthy of study. This 
work will cover the whole of the Batavia residency, from 
the northern part called the Stad en Voorsteden (inner city 
and downtown), the western part of the Tangerang region, 
to the south and eastern parts of Meester-Cornelis. There is 
some reference to Buitenzorg (now Bogor), as this southern 
region was adjoined to Batavia in 1866. However, most of 
the description will focus on the central part of the 
residency, that is the inner city [Stad en Voorsteden] which 
was the physical core of the Chinese establishment.
The Structure of The Institution
The kapitan Cina was a common historical phenomenon 
among Nanyang Chinese communities settled in Thailand, 
the Philippines and the Malay Archipelago, including the 
Dutch East Indies. As an institution of separate 
administrative rule over the Chinese in these colonies, 
there are some common features. Yet the kapitan Cina in 
the Dutch East Indies stands out, for maintaining the 
longest and most intense relationship with foreign 
sovereignty.
As the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were 
subdivided by dialect group (pang) and place of origin, each 
of the larger groups, such as the Hokkien, the Hakka and the 
Teochew had their own kapitanJ 1 In contrast, division into 
sub-groups was almost unknown among the Chinese of
11 Yong Ching Fatt, "Chinese Leadership in Nineteenth Singapore", Journal of 
the Island Society, vol. I, December 1967, pp. 6, 8; Chan Gaik Ghoh, "The 
Kapitan Cina System in the Straits Settlements", Malaya in History, vol. 25, 
1982, p. 76; Yen Ching-Hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore 
and Malaya, 1800-1911  (1986. Singapore: Oxford University Press), p. 
125.
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Batavia, as the earliest Hokkien settlers had been 
established long before the Europeans, and the first Hakka 
immigrants settled in Batavia much later, in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Different periods of 
migration for these different groups of Chinese settlers, 
meant that Indies-born Hokkien, or peranakan Chinese, held 
the officership until 1878. Only through the interference of 
the Dutch would a non-Hokkien be admitted into the Chinese 
officership of Batavia.12
As for the origins of their leadership, the kapitan Cina in 
Singapore and Malaya built their power at community level 
among members of their own group. When they were given 
official appointments as kapitan Cina by the Malay Sultans 
and later by the British, it was a formal acknowledgment 
and confirmation of that supremacy. This practice ceased in 
1826 when the kapitan Cina in the British territories 
became an unofficial position.
By contrast, the establishment of the Chinese officership 
in Batavia was, from its inception, a creation of the Dutch, 
as part of the colonial administration. Under the VOC 
regime, the Chinese captain of Batavia was directly 
subordinate to the Governor-General. Following the 
establishment of the Netherlands-lndies administrative 
system in 1 820, the Chinese officers were placed under the 
local authority of Batavia, with the Chinese captain/major 
directly responsible to the Dutch resident.
In the framework of administration of the Dutch East 
Indies colony, the Chinese officers were a counterpart to 
the system of indirect rule of the native population. This 
indirect rule of the Dutch, which was executed through the 
mechanism of the Binnelandsch B estuur [Interior 
Administration], established lines of hierarchy for both the 
native and non-native, non-European inhabitants [called the 
Vreemde Oosterlingen]. Within the structure of local 
administration in Java and Madura, the institution of
12 See Besluit van Gouvemeur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-lndie (hereafter, 
Gouvernementsbesluit), 22 December 1878, no. 19, requiring the Chinese 
Council to admit 3 Hakkas or Cantonese among its 10 officers.
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Chinese officers, as part of the Vreemde Oosterlingen 
administration, was parallel to the native administration, 
both of which were placed under the European 
administration headed by the resident. The Native 
Administration was called the Inlandsch Bestuur, and the 
local administration over the Chinese, the Chineesch  
Bestuur. In fact, the Chineesch Bestuur belonged to the 
Bestuur voor Vreemde Oosterlingen [administration system 
for the non-natives, non-European communities in the 
colony]. Other elements in this Vreemde Oosterlingen were 
the Arabs, the Moors and the Bengalis, who were also 
administered by their own headmen. Given that the Chinese 
played the most significant role in the colonial economy, 
the Dutch government gave considerably more attention to 
the Chineesch Bestuur.
When discussing the structure of the Chinese officers, 
one cannot avoid making reference to the Chinese Council, 
or Kong Koan, as this body represented the daily work of the 
Chineesch Bestuur for the Chinese community. The Chinese 
Council will be discussed in the following chapter.
All officers who were charged with administrative duties 
in the Chinese community had a seat on the Chinese Council. 
Their position was prestigious, as they were involved in 
daily communications regarding Chinese affairs. Their 
status was as effective officers, in contrast to other 
Chinese officers who did not hold membership of the 
Chinese Council.13 These officers, whom the Dutch 
government classified as non-effective or non-active 
Chinese officers, were given only titular rank. They were 
Chinese officials employed in various Dutch government 
offices, such as the Collegie van Boedelmeesteren [College 
for Masters of Heritage] or later the Wees-en Boedelkamer 
[Orphan's Court and Chamber of Heritage] and the Landraad 
[Native Court of Justice], including those who worked as 
translators of Chinese in the Dutch resident's office. Since 
they did not work with the Chinese Administration, or
13 See letter of General Secretary to Resident of Batavia, 8 May 1844, no. 
381, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 2 July 1844, no. 13.
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Chineesch Bestuur, their officership was more of an L 
honorary title, usually lieutenant, for which they paid the 
so-called 'recognitie geld1 or recognition money.
The active Chinese officers, whose authority was 
exercised in the daily Chinese Administration, used the 
hierarchy of military rank as determined by the VOC; 
lieutenant, captain or major. The lowest rank, i.e. 
lieutenant, were the people who had the most intense 
contact with members of the Chinese community, for they 
supervised the Chinese wijkmeesters, or wardmasters, in 
their neighbourhood. Any matter regarding Chinese affairs, 
from complaints and reports to rewards, were brought to 
these lieutenants through the wardmasters. In turn, the 
lieutenants forwarded their reports on daily matters to the 
Chinese Council's regular meetings. Most letters of 
complaint from Chinese community members, now kept in 
the local archives of Batavia, concerned the lieutenants and 
the Chinese wardmasters,14 as it was with these officials 
that the Chinese were most familiar.
The middle-level officers, i.e. captains, appear to have 
been more suited to protocol. They might chair the Council 
in the absence of the major, sign official letters on his 
behalf, or sit beside the native district commandant to deal 
with problems occur between Chinese and the natives.15 It 
is likely that the captains were mostly charged with 
external duties, such as attending the regular meetings at 
the Resident’s office to discuss matters regarding local 
government, and representing the Chinese community on 
committees set up by various government offices.16 Such
14 For example, a letter dated 28 December 1897, on behalf of the Chinese in 
Kebayoran, in Agenda, 13 June 1898, no. 12921, and other letters sent to 
the Resident of Batavia concerning the bad performance of Chinese lieutenants 
and wardmasters, see confidential report of Resident of Batavia, 21 
November 1891, no. La. G5, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 12 December 1891, 
no. 2.
15 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 18 October 1912, no. 
319/C, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 4 January 1913, no. 27.
16 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 13 August 1872, no. 
5650, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 31 October 1872, no. 11.
79
duties must have been frustrating for some captains, for 
this contributed little to the benefit of their own people.17
The most prestigious position was obviously that of 
Chinese major, not only because it was the highest rank but 
also because the position offered maximum responsibility 
for the community. It is interesting to note that despite the 
title, the Dutch authorities' original reason for promoting 
Chinese captains to major was rather suspect. Among the 
three main Chinese communities in Java, i.e. Batavia, 
Semarang and Surabaya, promotion to major was first 
grahted to the Chinese captain of Semarang, Tan Hong Gan in 
1829, as a sign of official gratitude for his help in raising 
revenue for the government.18 The second promotion to 
major was given to the Chinese captain of Surabaya, The 
Goan Tjiang in 1834 ,19 presumably for a similar reason. 
Batavia obtained its first Chinese major in 1837, when Tan 
Eng Goan was promoted for the simple reason that as 
Semarang and Surabaya both had a major, the Batavian 
Chinese officers should follow suit. In addition, Batavia had 
the largest Chinese community in Java.20
The importance of the Chinese major is demonstrated by 
his official assignment - both head of the Chinese district 
known as the sixth district in the city of Batavia, and 
chairman of the Chinese Council, "hoofd van het zesde 
district en voorzitter van den Chineeschen Raad".21
In 1917 the Dutch government became aware of the 
extent to which such functions and positions (particularly
17 As admitted by a captain in Batavia, mentioned in letter of Advisor for 
Chinese Affairs to Director of Home Affairs, 3 June 1929, and also quoted in 
letter of Resident of Central Preanger to Governor of West Java, 29 June 
1929, in Mailrapport, no. 3366/1929, ARA, The Hague.
18 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang, p. 96.
19 Mentioned in advice of Resident of Batavia, 8 September 1837, no. 2019, 
in Gouvemementsbesluit, 21 September 1837, no. 14.
20 Ibid.
21 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 8 October 1870, no. 
7709 /11 , in Gouvemementsbesluit, 19 November 1870, no. 16; see also 
Regeerings Almanak voor Nederlandsch-lndie van het jaar 1858, p. 66.
80
the chairmanship of the Chinese Council) were an integral 
part of the Chinese majorship. This was the year in which 
the government launched a plan for administrative reform, 
which raised questions concerning the Chineesch Bestuur. In 
this plan, the Chinese administration was related to the 
native administration in Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, 
where the largest Chinese communities also lived. Under 
this government scheme, from 1918 all Chinese officers in 
Java and Madura were temporarily relieved of their official 
functions until the results of a study were known, from 
which further steps might be taken either to reorganize or 
abolish the Chinese officership.22 In this scheme, the local 
authority of Batavia faced a problem regarding the Chinese 
Council, which to some extent actually ran the Chinese 
Administration. The Chinese officers might be temporarily 
relieved of their administrative functions w ithout 
relinquishing their duties as members of the Chinese 
Council. But for the Chinese major, who was officially 
identified as the chairman of the Council, being temporarily 
relieved of his official functions could mean release from 
his chairmanship, which in turn meant that the Chinese 
Council could select a new chairman without considering 
any affiliated officership. In other words, the Chinese 
Council might have a chairman, not necessarily the ex­
major, selected from among other officers. It  was 
unacceptable to the Dutch authorities that a Chinese officer 
of lower rank become chairman of the Chinese Council, for 
this would not only affect the prestige of the ex-major but 
might also embarrass the Dutch government in front of the 
Chinese community, because he had been selected by the 
government.
The question concerning the organization of the Chinese 
Council was, in fact, not a simple matter. Since the Council 
was responsible for the daily Chinese administration, it 
was the main concern of the Chinese community, 
particularly in Batavia. Having been left independent, the 
Chinese were very cautious about government interference
22 Detailed discussion is held over until Chapter VII.
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in their internal affairs. This was shown in the 1920s when 
the Dutch government launched a plan to abolish the Chinese 
officers, which was related to the continued existence of 
the Chinese Council. The preliminary government scheme 
planned to place the Chinese directly under the European 
Administration [Europeesch Bestuur] and European
administrators would be included in the Chinese Council. 
The Chinese expressed such strong opposition that the Dutch 
government withdrew the plan. Later, in March 1934, the 
institution of Chinese officers was ended in Java and 
Madura; yet in Batavia they continued until the last days of 
Dutch rule.
Returning to the question of the chairman of the Chinese 
Council, the Resident of Batavia was relieved from this 
troublesome matter by the fact that the Council agreed to 
retain ex-major Khouw Kim An as its chairman.23 The 
Chinese major was placed at the same level as the native 
regent or pat/h,24 later bupati, and both were subordinate to 
the Resident of Batavia.
In 1906 the Batavia residency was reorganized into four 
divisions called afdeeling, namely Stad en Voorsteden in the 
central part; Tangerang as the western division; Meester- 
Cornelis in the east; and Buitenzorg as the southern 
division. Each of these divisions was headed by a native 
regent, given the title of patih; by 1924 they were under a 
bupati. Should the structure of the Chineesch Bestuur have 
followed this administrative reorganization, in each 
afdeeling  or division a Chinese major would have sat in 
parallel to the native regent. In fact, the Dutch permitted 
only the rank of Chinese captain to be on duty in each 
afdeeling.
23 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 12 November 1926, no. 9 which confirmed 
compensation for major Khouw Kim An for executing his duties from August 
1919 to October 1926, despite being removed from his officership; see also 
letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 27 June 1932, in 
Geheim Mailrapport, no. 704x/1932, ARA, The Hague.
24 A patih replaced the district commandant from 1907 as head of each 
afdeeling or division of the Batavia residency. The first regent or bupati of 
Weltevreden in the inner city, appointed in 1924, was R A A Achmad Djaja 
diningrat, previously regent of Bantam.
A Chinese captain in the western division of Tangerang 
supervised three lieutenants;25 another captaincy was 
established in Meester-Cornelis with five lieutenants under 
him; Buitenzorg had one captain and four lieutenants.26 
Despite the fact that more Chinese lived in the Tangerang 
area than in Meester-Cornelis, five lieutenants were on duty 
in Meester-Cornelis, because one was posted to Kebayoran, 
in the remote southern part of that division.27
The Dutch government apparently did not take 
demographic considerations into account in the 
establishment of officers for the Chinese Administration in 
Batavia. That there were about 21 ,500 Chinese settled in 
and around Tangerang did not mean that there would be more 
officers, although which had roughly the same number, the 
Stad en Voorsteden, had thirteen officers.28 It is clear that 
the Dutch government considered the Chinese officers near 
Batavia of minor importance compared to those in the inner 
city, or Stad en Voorsteden. This can be explained by the 
land status of these outside regions, where particuliere  
landerijen, direct government control, was almost excluded. 
On the other hand, it was in the inner city that the 
activities of the Chinese community were concentrated. 
This was the area designated for the Chinese quarter, where 
the office of the Chinese Council and the Chineesch Bestuur, 
the main temple, schools, the Chinese hospital, commercial 
houses, Chinese associations and political movements, were 
all found. For practical reasons, all were within reach of 
the government. As the Chinese community in the inner city 
became increasingly important to the Dutch government, any 
administrative reorganization of the Batavian local 
authority would also affect the composition of the 
Chineesch Bestuur.
25 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 5 June 1871, no. 4.
26 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 22 April 1883, no. 1.
27 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 5 March 1883, no. 
1444, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 22 April 1883, no. 1.
28 Letter of Assistant-Resident of Tangerang to Resident of Batavia, 29 
November 1867, no. Litt.Ba, and letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor- 
General, 25 June 1868, no. 2 92 0 /1 , in Gouvemementsbesluit, 5 June 
1871, no. 4.
83
From 1833 the Stad en Voorsteden had been divided into 
seven districts, of which the sixth was specifically 
designated as the Chinese district. However, to supervise 
these seven districts there were only four district 
commandants (later to be replaced by wedana) who had 
offices in Penjaringan, Pasar Senen, Mangga Besar and Tanah 
Abang. In 1906 the districts were no longer known by 
number - first district, second district and so on - but were 
called by the name of the location of the wedana's office, 
for example, Penjaringan. Following this change, the 
Chinese district was no longer called the sixth district; the 
Chinese major, as the district head, was officially called 
hoofd der Chineezen,29 head of the Chinese.
As a major occupied the office of head of the Chinese 
district, a Chinese captain was placed in each of the four 
districts outside the Chinese quarter, in parallel with the 
four native commandants [or later wedana's]. Within these 
four districts there were also six important Chinese 
neighbourhoods, or Chineesche wijken: Kota/old Jakarta, 
Penjaringan, Mangga Besar, Tanah Abang, Pasar Baru and 
Pasar Senen. Six Chinese lieutenants were in charge of 
supervising several Chinese wardmasters in each district, 
and these lieutenants became subordinates of the Chinese 
captains. Evidence from 1871 confirms that by the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century, an established Chineesch 
Bestuur had been achieved, consisting of one major, four 
captains and six lieutenants.30
The structure of the Chineesch Bestuur always depended 
upon the structure of the local administration of Batavia. In 
general both the Inlandsch Bestuur and Chineesch Bestuur 
were on the same level, the function of each rank being at a 
similar position. The Chinese major was comparable to the 
native regent or b u p a ti; the captain to w e d an a ; the 
lieutenant to asisten-wedana; and the Chinese wardmaster 
to the native wardmaster. However, the Chinese officers
29 See Regeerings Almanak voor Nederlandsch-lndie van het jaar 1907, vol. 
I, p.161.
30 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-lndie 1871, no. 70.
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never enjoyed a salary, and received only some financial 
compensation called to e lag e . This was calculated in 
accordance with the salary of an equivalent native 
officials.31 Nevertheless, such parallels were not always 
apparent, particularly in the case of the Chinese 
wardmasters in outside districts or other divisions.
In accordance with local regulations of August 1835, 
issued by the Resident of Batavia, the Chinese 
neighbourhood was attached to a native district, with each 
Chinese wardmaster supervised by the native district 
co m m an d an t.32 This meant that a number of Chinese 
enclaves in the Batavia region were beyond the Chineesch 
Bestuur's supervision, were instead under the Inlandsch 
Bestuur. Furthermore, the Chinese inhabitants of private 
land estates were likely to be beyond the reach of the 
Chinese officers. Although most owners of private land 
located in the environs of Batavia were Chinese officers, 
the management and cultivation of these lands was usually 
undertaken by other Chinese acting as tenants or caretakers.
Considering these uneven conditions with respect to the 
authority of the Chineesch Bestuur, particularly in Batavia, 
it is no wonder that in 1894, F Fokkens, Inspector of the 
Department of Interior Administration asked whether this 
non-native, non-European institution fitted well in the 
structure of the administration. The question arose when 
Fokkens undertook an investigation into the economic 
condition of the native population in Java and Madura;33 his 
investigation of 1893 had shown that further enquiries into 
Chinese economic domination was essential,34 particularly 
the Chinese role in revenue-farming. Fokkens accordingly 
widened the scope of his enquiries, as he sought to develop
31 For example, the major received a monthly allowance of 300 guilders; see 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 11 October 1831, no. 18; and 17 July 1906, no. 2. 
It was later increased to 500 guilders, confirmed by Gouvemementsbesluit, 
8 August 1911, no. 13.
32 Copy letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 31 December 
1842, no. 2994, in Verbaal, 7 June 1846, no. 1 /318, ARA, The Hague.
33 Koloniaal Verslag, 1894, p. 3, footnote no. 2, and p. 75.
34 Koloniaal Verslag, 1893, p. 1.
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a new form of taxation to replace the revenue-farms. From 
here, Fokkens posed his basic question: where to put the 
Chineesch Bestuur in the new decentralized local 
administration which would be developed in the early 
twentieth century? This was something of a different 
question: considering that they were unpaid government 
employees, should the Chinese officers be liable to the new 
taxation?35 To answer this question meant a reappraisal of 
the position of the Chinese officers within the context of 
the Interior Administration.
The response from the Director of Home Affairs was that, 
in keeping with the idea of indirect rule, the Dutch never 
intended to place the Chineesch Bestuur directly under the 
European administration, although the Chinese major was 
responsible to a European official. On the other hand, it was 
impossible to place the Chinese officers either under the 
Native Administration or between the two main levels of 
In terio r A dm inistration. To place the Chinese 
Administration between the European and Native 
Administrations would be insulting to the Javanese regents 
and their subordinates. For whatever reason, the Dutch 
government would not implement such an undesirable 
measure, as the core of administrative rule and law in the 
colony was the Inlandsch Bestuur.36
This illustrates the precarious position of the Chinese 
administration and the unevenness of its structure. It also 
demonstrates the indecisive attitude of the Dutch towards 
the Chinese. And it was with similar indecision that the 
Dutch set up the Chinese officers in the first place.
The Chinese Officers
It has been noted that the establishment of the kapitan Cina 
in Singapore and Malaya was copied by the British from the
35 See Mailrapport, no. 13/1896, ARA, The Hague.
36 Copy letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 29 June 
1894, no. 3722, in Mailrapport, no. 13/1896, ARA, The Hague.
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Dutch in the East Indies,37 who in turn adopted the system 
from the old kingdoms of the archipelago, such as Bantam, 
Malacca, and others.38 In other words, the kapitan system 
had its origins in an indigenous arrangement.
Under Western rule the concept of ruling non-indigenous 
groups through their own headmen was maintained. Most of 
these settlers were traders, and it remained likely that the 
most powerful of them, in terms of financial resources, 
would be appointed, although by 1900 such criteria were not 
always relevant.
The appointment of the first Chinese captain of Batavia, 
Souw Beng Kong, in 1619, was simply a matter of his being 
granted legitimation by the Governor-General, J P Coen, as 
Beng Kong was already the headman of the Chinese 
community in Bantam before he and his people settled in 
Batavia.39 Thereafter, the appointemnet of the Chinese 
officers was more likely to depend on the Governor- 
GeneraPs favour.
Souw Beng Kong, for example, was undoubtedly on good 
terms with J P Coen, but the unfortunate captain, Nie Hoe 
Kong, was a victim of the dispute between Governor-General 
A Valckenier and a member of the Indies Council, G W Baron 
van Imhoff, which culminated in the Chinese massacre of 
October 1740.40
Lack of interest on the part of the Governor-General Joan 
Maetsuycker rendered the Chinese officership defunct for 
about twelve years from the death of captain Gan Dji Ko in 
1666 until 1678. During this period of neglect the Chinese 
community had its only experience of female leadership, as 
the widow of Gan Dji Ko boldly took his place as captain;
37 Yen Ching-Hwang, op. c it p. 121; Wong Lin Ken, "The Revenue Farms of 
Prince of Wales Island, 1805-1830", Journal o f the South Seas Society, 
vol.19, 1964, part 1, & 2, p. 58.
38 Details are discussed in Chapter II.
39 Phoa Kian Sioe, Sedjarahnja Souw Beng Kong, Phoa Beng Gan, Oey Tamba 
Sia (1956. Djakarta: penerbit Reporter) pp. 12-15.
40 For Nie Hoe Kong's bad treatment under the Dutch, see B. Hoetink, "Nie 
Hoe Kong, Kapitein der Chineezen te Batavia in 1740", Bijdragen tot de Taal- 
Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. 74, 1918, pp. 447-518.
this elicited bitter complaints from the male members of 
this patrilineal-oriented people.41
However, during the whole period of VOC supremacy, the 
office was preserved. As noted by B Hoetink, there were 22 
Chinese captains42 and 73 lieutenants in those days.43 Even 
the British in Java, during their short interregnum, followed 
the Dutch practice. The so-called recognition money, or 
recognitie geld, for the appointment of Chinese officers to 
be paid to the Chinese Hospital was maintained.44
After 1816 a new era of colonial dominion was begun by 
the Netherlands Indies government, which implemented a 
thorough system of colonial exploitation. In terms of civil 
administration, it laid the foundations of the Binnenlandsch 
Bestuur, Interior Administration, which included a system 
of rule over non-native, non-Europeans. As the dominant 
part in the administration of foreign asiatics, or Bestuur 
over Vreemde Oosterlingen, the Chinese administration 
gradually adjusted to this new system. Loose criteria for 
officership were set up, which gave guidance to the Chinese 
Council in selecting candidates. Procedural steps for 
appointment, promotion and performance of duty, all of 
which implied obligations and privileges, came to shape the 
Chinese officership. Indeed, a set of requirements was 
purposely never defined by the Dutch, but there was 
convention, or "sebegimana adat kebiasaan" as understood by 
the Chinese Council. It is hardly surprising that personal 
bias, even prejudice, on the part of the Dutch authorities 
played a great part in their dealings with the officers.
The Chinese officership began with the rank of lieutenant. 
To be a Chinese lieutenant, a person would be assessed by
41 J Th Vermeulen, "Eenige Opmerkingen over de Rechtsbedeeling van de 
Compagnie in de 17de en 18de Eeuw voor de Chineesche Samenleving", 
Mededeelingen van het China Instituut Batavia, December 1939, p. 11.
42 B Hoetink, "Chineesche Officieren te Batavia onder de Compagnie", BKI, 
vol. 78, 1922, pp. 8-9.
43 Ibid., pp. 88-95.
44 According to Gouvemementsbesluit, 19 October 1809, issued by Daendels. 
Later the recognitie geld was paid only for titular or honorary ranks, see 
Resolutie, 11 March 1819, no. 3; effective officers were released from this 
payment, see the case of captain Ko Tjoen Kiat in Gouvemementsbesluit, 11 
January 1850, no. 7.
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the Chinese Council in terms of: his behaviour towards the 
native people,45 his association with the distinguished 
Chinese, his financial capacity or means, his services in 
government, his contribution to his own society, his 
knowledge of the customs, usage and practices of Chinese 
institutions. Later, non-involvement in opium was added to 
the list.46 All applications were to be directed to the 
Governor-General through the Chinese Council, which would 
in turn forward them to the Resident of Batavia. After 
examining the candidates, the Council would draw up an 
official report, either to support or reject. The examination 
was conducted by the chairman of the Council, the Chinese 
major, and the result was discussed in the Council's 
meetings.
In studying the application letters, it is interesting to 
distinguish a candidate of non-peranakan origins from a 
peranakan. The non-peranakan Chinese would sign his name 
in Chinese characters, while the peranakan used a 
romanized Hokkien spelling. Very few signed their names in 
both Roman and Chinese characters.47 This illustrates the 
distinctions that were already occurring between the 
peranakan and the singkeh-totok members of the Chinese 
community in Batavia. Most peranakan no longer knew the 
Chinese language, while the singkeh-totok scarcely 
understood Malay.
An applicant also had to disclose his origins, whether he 
was Batavian born, and if not, the length of his residence in 
the city became a criterion for qualification. Naturally a 
candidate would disclose his background if he belonged to 
an officers family, for it was widely known that the Dutch 
preferred members of distinguished Chinese families. Yet,
45 "ada bae sama orang kampoeng", the term used by the Chinese Council, 
indicating how important good relations between the Chinese and the natives 
should be in the eyes of the Batavia local authority.
46 This criteria is listed in letters of the Chinese Council to the Resident of 
Batavia, 18 July 1849, no. 331; 14 August 1849, no. 357; letter of the 
Chinese major, 15 August 1849; all kept in Gouvemementsbesluit, 5 
September 1849, no. 2.
47 For example, see application letters kept in Gouvemementsbesluit, 27 
October 1838, no. 13.
89
in some cases, a Batavian-born peranakan was the choice, 
despite a lack of family background. Examples include the 
rejection by Dutch higher officials of Liem Goan Sioe for 
lieutenantship and as member of the Chinese Council in 
1872, and the nomination of Liem Goan Tjeng in 1883.
Liem Goan Sioe was from Gresik and had been settled in 
Batavia for about three years. He was the son-in-law of Be 
Biauw Tjoan, a rich Chinese captain of Semarang.48 Liem 
Goan Tjeng received support from the Resident of Batavia 
and the Director of Finance for both the lieutenantship and 
membership of the Chinese Council. Presumably this was 
because he was an opium pachter or opium revenue-farmer 
and also belonged to an officers family. Here we can detect 
a kinship tie between the two Liems, as both had brothers 
who were captains in Gresik and Semarang, and another 
brother who was lieutenant in Gresik.49 As time wore on, 
both fell into disfavour with the Dutch, particularly Liem 
Goan Sioe, who was suspected of involvement in the 
smuggling of opium.50
I do not entirely agree with Suryadinata's assertion that 
the officership was a semi-hereditary position.51 If he 
means that the officership passed from father to son, and 
was shared among the officers in active service, then my 
enquiries show this to be rare - happening only in 1866 and 
1879. The appointment of Tan Soe Tjong as captain in 1866 
was more to please his recently retired father, the ex­
major Tan Eng Goan, as his promotion had been rejected by 
the Resident of Batavia in 1861 when his father was still
48 Letter of the Chinese Council to Resident of Batavia, 5 March 1872, no. 
26, and advice from the Translator of the Chinese Language, 22 October 
1872, no. 17745, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 31 October 1872, no. 11. He 
was accepted as lieutenant in 1876, but two years later was suspected of 
involvement in opium smuggling. For further details see Chapter VI.
49 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 23 October 
1883, no. La.L2, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 18 November 1883, no. 13.
50 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 27 June 1879, no. 38.
51 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 28 footnote no.7. 
His comment may be true for the officership in Semarang and Surabaya; see 
also Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang.
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active in service.52 According to the Resident, his previous 
entry to the officership in 1849 was a result of his father’s 
influence, as he was the son of the Chinese major of that 
time. Later, in 1861, as the youngest member of the Chinese 
Council, the Dutch government could not grant lieutenant 
Tan Soe Tjong a higher rank.53
The approval of Nie Ek Tjiang and his brother Nie Hok 
Tjoan as lieutenants in 1879 and 1889 respectively was 
based on their qualifications. They were the sons of the late 
captain Nie Boen Tjiang, and both were good officers. Nie Ek 
Tjiang was very popular among the Chinese of Tangerang, 
who wanted him to be promoted to captain instead of Oey 
Giok Koen, a captain from Meester-Cornelis, posted to 
Tangerang .54 His younger brother, Nie Hok Tjoan was 
sufficiently trusted by the Dutch to be appointed acting- 
major during a vacancy in 1 9 0 8 -1 9 1 0 .55 The semi- 
hereditary character was present in some cases. But as the 
transfer of office from father to son occurred mainly among 
the non-active officers, who had no authority in handling 
daily Chinese affairs, no harm was done.
Nevertheless, the Resident of Batavia kept an eye on the 
situation, particularly during major Tan Eng Goan’s term of 
office. Complaints from members of the Chinese community 
in Batavia point to the coincidence that the first two 
majors, Tan Eng Goan (1 8 3 7 -1 8 6 5 ) and Tan Tjoen Tiat 
(1865-1879) shared the same family name.56 A certain Tio 
Tjat Seng sent a letter dated 9 June 1853 complaining about
52 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 17 January 1866, no. 22. Tan Soe Tjong was 
appointed lieutenant in 1849.
53 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 29 January 1861, no. 
325, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 17 January 1861, no. 9.
54 See letters of the Chinese of Tangerang to Governor-General, 5 November 
1897, 15 January 1899, and confidential advice from the Office for Chinese 
Affairs no. 363, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 2 July 1899, no. 22, and also 
Tangerang, no. 150/15.
55 Besluit of Resident of Batavia, 10 January 1908, no. 349 /6 . and letter of 
Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 15 November 1909, no. 5, in 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 29 November 1909, no. 46.
56 According to major Tan Eng Goan, Tan Tjoen Tiat was not his relative, 
though he bore the same family name; see his letter to Resident of Batavia, 15 
August 1849, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 5 September 1849, no. 2.
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certain family relationship in the Chinese Council, and 
strongly criticizing the way in which major Tan Eng Goan 
handled Chinese affairs.57 Some anonymous letters sent to 
the Resident of Batavia noted that there were many Tans 
serving in the Chinese Council under the chairmanship of 
major Tan Tjoen Tiat. One humourously suggested that since 
there were so many candidates for appointment to the 
lieutenantships coming from the Tan family, it would be 
better to put them into a lucky draw, "lebie bae taro die 
lotterij lebie bagoes".53
In this respect, the reader should apply caution in 
thinking that Chinese family names reflected family 
relations, such as those which the Dutch government called 
familie betrekkingen, or a kind of nepotism. Bearing the 
same family name did not necessarily indicate a blood 
relationship, although there was always the possibility of a 
kinship tie among people with different family names. The 
Chinese are well-known for being very clannish, and they 
regard a person bearing the same family name as a brother 
or sister. But this kind of kinship does not allow marriage 
between those bearing the same family name.
Therefore it was not easy to prevent family relations 
intruding into the officership, as there was a natural 
tendency towards marriage within the limited circle of 
Chinese officers. This phenomenon was not limited to the 
peranakan Chinese officers in Central and East Java, called 
by James Rush the cabang atas, or upper branch,59 but also 
commonly occurred among the native regent families, as 
observed by Heather Sutherland.60
57 See his letter kept in Gouvemementsbesluit, 17 July 1855, no. 3.
58 These letters are kept in, Gouvemementsbesluit, 7 November 1866, no. 
5.
59 See James Rush, Opium to Java. Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise 
in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910  (1990. Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 
particularly chapter V; and also J. Moerman, In en Om de Chineesche Kamp 
(1932. Batavia: G. Kolff & Co) p. 55.
60 Heather Sutherland, "Note on Java's Regent Families", part I, Indonesia, 
no. 16, October 1973, pp. 113-147; and part II, Indonesia, no. 17, April 
1974, pp. 1-42.
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The Dutch government saw that certain kinds of nepotism 
could be weakened, if not completely eliminated, through 
changes in the composition of the Chinese Council. This was 
particularly true after the 1870s, when there was an 
increase in the non-Hokkien, singkeh-totok group in Batavia. 
This growing element, although still in a minority among 
the peranakan-Hokkien Chinese of Batavia,61 could become 
crucial, as was evident during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. It was noted in 1912 that there were 
already 7 ,000 Hakkas, 4 ,000 singkeh-Hokkien and 1,200  
Macaos living in the city together with 16,000 peranakan 
Chinese.62 Seeing this growing element in the Chinese 
community, the Dutch, while admitting the wide differences 
in language, character and place of origins,63 decided to 
accommodate non-Hokkiens on the Chinese Council. 
According to Government decree no. 19, on 22 December 
1878, a new composition of the Chinese Council would 
admit five Indies-born Hokkien (meaning peranakan 
Chinese), two China-born Hokkien, and three Hakkas or 
Cantonese, preferably born in China. In the same decree, the 
first non-Hokkien officer, Tan A Kauw, a Cantonese, was 
appointed and admitted to the Chinese Council.
However, the government's decision to admit non- 
peranakan to the Chinese Administration did not necessarily 
reflect the personal prejudices of the Batavia authorities. 
It is interesting to note that consideration of a non- 
peranakan candidate was based more on the personal views 
of Dutch officials, rather than on the candidate's 
capabilities, as is demonstrated by the following objection: 
that 11 de meesten hunner weinig beschaafd, en met de 
Maleische taal niet voldoende bekend zijn", the majority of 
them were rather ill-mannered and their knowledge of the
61 See letter Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 4 September 1878, 
no. 5448, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
62 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 11 October 1912, no. 
199, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 4 January 1913, no. 27.
63 Confidential letter of W P Groeneveldt, Advisor for the Chinese Affairs, to 
Governor-General, 16 November 1878, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 22 
December 1878, no. 19.
Malay language was insufficient;64 that a Khe or Hakka 
candidate was "ruw en onbeschaaafcf" ,65 rude and ill- 
mannered, or a Cantonese could be "niet gegoed genoeg",66 
not sufficiently well-off. For the China-born Hokkien 
members, the choice was very limited, for most Hokkien in 
the city were born in the colony.67 Nevertheless, a pattern 
was set, particularly in facing the Pan-Chinese movement 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century, in 
which the non-peranakan Chinese or singkeh-totoks openly 
expressed their anti-Western feeling.68
The procedure for becoming an officer was related to 
promotion to a higher rank. Vacancies for lieutenantship 
were filled by candidates promoted from among the 
Council's members. This was because after 1871, seats for 
active officers were limited to only ten. Only once, in 1860, 
had the Dutch government allowed twelve officers in the 
Chinese Council; this was due to the increasing number of 
Chinese migrants arriving in the city, and the growing 
activities of Chinese in revenue-farms and interior trade.69
The pattern of promotion was so organised that 
candidates for captainship were selected from the ranks of 
lieutenants, and only captains were qualified to become a 
major. As active members within the circle of officers in 
the Chinese Administration were very few, promotion relied 
on a vacancy due to retirement or resignation.
The retirement or resignation of a captain meant that a 
lieutenant would be promoted to fill the vacancy. The 
promotion of a lieutenant in turn left a vacancy for a new 
member on the Council. Since there was no limited period of
64 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 4 September 1878, no. 
5448, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
65 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 24 July
1883, no. La. X I, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 18 August 1883, no. 9.
66 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 6 August
1884, no. La. C3, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 31 August 1884, no. 20.
67 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 6 January 
1890, no. La. E, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 12 January 1890, no. 12.
68 This will be discussed in Chapter V.
69 Letter of Resident of Batavia, quoted in letter of the Indies Council to 
Governor-General, 15 March 1860, no. 2462, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 
May 1860, no. 47.
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office for any Chinese officer of any rank, promotion from 
lieutenant to captain caused by retirement or resignation 
implied debate within government circles, particularly if 
the Dutch had their own candidate. For example, in the 
candidacy for captainship of Tan Boen Peng and Gouw Eng 
Hoei, the Director of Finance supported Tan Boen Peng 
while the Resident of Batavia and the Director of Home 
Affairs favoured Gouw Eng Hoei. Although Tan Boen Peng 
was considered a respectable lieutenant, being a revenue 
farmer who paid tax of 13 ,100  guilders annually and 
married to the daughter of a former captain, Lie Pek Tat, he 
was considered too young and inexperienced to be promoted 
to captain. This was the reason why the Resident of Batavia 
preferred Gouw Eng Hoei as captain. Gouw Eng Hoei was the 
oldest lieutenant among the Chinese Council members, and 
he was also endorsed by the Director of Home Affairs. The 
Director of Finance's objection to Gouw Eng Hoei was based 
on his fragile financial status. Previously, particularly in 
1873, Gouw had been heavily in debt, unable to pay the 
security on his opium farm business in Batavia and Krawang. 
The Director of Home Affairs claimed that Gouw's financial 
condition had recently improved, as he had managed to keep 
his rice trade firm, but the Director of Finance argued that 
Gouw still had to pay a fine of 27 ,700  guilders to the 
Collegie van Boedelmeesteren. Moreover, the Director of 
Finance observed that Gouw Eng Hoei was likely to be less 
respected by his people due to his inability to settle his 
financial problems. However, in the eyes of the Resident of 
Batavia, Gouw Eng Hoei, despite his debts, was not 
impoverished. But the Director of Finance then proved that 
Gouw's debts and securities were paid by his business 
partners. That Gouw Eng Hoei could not even make 
restitution for his opium-leasing indicated that he was no 
longer a man of means. The debate among these Dutch higher 
officials concerning the two candidates was ended by the 
confirmation of Tan Boen Peng as captain in December 
187770
70 see letter of Director of Finance to Governor-General, 22 September
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The debate above demonstrates how wealth was the 
primary consideration of the Dutch in their attitude to the 
Chinese officership. That the criterion should be such 
material considerations later became the focus of a 
lengthy, y e t unresolved, debate betw een the
Officers/Advisor for Chinese Affairs and the Resident of 
Batavia, this will be discussed later.
Retirem ent or resignation arose from various 
considerations. Usually retirement was approved for natural 
reasons such as sickness or old age. Resignations were due 
to personal reasons, such as feelings of embarrassment and 
being ill-at-ease, "maloe en trada enak",71 or because of 
entanglement in cases of indebtness, bankcruptcy or even 
illicit trade.72 Embarrassment could also arise when a 
Chinese lieutenant who was senior in terms of age and 
service was passed over for promotion by his junior.73
All discussions concerning the Chineesch Bestuur, 
particularly at the end of the nineteenth century revolved 
around a very basic question:74 the fact that the active 
Chinese officers who represented the Chinese 
Administration did not receive a government salary. This 
led to another issue, namely the position of the Chinese 
Administration in the colonial administrative system, its
1877, in support of Tan Boen Peng; letters of Resident of Batavia, 8 
September 1877, no. 5724, 20 October 1877; and of Director of Home 
Affairs, 14 September 1877, to Governor-General, both in favour of Gouw 
Eng Hoei. All letters kept in Gouvemementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 
21.
71 According to the Chinese Council, quoted by Resident of Batavia in his 
le tter to Governor-General, 28  September 1871, no. 5940 , in 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 February 1872, no. 26.
72 According to Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 February 1872, no. 26, any 
Chinese officer who was involved in a legal case involving bankcruptcy should 
be relieved from his post until rehabilitation. Details will be discussed in 
Chapter VI.
73 Gouw Eng Hoei asked to retire after 12 years in the lieutenantship, and had 
been twice passed over, see confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to 
Governor-General, 14 February 1878, no. 2047, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 
13 March 1878, no. 39; see also footnote 70. Nie Ek Tjiang resigned from 
the lieutenantship after 30 years, and had also been twice passed over for 
captainship, in 1880 and in 1899. His brother, Nie Hok Tjoan was promoted 
to captain in 1896, see Gouvemementsbesluit, 29 September 1896, no. 4.
74 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 29 June 1894, 
no. 3722, in Mailrapport, no. 13/1896, ARA, The Hague.
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criteria for membership, its hierarchy, and its relations 
with other government offices.75
Had Chinese officers been given a government salary like 
officials in the Native and European Administrations and not 
merely an allowance,76 many questions could have been 
resolved more simply. For example, it would not have been 
necessary to select candidates only on the basis of wealth, 
thus opening up the posts to professional persons, rather 
than restricting them to merchants, traders and 
landowners.77 Had the question of material wealth not been 
an issue, the discussion over the original concept of the 
Chinese officership, particularly between the local 
authority, represented by the Resident of Batavia, and the 
Officers for Chinese Affairs, could have been firmly 
concluded.
For the Officers for Chinese Affairs there appeared to be 
no real guidelines for selecting Chinese candidates for 
officership. The fact that only rich Chinese were eligible 
was clearly a'vicieus beginseP, a vicious circle, seeing that 
wealth did not entirely guarantee the financial status of an 
officer, particularly as their financial resources came 
mainly from revenue-farming, which relied to a great 
extent on Dutch government policy. Should future changes in 
policy adversely affect the economic position of an officer, 
how could wealth as a criterion of officership be 
sustained? For how long could the Chinese officership exist 
if the Dutch government continued to determine the 
officers’ wealth? Furthermore, the Officers for Chinese
75 Ibid.
76 Captains in the environs of Batavia and majors in the three main cities of 
Java also received a bezoldiging or stipend, meant for the administrative 
expenses of their offices and lower staff; see report of Director of Home 
Affairs, 22 April 1914, no. 3, in Agenda, 24 April 1914, no. 12877; see 
also letter of Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 6 December 
1911, no. 20707/6 , in Gouvemementsbesluit, 27 January 1912, no. 80.
77 This question had already been raised in the case of Tan Boen Sok, a 
lieutenant of Batavia, who was in debt and was asked to resign by the Resident 
of Batavia. The Translator of the Chinese Language, 15 December 1871, asked 
why only a rich Chinese was qualified for officership; see 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 February 1872, no. 26. For Tan Boen Sok’s case, 
see Chapter VI.
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Affairs argued that even in China, wealthy Chinese still had 
to pass state examinations in order to obtain an 
officership.78 Such a requirement was non-existent in the 
Dutch East Indies. The Resident of Batavia admitted that the 
Chinese officership in the colony was not based on European 
concepts or rules.79 Criteria such as 'b ekw aam h e id ', 
capability, and 'gesch ikthe id ', suitability, which were 
considered desirable qualities in European officials, were 
not necessarily taken into account when appointing native 
officials or Chinese officers. The two sets of requirements 
for European and non-European officials were plainly 
incompatible.80 And in addition, the Chinese view of society 
was rather worldly; although they openly expressed respect 
and were very sensitive to feelings of disgrace, they put 
material possessions above everything. In their way of 
thinking, honorary titles and positions were attainable only 
for those with wealth.81 The debate between the Officers 
for Chinese Affairs and the Resident of Batavia failed to 
reach a conclusion, and the criteria for Chinese 
officership82 continued to be based upon conventions which 
emphasized wealth, as well as the personal views of Dutch 
higher officials.
Moreover, because the Chinese officers were unpaid, the 
Dutch government offered them compensation in the form of 
tax exemptions and access to revenue-farming. One 
privilege was the release of officers and their families 
from the passport system from 1894.83 With regard to the
78 See his note of 15 December 1871, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 February 
1872, no. 26.
79 Quoted in disposition of Division C of the Office for Chinese Affairs, 22 
October 1872, no. 17745, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 31 October 1872, no. 
11.
80 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 13 August 1872, no. 
5650, in Gouvemmentsbesluit, 31 October 1872, no. 11.
81 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 28 September 1871, 
no. 5940, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 February 1872, no. 26.
82 See pages 87-88.
83 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 29 June 1894, 
no. 3722, in Mailrapport, no. 13 /1896 , ARA, The Hague. The passport 
system for the Chinese was relaxed in 1905 and abolished in 1916.
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Chinese officers' entry in revenue-farming, this later raised 
problems for the Director of Finance, particularly when it 
came to the implementation of a new taxation system. 
Fokkens argued that income from revenue-farming, mainly 
run by the Chinese, was not liable for bedrijfsbelasting or 
corporate tax for it was part of government financial 
policy. On the other hand, the abolition of revenue-farming 
in the early years of the twentieth century meant that the 
Chinese officers lost their main source of income. In 
addition, their uncertain position as unpaid government 
employees made their status for tax liability questionable. 
Many viewed tax exemptions for Chinese officers as a 
reward or financial compensation, and the Director of 
Finance strongly recommended that they be given a 
government salary;84 in his view, tax exemptions for 
Chinese officers should not be seen as a privilege. It would 
be preferable to acknowledge the position of the officials 
of the Chinese Administration in the same way as the 
members of the other 'bestuur*, for, in his opinion, should 
they had been government employees, their status would not 
have been viewed from financial reasons. In this respect, 
the Director of Finance did not see that it should affect 
public funds.85
The Advisor for Chinese Affairs, on the other hand, did 
not think it necessary to give them an official government 
income. He argued strongly that the government, in 
establishing the Chinese officership to run the Chinese 
Administration, saw it as a ‘kosteloos’, free of charge. This 
was the rationale behind selecting only wealthy Chinese for 
officership and compensating them with the above- 
mentioned privileges.86
Yet after the abolition of the revenue-farming system and 
the implementation of the new taxation structure, the 
question of salaries for Chinese officers remained. The
84 See consideration of Director of Finance to Governor-General, 29 March 
1895, no. 5177, in Mailrapport, no. 13/1896, ARA, The Hague.
85 Ibid.
86 Quoted in letter of Resident of Manado to Director of Home Affairs, 25 May 
1917, no. 100a, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 2193.
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Resident of Batavia reminded the government that under the 
changed financial conditions, most Chinese officers would 
be endeavouring to earn an income, and to expect their 
services to be free was no longer reasonable. The Resident 
suggested that giving the Chinese officers a fixed official 
salary would generate feelings of loyalty.87 And indeed, 
their loyalty to the Dutch government, which became 
critical during the turbulent period of the Pan-Chinese 
movement, would be better assured if their position was 
affirmed as government paid officials.88 Thus by the turn 
of the century the Chinese officership had the status of an 
unpaid government post which no longer benefitted from 
privileges such as entry to revenue-farming; clearly 
therefore it was no longer an attractive proposition for rich 
members of the Chinese community.89
Despite the lengthy discussion which took place within 
the Dutch government, a decision to give salaries to the 
officers of the Chineesch Bestuur was never made. And if 
one looks further, this was purely due to financial 
restrictions. In all probability the Dutch government was 
simply unable to allocate funds to this instrument of the 
Interior Administration. It was financial restraints, too, 
that discouraged the Dutch from unifying of the 
wijkbestuur, d is tric t adm inistration, managed by 
wardmasters for the whole of Java, to replace the 
Chineesch Bestuur 9°
87 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 6 December 
1911, no. 20707 /6 , in defending his proposal to give an allowance for the 
office expenses of Chinese officers in the environs of Batavia; see 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 27 January 1912, no. 80.
88 "Chineesche Officieren", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1914, p. 886.
89 "Chineesche Officieren en Wijkmeesters", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1913, 
p.1373.
90 See correspondence between the Resident of Batavia and Director of Home 
Affairs with Governor-General, 9 September 1912, no. 1 0 1 1 8 /3 , 14 
January 1914, no. 6 3 6 /1 0 , 27 February 1914, no. 1616, in Missive 
Gouvemements Secretarie, 13 May 1914, no 1197, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta; 
letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 13 November 1922, in 
geheim Mailrapport, no. 1249x/1922, letter of Director of Home Affairs to 
Governor-General, 25 April 1933, in geheim Mailrapport, no. 603 
x/1932, ARA, The Hague. Further details on the wijkbestuur see Chapter VII.
100
On 31 March 1934 the institution of Chinese officers in 
Java and Madura, with the exception of Batavia, was ended. 
For the last time, the officers received their allowance 
together, with an official expression of gratitude for their 
service.91
The Chinese Administration and the Local Authority  
of Batavia
It is not my intention here to go into details on the daily 
activities of the Chinese officers and their duties in the 
Chinese Administration. As this would focus on their 
functions and duties on behalf of the Chinese community, 
carried out through the Chinese Council or Kong Koan, an 
account of the Council would more appropriately describe 
the relationship between the Chinese people and their 
officers. Instead, I intend to concentrate on the 
adm inistrative mechanisms, between the Chinese 
Administration, headed by the major, and the offices of 
Batavia’s local authority.
As noted earlier, the Dutch government's principal aim in 
establishing separate administrative rule over the non­
native, non-European inhabitants, was to guard against 
possible or unnecessary entanglement with these foreign 
inhabitants. By appointing their own headmen, the Dutch 
would not become preoccupied with the internal affairs of 
others. Although these headmen were considered 
"handlangers van ons bestuur",*z henchmen of our 
government, their establishment should not represent any 
extra cost to the government. In practice, this meant that 
the Bestuur voor Vreemde Oosterlingen, Administration for 
the Foreign Asiatics, had to be self-sufficient. This may 
explain why the requirements for aspiring officers stressed 
the wealth of the applicant.
91 Gouvernementsbesluit, 30 March 1934, no. 2; see also Mailrapport, no. 
444/1943, ARA, The Hague.
92 Confidential letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 10 
December 1915, no. 685 G/B, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406.
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For the Chinese community itself, such a requirement 
fitted in with their way of life; as a migrant community, 
their reasons for being in the colony were purely financial. 
Nevertheless, the material requirements for would-be 
officers came to be irrelevant as times changed, and as 
attitudes towards officers within the growing Chinese 
community altered. The changing spirit of the Chinese 
community in the twentieth century brought about by Pan- 
Chinese revivalism led to a different, not to say difficult, 
era in the relationship with Dutch authority. But I will go no 
further on this matter here, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.
Being left self-sufficient, members of the Chinese 
community were able to accumulate property and maintain 
financial security. These properties were administered by 
the Chinese Council which regularly reported to the head of 
the local authority, i.e. the Resident of Batavia.93 In the 
case of financial administration, the local authority would 
not interfere except in cases of mismanagement. Very few 
cases of financial mismanagement by the Chinese Council 
occurred and these were settled by the Resident of 
Batavia94 without harm to the Chinese community.
The Chinese, as the Resident of Batavia noted, were well 
disposed towards the government. They were easy to rule 
and showed respect to the authorities in areas in which 
they settled.95 It is likely that the Resident of Batavia was 
referring to the Indies-born peranakan Chinese, for this 
description hardly fitted the new elements that emerged in 
the Chinese community in the early twentieth century. The 
main responsibilities of the Chinese Administration were to 
keep peace and order by showing obedience to Dutch 
authority, to respect the law of the country, to uphold 
public order, peace and security, and finally to maintain all
93 Letter of the Chinese Council to Resident of Batavia, 9 March 1855, no. 
33; and letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 9 January 1856, 
no. 73, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1856, no. 23.
94 Further discussion on this subject, see Chapter IV.
95 "Politiek Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het jaar 1872,1873", 
Batavia, no. 18, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
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general and local regulations, inspections and orders.96 It 
should be noted that in keeping peace and order in their 
community, the Chinese officers had no police authority, 
and were not competent to handle crimes,97 a situation 
which does not correspond to James Rush*s description of 
powerful Chinese officers in other parts of Java. According 
to Rush, the Chinese Council maintained a separate police 
force to investigate crimes involving Chinese, and to pursue 
those who sought to avoid government taxes and monopolies. 
Furthermore, he observed that the Chinese officers were 
authorized to inspect the warehouses, shops, depots, homes 
and other property of Chinese and other non-European 
suspects.98 As Rush does not refer in his account to any 
sources, either Dutch archives or printed indigenous 
materials, I contend that he exaggerates the power of the 
Chinese officers. My sources, particularly those derived 
from the local level, give a different impression.
The Chinese major of Batavia was very cautious in his 
relations with the Resident when dealing with the family 
affairs of his people, let alone using the police powers 
described by Rush to deal with crimes and tax violators. 
This is evident from the cases of two Chinese wives who 
forwarded complaints to the Chinese major about their 
husbands. These wives were sent back to their parents* 
homes, but the husbands did not mention divorces. To the 
peranakan Chinese family tradition, the case demonstrates 
that the husbands neglected their duties, which meant they 
were disrespectful towards the wives* families. The 
complaints were brought separately to the Chinese major 
who, in order to settle the dispute, wrote to the Resident of
96 See "Instructie voor de Hoofden van Vreemde Oosterlingen”, quoted in 
letter of Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 31 January 1913, 
no. 2014 /6 , in Agenda, 11 February 1913, no. 6146.
97 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 29 June 1894, 
no. 3722, in Mailrapport, no. 13/1896, ARA, The Hague.
98 James Rush, Opium to Java, p. 87.
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Batavia requesting that the two husbands be sent to him. In 
turn the Resident ordered the local sheriff to fetch them ."
Looking into the lower echelons staff employed by the 
Chinese Council, there were certain  ' o p p a s \  
attendants, 'tjenteng djage malem', nightguards, and ‘spion’, 
spy.100 The 'spion1 or 'm ata-m ata \ as they were popularly 
known, were very common in local authority offices, those 
of both Chinese officers and native officials; they acted 
chiefly as informants rather than being involved in 
enforcement. It is likely that what James Rush saw as a 
police force was in fact the group of centeng, or bodyguards.
Liem Thian Joe refers to the fact that in order to 
safeguard opium deliveries, most opium farmers kept 'jago 
silat' or martial fighters.101 But as James Rush goes further 
in suggesting the enforcement of police authority, an 
exaggerated picture is painted of the Chinese officers* 
powers. Would the Dutch really have tolerated the Chinese 
officers maintaining a separate police force? It seems most 
unlikely that the Dutch government would have consented, 
for that would have had serious consequences for law 
enforcement, peace and order in the colony.
My aim here has been to correct accepted, but misleading, 
descriptions of the institution of Chinese officers, by 
focussing on those in Batavia. Batavia had the largest 
Chinese community in Java but is clearly underrepresented 
in scholarly studies,102 the work on the Chinese in other 
parts of Java cannot speak for those in Batavia. As the 
Chinese of Batavia had distinctive characters, both of being
"  Letters of the Chinese major to Resident of Batavia, 18 January 1845 and 
28 March 1845, for each case, in Batavia, no. 3 4 5 /1 , Arsip Nasional, 
Jakarta.
100 "Staat Gadjih boelan November 1927", in letter of Governor of West- 
Java to Governor-General, 3 August 1928 , no. A 5 /1 1 /2 ,  in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 5 November 1929, no. 17. On the 'm ata-m ata ' 
employed by the Chinese Council of Batavia, see also letter of the Chinese 
Council to Resident of Batavia, 11 May 1866 , no. 77 , in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 13 July 1866, no. 17
101 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang, p. 100.
102 James Rush, "Placing the Chinese in Java on the Eve of the Twentieth 
Century", in The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modem Indonesian 
Life (1991. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program), p. 13, footnote no.1.
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urban and rural people, and being the largest Chinese 
community in Java indicates its own particulars.
4 THE CHINESE COUNCIL OF BATAVIA
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The term Chineesch Bestuur, namely local rule over the 
Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, frequently appears in 
Dutch colonial records, particularly in the 1920's when the 
government discussed its termination. In the eyes of the 
Dutch, this Chineesch Bestuur was represented by, or 
composed, of the Chinese officers and the Chinese Council. 
It should be noted that the term refers only to rule over the 
Chinese communities in Java and Madura. The institution of 
Chinese officers was in fact set up by the Dutch when they 
appointed the first Chinese captain on 11 October 1619. It 
existed until 1934, with the exception of the Chinese 
officers in Batavia.
Little has been written on the Chinese officers and the 
Chinese Council. Both institutions, the Chinese officers and 
the Chinese Council (called by the Dutch government, the 
Chineesche Raad, while for the Chinese community it was 
Kong Koan) worked together in managing and supervising the 
Chinese community.
There are two articles, written by P de Roo de la Faille,1 
former Resident of Batavia, and by Yo Heng Kam,2 former 
Chinese captain and member of the Chinese Council, which 
consider the question of the termination of Batavia's 
Chinese Council. Myra Sidharta3 showed the richness of the 
Kong Koan archives, yet there has been no serious study 
using these sources.4 In terms of historical studies using
1 P de Roo de la Faille, "De Chineesche Raad te Batavia en het door dit College 
Beheerde Fonds", Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land-en Volkenkunde van 
Nederlandsch-lndie (hereafter BKI), vol. 80, 1924, pp. 302 - 324.
2 Yo Heng Kam, "Reorganisatie van den Chineesche Raad", De Chineesche 
Revue, July 1928, pp. 77-89.
3 Myra Sidharta, "On the Remnants of the Gong Goan Archives in Jakarta". 
Paper presented at the International Conference on Local History of the Asia- 
Pacific Region, Hongkong, 6-8 April 1989.
4 This is admitted by J Th Vermeulen, see his " Eenige Opmerkingen over de 
Rechtsbedeeling van de Compagnie in de 17de en 18de Eeuw voor de 
Chineesche Samenleving " in Mededeelingen van het China Instituut Batavia,
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the archives kept in the Kong Koan or the Chinese Council 
office, the Chinese of Semarang have received more 
attention than those of Batavia. Liem Thian Joe used the 
Kong Koan archives for his work on the Chinese community 
in Semarang,5 which James Rush used for his description of 
the relationships among the Chinese officers of Java's 
northern coast.6
Unfortunately, I have been unable to use the Kong Koan 
archives of Batavia/Jakarta. Thus, here I am painting a 
rather sketchy picture of the relationships between the 
Chinese Council and the Chinese officers in Batavia. My 
evidence is gathered mostly from Dutch government 
archives, complemented by secondary sources. It may seem 
that there is little information on the Chinese response 
towards the management of the Council, as I am unable to 
use contemporary sources such as the Chinese-Malay 
newspapers, where Chinese public opinion was usually 
expressed.
The Establishment
Although the date of the establishment of the Chinese 
officers in Batavia is recorded in the VOC archives,7 there 
is no reference to when the C h i n e e s c h e R a a d  was 
established. Most historians argue th at it came into 
existence in 1678,8 with the exception of M Sidharta who,
December 1932, p. 2. and by B. Hoetink in his " Chineesche Officieren te 
Batavia onder de Compagnie ", BKI, vol. 78, 1922, p. 5.
5 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang (1933. Semarang: 
n.p.)
6 James R Rush, "Opium Farms in the Nineteenth Century Java; Institutional 
Continuity and Change in a Colonial Society 1860 - 1910" (1977 . 
Unpublished PH.D. dissertation, New Haven, Yale University) especially 
chapter IV. See also his Opium to Java. Revenue Farming and Chinese 
Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia 1860 -1910  (1990 . Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press)
7 See Resolutie, 11 October 1619, on the appoinment of Bencon, the first 
Chinese captain of Batavia.
8 J Th Vermeulen, "Eenige Opmerkingen over de Rechtsbedeeling", p. 11; P de 
Roo de la Faille, "De Chineesche Raad te Batavia", p. 308; and Liem Ting 
Tjay"Het Instituut der Chineesche Officieren", De Chineesche Revue, July 
1928, p. 67.
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for her own reasons, maintains it was 1717.9
The argument for 1678 is based on the fact that the year 
saw the appointment of three Chinese officers in Batavia, 
Tsoa Wanjock (Tjoa Hiang Giok) as captain, Limsisaij as 
lieutenant and Litsoecko as sergeant. The establishment of 
the Chinese Council is considered to have taken place when 
the VOC agreed to appoint not just one officer but 
additional officers to work with him. From 1619 to 1666 
the VOC had appointed only one Chinese captain to manage 
Batavia's Chinese immigrant community, as in the cases of 
Souw Beng Kong (Bencon), Phoa Beng Gan (Bingam), Lim 
Lacco and Gan Dji Ko (Siqua). By appointing several persons 
the Dutch laid the foundations for the Chinese officership, 
and led the way for the establishment of the Chinese 
Council, particularly as membership of the Council was open 
only to Chinese officers, the highest ranking being entitled 
to the chairmanship. Having several officers to manage 
Chinese affairs was beneficial to both the VOC and the 
Chinese themselves.
For twelve years the Chinese held a longstanding 
resentment against the VOC because after the death of 
captain Gan Dji Ko (Siqua) in 1666, it did not appoint a new 
captain; this was because the Governor-General, Joan 
Maetsuycker, had no interest in the Chinese community in 
Batavia.10 For almost twelve years, the widow of captain 
Gan Dji Ko took the liberty of presiding over the 
management of Chinese affairs. This caused great 
displeasure among the Chinese: not only were they ruled by 
a woman but the person concerned was the late captain Gan 
Dji Ko's concubine, of Balinese origin.
The VOC realized the need for advice and assistance in 
dealing with Chinese affairs in the city, and this could be 
obtained only from people who were respected by their 
fellow countrymen. This was expressed in the official 
assignment of Tsoa Wanjock (Tjoa Hiang Giok); according to 
the Batavia Daily Records [Daghregisters van het Casteel
9 M Sidharta, "On the Remnants of the Gong Goan Archives", p. 5.
10 J Th Vermeulen, op. cit., p.11.
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Batavia] of 29 June 1 678, he should communicate with his 
two subordinates in managing and settling all petty cases 
among the Chinese on behalf of the Dutch, but refer to them 
all serious cases. Additionally, advice was given on being a 
good, devout and alert captain.11 Furthermore, all Chinese 
inhabitants of the city were asked to show obedience and 
respect to their officers.
M Sidharta propounds 1717 for the establishment of the 
Chinese Council, because she claims that in this year, 
Chinese officers received authority to give permission for 
marriage and divorce within the Chinese community.12 The 
Chinese Council's main internal function was to take care of 
the community's civil affairs, especially regarding marriage 
and deaths.13 On the other hand, crucial functions 
concerning political advice tended to be carried out by the 
Chinese officers, either the Chinese captain or later the 
major, as he was the person directly responsible to the 
colonial authorities.
The Management of Chinese Affairs
The Chinese Council had been in existence for nearly two 
and a half centuries when the Resident of Batavia issued 
decree no 16210 /6  on 7 September 1915, article 2 of which 
outlined the Council's main functions. These were to serve 
the public interest of the Chinese community in Batavia, to 
do its utmost to help provide free education for Chinese 
children of less wealthy parents, to arrange and bear the 
expenses of annual public ceremonies, and to manage of the 
Chinese cemeteries located in the various Council-owned 
grounds.
A year after the siege of Batavia, on 1 July 1620, 
Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen set up a Collegie van 
Schepenen [College of Aldermen] to administer and exercise
11 B Hoetink, "Chineesche Officieren te Batavia onder de Compagnie", pp. 29- 
30.
12 M Sidharta, "On the Remnants of the Gong Goan Archives", pp. 5-6.
13 Ibid., Tables I and II.
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justice regarding the civil affairs of the city. In the case of 
the Chinese, whom the VOC regarded as 'onse onderstaen 
ende burgeren deser stede' [our subjects and citizens of this 
city], Bencon, the Chinese captain of the time, was given a 
seat in the College on condition that he was never allowed 
to preside over it.14
As the number of Chinese immigrants grew rapidly, from 
800 persons in 1620 to 3,500 in 1627 ,15 their activities in 
the city flourished, which increasingly drew the attention 
of the Dutch. On 16 June 1625 the VOC appointed a second 
Chinese, alongside the captain, to be an extra-ordinary 
member of the College of Aldermen, as cases concerning the 
Chinese were being raised almost every day.16 However, in 
1666 Chinese membership of the College of Aldermen was 
no longer allowed as, in the opinion of the Governor- 
General, Joan Maetsuycker, it was no longer necessary.17 
Nevertheless the advice of Chinese officers was still 
required in dealing with Chinese judicial affairs. From this 
time, internal Chinese disputes and disputes between 
Chinese and other nationals were brought to the Raad van 
Justi t ie or Superior Council of Justice. Criminal cases 
involving the Chinese were not brought before the Raad van 
Justitie but were heard in the Landraad, the Natives1 Court. 
This indicates that in terms of legal status, as members of 
the colonial community, the Chinese were split into two 
categories, each having its own jurisdiction. Being 'bangsa 
tengah1 (middle-group) between the Dutch and the natives, 
the Chinese fitted into either segment, according to  
government interests.
14 Article 5 in "Authorisatie van de Schepenen de Stadt Jacatra", Plakaatboek 
van Nederlandsch-lndie (hereafter Plakaatboek), vol. I, p.60.
16 Numbers of Chinese immigrants in Batavia fluctuated due to the in-coming 
and out-going junks which brought them to the city. In 1626 five junks 
brought 2,000 Chinese, while in 1627 there were already 3,500 Chinese 
residing in Batavia. In 1629 they decreased to 2,000, and by the end of 1632 
there were 2,422 Chinese living in Batavia. By the end of 1633 their 
numbers were only 2,300. See B Hoetink, "So Bing Kong; het Eerste Hoofd 
der Chineezen te Batavia", BKI, vol. 73, 1917, p. 350.
16 See article 6 in "Instructie voor het Collegie van Schepenen", Plakaatboek, 
vol. I, p. 128.
17 J Th Vermeulen, "Eenige Opmerkingen over de Rechtsbedeeling", p. 12.
\ ,
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The fac t that trials concerning civil affairs were 
conducted in the Raad van Justitie did not in any way 
indicate that the Chinese were admitted to the status of 
European citizens. It was a means of protecting Dutch 
interests in Chinese business transactions. On the other 
hand, being prosecuted in the Natives' Court or Landraad as 
a criminal case was regarded as a humiliation by the 
Chinese, something they could never willingly accept.
Legal condition worsened in 1868, when the Dutch 
launched the system of politie-ro l [police-roll], in which 
court jurisdiction was based in administrative areas, such 
that officials of the local administration also exercised a 
judicial function. In this system of politie-rol, the Chinese 
became victims of hostility from both the Dutch and native 
officials, as the courts were simply the tools of the 
administrators, rather than instruments of justice.1 8 
Moreover, the system made it possible for officials to pass 
sentence without consulting witnesses, and discouraged 
the accused from appealing to a higher court.19 Any 
grievance the Chinese might have concerning their legal 
status, however, could not be dealt with through their own 
headmen or Council. In the colonial system, Chinese 
officers, like the native officials, were an instrument of 
colonial authority, nothing more than the apparatus of an 
authoritarian colonial policy, by which they themselves had 
been created.
The first aspects of Chinese civil affairs that the VOC 
regime chose to administer were those dealing with 
inheritances, legacies, debts, estates and other related 
matters following the death of a Chinese. On 26 May 1640 a 
Collegie van Boedelmeesteren voor Chineesche Sterfhuizen 
[College of Estate-Executors for the Chinese House of 
Mourning] was founded. The reason for this was that "inde
18 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism. The Genesis o f the Pan- 
Chinese Movement in Indonesia 1900-1916  (1960 . Glencoe: The Free 
Press), p. 34.
1 9 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang, p. 89; F H 
Fromberg, "Terdjepit", Chung Hwa Hui Tsa Chiht no.1, December 1917, p.
I l l
Chineesche Sterfhuysen veele ende menichvuldige frauden 
ende malversatien 11, [in the Chinese Houses of Mourning 
there were frequent frauds].20 It is said that estates or 
inheritances were often unfairly assessed, so that the 
children of the deceased were left destitute. Although here 
the VOC appeared to be concerned with penniless Chinese 
families, their true intention was to protect the interests 
of Dutch involved in commercial transactions with the 
Chinese. At first the College had two Chinese officials 
appointed by the Dutch. After its reorganization in 1766, in 
which a division was set up to handle the legacies of non- 
Christians, there were Chinese officials and also native 
administrators. The Chinese officials employed in the 
College of Estate-Executors who dealt with the legacies of 
non-Christians could apply to the Dutch for Chinese 
officership at the rank of lieutenant or, more rarely, 
captain. As the title given to them was merely honorary, 
they had little influence in the development of the Chinese 
community in Batavia. On the other hand, those Chinese 
officers who performed an effective function, having 
responsibility in settling civil matters,21 formed a division 
among themselves, which later became institutionalized 
through the Chinese Council.
As has been mentioned, while Chinese legacies and 
related matters were administered under the Dutch, other 
civil affairs, such as marriage and divorce, were taken care 
of by Chinese officers, with administration and record­
keeping being handled by the Chinese Council. Before 
matters regarding marriage and divorce had been handed 
over to the Chinese officers, they had been completely in 
the hands of the Chinese families concerned, as according to 
customary Hokkien law, they were strictly a family issue, 
in which decisions were made by the oldest members of the
20 See "Aanstelling van Boedelmeesteren voor Chineesche Sterfhuizen", 
Plakaatboek, vol. I, p. 439.
21 See basic assignment given to the first captain, Bencon, in Resolutie, 11 
October 1619; and B Hoetink, "So Bing Kong, het Eerste Hoofd der 
Chineezen", p. 354 and "Chineesche Offcieren te Batavia onder de Compagnie",
p. 10.
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family.22 Due to much abuse of marriage and divorce among 
the Chinese in Batavia, the Chinese officers forwarded 
complaints to the VOC. The latter, however, had no 
knowledge of these family affairs, and ultimately the 
Chinese officers had to settle the disputes themselves.
In 1717 the Chinese officers were given the authority to 
perform marriages and permit divorce among the Chinese of 
Batavia. The instruction said that no Chinese person, man or 
woman, widow or daughter, or deserted widow would be 
allowed to enter into marriage without the knowledge and 
permission of the Chinese captain and lieutenant, who on a 
set day each week would hold a hearing for such matters.23 
The hearing would investigate whether the proposed 
marriage followed Chinese customary law, a particular 
stipulation being that the bride and bridegroom should not 
bear the same she or family name.24 From 1717 until 1907, 
when the Dutch set up a civil registry office for the 
Chinese, marriage records were kept by the Chinese Council.
Although the Dutch might interfere in their affairs, 
particularly those which dealt with monetary transactions, 
for the greater part the Chinese were left on their own. For 
example, they were perm itted to build their own 
cemeteries, which later developed into a successful 
business run by the Chinese Council. The first request by the 
Chinese to purchase a piece of land for their own cemetery, 
located beyond the old fort of Jacatra, was granted in 1660. 
Eight years later, on 20 November 1668, they gained the 
property rights for 400 rixdollars to enable them to dig a 
canal around the cemetery, to prevent plunder. After that, 
there were frequent land purchases by the Chinese 
community of Batavia for cemeteries, and later for other 
purposes. Chinese communal landownership was exercised
22 J Th Vermeulen, "Eenige Opmerkingen van de Rechtsbedeeling", p. 7.
23 See "Voorschriften nopens Huwelijken en Entscheidingen onder Chineezen 
te Batavia", dated 13 March 1717, in Plakaatboek, vol. IV, p. 94.
24 The Chinese regard persons bearing the same family name as kin, although 
they are not blood-brothers. Marriage between persons bearing the same 
family name is strictly forbidden. For a description of Indies-born Chinese 
family names, see Liem Thian Joe, "Nama Toeroenan dan Familiesysteem dari 
Orang Tionghoa", Jade, no.1, July 1941, pp. 38-49.
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through the Chinese Council. Much later, when debates on 
the termination of the Chineesch Bestuur took place within 
Dutch government circles, the government realised the 
difficulty of abolishing the Chinese Council, due to its 
function regarding Chinese communal landownership.25 How 
the Council built up handsome funds through landownership 
and land transactions, and the mismanagement which lead 
to Dutch interference, will be discussed in the following 
pages.
Apart from managing Chinese civil affairs, the Chinese 
Council's other function was to oversee the public interests 
of the Chinese community. As was stated in the Resident's 
decree of 1915, 'public interests' meant the provision of 
free education and the arrangement of annual religious 
ceremonies. In fact both activities took place near the 
office of the Chinese Council - Petak Sembilan, near the 
Great River or Kali Besar, in the previous Chinese quarter, 
presently West Jakarta. The Chinese community's main 
temple where public religious festivities were held was 
situated in Petak Sembilan. The temple was built in 1650, 
and in 1755 was given the name Jin de Yuan (presently 
called Wihara Dharma Bhakti) by captain Oey Tji Lo.26
To provide free education for children of poorer families, 
the Council set up a school in 1755 called Beng Seng Sie 
Wan, later known as Gie Oh.17 The school was also located in 
Petak Sembilan, in the yard of the main temple. Classes 
were conducted in the Hokkien dialect, and teaching 
methods were those of the motherland, providing a classical 
Chinese education. The old system of teaching concentrated 
mostly on the recitation of classical works, prononciation 
and accent and, at a later stage, knowledge of Chinese 
characters. A similar method was used in many other 
Chinese private schools in Batavia and the surrounding
25 For further details, see Chapter VII.
26 C Salmon & D Lombard, Les Chinois des Jakarta; Temples et Vie Collective 
(1980. Paris: Etudes Insulindiennes-Archipel, vol. I), p. 72.
27 Lie Tjian Tjoen, "Kong Koan dan Sekolah Tionghoa", in Hari Ulang Tahun 
ke-50 Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Djakarta, 3 Djuni 1900-3 Djuni 1950  
(1950. Djakarta: THHK), p. 14.
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areas. According to G. Schlegel, an official interpreter, 
there were 17 private schools in the 1860 ’s, each of which 
had about 15 pupils. These were run either by Chinese 
officers or by other wealthy Chinese, and a few had been 
opened by schoolmasters.28 The strong concern of the 
Chinese officers to educate the children can be seen in their 
requests to the Dutch to admit Chinese teachers, clerks and 
cashiers for their private land estates in the Batavia area.29
For these wealthy Chinese, the need to educate their 
children was primarily a practical one, for after attending 
school for a certain length of time, children were expected 
to assist their parents in running the business, mostly as 
bookkeepers and clerks. But in reality, these practical needs 
could not be met by schooling based on the old system of 
teaching. With these traditional methods, it took a pupil 
some 10 to 12 years to master the Chinese classics, while 
most Chinese parents were urging their children to be 
engaged in the family business after completing only the 
fourth year of their education.
This situation came to be of deep concern to the Chinese 
in Batavia. As immigrants, the first generations might be 
preoccupied with money-making; but the rapid growth of 
business activities led to more developed commercial 
affairs, and thus education for their children became a 
necessity. Employing teachers from the homeland, who still 
adhered to the old methods of teaching, simply perpetuated 
the problem. This explains why the main objective of the 
first modern Chinese association in Batavia, Tiong Hoa 
Hwee Koan (hereafter THHK) set up in March 1900, was to 
meet the needs of the Chinese to educate their children. The 
first school using a modern system of education was opened 
in March 1901. Instruction was conducted in Mandarin, the 
Chinese official language, as Batavia’s Chinese community
28 See Schlegel's report,10 December 1862, in Agenda, 2 January 1863, no. 
85, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
2 9 See request of captain Oey Liauw Keng, approved by 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 20 May 1843, no. 34; also from lieutenant Ko Tjoen 
Kiat, approved by Gouvernementsbesluit, 29 September 1843, no. 3.
115
was becoming more varied, and included Hakkas and Macaos, 
as well as Hokkiens.
Opening the modern THHK school meant that the Chinese 
Council had to consider the position of the existing Gie Oh 
school. As many Chinese officers were also members of the 
THHK board of directors, and some were even founding 
fathers of the association (Oey Giok Koen, Lie Hin Liang, 
Khoe A Fan, Khouw Kim An, to name a few) they decided to 
merge the Gie Oh and THHK schools. However, objections 
were raised, particularly on the part of the teachers. 
Rumours spread that the quality of THHK pupils was no 
better than that of the old school. To convince parents, a 
competitive examination was organized to determine which 
of the two educational systems was better. The competition 
was witnessed by all officers of the Chinese Council and 
the THHK executive board.30 As might be anticipated, better 
results were attained by the THHK pupils. Thus the decision 
to close the Gie Oh school was accomplished. Its pupils 
were transferred to the THHK school and the money provided 
to it was transferred to the THHK, a monthly contribution 
which lasted until a reorganization of the Chinese Council.
The Chinese community's achievement in establishing its 
own system of self-supporting education made the Dutch 
authorities wary, especially as within five years, schools 
had been set up by THHK branches in almost every city in 
Java as well as in Sumatra (Palembang, Bangka, Muntok, 
Pangkalpinang), Kalimantan (Banjarmasin) and North 
Sulawesi (Gorontalo).31 Viewing these rapid developments, 
the Dutch became anxious, as the tendency towards political 
activities in the Chinese movement was becoming obvious. 
School were certainly a seed-bed for political ideology and 
national awakening. In 1908 the Dutch government 
established the Hollandsch-Chineesch School [Holland- 
Chinese School] where the language of instruction was
30 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Batavia 1900- 
1939 (1940. Batavia: THHK), pp. 21-22; and Kwee Tek Hoay, The Origins 
of the Modern Chinese Movement in Indonesia (1969 . Ithaca: Modern 
Indonesia Project. Cornell University. Translation Series), p. 23.
31 See Nio Joe Ian, op. cit., pp. 69-74.
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Dutch.32 It is interesting to note that in order to encourage 
Chinese parents to send their children to this government 
school, the Dutch asked the THHK for the help.3 3 
Apprehension amongst the Chinese that the government 
school might distract from Chinese self-supporting 
education was misplaced. By 1934 there were 259 THHK 
schools accommodating 30,438 pupils.34
The Council and Its Financial Management
As has been stated, the Chinese Council administered 
Chinese communal land, for which it was given the status of 
a corporate body. P de Roo de la Faille, the former resident 
of Batavia, noted that by 1915 the Chinese Council 
possessed about 14 private land estates, dispersed in the 
areas surrounding Batavia.35 Twelve years later, according 
to a financial report of 1927, there were 23 properties, 
comprising pieces of land or plots (perceel) and private land 
estates.36
One may wonder how the Chinese Council compiled such 
huge resources. In the early years of the VOC, their 
financial resources generally came from the percentages or 
money incentives raised through taxes levied on the 
activities of the Chinese. These included taxes on in-coming 
and out-going Chinese junks and migrants, on burial and 
marriage registration, on Chinese capitation, also from fees 
for providing letters, passports and certificates, or from 
other matters which members of the Council called 
'perkara', cases which required the Council's participation.37
32 It should be noted that the opening of the Hollandsch-lnlandsche School 
(Holland-Native School) was not until 1914.
33 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Batavia, p. 116.
34 See "Onderwijs Tiong Hoa di Indonesia", Sin Po Jubileum Nummer 1910- 
1935 (1935. Batavia: Sin Po).
35 P de Roo de la Faille, "De Chineesche Raad te Batavia", p. 304.
36 "Verslag van de Commissie voor het Financieel Beheer van den Chineeschen 
Raad", 17 November 1927, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 5 November 1929, no. 
7.
37 Letter of the Chinese Council to Resident of Batavia, 11 May 1866, in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 13 July 1866, no. 17.
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Much later, when the Chinese were no longer engaged in 
revenue-farming, due to its abolition by the Dutch at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the Council's funds were built 
up by other means, through land leases, payment of rents, 
mortgages, bank investments, deposits and so on.38
It was the Dutch government's intention to leave the 
Chinese Council to manage its own funds although, being 
subordinate to the local authority, the Council was expected 
to submit an annual financial report to the Resident of 
Batavia.39 However, during the majorship of Tan Eng Goan 
(18 37 -1866 ) a case arose which could not fail to invite 
government interference. Being chairman of the Council and 
the highest-ranking officer, the major was a powerful 
person in the decision-making process. Tan Eng Goan, 
promoted as first Chinese major of Batavia in 1837, was 
rumoured to be' unfortunate in his revenue-farming business.
The life style which was required by his position as major 
exceeded his financial security, and it was said that most 
of his expenses were settled by a lieutenant whom he had 
promoted, Oey Thay Lo.40 The Resident of Batavia had long 
been aware of major Tan Eng Goan's declining business. In 
1844 the latter requested a loan of 250,000 guilders from 
the government to back up his business.41 In 1848 he asked 
for repayment of 5 ,462.37 guilders from revenue-leasing, 
as his receipts on the bazaar tax and on sales of spirits and 
tobacco had fallen short.42 In 1850 he again asked the 
government for compensation, 2 ,106 .56 guilders, but was 
given only 1,742.37 guilders.43 Dutch records of 1851 and 
1855 indicate the unpromising fortune of major Tan Eng
38 See "Verslag van de Commissie voor het Financieel Beheer van den 
Chineeschen Raad", op.cit.
39 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 9 March 1855, no.
652, noted that the financial report of the Chinese Council was regularly 
checked by his office; see Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1856, no. 23.
40 Phoa Kian Sioe, Sedjarahnja Souw Beng Kong, Phoa Beng Gan, Oey Tamba 
Sia (1956. Djakarta: Penerbit Reporter). Note that Oey Tamba Sia was the 
son of lieutenant Oey Thay Lo.
41 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 November 1844, no. 3.
42 Advice of Director of Public Funds and Domains to Governor-General, 14 
March 1851, no. 668, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 April 1851, no. 16.
43 Ibid.
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Goan's business.44 Eventually, the Dutch displeasure with 
Tan Eng Goan grew into distrust. It was said that many of 
his subordinates, notably captain Tan Tjoen Tiat and 
lieutenant The Kim Houw, were disappointed with Tan Eng 
Goan's meekness in handling the case of Oey Tamba Sia, the 
son of the late lieutenant, Oey Thay Lo.45 Moreover, the 
major was guilty of nepotism in promoting his sons, Tan 
Soe Tjong and Tan Kang Soei, to lieutenantships in 1849 and 
1860. It should be noted that at that time the Dutch were 
not concerned over favouritism among Chinese officers, 
although a decade later they would refuse a candidate 
because of his family connections.
The growing distrust towards Tan Eng Goan drove the 
Dutch in 1856 to hold up its approval of the Council's 
request to purchase areas of Tanjung and Slipi for Chinese 
cemeteries. Those two pieces of land, one located in the 
northern and the other in the western part of Batavia, had 
been leased by the Council for almost 15 years. The leasing 
contract and payments had been handled by the major from 
1829 to 1844. It is said that the major also kept 
certificates of the sale of land in Jati, located in the 
western part of Batavia.46 Not wanting to act in a direct 
manner that would cause the major to lose face in front of 
other officers and the Chinese community, the Dutch 
proposed that the Chinese Council transfer the management 
of its funeral funds to the office of the Collegie van 
Boedelmeesteren. Thus purchase of burial grounds, legacies, 
inheritances and debts of the deceased would be handled by 
the College in its section for non-Christians. The Chinese 
Council was aware of the subtle meaning behind the
44 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 11 June 1851, no. 16; and 6 November 1855, 
no. 11. See also Chapter VI.
45 Oey Tamba Sia was a notorious womanizer, having a bad reputation among 
the Chinese in Batavia. He was much disliked by most Chinese officers for his 
ill-manners and contempt towards them. The officers expected major Tan Eng 
Goan to reproach Oey Tamba Sia, which he did not dare to do, as the major had 
unpaid debts to his late father, Oey Thay Lo. Later, Oey Tamba Sia was 
sentenced to death for committing murder. See Phoa Kian Sioe, op. cit., pp. 
81-104.
46 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 9 January 1856, no.
73, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1856, no. 23.
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proposal, and its answer conveyed its unhappiness, 
repeatedly stating that its accountability was to the 
Resident of Batavia. It said that its financial report was 
annually submitted to the Resident. The fact that it had 
regular fortnightly meetings to check on daily matters, and 
that the money collected by the lieutenants was reported 
monthly, showed an eagerness to convince the Dutch of its 
ability to manage its affairs. Although saying it was 'trada  
pantas", inappropriate, if the management of land purchases 
were to be transferred to the office of Boedelmeesteren, it 
also expressed an unwillingness to decline the government 
proposal.47
The question was settled when the Chinese Council and 
the Resident of Batavia reached an agreement, an 
Arrangement for Further Management of the Chinese Funeral 
Funds of Batavia [Regeeling over het verder Beheer van het 
Chineesch Begrafenisfonds te Batavia] on 17 February 
1 8 5 6 .48 Before this, major Tan Eng Goan promised the 
Council that he would no longer be involved in the 
management of funeral funds; all papers, debentures and 
certificates of land sales were handed to the secretary of 
the Chinese Council.49 The agreement outlined the duties of 
two elected officers, who were to be in charge of the 
finances together with the secretary of the Council. 
Accounts would be submitted to the Council at the end of 
every month, and annually to the Resident of Batavia. 
Furthermore, the agreement gave instructions on expenses 
for burial ground maintenance, the salaries of the guards 
and persons who had access to money. By these new rules, 
the Dutch prevented the major from being single-handedly 
involved in the finances of the Chinese Council, which might 
easily fall into mismanagement. On the other hand, 
considering that many transactions involved Chinese funeral
47 Letter of the Chinese Council to Resident of Batavia, 9 March 1855, no. 
33, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1856, no. 23.
48 Letter of the Chinese Council to Resident of Batavia, 29 December 1855. 
no. 539, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1856, no. 23.
49 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 9 January 1856, no. 
73, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1856, no. 23.
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affairs (purchase of plots for burial grounds, maintenance 
fees, and regular contributions for the expense of funeral 
ceremonies) handling such funds was a complicated 
business, involving considerable sums of money. Moreover, 
the land that had been purchased, though reserved for 
cemeteries, could in the meantime be utilized for other 
purposes. In this way the Chinese Council added to its huge 
funds.
If the Chinese major's position as chairman of the Council 
could lead to an abuse of power, the next person who might 
be prone to ill-action was the secretary. The Council 
employed two secretaries, the second of which acted as 
treasurer and was directly supervised by the chairman of 
the Council. It was quite possible, if the major was not very 
efficient, that all the Council's paperwork and financial 
reports would be left to the secretaries without further 
checking. And this could lead to unfortunate consequences, 
as was the case in 1907 during the majorship of Tio Tek Ho.
If Tan Eng Goan was known for his weakness in dealing 
with the Council's funds, then Tio Tek Ho was simply an 
inefficient organizer. The case was made public, raising 
questions about money collected for an annual religious 
ceremony, called 'sembahyang r e b u ta n or in Dutch records, 
'c iokofeest'.50 It was the task of the Chinese Council to 
arrange this public ceremony in the main temple, Jin de 
Y uan , by means of a long established system of 
contributions, known as ' tee-yan bohong' .51 The Council 
gained more contributions by circulating a list of donations, 
accompanied by the names of the officers who had given 
them, although the figures were great exaggerations. This 
was in order to attract more money, as no one in the 
Chinese community would dare embarrass the officers by 
donating more than they. In fact, many Chinese businessmen
50 This ceremony, held in the seventh month of the Chinese lunar calender, is 
intended to provide a feast for all wandering spirits, as according to Chinese 
belief, they might have no living relatives to take care of their altar.
51 See Kwee Tek Hoay, The Origins of the Modern Chinese Movement in 
Indonesia, p. 29.
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could afford to contribute more, yet Chinese values did not 
encourage this.
This game was revealed in 1907 by Khouw Lam Tjiang, 
the master of ceremonies. He was the THHK chief treasurer 
who, after completing his ceremonial duties, insisted on 
consulting the Council's books to calculate the expenditure. 
His insistence frightened the second secretary and in turn 
made the major anxious. When his requests were met by 
continual excuses from the Council, Khouw Lam Tjiang and 
Phoa Keng Hek, president of THHK, brought the question 
before the Resident of Batavia.52 At the same time, HHKan 
(Kan Hok Hoei), a notable Chinese landlord who was later 
chosen by the Dutch government as the first Chinese 
representative in the People's Council, and Lie Hin Liam, a 
Chinese captain who was one of the founding fathers of 
THHK, made a move within the Council. Both accused the 
second secretary, Nie Liang Soey, of manipulating the 
expenditure of the ciokofeest held on 15 August 1907. 
Apparently he had claimed expenses of 400 guilders, but 
HHKan said that the ceremony could not have cost more than 
200 guilders. Nie Liang Soey was fired for being 
untrustworthy.53
Compared with major Tan Eng Goan, Nie Liang Soey's 
misdemeanour was minor. But what should be noted is the 
government attitude towards the two cases. In the case of 
the land purchases at Tanjtmg and Slipi, which revealed 
major Tan Eng Goan's involvement, the Dutch immediately 
took decisive action to regulate the management of Council 
funds, and at the same time prevent the possible future 
involvement of any Chinese officer, particularly the major 
or chairman. The case of Nie Liang Soey, apart from the 
rather insignificant sum of money involved, appeared more 
as an internal problem of the Chinese community, and thus 
the Dutch authorities were less concerned. This case, in 
fact, took place in a challenging period for the Council, as
52 Ibid., p. 30.
53 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 20 September 1907, 
no. 17264/36, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 23 December 1907, no. 14.
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the modern element in the Chinese community was growing 
fast and reaching wider horizons. Known as the young 
Chinese group, 1de jong Chineezen p a rtif ,54 they were a 
product of Dutch education, and had more interest in 
political activities than the older generation, who had been 
mainly commercially-oriented. Their emergence in the early 
twentieth century was a new factor for the Chinese 
community, and led to an awakening, through the founding of 
the first modern Chinese association in the colony, the 
Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan. However, the established Chinese 
officers still remained the foremost element in the Chinese 
community. Therefore the first decade of the THHK saw a 
struggle between these two elements. One was to win the 
Chinese leadership, whilst the other was to hold tightly to 
the prestige given by the colonial authority.
It is interesting to note that the THHK, from its 
foundation, embraced these two elements. This is in 
striking contrast to the Budi Utomo (founded 1908) which 
excluded the old-established native leaders - the regents or 
bupatis. As noted earlier, many Chinese officers were also 
founding fathers in this first modern Chinese organisation, 
and members of its board. It was customary for the Chinese 
major to be appointed its patron.55
The case of Nie Liang Soey was one manifestation of this 
conflict within the Chinese Council, facing the newly 
emergent elites in the Chinese community. Major Tio Tek Ho 
belonged to the conservative group,56 yet as patron of THHK 
could not openly criticize the young group. Indeed the reason 
why they disliked Nie Liang Soey was because he had had to 
reprimand them on behalf of the major.57 Before the case 
closed with the firing of Nie Liang Soey, major Tio Tek Ho 
had asked for leave due to severe illness. He could not face
54 J. Hofland, "Memorie van Overgave van de Residentie Batavia, 20 Mei 
1906- 4 September 1907", ARA, The Hague.
55 See Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Batavia; see 
also Chapter V.
56 See J Hofland, "Memorie van Overgave van de Residentie Batavia", ARA, 
The Hague.
57 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Resident of Batavia, 8 October 1907, 
no. 217/A , in Gouvernementsbesluit, 23 December 1907, no. 14.
123
his majorship ending in such shameful circumstances. He 
died in January 1908, after which the majorship was vacant 
for two years. In August 1910 Khouw Kim An was appointed. 
He was to be the last major in Batavia. He was the son-in- 
law of Phoa Keng Hek, the president of THHK.
The Council and The Officers
Before 1882 there was no official reference to the 
membership of the Chinese Council. However it was 
generally known that the members of the Council were 
primarily Chinese officers; this was often mentioned in the 
official correspondence on Chinese affairs between 
Batavia's local authority and the colonial government. 
Despite having existed for centuries, o ffic ia l 
acknowledgment was not given until 1882, when the 
Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-lndie [Netherlands Indies 
Government Statute Book] stated that the Chineesche Raad, 
or Chinese Council, was composed of notable Chinese, 
meaning the Chinese officers, who managed the internal 
affairs of their community and represented these to the 
Resident. It was further stated that the formation o f the 
Chinese officer and the council was with government 
approval, and established only in the three main cities of 
Java, that is Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya.58 From this it 
is clear that the Council -was formed by the Chinese 
officers. This is confirmed by the stipulation that its 
chairman was to be the major. Batavia's Chinese Council 
lasted from 1678 to 1955, while in Semarang the Council 
was set up in 1825 and abolished in January 1 931 ;59 the 
Chinese Council of Surabaya probably existed over the same 
period as in Semarang.60 From a different perspective, 
Batavia was granted the Chinese majorship in 1837, 
Semarang in 1829, and Surabaya sometime before 1834.
58 "Bestuur over Vreemde Oosterlingen", in Regeeringsalmanak voor 
Nederlandsch-lndie van het jaar 1889, vol. I, pp. 88-89.
59 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang, p. 48.
60 No literature on this particular subject had yet been found.
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Membership of the Council during the VOC period reached 
six seats in 1762, comprising captains and lieutenants only. 
By 1849 more seats were provided; one chairman (the 
major) and eight members (tw o captains and six 
lieutenants) plus two extra-ordinary members (also 
lieutenants)61 which represented the largest body in the 
history of the Chinese Council. A membership of ten seats 
was maintained until the reorganization of the Chineesch 
Bestuur in 1927; in the meantime, some changes took place 
without disturbing the number of seats on the Council. The 
first alteration, made in 1860, was to remove the 
distinction between ordinary (gewone) and extra ordinary 
( buitengewone)  members.62 The second modification took 
place in 1871, following the reorganization of local 
government in the Batavia residency, to match the 
formation of native district commandants in the Stad en 
Voorsteden, where the old Chinese Quarter and Chinese 
neighbourhood were located. The Batavia residency 
consisted of four divisions - the city and three surrounding 
areas called Ommelanden. The city division was called Stad  
en Voorsteden Batavia, while the O m m elanden  were 
Meester-Cornelis (the eastern region), Tangerang (the 
wetsren region) and Buitenzorg (the southern region). Stad  
en Voorsteden Batavia had seven districts headed by native 
district commandants with seats in Penjaringan, Pasar 
Senen, Mangga Besar and Tanah Abang. The two smaller 
districts, known as the second and the fourth, were both 
annexed to larger districts and headed by one commandant, 
while the sixth district (the old Chinese Quarter) was 
allocated for the Chinese and headed by the major.63 As 
there were four native district commandants, the Chinese 
should have four captains. The Resident's reason for this 
was that all communications, social contacts or disputes 
between the Chinese and the natives would be dealt with by
61 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 22 August 1849, no. 
2256, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 5 September 1849, no. 2.
62 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 10 February 1868, no. 10.
63 "Gewestelijk Bestuur, Batavia", in Regeeringsalm anak voor 
Nederlandsch-lndie van het jaar 1872, vol. I, pp. 144-149.
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the Chinese captain and the related native district 
commandant. As several large Chinese neighbourhoods were 
located outside the Chinese quarter, although still within 
the authority of the Stad en Voorsteden, the Council’s six 
Chinese lieutenants were to be in charge of these areas, 
which were old Jakarta, Penjaringan, Mangga Besar, Tanah 
Abang, Pasar Baru and Pasar Senen.64
A third change was made in 1878 to accommodate the 
growing non-Hokkien element in the Chinese community in 
Batavia. The emergence of Hakka in Batavia as early as 1865 
was probably caused by the repression of the Taiping 
movement in China, in which they were known to have 
played an active part, or was a consequence of the Dutch 
annexation of the islands of Borneo and Bangka, that led 
some members of the Hakka communities there to make 
their living in Java.65 Although the Hakkas, the Cantonese 
and the Macaos were minorities among the 12,602 Chinese 
living in Batavia in 18 77 ,66 the Dutch had long been 
displeased by the Hokkien-peranakan domination of the 
Chinese Council. Yet, to take sudden action would invite an 
even more undesirable situation because, for various 
reasons, the long-established peranakan Chinese undeniably 
formed a powerful element in the Chinese community of 
Batavia.
The Dutch also realized the big differences in language or 
dialects, origins and customs among the Chinese that set 
them apart from each other. A confidential letter from the 
Advisor for Chinese Affairs noted the dislike between the 
peranakan-Chinese and the singkeh-totok Chinese; the first 
regarded themselves as superior, which was not gladly 
admitted by the latter.67 Furthermore, most transactions in
64 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 18 October 1912, no. 
319/c, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 4 January 1913, no. 27. The confirmation 
of four captains and six lieutenants in the Chinese Council was in the 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 20 May 1871, no. 37.
65 C Salmon & D Lombard, Les Chinois des Jakarta, p. xxvi.
66 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 4 September 1878, no. 
5448, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
67 See his letter to Governor-General, 16 November 1878, in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
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the city were conducted in Malay, and this was a hindrance 
to joining the Chinese Council for the non-peranakan or 
Hakka Chinese, the majority of whom were unfamiliar with 
the language.68 Needless to say the Hakkas were somewhat 
reluctant to apply for Chinese Council membership or 
officership, as they knew that they would not be welcome 
by the peranakan officers.69 A Dutch move to modify the 
ethnic make-up of the Council took place when two 
vacancies arose. A new pattern of membership was proposed 
by the government. The Council should consist of five 
Hokkien-Chinese born in the Netherlands Indies, two 
Hokkien-Chinese born in China, and three Hakka or other 
Chinese originating from Canton and preferably not born in 
the Dutch East Indies.70 It is surprising to learn that it was 
the Resident of Batavia, not the Chinese officers, who 
strongly objected to this proposal. He argued that it would 
be a problem to find a Hakka candidate, as most were less 
educated and not sufficiently familiar with Malay.71 The 
same attitude was expressed by the next Resident, who 
refused Hakka candidates for Council membership in 1883 
and 1884 as they were either ’rude and ill-bred1,72 or ’not 
well-off’.73
Nevertheless, the policy of the central authority had to be 
carried out regardless of the objections raised by the local 
authority in Batavia. Besides which, changing Council 
membership was the most subtle way for the Dutch to 
eliminate the so-called familie betrekkingen, or family 
connection, among the peranakan officers. In fact, the 
composition of five Hokkien-peranakan, two Hokkien-
68 Correspondence between the Chinese Council and the local authority of 
Batavia was in Malay.
69 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 16 
November 1878, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
70 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
71 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 4 September 1878, no. 
5448, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 December 1878, no. 19.
72 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 24 July
1883, no. La. X I, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 18 August 1883, no. 9.
73 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 6 August
1884, no. La. C3, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 31 August 1884, no. 20.
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singkeh and three Hakka or Cantonese was more convenient 
to the Dutch, and thus was maintained until new 
amendments were adopted in 1918.
The institution of Chinese officers was removed from 
1918 to 1927, when a prolonged study was undertaken to 
prepare for a reorganization of the Chineesch Bestuur in 
Java and Madura. The Chinese major of Batavia and other 
officers were released from their positions until 1927. 
During this period, the daily work of the Chinese Council 
hardly changed, except that the chairman's seat was empty. 
After the institution of Chinese officers was reorganized, a 
number of captains and lieutenants were allowed to 
disappear following their retirement. Membership of the 
Chinese Council decreased only slightly however, as the 
vacant seats were filled by private persons. A total of six 
members was maintained until the last days of Dutch rule.
For the Chinese community which had been experiencing 
rapid social change since the beginning of this century, to 
become a member of the Chinese Council did not necessarily 
mean that they had to be a Chinese officer, as 
reorganization meant that these were gradually being 
reduced in number. The remaining Chinese officers on the 
Council were obviously insufficient for the management of 
Chinese public affairs in Batavia. Therefore the Chinese 
associations proposed to the Resident of Batavia that 
private persons might be considered as non-officer 
members of the Chinese Council. This was granted in 
December 1928, and the first two non-officer members, Tan 
Pia Teng and Nio Peng Liang, were appointed.74
By the end of 1931, the reorganization of the Chinese 
officers had reached its final stage, retaining only one 
major, Khouw Kim An, one captain, Lie Tjian Tjoen, and one 
lieutenant, Lie Boen Sien.75 This meant a total of five 
council members, although the rules stated that there 
should be six members seated in the Council. The Dutch 
government then considered accepting Chinese proposals for
74 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Batavia, p. 181.
75 See Geheim Maifrapport, no. 603x71932, ARA, The Hague.
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admitting a third non-officer member. A fter their 
painstaking efforts to wind down the institution of the 
Chinese officers, it was out of the question for the Dutch to 
fill the post with another officer. As it was, the three votes 
of officer-members, including the major as chairman of the 
Council, outnumbered the two votes of the non-officer 
members, an undesirable situation which left the authority 
of the Chinese Council open to abuse.76 It was a great relief 
to the Dutch authorities when the Chinese community 
agreed that the extra seat should be occupied by a non­
officer member. Dr. Tjiong Boen Kie was the first of the 
third private members of the Chinese Council, and also the 
only member during colonial times who was an academic. He 
was appointed on 9 March 1940,77 and two years later the 
Japanese army occupied the city of Batavia.
Looking over the Council's archives it is clear that the 
nineteenth century was the most active period for the 
Chinese Council. As well as the increase in the number of 
members from six to ten, its duties greatly multified. The 
growing activities of Chinese immigrants in Batavia, 
particularly in trade and commerce, attracted even more to 
this city. As mentioned earlier, the mid-nineteenth century 
also saw the emergence of the Hakka, in addition to the long 
established Hokkien-peranakan majority. Figures recorded 
in the political report of the Batavia residency show that 
the 10,494 Chinese living in the area in 187178 increased to 
19,471 a year later.79 Records for 1893 mention 26,568  
Chinese living in Batavia, out of a total population of 
1 1 0 ,6 6 9 .80 As they grew in number, their activities also
76 Yo Heng Kam, "Reorganisatie van den Chineesche Raad", p. 85.
77 See "Gewestekijk Bestuur, Provincie West-Java", under the heading of 
"Residentie Batavia, de Chineesche Raad", in Regeeringsalmanak voor 
Nederlandsch-lndie van het jaar 1941, vol. II, p. 291.
78 "Staat der Bevolking in de Residentie Batavia over het jaar 1871", in 
Politieke Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het jaar 1871; see Batavia, 
no. 18, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
79 "Politieke Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het jaar 1872", in 
Batavia, no. 18.
80 C. Salmon & D Lombard, Les Chinois des Jakarta, p. xxvi.
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intensified in revenue-farming, including the opium trade, 
in which the revenue-farmers or pachters were mostly 
Chinese.81
How busy the members of the Chinese Council were was 
acknowledged by the Resident of Batavia in a letter to the 
Governor-General. Apart from giving advice to the Resident 
in cases dealing with administrative policy and revenue- 
farming, they had to attend all judicial and criminal trials 
in which Chinese were involved, both in the Raad van 
Justitie and the Landraad. Other members had to be present 
in the Chinese Council office to handle all complaints, 
disputes, reports and requests, regarding any matter raised 
by their people.82
Weekly duties had to be divided among them, as two 
officers had to be present at trials three times a week, 
whilst another two, had to attend meetings at the 
Resident's office to discuss matters connected with local 
government. Yet another two officers handled daily matters 
brought directly to the Chinese Council office, and a further 
two were expected to sit on the committees of various 
government offices, on matters relating to the Chinese in 
the colony.83
However, work had slackened by the turn of the century. 
This was the result of the abolition of the revenue-farming 
system, the passport system or passenstelsel, and the 
residence system or wijkenstelsel, which were initially 
intended to control Chinese movement into native areas. 
Those systems had been set up and enforced through the 
Chinese officers. A second reason was the establishment of 
Gemeente in 1905. This was a system of administration 
applied in Java's main cities, in which any matter concerned 
with city government was brought up in the Gemeente Raad
81 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 22 August 1849, no. 
2256, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 5 September 1849, no. 2; and "Politieke 
Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het jaar 1856", in Batavia, no. 18.
82 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 22 August 1849, no. 
2256, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 5 September 1849, no. 2.
83 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 13 August 1872, no. 
5650, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 31 October 1872, no. 11.
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or City Council. Consequently, part of the Chinese Councils 
tasks relating to Chinese inhabitants in the city were 
removed, as these public matters became the responsibility 
of the Batavia City Council. This changing situation is also 
reflected in the Council archives, which from 1910 contains 
records only of Chinese public interests, such as 
cemeteries, religious festivities and charity work.
According to M Sidharta, the functions of the Chinese 
Council in the independent Republic of Indonesia were 
limited to that of a charity foundation, a body to give loans 
to members of the community, and to supervise Chinese 
culture, mainly through temples and their activities.84 As 
the Republic government did not allow for separate systems 
of administration for particular groups, it was not possible 
to restore the Council to the significance it had held in 
colonial days. The last major, Khouw Kim An, had died in a 
Japanese prison camp in 1945; the post-war Chinese 
Council was chaired by ex-captain Lie Tjian Tjoen. In 1953 
the Chinese Council's land had to be sold to the city 
government of Jakarta, following Law no. 9 of 1953, on the 
Necessity to Return some Private Landed Properties to the 
Government [Undang Undang Tentang Pernjataan Perlunja 
Beberapa Tanah Partikulir Dikembalikan Mendjadi Tanah 
N e g e r i] .* *  After the death of its last chairman, ex­
lieutenant Tan In Hok, in 1955, the Kong Koan or Chinese 
Council faded away.
84 M Sidharta, "On the Remnants of the Gong Goan Archives", p. 26.
85 Ibid., p. 22.
5 THE OFFICERS AND THE CHINESE POLITICAL
MOVEMENT
I will devote this chapter to describing the extent to which 
the Chinese officers responded to and involved themselves 
in Chinese political activity from the early twentieth  
century. In particular I will discuss their political loyalties 
and participation in political movements.
The Dutch observed that there were three main political 
streams among the Chinese in the colony,1 namely the 
China-oriented Sin Po group, the Chung Hwa Hui, the Dutch 
East Indies-oriented party, and the Partai Tionghoa 
In d o n e s ia , which was Indonesian-oriented. These
perceptions are supported by the many Indonesianists whose 
area of study is the Chinese, particularly Lea E Williams,2 
Mary F Somers,3 and also the Indonesian-Chinese scholar, L. 
Suryadinata.4
I presume that the Dutch perception was derived from the 
writings of Kwee Tek Hoay who, in 1932, presented a 
thorough analysis of the strengths and shortcomings of the 
Chinese political movement. Kwee's article was first 
published in a peranakan newspaper, the Djawa Tengah, on 
1-4 October 1 9 3 2 .5 It is clear that the above scholars
follow Kwee's analysis in their studies on the Chinese
movement. It is not my intention here to repeat these
analyses. I will concentrate on the Chinese officers'
1 See Geheim Verbaal, 11 February 1933, no. R.2; Geheim Mailrapporten, 
nos. 211x/1935 and 255x/1936; Geheim Verbaal, 17 February 1937, no. 
L.3, ARA, The Hague.
2 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism. The Genesis of the Pam 
Chinese Movement in Indonesia 1900-1916  (1960. Glencoe: The Free 
Press).
3 Mary F Somers, "Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia", (1965. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Ithaca, Cornell University)
4 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java 1917-1942  (1976. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
5 The English translation of Kwee's article is in L Suryadinata (ed), Political 
Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977. A Sourcebook (1 979- 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 55-61.
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response towards the movement, to which none of these 
scholars have paid particular attention.
Measuring their political response by their involvement 
as leading members in or founding fathers of a particular 
organization, I perceive that the Chinese officers were 
involved in only two of the main Chinese organizations, the 
Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan and the Chung Hwa Hui. Although the 
Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, founded in 1900, was not a political 
organization, it was the first modern Chinese association 
attached to the officers from the beginning. The peranakan 
Chinese majority became unhappy with the Tiong Hoa Hwee 
Koan, in particular because it was heavily dominated by 
singkeh-totok Chinese. This was also felt by the peranakan 
officers of Batavia. Later, they joined the Chung Hwa Hui.
It is obvious that the Chinese officers were unlikely to 
join either the Sin Po group or the Partai Tionghoa 
Indonesia, since both were blatant in their anti-Chinese 
officer feelings. It was from the Chung Hwa Hui that the 
Chinese officers gained support during the lengthy debates 
of 1 9 1 5 -1 9 17  over the Dutch government plans to 
reorganize the officers.
In this chapter I will devote myself to the Tiong Hoa 
Hwee Koan, the Chung Hwa Hui, the People's Council, and to 
the question of the Netherlands subject law and the early 
anti-Chinese turbulence of 1912-1913. The third part will 
focus on Chinese participation in the People's Council, and 
the response of the Chinese political movement to the 
application of Netherlands subject legislation. For the 
Chinese, the establishment of the People's Council in 1918 
was not simply an opportunity to participate in the 
parliamentary body created by the Dutch but was closely 
related to Chinese acceptance of the Netherlands-subject 
issue. These two topics touched a very basic point, the 
status of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies.
Two of the Chinese representatives on the People's 
Council were Batavian officers - major Khouw Kim An 
(1921 -1931) and captain Yo Heng Kam (1927-1942). Their 
seats on the Council reflected their political affiliation,
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Khouw Kim An for the Chung Hwa Hui and Yo Heng Kam for 
the Politieke-Econom ische Bond , rather than their
administrative position as Chinese officers of Batavia. 
Moreover, of the eight Chinese representatives during the 
whole period of the People’s Council from 1918 to 1942, 
four were of Batavian origin. They were Kan Hok Hoei, 
Khouw Kim An, Yo Heng Kam and Loa Sek Hie. With the 
exception of Yo Heng Kam, all represented the Chung Hwa 
Hui.
The last part of this chapter will be devoted to the anti- 
Chinese riots in 1912-1913. This period was a crucial time 
for non-western groups in the colony, the Chinese, the 
indigenous-lndonesians and also the Arabs, who were all 
moving towards national consciousness. Indeed Chinese 
political revivalism and the indigenous nationalist 
movement crossed paths at one point, resulting in riots and 
disturbances in many parts of Java. For Batavia, this period, 
the second decade of the twentieth century, saw a change in 
the Chinese/Indonesian relationship, in which a brotherly 
relationship, ' b r o e d e r s c h a a p ' ,  broke into enmity, 
'vijandcshap'G
My study, shows how the peranakan Chinese in Batavia 
became entangled in this socio-political explosion. Unable 
to feel at home in pure singkeh-totok Chinese organizations, 
the peranakan silently resisted Chinese ultra-nationalist 
influences. But as the Indonesian nationalist movement 
never took the trouble to differentiate the peranakan from 
the singkeh Chinese, to admit peranakans into any 
Indonesian political organization was clearly out of the 
question. Needless to say, the peranakan were regarded as 
non-indigenous by the Indonesian nationalists, and 
consequently became victims in the anti-Chinese riots. 
Suspicions that the peranakan were closer to the Dutch 
were well-founded.
6 See "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol.II, 
1912-1913, pp. 320, 886; vol. V, 1916, p. 230.
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The Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (hereafter THHK) was established 
on 17 March 1900 in Batavia, and cannot really be called a 
political association.
The emergence of this first Chinese modern organization 
was directed towards cultural revivalism among the 
peranakan Chinese of Batavia. This was expressed in its 
philosophical foundation, that the THHK was " .. . .s a to e  
perkoempoelan jang bersifat laen dari pada jang laen-laen, diatas dasar jang 
loeas dan dengen menjender pada kasopanan Tionghoa dan teroetama 
pengadjaran-pengadjaran Khong Tjoe...”, 7 an association which 
relied upon Chinese ethics, in particular the teachings of 
Confucius.
Such cultural revivalism may be explained by the socio­
cultural conditions of the Batavian Chinese community. 
Kwee Tek Hoay, a peranakan writer, points out the 
disintegration of the Chinese tradition among the 
peranakan, showing how distant they were becoming from 
the real Chinese identity. According to Kwee, the peranakan 
upbringing contained so many indigenous elements from 
their native maternal side that their Chineseness eventually 
became obscure.8
Another writer, Hoay Tjiong - pseudonym of Ang Jan Goan, 
the editor of Sin Po newspaper - notes the conflicts among 
the Chinese triads in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century as one of the influential factors in the awakening of 
Chinese cultural revivalism, through the founding of the 
THHK.9 I have not yet come across a study of Chinese secret 
societies in Java,10 but I assume there was little peranakan
7 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Batavia 1900- 
1939 (1940. Batavia: THHK), p. 5.
8 Kwee Tek Hoay, The Origins of the Modern Chinese Movement in Indonesia 
(1969. Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project. Translation 
Series), pp. 8-12.
9 Hoay Tjiong, "Hoakiauw dan Perkoempoelan-Perkoempoelannja", Sin Po 
Jubileum Nummer 1910-1935  (1935. Batavia: Sin Po), unpaginated.
10 The monthly report from the Office for Chinese and East-Asian Affairs of 
February 1937, mentions the violent elements among the singkeh-Chinese 
that merged into the political association; see "Mededeelingen van den Dienst
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involvement in such dangerous activities. However, the 
Chinese gang wars of the 1890's became a concern of the 
peranakan. This concern was strongly expressed in a letter 
from the founding fathers of the THHK, represented by Phoa 
Keng Hek, the president, sent to all Chinese in the Dutch 
East Indies in April 1900. It contained a long discourse on 
morals and values, on Chinese ethics as propounded by 
Confucius, appealing to the Chinese community to study the 
teachings of Confucius in greater depth: “If a person is 
exposed to good teaching, his thinking, customs, heart and 
behaviour will probably be good. He will remember not to do
wrong but to do good deeds ”.u  From this idealism came
the THHK objective to improve Chinese customs in 
accordance with the teachings of Confucius, and to 
establish schools that enriched the knowledge of Chinese 
classical works and language.12
To see how much the THHK attracted the Chinese officers, 
we should look further into its leading members. The 
meeting to set up the THHK took place on 17 March 1900 at 
Phoa Keng Hek's residence. All twenty persons present 
became members of its executive board. Among these 
executive board members were Chinese officers in Batavia, 
while others were from officers' families. Phoa Keng Hek, 
who became the first president of the THHK, from 1 900 to 
1923, was the son of the Chinese lieutenant in Meester- 
Cornelis, the eastern division-of the Batavia Residency. One 
of the two vice-presidents was Khoe A Fan, a Chinese 
lieutenant of Hakka-Cantonese origin. Among the twelve 
members of the various committees of the THHK were four 
Chinese officers, namely captain Oey Giok Koen, captain Lie 
Hin Liam, lieutenant (later captain) Nie Hoey Oen and 
lieutenant Khouw Kim An. The latter was the son-in-law of 
Phoa Keng Hek, and was appointed the last Chinese major of 
Batavia in 1910.
der Oost-Aziatische Zaken van Februari 1937", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 
2122, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
11 An English translation of this letter is in L Suryadinata (ed), Political 
Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 6.
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These founding fathers realized that any initiative in the 
Chinese community should not exclude the man at the top, 
the Chinese major. Thus the major was seated as the patron 
of the THHK, an ex-officio position. Major Tio Tek Ho was in 
post at the time the THHK was founded, and consequently 
became its first patron. It was under his patronage that the 
first contest for Chinese leadership occurred, a subject 
that will be discussed later.
As the establishment of the THHK was initiated by 
notable, well-off Chinese community members, or 'babah- 
babah bangsawan dan hartawari, as pointed out by a Chinese 
journalist, Tan Tjhan Hie,13 we can assume that Phoa Keng 
Hek, Oey Giok Koen, Khoe A Fan and Lie Hin Liam were 
successful Batavian businessmen.
Phoa Keng Hek owned rice-mills and a tea factory located 
in Parung, Buitenzorg, as did his two brothers, Phoa Keng 
Hoey and Phoa Keng Hong.14 Captain Oey Giok Koen belonged 
to a rich Chinese family and owned various private lands 
and plantations in Tangerang, the western division of the 
Batavia Residency. Although he was a peranakan, he kept an 
interest in the welfare of his ancestral land, being a large 
shareholder in the Fukien Railway Company in Amoy.15 
Lieutenant Khoe A Fan, a Hakka-Cantonese of long residence 
in Batavia, was engaged in the import and export trade, 
dealing mainly with Chinese and Japanese products. He and 
his Cantonese partner, Lieuw -A Yoeng, were directors of the 
Chop Hin Liong rice-mill.16 Captain Lie Hin Liam and his 
brother Lie Hin Liang were noted for their huge financial 
contribution to the THHK. One of their houses in downtown 
Batavia was given to accommodate THHK activities.17 In
13 See his article, "Pakoempoelan Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan", in Li Po, Nomor 
Perkenalan 1901, as quoted by Charles Coppel, "The Origins of Confucianism 
as an Organized Religion in Java, 1900-1923", Journal o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, vol. XII, no. 1, March 1981, p. 190.
14 "Staat der in de Afdeeling Buitenzorg, Residentie Batavia Aanwezige 
Fabrieken en Trafieken", Batavia, no. 352 /2 , Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
13 Arnold Wright (ed), Twentieth Century Impressions o f Netherlands-lndia 
(1909. London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing Co.), p. 479.
16 ibid.
17 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, p. 177.
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addition there were two more brothers, Lie Hin Pang and Lie 
Hin Sian, and these four sons of the Lie family were 
remarkable Chinese businessmen. It is known that they 
owned the largest rice-mill in Batavia, the Hoat Hin.18 And 
there were others who were not quite so conspicuously 
wealthy, but for reasons of financial status and educational 
background still belonged to the cream of Batavia's Chinese 
society. They enthusiastically devoted themselves to 
develop the THHK into an educational institution for the 
colony's Chinese.
As the Dutch government paid no attention to education 
for the Chinese, the THHK could not expect to receive a 
financial subsidy from the colonial authority. Thus for its 
first two decades the THHK was supported by these leading 
members of the rich Batavian Chinese.
Another interesting point about the establishment of the 
THHK was the fraternal association between the peranakan 
of Hokkien descent and those from the Hakka-Cantonese 
group of Chinese in Batavia. Obviously the majority of 
members of the THHK executive board were peranakan, but 
the important seats given to Khoe A Fan and Lie Hin Liam 
represented the Hakka-Cantonese strength. Khoe A Fan and 
Lie Hin Liam formed a link between the non-Hokkien and the 
peranakan elements of Chinese society in Batavia. Both 
were Chinese officers. Within the peranakan element, the 
most notable member was Phoa Keng Hek.
He was so well respected by the Dutch authorities that in 
1906 he received the medal of the Orange-Nassau Order. 
This honour reflected not only the respect in which he was 
held among Batavia's Chinese community, for his 
contribution in establishing schools and providing free 
medical care, but also his action in closing the gambling 
business in his area of Bekasi and Meester-Cornelis.19 
Having been educated in a Dutch missionary school, Phoa
18 Arnold Wright, Twentieth Century Impressions o f Netherlands-lndia, p. 
476.
19 "Een Woord ten Gunste van Chineezen", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1904, pp. 
908-909.
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Keng Hek, unlike most of his fellow Chinese, had a strong 
dislike of this dishonourable, though profitable, business. 
The Dutch government was very pleased with his attitude, 
which was an exemplary response to the government plans 
to abolish gambling revenue-farms in 1904.20
After the death of major Tio Tek Ho in 1908, Phoa was 
offered the Chinese majorship which he declined, because 
he was unable to reside in the Chinese quarter.21 Apparently 
one of the conditions attached to accepting the Chinese 
majorship was to take residence up in the old Chinese 
quarter, located in downtown Batavia.
Although Phoa had declined the offer of the majorship, 
the Advisor for Chinese Affairs still approached him for his 
views on a suitable candidate. From their talks it was 
agreed that the occupant of such an important position 
should be "a person belonging to the progressive element of 
the Chinese community, who could give a clear idea for the 
development of his people, and one who understood their 
expectations and accordingly could give appropriate 
guidance to their goals".22 From further discussions 
between the Resident of Batavia and the Advisor for Chinese 
Affairs, Khouw Kim An, a Chinese lieutenant and member of 
the Chinese Council, was nominated as the only qualified 
candidate. Yet Khouw could not proceed directly from his 
lieutenantship to the position of Chinese major. It was then 
agreed among the Dutch higher officials to appoint captain 
Nie Hok Tjoan as acting-major while waiting for Khouw's 
promotion from his present position to captain, and then to 
major.23
20 See C R Bakhuizen van den Brink, "Memorie van Overgave van de 
Residentie van Batavia, van 16 September 1901 to t 9 Mei 1906", ARA, The 
Hague.
21 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 9 June 1908, no. 109, 
in Besluit van Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-lndie (hereafter 
Gouvernementsbesluit), 29 June 1908, no. 41, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
22 Confidential letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Resident of 
Batavia, 6 April 1908, no. 27, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 29 June 1908, no. 
41.
23 See Besluit van de Resident van Batavia, 10 January 1908, no. 349 /6 .
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The above description will make little sense if we do not 
examine Lea E Williams' argument about the leadership of 
the Chinese officers during the early period of the Chinese 
movement. Lea E Williams, and also L Suryadinata, assess 
the leadership of the Chinese officers only from the 
political aspect. Neither scholar sees that the Chinese 
officers played a remarkable role in the early years of the 
Pan-Chinese movement. According to Williams and 
Suryadinata, Chinese leadership in the early twentieth  
century was seized from the old established, Dutch-created, 
Chinese officership by political figures in the THHK, 
obviously Phoa Keng Hek, and the chairman of the Siang 
Hwee, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.24 My argument 
will involve an examination of how the THHK might have 
developed if Phoa Keng Hek had accepted the majorship.
Phoa was the first president of the THHK, from 1900, and 
held the post for about 23 years. Under his leadership, there 
was an extensive growth of THHK schools all over Java 
within the first decade. Despite being unable to clarify 
Phoa's tactful refusal of the Chinese majorship offered by 
the Dutch government, I would argue that had Phoa been the 
Chinese major, he would have experienced constraints in 
developing the THHK. As a major, he could not hold the 
position of THHK president and would have been honorary 
patron instead. On the other hand, to the other Chinese 
officers, he would possibly have been unwelcome as 
chairman of the Chinese Council, for he was the father-in- 
law of lieutenant Khouw Kim An. Undoubtedly, had Phoa Keng 
Hek accepted the Chinese majorship, it would not have been 
advantageous to either the THHK or the Chinese Council. He 
would have become a target for strong resentment both 
within the officers' circle and the Chinese movement, 
because of the charge of nepotism. Such criticism from 
Chinese public opinion would not only damage his personal 
reputation but also obstruct his social mission on behalf of 
his people.
24 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, pp. 171-172; L 
Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 15.
140
When Khouw Kim An was eventually appointed Chinese 
major in 1910, he changed from committee member to 
patron of the THHK. A t this time, his father-in-law, Phoa 
Keng Hek, was still president of the THHK. In contrast to the 
period of the former major, Tio Tek Ho, the period in which 
Khouw Kim An held the positions of Chinese major and THHK 
patron produced a different relationship between the 
Chinese leadership, the Chinese officers, and Chinese public 
figures, represented by the THHK leaders. Whilst Khouw Kim 
An undoubtedly kept this relationship harmonious, the 
period of the former major, Tio Tek Ho, had seen 
competition, provoked by the THHK group.
Tio Tek Ho and his brother, lieutenant Tio Tek Soen, who 
was also a member of the Chinese Council, were believed to 
be closer to the conservative Chinese. However, there was a 
group of young officer members of the Chinese Council, led 
by captain Nie Hoey Oen, who preferred to join the modern 
association, the THHK. The Resident of Batavia, J. Hofland, 
called this group, 'the young Chinese party1, or the 'jong 
Chineesche partiy1.25 Despite being the patron of the THHK, 
major Tio Tek Ho was unlikely to play an active role in the 
organization, and the absence of any record of his 
participation in its committee meetings seems to confirm 
this reluctance.26 The uncomfortable relationship between 
the THHK executive and major Tio Tek Ho was hidden until 
1907, when a petty case of financial mishandling brought 
these cold relations to open conflict.
This case involved the secretary of the Chinese Council 
and the chief treasurer of the THHK, and concerned 
expenditure on an annual religious festival called the 
ciokofeest in the Dutch records. The ciokofeest was held in 
the seventh month of the Chinese calendar, and the Chinese 
Council was responsible for the arrangement and financing 
of the event. Following the ceremony, Khouw Lam Tjiang,
26 See J.Hofland, "Memorie van Overgave van de Residentie van Batavia, van 
28 Mei 1906 tot 4 September 1907"; and also letter of Director of Home 
Affairs to Governor-General, 19 February 1904, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 
4 March 1907, no. 18.
26 See Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan.
the treasurer of the THHK who had acted as master of 
ceremonies, discovered some chicanery in the fund-raising 
process.27 The money involved was only 400 guilders, but it 
was good reason for the THHK leading members to move 
against the Chinese major. Phoa Keng Hek and Khouw Lam 
Tjiang reported this financial trickery to the Resident of 
Batavia, while Kan Hok Hoei and captain Lie Hin Liam 
accused Nie Liang Soey, the secretary of the Chinese 
Council, of manipulation of the Council's accounts.
In the eyes of the Dutch, this case demonstrated the 
struggle between the old conservatives and the new 
emerging elites within Batavia's Chinese society. It was 
said that Nie Liang Soey, acting on behalf of the major, had 
often reprimanded those young members, which led them to 
dislike him.28 The case was settled with Nie Liang Soey 
being fired from his position for being untrustworthy.29 But 
a few months prior to that, major Tio Tek Ho asked for a 
temporary leave due to severe illness; he could not face his 
majorship ending in such shameful circumstances. Major Tio 
Tek Ho died in January 1908.
As Phoa Keng Hek subsequently declined the Chinese 
majorship, the position was left vacant for about two 
years, during which time the daily duties of the office were 
performed by the acting-major, captain Nie Hok Tjoan.
The appointment of Khouw Kim An as Chinese major in 
1910 not only marks the advance of the young progressive 
element within the Chinese, but also facilitated the further 
development of the THHK. However, the years following 
brought considerable changes to the THHK.
The changing policy of the Dutch, moving from 
centralization of power to decentralization, affected the 
development of the Chinese community in the Dutch East 
Indies. In addition, political events in mainland China had 
their own particular influences, and for the first time the
27 For further details, see Chapter IV.
28 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to the Resident of Batavia, 8 October 
1907, no. 217 /4 , in Gouvernementsbesluit, 23 December 1907, no. 14.
29 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 20 September 1907, 
no. 17264/36, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 23 December 1907, no. 14.
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Chinese of the Dutch East Indies were drawn into wider 
affairs. For the Dutch, any matter concerning the Chinese 
was no longer merely a domestic problem, but unavoidably 
involved the Chinese government. On the other hand, for the 
Chinese of Batavia, the main change was the emerging new 
element during the first decade of this century.
In the early years of the twentieth century, a new wave 
of Chinese migrants flooded into the colony as a result of 
the Chinese govermment's new policy of allowing free 
migration. Unlike the previous migrants, who were mostly 
labourers, among these newcomers were professionals such 
as teachers, nurses and clerks. In addition the new migrants 
included females, which meant that these new Chinese 
could arrange marriages within their own group, and thus 
form a new element within Batavia's Chinese community, 
v keeping its distance from the long established peranakan 
society and the indigenous population. Moreover, these 
latest Chinese newcomers maintained their political 
interests in and relations with their home country.
In 1908, within a few years of arriving in numbers in 
Batavia, they set up two mainly singkeh-totok  
organizations, the Siang Hwee or Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Soe Po Sia, Chinese Reading Clubs. 
Although there were peranakan members of the Siang Hwee, 
indeed on its executive board,30 it were the singkeh who 
played the main active role. As the establishment of the 
Siang Hwee had been initiated by the Chinese government 
through its Ministry of Trade, the organization imitated the 
one in China. Communication was conducted in Chinese and 
the Chinese system of accounts was used.
The Soe Po Sia, or Chinese Reading Clubs, were suspected 
by the Dutch of being a cover for Kuo Min Tang activities in 
the Netherlands Indies,31 for spreading Pan-Chinese
30 In the first years of its establishment there were eight peranakan 
committee members in the Siang Hwee, notably Kan Hok Hoei; see Peringatan 
Tiong Hoa Siang Hwee Batavia, Berdiri 40-Taon, 1908-1948  (1948 . 
Batavia: THSH).
31 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 13 July 1925, in 
Geheim Verbaal, 3 November 1925, no. U.15, ARA, The Hague.
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ideology and the revolutionary ideas of Sun Yat Sen.32 
Although there is no record of the number of peranakan who 
joined these reading clubs, it can be assumed that they 
were an obvious target for Kuo Min Tang propaganda.
Also in 1908 the Dutch government opened the Dutch- 
Chinese School, or Hollandsch-Chipeesche School (HCS) for 
the Chinese. The opening of the HCS showed a new attitude 
on the part of the Dutch government towards the Indies- 
born Chinese. This attitude was maintained throughout the 
last decades of Dutch rule. The application of the 1910 Law 
regarding Netherlands subjects, or N e d e r l a n d s c h -  
o n d e r d a a n s c h a p t for Indies-born Chinese, and the 
appointment of Chinese members to the People's Council, or 
Volksraad, in 1918 also reflected this new attitude.
The changing view of the Dutch towards the Indies-born 
Chinese was primarily a response to the Chinese 
government’s shift in policy towards their overseas 
subjects, which saw the Manchu government abandoning its 
prohibition on overseas migration. Even the new republic 
under Yuan Shih Kai and the 1911 nationalist Republic of 
China could not ignore the importance of overseas Chinese 
financial support.33
It was the Indies-born Chinese who became the main 
concern of Dutch government policy during this period. For 
the Dutch, despite the changing conditions of colonial 
society, the Indies-born Chinese steadfastly occupied their 
important roles in intermediary trade, education and the 
press.
The opening of the HCS by the Dutch government sought to 
keep Indies-born Chinese away from the influence of the 
Chinese government and KMT propaganda. By providing 
Western/European education, the Dutch led the Indies-born 
Chinese to the side of the Netherlands Indies government, 
resisting the interference of the Chinese government. In a
32 H Mouw, De Chineesche Kwestie (1913. Batavia: Papyrus), p. 22.
33 For a study of Chinese migrants and the Chinese Republic, see Yen Chin- 
Hwang, Coolies and Mandarins. China's Protection o f Overseas Chinese During 
the Late Ch'ing Period 1851-1911 (1985. Singapore: Singapore University 
Press).
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direct sense, however, the opening of the HCS was a 
counter-measure against the THHK English school, which 
was set up in September 1901. The Dutch could not accept 
that the Chinese preferred to learn English rather than 
master Dutch. The Chinese, for practical reasons, saw that 
English was more useful worldwide, particularly in 
conducting business with their fellow Chinese in the 
Straits Settlements and elsewhere. In short, for the 
Chinese, English was a commercial language;34 there was no 
reason for them to learn Dutch, as in domestic trade they 
dealt more with the indigenous population.
It is interesting to note that the admittance of Chinese 
pupils to the first HCS opened in Batavia was aided by the 
THHK. Phoa Keng Hek, as the president of the THHK, 
circulated a letter to all Chinese parents, asking if they 
wished to transfer their children to the new Dutch 
schools.35 The response was strong: for a long time Chinese 
parents had desired a Dutch education for their children. 
How Phoa Keng Hek was the decisive actor in this matter 
because he had pressed the Director of Education to admit 
Chinese into Dutch education.36 It was then obvious that the 
person to be approached by the Resident of Batavia in 
seeking Chinese pupils for the first HCS must be Phoa Keng 
Hek.
Furthermore, Phoa, as the central figure in the THHK, 
managed to meet the education needs for the peranakan. As 
a peranakan Chinese, he realized the necessity to further 
knowledge of the teachings of Confucius in maintaining 
Chinese culture. However, while retaining this ideal, the 
THHK schools did not follow the old methods of Chinese 
education but adopted a modern system and used Mandarin. 
By seeking advice from Dr Liem Boen Keng, an intellectual 
and Chinese leader in the Straits Settlements, and by 
employing the first THHK teachers from that colony, Phoa
34 S L van der Wal, Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-lndie 7900- 7940  
(1963. Groningen: J B Wolters), p. 42.
35 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, p. 116.
36 Kwee Tek Hoay, The Origins of the Chinese Movement in Indonesia, p. 42.
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made the Chinese school movement in Java widely known. 
Yet, as a consequence of this approach, the Chinese 
movement in Batavia was put in line with the diplomatic 
ambitions of the Chinese government, drawing the THHK into 
China's influence. The THHK schools were placed under the 
supervision of the Chinese Ministry of Education,37 and 
various Chinese educational missions were sent to the 
Dutch East Indies.
Important missions sent in 1906 and 1907 resulted in 
THHK pupils being sent to the University of Overseas 
Chinese, or Kay Lam Hak Tong, in Nanking for further 
study.38 This took place before 1908, the year in which the 
Dutch government began to pay serious attention to Chinese 
education. Therefore, the Chinese could hardly be blamed if 
they looked to the Chinese government for assistance.
The year 1 908 appears to mark the second phase of the 
Chinese education movement, particularly in Batavia. The 
establishment of the HCS gave the Indies-born Chinese a 
more appropriate education. The peranakan preference for 
Dutch schools had been expressed from the very beginning,39 
and was well represented by the leading THHK members.
Phoa Keng Hek himself was Dutch-educated, while the 
Chinese officers and wealthy Chinese were either Dutch- 
educated or elected to send their children to Dutch schools. 
This became the target for vehement criticism from the 
China-oriented opposition, as expressed in the Sin Po 
newspaper. This same group later launched an attack 
against the Chinese officers, stirring up Chinese public 
opinion for their abolition.
In line with its policy of leading the Indies-born Chinese 
into the Dutch sphere of influence, the government 
encouraged private institutions, mostly Christian 
misssionaries, to provide a form of HCS education. As the 
HCS not only provided a Dutch curriculum but also employed
37 H Mouw, De Chineesche Kwestie, p. 16.
38 Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, pp. 101-107.
39 For example, see letter of Ta Ba Ik, pseudonym of a peranakan Chinese of 
Java, published in Bintang Hindia, and quoted in "Een Chinees over de Indische 
Regeering", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1905, pp. 1409-1410.
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mostly European teachers, these Chinese children were 
strongly exposed to European influence.40 That the 
peranakan became more and more inclined towards European 
education is shown by their demands for wider admittance 
to Dutch schools. They complained that the high tuition fees 
of the HCS could be met only by the rich Chinese.41 The 
aspirations for European education was not without reason, 
for the peranakan realized that a THHK education could not 
meet their practical needs.42 The Chinese curriculum was 
more-or-less redundant, and Chinese could not be used to 
communicate with indigenous clients and neighbours.43
For the China-oriented element who dominated the THHK 
after the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
peranakan commitment to Dutch education was plainly 
contemptuous. This opinion, which was expressed mainly in 
the Chinese-Malay press, Sin Po being the leading 
publication, showed the anxiety of the Chinese community 
in general. They feared that the Chinese were becoming 
more Hollandized, or 'verho llandcsh ' ,44 and that their 
children might lose their Chineseness. There was the 
example of a Chinese grandfather who visited his son in 
town. One day, a friend of his son paid a visit, and was 
greeted at the door by the grandson who was a pupil at the 
HCS. What a shocking insult for this Chinese grandfather 
when his grandson informed his father by that "there was a 
Chinese outside!" ["daar buiten staat een TjinaP'].AS
The peranakan themselves were caught between two 
worlds, always trying to fit into whichever culture felt 
most comfortable.
40 Mary F Somers, "Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia", pp. 53-54.
41 See "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Oktober 1915", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. V, 1916, p. 102.
42 "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui ten Overzicht van de Peranakan-en 
Singkeh-Chineesche Bevolkingsgroep Hier te Lande, October 1935", in 
Geheim Mailrapport, no. 255x/1936.
43 "Jaarverslag over 1937 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
44 See letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 23 January 
1917, no. 74/B, in Verbaal, 31 March 1919, no. 52.
45 Quoted in the same letter.
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From the outset, the THHK schools did not intend to 
provide other than a Chinese education, employing Chinese 
teachers and seeking assistance from the Chinese 
government. Political reforms taking place in China spread 
their influence to the overseas Chinese, influences which in 
the Dutch East Indies were chanelled through the THHK 
curriculum. Domination by the China-oriented group of the 
THHK increased, particularly when the teachings of 
Confucius were replaced by the thoughts of Sun Yat Sen,46 
and all the reading materials came from China.47 This made 
the peranakan even more unhappy with the THHK education, 
with the result that they easily fell into the Dutch sphere.
In fact, the peranakan should have been comfortable with 
both types of schooling, the THHK education providing the 
cultural materials of Chineseness, and the HCS providing for 
their practical needs as inhabitants of the Dutch East 
Indies.48 Yet instead of teaching Chinese ethics to meet this 
peranakan cultural necessity, to maintain their 
Chineseness, the pupils were exposed to political ideology, 
aggressively launched by the KMT through THHK education. It 
is no wonder that the peranakan were so eager to accept the 
Dutch-created HCS, although they could not entirely abandon 
the THHK.
Although the peranakan were reluctant to enter THHK 
schools, the fact that there were only 29 HCS in the entire 
Netherlands Indies49 forced them to educate many of their 
children in the THHK or later in the Dutch-Native schools 
[Hollandsch-lnlandsche School] which were opened in 1913. 
Much to the dismay of the peranakan inhabitants, Batavia 
provided only three HCS,50 while only the children of
46 Thio Boen Hiok, "Het Onderwijs aan het Chineesche Kind in Indoneise", De 
Chineesche Revue, April 1929, p. 7.
47 H Borel in De Locomotief, 27 March 1907, and qouted in "De Chineesche- 
quaestie in Indie", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1907, p. 918.
48 "Beschouwingen over de Chineesche-Maleisch Persoverzicht, Maart-April 
1918", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4390.
49 Mary F Somers, "Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia", p. 51 and 
Table 11/1.
50 Thio Boen Hiok, "Het Onderwijs aan het Chineesche Kind in Indonesie", p. 
8.
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wealthy Chinese could enter European primary schools such 
as the Europeesch-Lagere School.
Phoa Keng Hek, as the president of the THHK, and major 
Khouw Kim An, as its patron, plus other leading members 
might endorse Dutch education for Chinese children, but 
they were unable to prevent the aggressive stream of Pan- 
Chinese ideology flowing through their own community via 
THHK schools.51 This was particularly so as Dutch 
government involvement in Chinese education came so 
belatedly: by 1908, when the first HCS school was opened, 
the THHK had mushroomed to 54 branches52 and 75 schools 
all over the country.53
During the forty years of its existence the THHK engaged 
nineteen Chinese officers of Batavia on its executive 
board,54 but I am unable to go into further detail regarding 
the divisions between peranakan and singkeh over their 
choice of education. There are not the sources to distinguish 
whether officers were peranakan or singkeh-totok in origin; 
in any case, political orientation did not necessarily relate 
to origins. In other words, there may be peranakans who 
opted for a Chinese education, while I can be certain that 
the majority of singkeh refused a Dutch school for their 
children.
Nevertheless, the above highlights the vulnerability of 
the peranakan. It was as if they were sitting on a pendulum, 
whose point of direction was dictated by the hand putting it 
in motion. For them it was not a question of being Dutch- 
oriented or being inclined towards China, but of the 
fluctuations in Dutch government policy. How the peranakan 
responded and adjusted to these changing conditions placed 
them at a crucial point in their existence in the colony. In 
particular, the Dutch governments belated response to their
51 See Geheim Mailrapport, no. 617x /1920.
52 "Onderwijs Tionghoa di Indonesia", Sin Po Jubileum Nummer 1910  - 
1935.
53 Mary F Somers, "Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia", p. 49.
54 My compilation was primarily taken from Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40-Taon 
dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, pp. 235-300.
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movement left them vulnerable to political penetration by 
the Pan-Chinese forces.
After Phoa Keng Hek retired from the THHK in 1923, the 
presidency was held by Tan Pia Teng, a singkeh of Hokkien 
origin, and after that the THHK chairmanship was dominated 
by the singkeh-totok element. Major Khouw Kim An remained 
patron of the THHK until the Japanese arrived in 1942, 
although he concentrated his interests in political 
organization by helping to found the Chung Hwa Hui.
I should note here Lea E Williams' comment on the role of 
major Khouw Kim An in the THHK. Although Williams did not 
specify his; name, it is quite obvious that the Chinese major 
of Batavia he referred to Khouw Kim An; "as a THHK patron 
[he] was not only inactive but tended to be hostile to the 
association".55 Williams was clearly unable to avoid bias 
against the Chinese officers, particularly those of Batavia.
Williams' comment on major Khouw Kim An discredits 
him by pointing out how the major supplied the Dutch with 
information on Soe Po Sia, the Chinese reading clubs, and 
how, after the Ch'ing dynasty was overthrown, he was 
suspicious of the Chinese republicans and denied their 
request for authorization to hoist the new Chinese flag.56 
Williams' words, "...the Batavia m ajoor obviously did not 
march with the times..."57, convince me that he had little 
understanding of the background and origins of the 
individuals who became Chinese officers, particularly in 
Batavia. Williams disregarded the fact that Khouw Kim An 
was a peranakan officer who had obtained a Dutch education 
at the Europeesch-Lagere School. That Khouw Kim An later 
joined the Chung Hwa Hui rather than another Chinese party 
shows where his political orientation lay. Williams also 
fails to take into account the family relations between 
Khouw Kim An and Phoa Keng Hek, the president of the THHK, 
whom he praises highly. My data indicates that these family 
relations also extended to a shared political orientation. A
55 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, p. 133.
56 Ibid., pp. 131-132.
57 Ibid, p. 132.
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nephew of Phoa Keng Hek, Phoa Kian Kie, who was also 
active m the Chinese movement, had a daughter who was 
married to the son of major Khouw Kim An.58 Furthermore, 
as I have already mentioned, Phoa Keng Hek's tactful refusal 
of the Chinese majorship left the position clear for Khouw 
Kim An, which surely discloses the weakness of Williams' 
analysis. And when Phoa visited the Netherlands for medical 
care, he was accompanied by major Khouw Kim An and his 
wife, Phoa's daughter.59 With this in mind, Williams' 
criticism of the Chinese officers in general and major 
Khouw Kim An in particular is unfounded. It is most unlikely 
that Khouw Kim An would be hostile to the THHK as his 
father-in-law, Phoa Keng Hek, was the president of that 
organization. That both shared political ideas for the 
progress of the Batavian Chinese community is quite 
obvious. As Williams did not specify the names of the last 
two majors of Batavia, Tio Tek Ho and Khouw Kim An, he 
might have confused these two persons.
The other weakness in Williams' analysis of the Pan- 
Chinese movement in the Dutch East indies during the period 
1900-1916 is his ignorance of the nature of the peranakan 
Chinese of Java. The peranakan reluctance to join the 
singkeh-totok in various Pan-Chinese organizations was due 
to a wide, seemingly unbridgeable, gap between the two. For 
various reasons the peranakan could not be comfortable in 
the singkeh environment, and even regarded the singkeh as 
'sem i-vreem delingen',so semi-foreign, an attitude which 
was shared by most Chinese officers in Java.
Therefore it is not surprising that Khouw Kim An, his 
peranakan fellow officers and other Dutch-educated groups 
set up the Chung Hwa Hui in 1926, the only Chinese political 
organization in tune with their way of thinking. The THHK,
58 "Politieke Actie onder de Chineezen in Nederlandsch-lndie", in Verbaal, 8 
April 1919, no.69.
59 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor of West Java, 15 June 1927, no. 
12169/2, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 28 July 1927, no. 37.
60 Note of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 9 January 
1924, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 43x /1924.
the first association they had founded, no longer fulfilled 
their aspirations.
The Chung Hwa Hui
Before I go into detail on this Dutch East Indies-oriented 
peranakan organization, there are three points which I need 
to establish.
Firstly, the Chung Hwa Hui (hereafter CHH) was not set 
up until August 1926, in Semarang. Its establishment 
reflected the peranakan need for a political party which 
would manifest their aspirations as members of Dutch East 
Indies society, and appears to demonstrate that they were 
unhappy with the China-oriented political idealism of the 
Sin Po group. Secondly, looking into the nature of peranakan 
society in the Dutch East Indies, Java in particular, in my 
view there were only two main peranakan organizations, the 
Chung Hwa Hui and the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (hereafter 
PTI). Thirdly, on a point of definition, I do not consider the 
Sin Po group to be a political party, whereas L 
Suryadinata,61 Lea E Williams,62 and other students of the 
Chinese political movement do. My reasons are that Sin Po 
had never been an organized political party, unlike the CHH 
and the PTI which had official acknowledgment from the 
Dutch government. The CHH received that acknowledgment 
by a decree on 6 June 1928. Sin Po's China-oriented 
idealism was mainly expressed in the Sin Po newspaper, 
from which the group derived its name, where it stirred up 
Chinese public opinion. Stirring up public opinion does not 
mean that Sin Po represented all Chinese public aspirations 
in the colony, particularly those of the peranakan 
m ajority .63 Secondly, Sin Po's political campaign mainly 
concentrated on Chinese participation in the Volksraad, in 
connection with the implementation of the Netherlands-
61 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java.
62 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism.
63 See Koloniaal Verslag van 1917 (1918. 's Gravenhage: Landsdrukkerij),
152
subject Law. Supported by various singkeh organizations and 
obtaining moral support from the Chinese government, the 
Sin Po group vigorously urged the Chinese of the Dutch East 
Indies to reject participation in the People’s Council. Its 
political efforts to lure the peranakan majority into an 
acceptance of Pan-Chinese ideology were not successful, 
and by the 1920's the Sin Po lost its popularity. An issue of 
Sin Po's Chinese edition in about 1925 was a turning point 
in its efforts to rely more on the singkeh public, for they 
could not rely on perianakan support for their China-oriented 
political campaigns.64
For those not fully familiar with the Indonesian Chinese 
movement, the fact that an organization called Chung Hwa 
Hui was set up in August 1926 may be surprising as there 
already existed another Chung Hwa Hui, founded in April 
1911. The latter was an Indies-Chinese student association 
in the Netherlands, which kept regular contact with many 
notable Chinese and officers in the Dutch East Indies, 
mainly seeking financial and moral support.65
The founding of the CHH in the colony in 1926 was 
initiated by ex-CHH Holland activists, among them Yap Hong 
Tjoen, Han Tiauw Tjong and Phoa Liong Gie. On returning to 
their home country, they encountered the unhappy political 
circumstances of the peranakan in Java. The need to set up a 
political party had long been discussed among the 
peranakan, since the Dutch authorities offered the Chinese 
participation in the colonial government and it was obvious 
that the majority of the peranakan welcomed this.66
The peranakan majority realized that the Sin Po group 
could not satisfy their aspirations as members of Dutch 
East Indies society, due to its China-oriented goal and its 
campaign against Chinese participation in the Dutch-
64 "Jaarverslag over 1922 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 2065.
65 Vijfjarig Bestaan van Chung Hwa Hui. Algemeen Vergadering, 15 April 
1916 in Amsterdam (1916. Leiden: CHH), p. 18.
66 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, September 1917", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, voi. VII, 1918, p. 368.
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created Volksraad. The desire for a political party had long 
been cherished, since 1917 when the Dutch authorities 
proposed that the Chinese nominate their candidates for the 
first sitting of the People’s Council in October 1918. This 
will be discussed later. The establishment of the CHH as a 
political party thus showed peranakan acceptance of 
involvement in colonial governemnt, despite Sin Po’ s 
vehement campaign. Even the PTI would not reject this 
participation.
It did not take long for the peranakan majority to accept 
the CHH as a constituency association, or 
1 kiesvereeniging'.67 As it turned out, during the entire period 
of Chinese participation in the Peple’s Council, the Chinese 
were represented in the main by members of the CHH. This 
made the CHH the target of much criticism although for the 
Dutch the CHH was the only Chinese political party that 
could propose candidates.68 Why the establishment of this 
Dutch East Indies-oriented peranakan party came so late 
was due to the aggressive campaign of the ultra-nationalist 
Sin Po group launched in 1917, but also because of the low- 
profile of the CHH itself, particularly in the first years of 
its existence.69
The goals of the CHH were directed at various activities 
of the Chinese community in the Dutch East Indies. It 
concerned itself with political and socio-economic issues 
on which cooperation with the Dutch was sought. On the 
other hand, cultural consciousness as Chinese did not lead it 
to reject relationships with China.70 As the main concern of 
the CHH was the Indies-born peranakan, it did not admit 
singkeh-totok members, except as donors. However, most 
active members were wealthy Chinese who, because of their 
economic interests* could not avoid commercial contact 
with China. Many of them certainly recognized the CHH’s
67 See Geheim Mailrapport, no. 120x /1930.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.; see also "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van 
het Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
70 "De Chineezen-Bond", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1928, p. 363; and see also 
Geheim Mailrapport, no. 211 x /1 935.
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potential in furthering their business interests, either in 
the Dutch East Indies or in China. The CHH could not exclude 
China. Observing this, many people thought the CHH might 
accommodate the singkeh-totok; such was the case in the 
Semarang branch.
Semarang was the base of the most famous Chinese 
enterprise, the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, whose owner 
required his employees to be members of the CHH. The 
strong influence of Semarang's Chinese major, Oei Tiong 
Ham, particularly his huge financial support, may explain 
why Semarang was frequently chosen as the venue for CHH 
congresses. I presume that it was this fact, among others, 
that led Suryadinata to the conclusion that Semarang was 
the centre of power of the CHH.71
My sources do not support Suryadinata. But I will not 
proceed further with this argument until I have focused on 
the question of singkeh admittance to the CHH. That will 
reveal where the CHH’s centre of power was located.
A reorganization plan, in early 1935 to solve the problem 
of admitting singkeh Chinese into the CHH, suggested 
turning the CHH into two parties. One party would deal 
primarily with the socio-economic development of the 
Chinese, and would disregard whether a member was Indies- 
born peranakan or singkeh. The other party would be 
occupied with political ideas, and membership would be 
open only to Indies-born Chinese, since they were 
considered Netherlands subjects. Members of the CHH first 
party , the socio-econom ic o rgan ization , would 
automatically become members of the CHH political party. 
In this way, the CHH was expected to embrace both 
elements in Chinese society. However, the reorganization 
plan proposed by the Semarang branch did not materialize. 
During discussions in the CHH congress on 25-26 December 
1935 in Semarang, the proposal was supported by only four 
branches, Semarang itself, Cirebon, Bandung and Cilacap. 
Batavia strongly opposed the plan, for to divide the CHH 
organization would, it felt, give rise to serious problems.
71L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, pp. 82-84.
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The Batavia CHH preferred to retain the policy of admitting 
singkeh members, only as donors.72 It should be noted that 
most wealthy peranakan Chinese and officers of Batavia 
were active CHH members. The Surabaya branch said that 
wider admittance of singkeh would merely enlarge the 
number of CHH members.
The vote of 28 to 10 against admitting singkeh members 
shows that most Indies-born Chinese would not associate 
easily with the China-oriented singkeh.73 The president of 
the CHH, the notable Kan Hok Hoei, better known as HHKan, 
tried to smooth over peranakan-singkeh antagonism by 
stating that, despite the decision of the CHH congress in 
Semarang, cooperation between both elements of Chinese 
society could be carried out through the Siang Hwee, or 
other Chinese trade associations.74
The CHH congress of 1935 to some extent demonstrated 
peranakan anxiety over HHKan's attitude, and he was later 
suspected of growing closer to China, particularly after a 
visit to the mainland in 1933. HHkan's visit to China, 
although purely for business, raised such suspicion because 
he accepted the chairmanship of the Siang Hwee, the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, in January 1934.75 One of 
his sons married the daughter of F T Sung, the Chinese 
Consul in Batavia.76
I am unable to give details of the reaction of Bataviafs 
peranakan community to HHKan. Dutch sources suggest that 
HHKan convinced the Dutch authorities that any inclining of 
CHH leaders towards China was only in an economic sense,
72 "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui ten Overzicht van de Peranakan- en 
Singkeh", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 255x/1936.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Note of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Government Commission for 
General Affairs of the People's Council, 19 February 1935, no. 521 /35 , in 
Geheim Mailrapport, no.211 x /1 935.
76 S L van der Wal, De Volksraad en de Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van 
Nederlands-lndie (1965. Groningen: J B Wolters), vol. II, p. 187, footnote 
1; also quoted by L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 157.
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and intended purely for the benefit of the Netherlands 
Indies.77 HHKan said that the fear that ultra nationalist 
political aspirations would lead the peranakan to become 
estranged from their birthplace, the Dutch East Indies, was 
simply unfounded. Nevertheless, the Dutch authorities were 
still unhappy that HHKan was chairman of the Siang Hwee. 
Although this singkeh trade organization had been officially 
recognized by the Dutch government, it was suspected of 
having foreign political bases. As the Siang Hwee 's  
activities were carried out under the auspices of the 
Chinese Ministry of Trade, many Dutch officials regarded it 
as a state within a state, 'staatjes in den staat'.7B In this 
context the Advisor for Chinese Affairs reminded HHKan 
that his dual position as chairman of the Siang Hwee and 
president of the CHH would give rise to unease among many 
peranakan.79 Without pursuing the possibility that HHKan's 
position as chairman of the singkeh trade organization 
would cause him serious problems with the Dutch 
government, the Advisor for Chinese Affairs subtly touched 
on the most crucial point regarding HHKan's reputation as a 
peranakan leader. During their talk on 14 February 1935, 
HHKan confessed that he doubted whether he could maintain 
his leadership of the peranakan, could withstand the strong 
influence and political penetration of the Chinese 
nationalist movement. He was aware that those foreign 
elements had already created an uneasy situation.80 A few 
days after his talk with the Advisor for Chinese Affairs, 
HHKan informed the chairman of the People’s Council that he 
had resigned as chairman of the Siang Hwee.81 This was a 
great relief for the Dutch government.
HHKan’s political attitude, which often brought him 
trouble, was the typical of most peranakan leaders and
77 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 23 
February 1935, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 219x/1935.
78 H Mouw, De Chineesche Kwestie, p. 16.
79 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 23 




Chinese officers, HHKan was close to notable members of 
the Chinese community in Batavia, for he was well-known 
as the landheert or landlord, of Batavia. When Chinese public 
opinion expressed a vehement dislike of the institution of 
Chinese officers, in response to Dutch government plans to 
reorganize the Chineesche Bestuur, HHKan, as the Chinese 
representative on the People's Council, argued in its 
support.
Because of their financial status, HHKan, major Khouw 
Kim An and other leading members of the CHH were an easy 
target for criticism. Chinese public opinion, stirred up by 
the Chinese-Malay press led by the Sin Po, labelled them the 
'Packard-group1,82 referring to the fact that most of them 
owned that expensive make of American car. The PTI 
reproved them for making the CHH into a 'capitalist' 
organization.83
Considering the incessant criticism against the CHH, one 
might imagine that the position of this Indies-born Chinese 
party would be weakened. In fact the CHH managed to 
survive until the last days of Dutch rule, although this does 
not mean that it was free from internal friction. Such a 
situation arose in the early 1 930s, when a group of young 
executive members, led by Phoa Liong Gie of the Bandung 
branch, was unhappy with HHKan's leadership. Phoa accused 
HHKan of being an autocratic leader and attacked his 
nepotism.84 In August 1933, Phoa Liong Gie left the CHH and 
joined the PTI, following two other leading members, Kwa 
Tjoan Sioe and Ko Kwat Tiong.
The PTI or Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese 
Party) was founded by Liem Koen Hian in Surabaya in 
September 1932. The Dutch government suspected the PTI of
82 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Government Commission 
for General Affairs of the People's Council, 19 February 1935, no. 521 /35 , 
in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 2 1 1x/1935; "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui", in 
Geheim Mailrapport, no. 255x/1936; see also R C Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling 
van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-lndie (1982 . Groningen: 
Wolters-Nordhoff), vol. IV, p. 375.
83 R C Kwantes, op.cit.
84 Ibid.; see also "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 
255x/1936, and Geheim Mailrapport, no. 1124x /1936.
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having an anti-Netherlands stance,85 particularly as it 
embraced the majority of lower class, Indies-born 
peranakan, or the ' lagere klasse der in deze gewesten 
geboren Chineezen\ who regarded the colony as their 
home.86 It is obvious that the PTI was founded as a political 
reaction against the CHH. The PTI claimed that the CHH was 
merely a means by which its founders could achieve their 
personal aspirations, and that the organization had little 
concern for the poor peranakan Chinese.87 The political 
attitude of the PTI was later shown in its leftist 
tendencies, particularly after Indonesian independence.
As a peranakan party with an Indonesian-oriented 
character, the PTI strongly disagreed with the CHH’s 
aloofness from the Indonesian nationalist movement.88 
Starting from political extremes, debates between the CHH 
and the PTI later dominated the history of the Chinese 
movement until the arrival of the Japanese. The main focus 
of their disagreement lay in the question of the future of 
the Indies-born peranakan Chinese in an independent 
Indonesia.
The PTI, known as the party of the less wealthy strata of 
peranakan society, was sympathetic to the Indonesian 
nationalist movement. This was quite understandable, as 
the living standards of its members brought them into 
closer contact with the indigenous population. However, in 
the eyes of the Dutch, in times of economic pressure, the 
PTI attitude reflected the necessity for the less wealthy 
Chinese to determine their position towards the indigenous 
population.89
85 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Government Commission 
for General Affairs of the People's Council, 19 February 1935, no. 521 /35 , 
in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 211x/1935.
86 "Onderlinge Verhouding der Peranakan-Chineesche in Inheemsche 
Bevolkingsgroep in Nederlands-lndie in Verband met hare Relaties met 
Japan", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 1124x/1936, kept in Geheim Verbaal, 
17 February 1937, no. L.3. See also "Mededeelingen van Dienst der Oost- 
Aziatische Zaken, September 1934", in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 2120.
87 See Geheim Mailrapport, no. 211 x /1 935.
88 Ibid.
89 "Onderlinge Verhouding der Peranakan-Chineesche in Inheemsche 
Bevolkingsgroep", in Geheim Verbaal, 17 February 1937, no. L.3.
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The CHH, in defence of its political attitude, stated that 
although it sympathized with the Indonesian nationalist 
movement, it did not wish to involve itself with indigenous 
political goals.90 Consequently, the CHH was severely 
condemned by the Indonesian nationalists, and their dislike 
became even stronger when the two Chinese representatives 
of the CHH voted against the proposal for an indigenous 
majority on the Peopled Council.91 As the question of the 
indigenous majority on the Council was increasingly 
discussed, Indonesian public opinion indignantly rebuked the 
CHH as 'the enemy of the Indonesian'.92 The PTI took the 
opportunity of the CHH's vulnerable situation to appeal to 
all Indies-born Chinese not to support CHH members in the 
People's Council. It urged the peranakan not to play with 
fire, as the CHH might provoke Indonesian anger, and it 
would be the small, poor Chinese who would pay for the 
actions of the rich Chinese members of the Council.93
Yet, despite the PTI's efforts to discredit the CHH, the 
political conditions of the Dutch East Indies in that period 
did not favour such an attack. Firstly, in line with its 
changing policy towards the Indies-born Chinese, the Dutch 
government obviously encouraged the CHH. From the outset, 
the CHH had cooperated with the Dutch, accepting the 
Netherlands-subject Law, participating in parliament, and 
clearly showing its Dutch-oriented political attitude. It is 
hardly surprising that the CHH movement was tolerated by 
the Dutch. Not only did the Dutch consider the CHH to be 
tame, but they also used it to combat the ultra-nationalist 
KMT and diplomatic interference of the Chinese government 
in the Chinese affairs of the colony. It is no wonder that the 
Dutch government could always accommodate CHH
90 "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 255x/1936.
91 See Verbaal, 22 February 1928, no. 11; and S L van der Wal, De 
Volksraad en de Staatskundige Ontwikkeling van Nederlands-lndie (1965. 
Groningen: J B Wolters), vol. II, p.45.
92 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Government Commission 
for General Affairs of the People's Council, 19 February 1935, no. 
521/1935, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 211x/1935.
93 Ibid.
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candidates on the People’s Council.94 Indeed, among the 
eight Chinese members seated during the whole period of 
this Dutch-created body, four were CHH members, HHKan, 
Khouw Kim An, Han Tiauw Tjong and Loa Sek Hie.
Secondly, although the PTI was suspected of having an 
anti-Netherlands attitude, the Dutch did not see the dangers 
of its encouragement of the peranakan majority. Even the 
strong anti-Japanese feelings of Liem Koen Hian during the 
period 1937-1939 brought him and the PTI into conflict 
with the Indonesian nationalists rather than the Dutch.
It is well known that the establishment of Japanese 
military power, and its victory over Russia in 1905, 
awakened strong national consciousness in many colonized 
Asian countries, resulting in the establishment of 
indigenous political movements. Working from the point 
that Asia is for Asians, in later years Indonesian 
nationalists never lost their pro-Japanese views. During the 
Sino-Japanese conflict, unlike the Chinese in the Dutch East 
Indies, Indonesians sided with the Japanese.
The anti-Japanese campaign of 1937-1939, launched by 
the Chinese in the Indies, saw a fierce argument between 
Liem Koen Hian and Dr Sutomo, one of the Indonesian 
nationalist leaders in Surabaya, and this invited further 
attacks by the Indonesian press on the PTI. Indonesians 
found it appalling that Liem Koen Hian, as a Chinese, openly 
criticized a respected Indonesian leader because of his pro- 
Japanese feelings. Liem argued that Dr Sutomo's writings, 
expressing his high opinion of Japan after his visit to that 
country, was nonetheless propaganda for Japanese 
imperialism. Furthermore, Liem warned that in view of 
Japan’s rapid expansion and military advances in Asia, 
Indonesians should be extremely watchful, instead of having 
great expectations that the Japanese would assist in 
releasing Indonesia from Dutch rule.95
94 Ibid.
95 "Onderlinge Verhouding der Peranakan-Chineesche en Inheemsche 
Bevolkingsgroep in Nederlands-lndie in Verband met hare Relaties met 
Japan", in Geheim Verbaal, 17 February 1937, no. L.3.
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Indonesians could not accept the political views of Liem 
Koen Hian and the PTI on this matter. It was difficult to 
erase indigenous distrust of the Chinese. The Indonesian 
nationalist parties did not fully accept the PTI's 
Indonesian-orientation. An article by an Indonesian 
journalist R M Soedarjo Tjokrosisworo, using the pseudonym 
Soebadra Poetra, in the Djawa Tengah newspaper 
(interestingly a Chinese peranakan paper) on 15 October 
1932 expresses the general feeling of Indonesians towards 
Liem Koen Hian and his party. He wrote: "We appreciate your 
exertion, but you will remain Chinese11.96 The PTI believed 
that the peranakan should be considered 'Indonesian', and be 
recognized as sons of Indonesia because they had been born 
in the country; but Indonesian public opinion condemned 
them as opportunist, saying that the Chinese 11van twee 
borden wilder) eten",97 or will eat from two plates.
The foregoing demonstrates the difficulties experienced 
by the peranakan Chinese political parties in deciding which 
side to take. Being a practical people, Chinese concerns lay 
more with education than with politics, as was shown by 
the founding of the THHK. That the THHK fell under the 
Chinese government's influence was due to the negligence of 
the Dutch East Indies government in taking care of Chinese 
educational needs. The peranakan preference for the HCS 
shows how they could not deal with either the genuine 
singkeh-totok or with the political ideology of the Chinese 
government.
Even the Dutch East Indies-orientation of the CHH cannot 
be attributed to the changing Dutch policy towards the 
Indies-born peranakan Chinese. The Dutch simply took the 
opportunity to deflect the influence of the Chinese 
government over the colony's Chinese. Without diplomatic 
interference from the Chinese government, the Dutch 
authorities would have left the Chinese to settle their own 
affairs. To a great extent, then, Dutch policy regarding the 




or 1bangsa tengah’ , in the process of colonial exploitation. 
The changing attitude of the Dutch towards the Indies-born 
Chinese must be seen as an effort to protect Dutch 
interests.
For the peranakan majority, cooperation with the Dutch 
government appeared to be the most reasonable course. 
Under the colonial regime, the peranakan could never be 
comfortable with either extreme, whether it was China- 
oriented or Indonesia-oriented. Within the colonial 
framework, the CHH’s political attitude was far more 
reasonable than that of the PTI, particularly as the 
Indonesian nationalist movement offered no opening to the 
Chinese in their idealism.
Being Chinese, whether peranakan or singkeh, was to be 
considered as non-indigenous by the Indonesian 
nationalists, and thus it was difficult for Chinese to enter 
any Indonesian political association. There is the example 
of Kwee Tjing Hong, a peranakan Chinese of Palembang, who 
took the initiative in setting up a local branch of the PNI, 
the Indonesian Nationalist Party. Yet, as a peranakan 
Chinese, Kwee could not be a full member of the PNI, let 
alone be elected as an executive member of the branch that 
he himself had formed.98
In addition to such prejudice, the rapid growth of Sarekat 
Islam  in the second decade of the twentieth century 
reflected the segregation policy of the Dutch government. 
This period was noted for the anti-Chinese feelings among 
the indigenous majority, which reached its peak with a 
series of riots throughout Java. As the indigenous 
population did not attempt to differentiate between the 
singkeh and peranakan elements, the anti-Chinese 
disturbances placed the peranakan in a very delicate 
position.
An examination of the nature of the peranakan Chinese in 
the colony, particularly in Java, shows that the CHH closely 
represented their political stand. Dutch policy itself
98 L Suryadinata, "Pre-war Indonesian Nationalism and Peranakan Chinese", 
Indonesia, no. 11, April 1971, p. 87.
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contributed to the emergence of a self-sufficient peranakan 
community. Despite the various inconsistencies and 
ambivalence in Dutch policy regarding the Chinese, it was 
the Dutch who provided the Chinese with the opportunity to 
make a living. No matter how much the Dutch authorities 
were prejudiced against and fearful of the Chinese, both 
managed to work together in the exploitation of the country. 
Secondly, the socio-cultural characteristics of the 
peranakan meant that it was unlikely that they would side 
either with China or with Indonesia. In common with 
marginal groups fn most societies, the peranakan, who 
originated from two racial elements, were distinctive. They 
were too Chinese to be Indonesian, too Indonesian to be 
C h in e se ,"  they could never fully integrate with either. 
Therefore, the most likely political path for the peranakan 
was to lean towards the Dutch East Indies, or at least to 
have a Dutch-orientation.
Kwee Tek Hoay, a peranakan writer, in his piece on the 
three streams of the Chinese political movement, the 
China-oriented Sin Po group, the Dutch East Indies-oriented 
Chung Hwa Hui, and the Indonesian-oriented Partai Tionghoa 
Indonesia, properly placed the CHH as the middle stream. 
According to Kwee, the CHH lay between the two extremes 
of Sin Po and PTI.100
I can now develop my argument with L Suryadinata, 
regarding the centre of power of the three political streams 
of the Chinese movement. Suryadinata concludes that the 
Sin Po group had its main base in Batavia, the CHH in 
Semarang and the PTI in Surabaya.101 He is quite correct in 
identifying these three cities as bases for the Chinese 
political movement, but he has misplaced them. 
Suryadinata's argument, using demograhic data on Batavia, 
may support his view that the capital was the centre of the 
Sin Po group, but as my interest lies with the non-China-
"  Kwee Kek Beng, 25  Tahun Djamblang Kotjok, 1929-1954  (1954 . 
Djakarta: Penerbit Gula), p. 30.
100 L Suryadinata (ed), Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900 - 
1977, p. 55.
101 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, pp. 82-84.
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oriented peranakan, I will not discuss the China-oriented 
Sin Po group further. In any event, Suryadinata may well be 
right about the Sin Po's strength in Batavia. However, 
Suryadinata appears to have underestimated the strength of 
the singkeh in Semarang and Surabaya, in terms of their 
influence on the peranakan in those two cities.
According to Suryadinata, Batavia was a port-city with 
close links to Singapore, the centre of Chinese nationalist 
activity in Southeast Asia, and the Soe Po Sia and the Siang 
Hwee of Batavia were very active.102 But in my view, these 
conditions did not guarantee the singkeh a dominating 
influence over the peranakan community in Batavia. From 
the Dutch sources it is known that, after its reorganization 
in 1929, the KMT made Batavia its main branch, or 
1hoofdafdeeling'S03 although the KMT's popularity remained 
weak. This was shown in July 1925, when the Chinese 
Consul-General in Batavia organized a memorial ceremony 
on the death of Sun Yat Sen. This event was not the great 
success expected by the Chinese Consul and the KMT leaders 
owing to the reluctance of Chinese officers, particularly 
major Khouw Kim An, to summon their people to join the 
ceremony. Major Khouw Kim An was concerned about 
aggressive KMT activities, a subject on which he often 
complained to the Resident of Batavia. He stressed that if 
the Dutch authorities did not take preventive measures, the 
Chinese leaders of the KMT would present a dangerous 
threat to peace and order in the region.104 The major's 
anxiety was shared by Batavia's peranakan majority, as 
many of the riots and disturbances which had occurred 
during the 1910s were initiated by the singkeh element. In 
an open letter published in Koloniaal T ijdschrift, a 
peranakan complained that "... those members of the Soe Po
102 Ibid., p. 83.
103 "Jaarverslag over 1928 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129. See also 
"Overzicht van de Chineesche Beweging in Nederlandsch-lndie", in Geheim 
Mailrapport, no. 813x /1932.
104 Letter of the Resident of Batavia, 13 July 1925, no. 1241/E, quoted in 
the letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 17 July 
1925, no. 363 /25 , in Geheim Verbaal, 3 November 1925, no. U.15.
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Sia could not go along with us, the peranakan. As we know 
better about the law in this country, we know what we may 
and may not do, yet those members of the Soe Po Sia did not 
understand us. They accused us of being afraid of the Dutch 
government, that we have sold ourselves to the Dutch, and 
therefore, they offensively harassed us even more ...”.105
Many higher Dutch officials also observed that it was 
very unlikely that the peranakan would join the singkeh in 
one organization, for each would stand in the way of the 
o t h e r .106 As a result, the peranakan responded 
enthusiastically to the establishment of the CHH. I am 
certain that the CHH had more solid support among the 
Batavian peranakan.
Despite the many criticisms of HHKan, particularly with 
regard to nepotism, it indicates that the CHH leadership 
was dominated by the Batavian peranakan. As HHKan himself 
was very close to the Chinese officers, particularly major 
Khouw Kim An and captain Lie Tjian Tjoen, the CHH 
leadership was in effect shared among them. In addition, 
among the CHH members who became Chinese 
representatives on the People’s Council, HHKan, Khouw Kim 
An, Loa Sek Hie and Han Tiauw Tjong, only the latter did not 
originate from Batavia. If Yo Heng Kam, a Chinese captain of 
Batavia, had not left the CHH in 1927 because of a political 
dispute with HHKan, the overwhelming domination of CHH 
members of Batavian origin on the People’s Council would be 
even clearer. Yo Heng Kam’s subsequent membership of the 
People’s Council, from 1927 to 1942, was due to his 
affiliation with the P o litie k e -E c o n o m is c h e B o n d , an 
association of European businessmen.
Later, in 1935, when the Semarang branch of the CHH 
proposed a reorganization of the party to admit singkeh 
members, the CHH of Batavia strongly opposed.107 That
105 "Een Chinees over de Chineesche Beweging", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 
1911-1912, pp.669-670.
106 "Overzicht over de Chineesche Beweging in Nederlandsch-lndie", in 
Geheim Mailrapport, no. 120x /1930.
107 "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 
219x /1935; see also pages 154-155.
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Batavia was the main office of the CHH, and maintained a 
strong influence, is shown by the fact that it was followed 
by 27 other branches. Semarang was supported by Cirebon, 
Bandung and Cilacap, showing that singkeh influence was 
visible in the CHH only in these four cities.
Suryadinata also suggests that as well as the old 
entrenched peranakan of Semarang, the peranakan city's 
businessmen were not enthusiastic about taking part in 
Chinese nationalist activities. Furthermore, he suggests 
that Semarang was the base of the Oei Tiong Ham concern, 
which was important to the strength of the CHH,108 although 
his argument fails to convince me.
I shall disregard Suryadinata's point that Semarang had a 
smaller Chinese community than Batavia and Surabaya; if 
one goes further, and compares the economic conditions of 
the Chinese in these three cities, Semarang cannot be 
considered a stronghold of the CHH. From Dutch sources it 
is clear that the Chinese of Semarang paid a greater amount 
of 'personeele b e la s t in g or property tax, than their 
contemporaries in Batavia. This tax, which was assessed on 
houses, furniture, horses and vehicles was indeed higher, on 
average, in Semarang, 51.75 guilders compared to 37.54  
guilders in Batavia. But in terms of tax-payment in general, 
[tax payment per capita], the Chinese of Batavia contributed 
more than their fellows in Semarang and Surabaya.
The economic strength of the Batavian Chinese lay in 
their vast landownership, for which in 1932 they paid a 
total ground-tax of 459,000 guilders, compared to 211,000  
guilders in Semarang, and 311,000 guilders in Surabaya.109 
In this period the strength of Chinese landownership in the 
Batavia residency enabled them to endure harsh economic 
pressures110 and strong competition from both the singkeh 
and the emerging indigenous middle-class.
108 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 84.
109 See Indisch Verslag van 1932 (1933. 's Gravenhage: Landsdrukkerij), 
vol.ll, p. 138, Table no. 113.
110 Djie Ting Ham, "Enkele Opmerkingen over den Economischen Toestand 
van den Chineeschen op Java”, De Chineesche Revue, October 1928, p. 49.
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The fact that Semarang was frequently chosen as the 
venue for the CHH congress was obviously due to the 
financial backing of the Oei Tiong Ham concern.
The failure to overthrow the domination of the CHH's 
Batavian element is indicated by the fact that two young 
executive members who later joined the PTI, Ko Kwat Tiong 
and Phoa Liong Gie, were not from Batavia. Ko was born in 
Parakan, Central Java and was from the CHH’s Semarang 
branch, while Phoa was from the CHH’s Bandung branch in 
West Java. Ko Kwat Tiong served as a member of the 
People’s Council from 1935 to 1939, representing the PTI. 
But Phoa Liong Gie never succeeded in securing a seat on the 
People’s Council since he left the CHH over the question of 
Chinese candidacy, a subject on which he disagreed with 
HHKan.111
As mentioned earlier, the favour in which the Dutch held 
the CHH contributed to the stability of HHKan's leadership 
and that of his fellow Batavians. But if one looks more 
deeply into the silent majority of the peranakan in the three 
main cities of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, one wonders 
about the real power of the CHH and the PTI within 
peranakan society. In terms of elite leadership, it is clear 
that the CHH was dominated by the Batavian peranakan. But 
as for its common followers, why should the PTI, as the 
Indonesian-oriented peranakan party, have emerged strongly 
in Surabaya and not in Batavia?
If we observe the history of the peranakan community of 
Batavia, the oldest, largest and most solid community, then 
it might be anticipated that the PTI would have flourished 
there. However, during the turbulent periods when anti- 
Chinese riots raged occurred in Java, from 1911 to 1913 
and 1916 to 1918, the main riots were in Central and East 
Java. Batavia had smaller troubles which were easily 
overcome. This seems to provide evidence for what the 
Dutch government called the ’brotherhood’ between the
111 "De Positie der Chung Hwa Hui", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 
219x71935.
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peranakan Chinese and their indigenous neighbours in that 
region.
I would like to emphasize that it is inaccurate to 
describe the strength of the CHH and PTI as peranakan 
political organizations simply by looking where they were 
first established, as Suryadinata has done. The writer needs 
to observe deeply and thoroughly the nature of the 
peranakan community, the history of its establishment, the 
attitude of the Dutch local government in the handling of 
Chinese affairs in the region, the quality of 
peranakan/indigenous relations. Each is an indispensable 
factor contributing to the distinctive character of each 
peranakan organization. The peranakan comunity in Java was 
not of a single character.
The People's Council and the Question of the  
Netherlands Subjects
The Dutch plan of 1917 to set up a semi-parliamentary 
body in the Netherlands Indies aroused various political 
responses among the inhabitants of the colony.
The Indonesians saw the People's Council, or Volksraad, 
as a political opportunity to participate in the colonial 
government. The Chinese response was somewhat different. 
For them, the government's offer to join the new institution 
by nominating their representatives forced them into a 
difficult position, due to their ambiguous civil status in the 
colony. I should first consider the Chinese legal position in 
the Dutch East Indies.
The Dutch applied a policy of segregation in ruling their 
colony in the East. For the Dutch East Indies, this 
segregation was operated mainly on lines of legal status, by 
dividing the population on grounds of race and religion. On a 
racial basis, colonial society was divided into three main 
categories - European, Natives and Foreign Asiatics or the 
Vreemde Oosterlingen. On a religious basis, categorization 
was simply between Christian and non-Christian.112
112 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter I.
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The Chinese belonged to the Vreemde Oosterlingen group, 
and became primary members of this non-native, non- 
European element in colonial society. Because of their 
considerable numbers and the indispensable role they played 
in the colonial economy, it is not surprising that the Dutch 
took the Chinese into consideration when formulating 
government policies. For the three centuries to 1900, Dutch 
government concerns revolved around economic matters, but 
to this were added political concerns in the first half of the 
twentieth century.
As members of the Vreemde Oosterlingen group, the 
Chinese position was extremely 'onvaste en zwevende'S13 
unsteady and floating, which reflected the dualist policy of 
the Dutch government. There is an example in the legal 
sphere: in legal cases, the Chinese were liable to European 
law, and thus their judicial processes took place in the 
Council of Justice, or Raad van Justitie. However, if a 
Chinese was involved in a criminal case, he was prosecuted 
by the Landraad, or Native Court of Justice. When, in 1868, 
the Dutch introduced the politierol, or police roll, by which 
rights were given to administrative officials to exercise 
judicial power over the natives and the Chinese, Chinese 
grievances increased.114
Another example of dualist practice applied to the 
Chinese was in taxation. The bedrijfsbelasting, or corporate 
tax, was levied on both the natives and the Chinese; 
Europeans were not included, as they paid on a different 
basis. That the Chinese were liable to this corporate tax 
was due to their civil status as 'gelijkgesteld m et de 
Inlanders',i15 or being equal with the natives. However, in 
terms of the personeele belasting, or property tax, which 
was assessed on material possessions such as houses, 
vehicles, furniture, horses, the Chinese were linked with
11 3 Han Tiauw Tjong, "De Chineezen op Java en het Nederlandsch 
Onderdaanschap", Delndische Gids, vol. II, 1919, p. 938.
114 F H Fromberg, "Terdjepit", Chung Hwa Hui Tsa Chih, 6 October 1917, p. 
111.
115 Verslag van de Commissie to t Bestudeering van Staatrechtelijk 
Hervormingen (1941. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), vol. II, p. 45.
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the Europeans. Even the imposition of the hated 
passenstelsel, or passport system, which was intended to 
prevent Chinese penetration into the native village 
economy, was an example of the Dutch government's 
ambiguous attitude towards the Chinese. As the passport 
system did not apply to those who owned the rights to 
revenue-farming, the majority Chinese, it did not operate 
well in practice. Indeed it was more of an annoyance to the 
Chinese than an effective measure to hinder their movement 
in the hinterland. There are many other examples of the 
ambiguous nature of Dutch policy towards the Chinese, 
although it is not my intention to dwell on them here.
On 10 February 1910 the Dutch administration issued a 
law regarding Netherlands subjects. It was based on the 
principle of jus soli, by which all Indies-born Chinese 
became Netherlands subjects. This was a remarkable step 
by the Dutch to improve the status of the Chinese, although 
it subsequently created an even more complicated problem. 
The issue of this law was a political reaction to the 
Chinese government's policy regarding her overseas 
subjects.
A year earlier, on 28 March 1909, the Chinese government 
had issued an edict stating that all Chinese born of a 
Chinese father or mother would be considered subjects of 
China.116 As the government of China applied the principle 
of jus sanguinis in this matter and its regulation had been 
issued first, the jus soli principle adopted by the 
Netherlands Indies government was intended to 'protect' the 
Indies-born Chinese or peranakan. It goes without saying 
that these opposing principles turned the question of the 
status of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies into a 
political issue.
The jus soli principle applied in the Netherlands-subject 
Law revealed how much the Dutch depended upon the Chinese 
residents, particularly in economic matters, although this 
dependency was never openly admitted. But the application
11 6 F H Fromberg, "De Chineezen en het Nationaliteitsbeginsel", in his 
Verspreide Geschriften (1926. Leiden: CHH), p. 653.
of the Netherlands-subject Law brought a number of 
political consequences. Firstly, despite the Dutch 
government's intention to 'p ro tect' the Indies-born 
peranakan from the Chinese government's influence, the jus 
soli principle also covered the Indies-born singkeh. 
Consequently diplomatic friction occurred between the 
Dutch government and the Chinese Consulates in the 
Netherlands Indies when the latter launched a registration 
drive for Chinese residents in the colony. I will discuss on 
this later. Secondly, as the Netherlands subject status was 
intended to smooth external relations, and had no legal 
impact on the status of citizenship, it did not change the 
civil status of the Chinese within the colony. That 
ambiguous position encouraged Chinese movement into the 
political arena. This was first shown in the Chinese 
reaction to the People's Council, as the Chinese movement 
was then deeply occupied with political issues concerning 
Chinese status and Chinese participation in colonial 
government.
That the Netherlands-subject Law was more relevant in 
the diplomatic and territorial context can be observed from 
its attendant legal terms. A Chinese, according to the 1910 
law, was 'N ederlandsch-onderdaan ', although being a 
Netherlands subject did not change his civil status as a 
Vreemde Oosterlingen. 117 Although the term Vreem de  
Oosterlingen was not to be used as a legal categorization 
of Dutch East Indies inhabitants after 1 January 1920 ,118 
this ridiculous title  continued to appear in Dutch 
government correspondence.119 Moreover, despite the Dutch 
plans for administrative reform of the Chineesche Bestuur,
117 Sim Kim Ay, De Chineesche Nederzetting in Nederlandsch-lndie (n.d. 
Leiden: CHH), p. 39.
118 See Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-lndie 1919, no. 622, in which the 
inhabitants of the colony were divided into: (a) European, and those having 
equal status with the European; (b) Natives, and those having equal status 
with the Natives, to whom the Chinese were linked.
119 For example, in Mailrapport, no. 3426 /1922 , regarding "Het Vraagstuk 
der Hervorming van het Bestuur in de Groote Hoofdplaatsen op Java", 
particularly chapter II, "De Regeling van het Besttur over Chineezen en 
Andere Vreemde Oosterlingen na het Verdwijnen van Wijken voor Ingezetenen 
van die Landraaden". (Italics are mine).
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or Chinese Administration, in 1918, the heading Bestuur 
over Vreemde Oosterlingen, or Administration over the 
Foreign Asiatics, was used in official reports, until 
1938!120
As I noted earlier, the establishment of the People’s 
Council raised for the Chinese the question how their legal 
status would be considered when a parliamentary body came 
into existence. It is interesting to note that it was within 
this political initiative that the Chinese raised their civil 
status as a problem; many wondered why they should have 
waited around seven years to raise this issue. Suryadinata 
suggested that it was due to Sin Po stirring up Chinese 
public reaction against the implementation of the 
Netherlands-subject Law, after a mass Chinese meeting 
held in Semarang on 11 November 1917 .121 This occasion 
marked the emergence of the Sin Po group as the earliest 
political stream in the Chinese movement and as the 
champion of the anti-Netherlands-subject law forces.
The Semarang gathering had been preceded by a meeting 
held in Bandung on 7 October 1917, to discuss the 
nomination of Chinese representatives for the People’s 
Council. Among the 36 Chinese members of various local 
councils who had been invited, only eleven managed to be 
present, most being Chinese officers. The main question 
under discussion concerned Chinese participation in the 
Volksraad, and whether the Chinese community should be 
represented by Chinese who bore equal status to Europeans, 
that is the 'Europeanen gelijksgestelde Chineezen\ or by 
European members of the People’s Council.122 The meeting 
settled on nominating five Chinese as their representatives, 
namely Kan Hok Hoei (better known as HHKan) from Batavia; 
Tjoa Liang Djien, a Chinese lieutenant from Surabaya; 
Tjoeng Tay Hoen, the Chinese major of Muntok, Bangka
120 See Indisch Verslag van 1939, vol. I, p. 446.
121 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 33.
122 S L van der Wal, De Volksraad en de Staatskundige Ontwikkeling, vol. I. p. 
209.
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Island; Khouw Kim An, the Chinese major of Batavia; and Lie 
Tjian Tjoen, the Chinese captain of Batavia.123
However, the decisions of the Bandung meeting met with 
strong opposition from the Chinese public, and thus it was 
necessary to hold another meeting with a larger audience, 
and one that was not limited to the Chinese leaders. The 
audience of 700 people was, according to Suryadinata, the 
largest gathering of the Chinese in Java since the 
emergence of the Pan-Chinese movement.124 It aimed to 
reject the People’s Council, as it was represented at the 
Semarang meeting. To understand this, we need to explain 
the political situation in Semarang at that time.
The choice of Semarang as the venue indicates the 
political influences at work during the meeting, as the city 
was known as the base of the Indonesian socialist groups at 
that time. The ISDV, Indisch-Socialistisch-Democratische 
Vereeniging, or Indies Socialist Democrat Association, had 
been founded by H Sneevliet and A Baars, two leading 
members of the Dutch socialist party, who had arrived in 
Java in 1914 and settled in Semarang. The ISDV was later 
transformed into the Perserikatan Komunis Hindia (Indies 
Communist Association), which in 1918 was named the PKI 
or Indonesian Communist Party.
Therefore, did these 700 represent the 360,000 Chinese 
residents in Java? It seems certain that the 700 spoke only 
for their own interests, those of the approximately 27 
Chinese associations from East Java "(mostly from 
Surabaya), five from Central Java (Semarang); while West 
Java (Bandung, Batavia and Indramayu) were represented by 
only one organization.125 But what was the position of about 
the silent majority, especially as the non-China oriented 
peranakan political parties, the Chung Hwa Hui and the 
Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, were founded later? I can only 
assume that political opinion at the Semarang meeting was
123 Ibid., p. 210.
124 L Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, p. 21.
125 Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Orang Orang Tjina di Semarang{ 1 9 3 0 .  
Semarang: n.p.), p. 235.
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dominated by China-oriented and socialist Chinese groups.
In other words, the Semarang meeting did not represent the 
feelings of the peranakan majority.
It is very likely that the Semarang meeting was a war of 
words between those who favoured Chinese participation in 
the Volksraad (represented by HHKan from Batavia) and 
those who opposed (represented by The Kian Sing from 
Surabaya). HHKan argued that it was futile to attempt to 
discuss or launch plans for the improvement of education, 
taxation, legal status, without joining the People's Council, 
as the only place to put forward Chinese demands was in 
that body. He emphasized that in order to gain political and 
social emancipation, the Chinese had no other way, 'verzet 
of medewerking'^ZG either opposition or cooperation. The 
majority opinion of the meeting, on the other hand, was that 
the Volksraad  was a fake, or 'palsoe r, 127 and saw no 
benefit to the Chinese in this institution.
The Kian Sing, whom the Dutch suspected of having close 
contact with Sneevliet and Baars, condemned as capitalists 
thpse who willingly agreed to be members of the 
VolksraadA28 He argued that the Bandung meeting of October 
1917, initiated by Chinese officers and Chinese members of 
government-created local councils, did not truly represent 
the Chinese community. Indeed he suspected that those 
Chinese candidates for the People's Council were simply 
seeking their own advantage.~HHKan continued to insist that 
the Chinese should join the People's Council, otherwise they 
would be more and more deprived.
In the meantime, the Dutch observed that The Kian Sing's 
opposition was not solely to Chinese participation in the 
Volksraad but was more directed at HHKan himself.129 There 
was personal rivalry for leadership of the Chinese.
126 Quoted in Confidential Note of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the 
Director of Home Affairs, 22 November 1917, no. 4 2 7 /1 7 , in Geheim 
Mailrapport, no. 301x/1917. See also S L van der Wal, De Volksraad en de 
Staatskundige Ontwikkeling, p. 216.
127 See Geheim Mailrapport, no. 301 x /1 917.
129 Ibid.
129 Ibid. See also S L van der Wal, De Volksraad en de Staatskundige 
Ontwikkeling, p. 217.
175
Although they rejected the Peopled Council, the Chinese 
community understood that the Dutch would still nominate 
HHKan as the first Chinese representative in the 
Volksraad.13° The fact that HHKan was opposed by those 
Chinese present at the Semarang meeting created  
disagreement among the Dutch officials, some of whom 
thought HHKan’s position in the eyes of his Chinese fellows 
was rather insecure. Others suspected that as a Volksraad 
member, HHKan might speak more as a Chinese than as a 
Netherlands subject, or that he was likely to be sought out 
by either Chinese or Dutch extreme groups.
There was also some uncertainty with regard to The Kian 
Sing’s criticism, his socialist politics and his potential 
influence over the Chinese majority. However, the Advisor 
for Chinese Affairs was of the opinion that of the two, 
HHKan might be more dangerous than The Kian Sing, who 
possessed no original political ideas and was greatly under 
the influence of the other socialist leaders. HHKan, on the 
other hand, was a very forward Chinese, cool and politically 
experienced: to draw this Chinese leader to the Dutch side 
would be more advantageous.131
The Dutch choice of HHKan was also due to his personal 
status. Despite the fact that the Semarang meeting did not 
support him, HHKan was unquestionably a strong public 
figure, whose high status and intellegence would serve well 
those whom he represented. As a member of the People's 
Council, on whatever subject or question, he would not make 
a bad impression on his fellow members or on the public, a 
capacity not matched by others in the Chinese 
community.132
130 "Beschouwingen over de Chineesch-Maleische Pers van February-Maart 
1918", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4390; and see also note of Director of 
Home Affairs to Governor-General, 8 March 1918, no. 165/B, in Verbaal, 2 
July 1919, no. 15.
131 All these arguments were elaborated in the letter of the Advisdr for 
Chinese Affairs to the Director of Home Affairs, 22 December 1917, no. 
476 /17 , in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 13x /1918.
132 Ibid.
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Although Chinese public opinion was initially unhappy 
with HHKan, condemning him for being more or less 
Westernized, or 'vereuropeescht /s',133 and likely to forget 
his ’Chinese nationality1,134 his Chineseness, it later 
managed to accept his appointment by the Dutch.135
However, before this decision was made, the Advisor for 
Chinese Affairs proposed that the government consider 
other Vreemde Oosterlingen besides the Chinese, for 
example Arabs.136 He pointed out that there was a split 
among the Chinese on this matter. But the Chinese were too 
numerous and too important to be neglected. The Dutch 
government carried out its plan by appointing two Chinese 
representatives to the People's Council for its first period, 
1918-1921.
The two Chinese members were HHKan from Batavia and 
Lim A Pat, the Chinese captain of Muntok, Bangka Island.137 
Chinese public opinion assumed that HHKan had been chosen 
for his political standing, while Lim A Pat's nomination was 
due to his activities in trade and industry.138 As they were 
categorized as appointed or non-elected members of the 
People's Council, neither represented a political party, or 
'partijloos'.^zv It should be reiterated that the two main 
peranakan political parties, the Chung Hwa Hui and the 
Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, had not yet been founded. It is 
remarkable that despite there being no Chinese political 
party in existence at the time, the people still managed to 
establish their attitudes political participation, indicating
133 Note of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 8 March 
1918, no. 165/B, in Verbaal, 2 July 1919, no. 15.
134 "Beschouwingen over de Chineesche-Maleisch Persoverzicht, December 
1917", in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4390.
135 Ibid.
136 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Director of Home Affairs, 
22 November 1917, no. 427 /17 , in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 301 x /1 917.
137 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 23 February 1918, no. 2; and also S L van 
der Wal, De Volksraad en de Staatskundige Ontwikkeling, vol. I, p. 224.
138 See Perniagaan, 2 February 1918, quoted in the letter of the Director of 
Home Affairs to Governor-General, 8 March 1918, no. 165/B, in Verbaal, 2 
July 1919, no. 15.
139 Verslag van de Bestudeering van de Staatrechtelijke Hervormingen, vol. 
I, p. 82.
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that from this point the Chinese movement was being 
transformed from the socio-cultural base of the Tiong Hoa 
Hwee Koan into the political arena.
As I noted earlier, the meeting in Semarang on 11 
November 1917 confirmed the influence of the Sin Po group 
in directing Chinese opinion against the People's Council, by 
focusing on the Netherlands-subject Law. This China- 
oriented group kept reminding the Chinese of the Dutch East 
Indies that they were 'guests' in the colony, and they could 
not be considered Netherlands subjects. There was 
therefore no benefit in joining the People's Council. 
According to this group, the Netherlands-subject law and 
the Dutch offer of Chinese participation in colonial 
government was a plot to isolate the Chinese of the Dutch 
East Indies from China, their country of origin.140 It further 
argued that Dutch laws were distorted in such a way that 
the Chinese position in the Netherlands Indies was 
degraded.141 In addition, the Chinese were unfairly treated 
by the Dutch government, having to pay double taxation, 
being placed under the Native Court of Justice, deprived of 
Dutch education, and much else. Therefore it urged that the 
Chinese fight the Netherlands-subject Law, that they should 
remain Chinese.142
After the Semarang meeting of November 1917, the Sin Po 
group launched the 'anti-Nederiandsch-onderdaanschap1 
campaign. In early April 1919, in a space of less than three 
months, they had collected 28,789 signatures from Chinese 
supporters.143 This success was due to the way in which Sin 
Po stirred up Chinese sentiment. The Chinese had long 
desired to gain equal status to the Europeans, especially as 
the Japanese had already achieved this in 1896. In their
140 L Suryadinata, Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977, 
p. 30; W J L van Es, "Het Chung Hwa Hui Congres", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 
1927, p. 599; "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van 
het Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
141 L Suryadinata, Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977,
p. 21.
142 Ibid., p. 22.
143 According to Sin Po, 15 April 1919, quoted in L Suryadinata, Peranakan 
Chinese Politics in Java, p. 34.
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view it was clearly ridiculous that respectable Chinese 
merchants and shopkeepers were granted a lower status 
than Japanese prostitutes!144 Had the Chinese been granted 
equal status with the Europeans they would have been 
relieved of the many anomalies stemming from their dual 
position, and would no longer be mere *belastingsobjectV 45 
objects of taxation.
At this time the Chinese government was in a state of 
political turmoil with the South China Kuo Min Tang and 
North China fighting for supremacy. The Dutch felt that this 
unfavourable situation would not help the Chinese in the 
Dutch East Indies to gain their demands.146 The fact that in 
the international community, the Chinese government was 
striving for equal status with the Western powers did not 
help the Chinese either. Unlike China, Japan had concluded a 
treaty with the Netherlands on 8 September 1896 regarding 
the status of their subjects.
The Chinese desire for equal status with Europeans was 
not simply a question of prestige. Being categorized as 
Vreemde Oosterlingen, and put on a parallel footing with the 
natives caused them much deprivation. That the Chinese 
would prefer to be equal with the European rather than with 
the natives did not mean that they looked down upon their 
'brown brothers'; their status as 'vreemdelingen' meant that 
they were denied the rights granted to other foreigners.147 
In other words, the Chinese objected not to their equal 
status with the natives but to their unequal status with 
Europeans.148 Moreover, being accepted as Netherlands 
subjects yet still being considered ' Vreemde Oosterlingen', 
le ft the Chinese with no rights to landownership and
144 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Februari 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p. 358; J Moerman, In en Om de Chineesche 
Kamp (1932. Batavia: G.Kolff & Co), p. 17.
145 "De Chineezen-kwestie", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1927, p. 543.
146 "De Chineezen in Nederlandsch-lndie", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1910, p. 
1381; see also "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, October 1916", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. VI, 1917, p.112.
147 Han Tiauw Tjong, "De Chineezen op Java en het Nederlandsch 
Onderdaanschap", p. 956.
148 F H Fromberg, "De Chineezen en het Nationaliteitsbeginsel", p. 647.
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cultivation. Their legal position, being categorized with the 
natives, did not help them in this matter.
The question of Chinese acceptance of the Netherlands- 
subject law remained until the 1930's, as the Dutch 
continued to disregard Chinese demands for equal status. 
The Dutch preferred to offer Chinese personal equal status, 
'persoonlijke gelijkstelling'^^  by lowering the requirement 
for applicants of financial standing and ability to speak the 
Dutch language, particularly after 1930 .150 But the Dutch 
would not meet demands for equal status for all Chinese in 
the Dutch East Indies.
Dutch rejection of Chinese demands was for political 
reasons, for that concession would have had a great impact 
on the growing nationalist forces.151 Considering the 
turbulent political circumstances of the colony, 
particularly from the first decade of the twentieth century, 
the Dutch were very cautious in their handling of Chinese 
affairs. Yielding to the Chinese request for equal status 
would provoke anti-Chinese feeling among the Indonesians, 
which in turn might endanger the Dutch themselves.
On the other hand, the Chinese were reluctant to apply for 
1persoonlijke gelijkstelling ', for equality with Europeans 
would mean that they would be subject to 'schutterij', civic 
guard and militia service, particularly as in early 1916 the 
Dutch government had launched a Indie-Weerbaar, or Indies 
Defence. The Chinese immediately rejected the Ind ie- 
Weerbaar; stating that, "whatever the Dutch have done for 
us, we do not want to sacrifice our lives for their 
interests".152 They mockingly indicated that as there was a 
serious shortage of Dutch soldiers, the colonial government
149 "Beschouwingen over de Chineesch-Maleische Pers, April 1918", in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4390.
150 "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
1 51 S L van der Wal, De Opkomst van der Nationalistische Beweging in 
Nederlands-lndies (1967. Groningen: J B Wolters ), p. 51, footnote 2.
152 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, December 1916", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. VI, 1917, p. 685.
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planned to make Chinese ' kanonnenvleesch', cannonfodder!153 
At a general meeting concerning the Indie-Weerbaar held in 
Batavia on 31 August 1916, the Chinese delegates stated 
their refusal to join the militia, if the tax assessment on 
the Chinese continued to increase.154 Why the Chinese were 
so agitated by the prospect of military service can be 
explained by the history of the early years of the VOC in 
Batavia. A declaration made by the VOC on 9 October 1620  
relieved all Batavian Chinese from civic guard service in 
order that they could concentrate on economic activites, 
which of course was very much to the benefit of the VOC. 
For this dispensation, the Chinese of Batavia would pay a 
capitation tax, the 'hoofdgeld der Ch/neezen1.155 From the 
1830's a similar tax was applied to the Chinese in Madura 
and in Semarang, Central Java.
Despite Sin Po's aggressive campaign against the 
Netherlands-subject law, from the 1920's they almost 
totally failed to draw support from the majority of the 
peranakan Chinese. This was primarily due to their failure 
to understand the nature of the peranakan, who never felt 
comfortable with the China-orientation of the Sin Po group. 
The peranakan might cherish their sentimental ties with 
China as their ancestral land. But they were cautious in 
their response to the China-oriented propaganda and 
activities of most singkeh groups. This was understandable, 
since they had been established for centuries in the Dutch 
East Indies. The colony was the country of their birth and 
where their economic interests lay.
Second was the policy of the colonial government to draw 
the peranakan Chinese to the Dutch side, particularly in 
favouring the Chung Hwa Hui over the Sin Po efforts to win 
peranakan support. By accommodating the establishment of
153 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, October 1916", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. VI, 1917, p. 112.
154 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, September 1916", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. V, 1916, p. 1655.
155 See Plakaatboek van Nederlandsch-lndie (1 8 8 5 . Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij), vol. I, 1602-1642, pp. 76, 547.
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the peranakan political party founded in August 1926, the 
Chung Hwa Hui, the Dutch made certain that Chinese 
rejection of the Netherlands-subject law would be removed. 
It was the Chung Hwa Hui plan to encourage the acceptance 
of Indies-born peranakan Chinese as Netherlands subjects. 
Chung Hwa Hui membership was specifically open to "all 
Netherlands subjects of Chinese origin who are over 18 
years",156 a condition that helped the organization to resist 
the entry of singkeh into the party.157
The jus soli principle adopted in the 1910 law on 
Netherlands subjects brought its own problems, for it 
embraced all Indies-born Chinese as Netherlands subjects, 
whether they were singkeh or peranakan. Thus it was clear 
that the adoption of contradictory principles by the 
Netherlands Indies and China would lead to diplomatic 
friction.
This matter was eventually solved by means of a 
diplomatic understanding, concluded in a consular treaty of 
8 May 1911, to be reviewed every five years.158 To avoid 
complications in the enforcement of the Netherlands 
subject legislation, the Dutch government informed all local 
authorities in the colony, that is the residents and 
assistant-residents, of the 1911 consular treaty. An 
official letter was issued by the Government Secretary on 
28 August 1911, explaining that there would be no further 
doubt in distinguishing Chinese subjects from Netherlands 
subjects of Chinese blood.159 All local authorities were 
instructed to register the Chinese residents in their areas: 
this was carried out by the Chinese major or captain, and 
the Chinese wardmasters.160
156 Quoted in the letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Government 
Commission for General Affairs of the People's Council, 19 February 1935, 
no. 521/35, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 2 1 1x/1935.
157 See pp. 154-155.
158 Han Tiauw Tjong, " “De Chineezen op Java en het Nederlandsch 
Onderdaanschap", p. 952.
159 Circular of the Government Secretary, 28 August 1911, no. 629, in 
Tangerang, no. 186/3, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
160 Ibid.
The struggle for power within the Kuo Min Tang, between 
the leftist and ultra-nationalist groups, dragged in the 
overseas Chinese subjects. Each faction tried to draw them 
into their camp. More and more political initiatives were 
launched towards the overseas Chinese, which in turn 
influenced the Chinese movement in the Dutch East Indies.
In order to protect their overseas subjects, the Chinese 
government more than once accused the Netherlands Indies 
government of unfairly treating the Chinese in the colony. 
This interference should be seen not only as the Chinese 
government's response to the Chinese grievances reported 
by the singkeh via their Chamber of Commerce and the trade 
associations,161 but also as an indication of need for 
support, particularly financial support, from their overseas 
subjects.
Most Kuo Min Tang activity in this respect took the form 
of fund raising campaigns, either to assist casualties in 
mainland China or to secure party funds and the Chinese 
government. It was reported, for example, that the Chinese 
Consul-General of Batavia made a tour of the main cities of 
Java to collect about $40,000,000 although he managed only 
$ 5 5 0 ,0 0 0 .162 I suspect that the fund raising campaigns of 
the Kuo Min Tang and Chinese Consulates in Outer Java were 
more successful, owing to the preponderance of singkeh 
residents there.
For the peranakan of Java, the constant fund-raising 
activities, as well as the aggressiveness of most singkeh 
Kuo Min Tang members, became a real nuisance. These 
feelings are well represented by a peranakan wardmaster in 
Kutoarjo, Central Java, who com plained th at:
" perkoempoelan Kuo Min Tang di Batavia, Soerabaja dan Bandoeng sering
sering tariek oewang sadja the Kuo Min Tang organizations
161 See letter of the Dutch Ambassador to China to Governor-General of the 
Netherlands Indies, 18 September 1922, in Geheim Verbaal, 24 July 1923, 
no. Y.9; and Geheim Mailrapport, no. 617x/1930. All correspondence is kept 
in Verbaal, 29 October 1920, no. 52.
162 "Jaarverslag over 1928 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
163 Quoted in "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het 
Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
in Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung constantly appeal for 
money.
Even the registration of Chinese residents in the colony, 
launched by the Chinese consulates in mid-1929, was not 
free of money-raising activity. As the Chinese Consulates 
did not have an adequate budget for the project, a payment 
was requested, in addition to the registration fee, to cover 
staff costs.164 It was said that 20% of the registration fee 
was allocated to Kuo Min Tang funds.165 What was to become 
a serious problem for the Dutch government was that the 
Chinese registration included Indies-born peranakan. This 
brought additional diplomatic difficulties.
From the outset it was clear that the Dutch government 
would not consent to the registration of the Chinese 
residents of the colony. Yet the Chinese Consul strongly 
argued for it, saying that there was important data to be 
recorded, such as the date of arrival of Chinese migrants166 
who later came to reside in the colony. He insisted that 
registration would not apply to the Indies-born peranakan.
Despite the interpretation of the legal enforcement of jus 
soli having been settled by the diplomatic understanding of 
May 1911, the flaw in proclaiming all Indies-born Chinese 
as Netherlands subjects was open to manipulation by the 
Chinese government. This led to interference on the part of 
the Chinese government in order to protect their overseas 
subjects. On the other hand, the Indies-born peranakan could 
be mixed in with Indies-born singkeh and consequently be 
registered as subjects of the Chinese government. Such 
problems gave the Dutch government and local authorities a 
great deal of work.
This commonly occurred in areas where the singkeh were 
numerous, and indeed outnumbered the peranakan, for
164 It states: n...maka soeka boeat bantoe sedikit oeang onkost, goena oepah 
orang speciaal jang kerdjakan..."; in circular notices of the Chinese 
Consulate in Palembang, 20 December 1932; see A dossiers, no. 7794, 
Ministry of Colonies Archives, ARA, The Hague.
165 "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 129.
166 See letter of the Chinese Consul in Palembang to the Resident of 
Palembang, 12 January 1932, in A Dossiers, no. 7794.
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example in Palembang, Padang and the East Coast of 
Sumatra.167 Here the Indies-born peranakan might be mis- 
registered as Chinese rather than Netherlands subjects. In 
some areas of Java, such as Preanger and Semarang, similar 
cases of mis-registration occurred, since the registration 
forms were circulated through trade associations and the 
Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan schools.168 The peranakan became 
increasingly confused as the Chinese Consuls took 
advantage of the situation. On one occasion the Consuls said 
that the Indies-born peranakan Chinese would temporarily 
be exempt from registration; in other places they admitted 
that they were not to be included in the registration.169 An 
old rumour that peranakan Chinese who travelled to China 
and returned to Java would be considered singkeh or Chinese 
subjects, not Netherlands-subjects,170 spread again. It then 
became the duty of the Chinese major and other officers in 
Batavia and Semarang to calm the confused peranakan, 
explaining that according to the consular treaty of May 
1911 between the Netherlands and China they were 
Netherlands subjects.171
Apart from demanding that the Chinese Consulates 
exclude all peranakan from its registration, the Dutch 
instructed all local authorities to locate the peranakan 
residents in their areas and have their names removed from 
the registration list.172
167 See various reports in A Dossiers, no. 7794; also mentioned in the 
letter of the Chinese lieutenant of Fort de Kock (Bukittinggi, West Sumatra), 
16 July 1929, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 740x/1929, and Geheim Verbaal, 
16 October 1929, no. 0.20.
168 Noted in confidential letter of the Government Secretary, 11 September 
1929, no. 295x in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 857x/1929; see also Geheim 
Verbaal, 16 October 1929, no. 0.20.
169 "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor 
voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
170 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, July-August 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p. 1132.
171 See "Jaarverslag over 1929 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het 
Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129.
172 Letter of the Government Secretary, 13 September 1929, no. 299x, in 
Geheim Mailrapport, no. 857 x /1929; see also Geheim Verbaal, 16 October 
1929, no. 0.20.
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It was fortunate for the Dutch government that the 
majority of peranakan Chinese wished to bring order to this 
confusion. This was particularly true of the inhabitants of 
Batavia, and as early as 1911 the Chinese officers and 
wardmasters, under the instruction of the local authority, 
had registered their own people.173 By gaining information 
on the origins of the Chinese residents of the Batavia 
residency, distinctions between singkeh and peranakan 
could be made. In this task, there were no officials who 
knew the members of the Chinese community better than 
the Chinese officers. No matter what criticism was made of 
the Chinese officers, the Dutch wisely acknowledged their 
expertise in handling the Chinese.
The first part of this chapter was concerned with the two 
main peranakan organizations in which the Chinese officers 
were involved. I have indicated the changing attitude of the 
Dutch policy towards the Chinese, in favouring the Indies- 
born peranakan. This can be seen initially in education, with 
the opening of the Dutch-Chinese School in 1908, and in the 
establishment of the Chung Hwa Hui. The Dutch further 
favoured the peranakan by the appointment of Chinese 
members to the Peopled Council. Meanwhile, the 
Netherlands-subject law was intended to protect the 
peranakan Chinese not only from Chinese government 
influence but also from the singkeh-totok. For the 
Indonesian nationalists, this divide et impera policy was 
vehemently condemned. But for the Indies-born peranakan, 
despite its hypocrisy, the Dutch attitude helped them 
review their position as members of Dutch East Indies 
society, although later it would bring them into conflict 
with the growing Indonesian nationalist movement.
The peranakan found themselves unavoidably sandwiched 
between the ruler and the majority ruled. The name 'bangsa 
tengah' given to the peranakan, spoke for itself. Not only 
were they 1terjepit', or squeezed, between the oppressor and 
the oppressed but they were also the scapegoat when 
disputes arose. This occurred in the period 1912-1913 ,
173 See Tangerang, no. 186/3.
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when the peranakan became victims in the anti-Chinese 
riots. Since the indigenous population, strongly influenced 
by fanatical religious elements, disregarded the differences 
between singkeh and peranakan, the peranakan were equally 
vulnerable.
The Early Chinese Turbulences of 1912-1913
The turn of this century witnessed great changes within 
Asia, a revival among indigenous peoples, expressed in the 
emerging national movements. In its initial stages this 
revival manifested itself in cultural idealism: in the Dutch 
East Indies, Budi Utomo in May 1908 and, in the case of the 
Chinese, the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan in April 1900.
It did not take long for cultural revival to extend to 
politics, in which ideas of nationalism, solidarity, class- 
struggle nurtured action against the colonial government. 
This, then, was the spirit of the time, which deeply touched 
the various elements of Dutch East Indies society, 
Indonesians, Chinese and Arab.
When a series of disturbances occurred in 1912 and 1913, 
it was clear that political events outside the Dutch East 
Indies were stimulating the nationalist sentiments of the 
Chinese and the Arabs. The triumph of the October 1911 
revolution in China led by Sun Yat Sen undoubtedly excited 
the Chinese in the Indies. This was most striking seen in the 
arrogance towards non-Chinese. This unpleasant attitude 
was abhorred by the peranakan Chinese,174 who were later 
to be deeply affected by anti-Chinese feeling within the 
indigenous peoples.
In the same way that the Chinese looked to China, the 
Arab residents of the Dutch East Indies owed their political 
orientation and idealism to the Middle East. Many sent their 
children to Turkey to pursue advanced study.175 They held a
174 See "Een Chinees over de Chineesche Beweging", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 
vol. I, 1911-1912, pp. 667-672; see also "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche 
Pers, Februari 1912", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, pp. 363, 731.
175 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942  
(1973. Singapore: Oxford University Press), p. 59.
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long-standing resentment against the Dutch government 
which was inclined to favour the Chinese over the Arab or 
Muslim community.176 Moreover, economic rivalries between 
these two elements in the Vreemde Oosterlingen had a long 
history, which later ignited into racial disputes. The 
arrogant Chinese excitement resulting from the triumph of 
the 1911 revolution later provoked Arab hatred.
For the Indonesians, the year 1911 saw the founding of a 
mass movement channelled through Sarekat Islam 
(hereafter SI). SI was the first Indonesian mass movement. 
Islam became an effective mechanism, directing the people 
against the oppressor, the colonial government.
The leaders of SI never openly expressed an anti­
government attitude: indeed they showed a willingness to 
participate in the colonial government through the People’s 
C ouncil.177 In their view, there was no contradiction 
between native progress and loyalty to the government.178 
Nevertheless, this unusual expression of solidarity and 
equality often got out of hand, leading the common people 
into hatred towards the alien, particularly the Chinese.
The year 1912 was the turning-point in relations between 
the Chinese, the Arabs and the indigenous Indonesians. The 
Chinese riots in Batavia and Surabaya reflected the mutual 
dislike between singkeh and peranakan, particularly the 
feelings of the singkeh against the peranakan Chinese 
officers. In October 1912 there were skirmishes between 
Chinese and Arabs in several cities in Java, which showed 
the bitter antagonism between the two, arising from their 
different backgrounds and treatment by the Dutch. The anti- 
Chinese incidents from late 1912 abruptly shattered the 
relationship between the Chinese and the indigenous
176 Ibid., p. 92.
177 Some prominent SI leaders such as HOS Tjokroaminoto, A Moeis, H A 
Salim joined the People's Council; see T Shiraishi, An Age in Motion. Popular 
Radicalism in Java 1912-1926  (1990. Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 
pp. 95-96.
178 /d/d, p. 62.
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population,179 and most of the suffering took place on the 
peranakan side.180
The first incidents occurred in Batavia and Surabaya 
during the Chinese New Year of 18 February 1912. Since the 
Dutch government had not officially recognized the new 
Chinese Republic, the Chinese residents in the Dutch East 
Indies were not granted official permission to hoist the 
republican flag during their New Year feast. Instructions to 
this effect were given to Bataviafs Chinese major, who 
passed the directives to the Chinese wardmasters so that 
they might inform the public. Yet there were always those 
who would break that restriction, leading to hostile action 
against the police. According to a peranakan, the riot was 
caused by aggressive Hakka-Macaos, who provocatively 
hoisted the flag. They had bought the flag from a shop owned 
by a Chinese lieutenant of Hakka origins, who had assured 
them that hoisting the flag was allowed.181 Disagreement 
broke out when the police hauled down the flag, resulting in 
twenty arrests.
The Hakka-Macaos grudge against the peranakan major of 
Batavia was well-known, and during these times he 
received many death threats. They accused him of 
misleading them, saying that they were allowed to hoist the 
republican flag but then quickly issuing a ban when the 
resident of Batavia disagreed. It was reported that at a 
secret meeting, the Hakka-Macaos collected about 12,000  
guilders to pay someone to murder the Chinese major.182 
About ten Hakka-Macaos forcibly hoisted the flag in front of 
the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan building. When this was rejected, 
the outraged Hakka-Macaos broke the windows and lanterns
179 Both the Dutch government and the peranakan press deeply regretted the 
deterioration of this relationship, which they described as 'van broederschap 
naar vijandschap', from brotherhood to enmity. See "Persoverzicht: De 
Chineesche Pers", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, pp. 320, 886  
and vol. V, 1916, p. 230.
180 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Maart-April 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911 -1912, p. 623.
181 "Een Chinees over de Chineesche Beweging", p. 668.
182 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Februari 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p. 354.
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of the building.183 Fearing that the situation might get out 
of hand, the Chinese major immediately sent a telegram to 
the Governor-General in Buitenzorg, asking for official 
confirmation of the ban. The answer, signed by the 
Government Secretary,184 stated that permission would not 
be given to hoist the flag as the Netherlands government had 
not recognized the new Chinese Republic. The answer* was 
translated into Chinese and Malay, and distributed in all 
Chinese neighbourhoods in Batavia. Following this, the 
situation in Batavia returned to normal.
Among the twenty people arrested during the two days of 
disturbances, 18-19 February 1912, four were detained for 
some time, suspected of being the ringleaders. On bail 
provided by the Chinese officers, and following a request 
from the Chinese delegates representing all Chinese groups 
in Batavia, the four were released after they promised not 
to repeat their action.185
Unlike the situation in Batavia, which was quickly 
suppressed due to the alert Chinese major,186 the riot in 
Surabaya had serious consequences. It lasted for about a 
week, from Chinese New Year’s Eve on 17 February until 26 
February 1912. Whereas the trouble in Batavia arose mainly 
from the government ban on hoisting the republican flag, the 
riot in Surabaya started on New Year’s Eve, when Chinese 
broke the local authority ban on setting off fireworks in the 
middle of a public road. To-set off fireworks during Chinese 
New Year was not prohibited, as long as it did not disturb 
the surrounding neighbourhood. This meant that the Chinese
183 "Een Chinees over de Chineesche Beweging", p. 669.
184 Official consent to hoist'vreemde natievlaggen' or foreign national flag, 
was later given in the Government Secretary circular of 19 February 1914, 
no. 71. It stated that the hoisting of these foreign flags should not carry a 
political character, as a challenge to the Dutch government authority; see 
Tangerang, no. 1 6 4 /4 . The Chinese officers, however, as (Dutch) 
government officials, were not allowed to hoist any foreign (Chinese) flag; 
see telegram of Government Secretary, 27 April 1927, in Agenda, no. 
13164, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
185 "Officieel Relaas van de Chineesche Opstootjes te Batavia and Soerabaja", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, pp. 601-602.
186 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Februari 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, p. 356.
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could have fun in their own courtyards but not in the middle 
of a public road. However, since many Chinese houses had no 
courtyard, this restriction was interpreted as a total ban on 
setting off fireworks.187 It goes without saying that many 
Chinese broke the restriction during the New Yearfs Eve 
festivities. When the police arrested these violators, a riot 
became unavoidable, as gangs of Cantonese-Chinese showed 
up on every corner of the neighbourhood, attacking the 
police and shouting: "Kill them!" In order to control this 
situation, the police fired their arms, making matters 
worse as the gangs fled and plundered a Chinese shop. The 
owner was counting his earnings, and being taken by 
surprise, cried frantically that his money was being stolen. 
The police then broke into the shop, and chased the gang who 
escaped through the back door of the shop. The next day of 
the Chinese New Year passed peacefully.
By noon on 19 February, a proclamation was written on a 
board in front of the Soe Po Sia building. It announced that 
all Chinese should gather at 3.00 p.m. to demand permission 
from the Chinese major to hoist the republican flag. A 
Chinese wardmaster, who happened to be passing, was 
detained inside the building; it was reported that his pigtail 
was cut off. In the meantime, while the Chinese captain was 
reporting to the assistant-resident's office, that the 
situation was again calm, he was informed that about 300  
Cantonese-Chinese had plundered his house. When the police 
arrived at the captain's residence, the culprits had already 
d is a p p e a re d .188 In fact, it was not only the Chinese 
captain's house that had been vandalized, but the Chinese 
major's residence was also damaged. It was reported that 
some gang members who had fled from the police were 
hiding inside the Soe Po Sia building. Twenty persons were 
arrested, and to prevent further disturbances, the police 
carried out a night patrol throughout the city.
187 Ibid., p. 352.
188 "Officieel Relaas van de Chineesche Optootjes te Batavia en Soerabaja", 
pp. 603-604.
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The next day, 20 February, the situation appeared to be 
back to normal. The Chinese opened their shops, although a 
small gang of Cantonese threatened them. Later it was 
reported th at some important Chinese traders and 
merchants had received a threatening letter, warning them 
not to continue with their business. More suspects were 
arrested, and the police kept guard in some Chinese 
commercial districts on the following day. These Chinese 
merchants asked the Resident of Surabaya for protection, 
but he assured them that the situation would be easily 
restored, as the bad Cantonese were only a minority within 
the Chinese community.
However, the Resident’s goodwill was not matched by the 
behaviour of the local police, who frequently used their 
rifles forcefully to force the Chinese to open their shops, 
driving the confused shopkeepers into a panic. They would 
open their shops but later close again. The Resident of 
Surabaya called the Presidents of the Siang Hwee and the 
Soe Po Sia to enlighten him on the situation. However, the 
answers from these Chinese leaders were somewhat 
unreliable, and were considered untrustworthy by the local 
authorities. As a result, these leaders were also placed in 
police custody.189 For several days until 26 February, all 
Chinese economic activity in Surabaya was suspended, all 
shops were closed. It was only after the local authorities 
took further measures, arresting 850 suspected persons, 
that the situation returned to normal.
Of those arrested, 173 were quickly released. Police 
investigations revealed that these Hokkien and peranakan 
had become involved in the riot in self-defence.190 The 
majority of the others arrested were in fact illegal 
migrants who did not possess entry permits. They were 
subsequently expelled from the colony, and only a few left 
willingly.191 The Dutch government noted that only one 
Chinese was killed during the Surabaya riot but that several
189 Ibid., p. 605.
190 Ibid, p. 606.
191 Ibid. See also Koloniaal Verslag van 1912, p. 3.
192
others were wounded. Yet, the damage was done, in the 
sense that the riot revealed a fragile situation.
The riot of 1912 revealed economic pressures within the 
Chinese community, resulting from the arrival from around 
1900 of increasing numbers of Chinese migrants - legal or 
illegal. For the long established peranakan members of the 
Chinese community, these new-comers clearly disturbed 
their peaceful lives, and consequently were disliked. It 
later became clear that the riots in February 1912 had not 
completely settled, for in October of the same year a riot 
broke out between the Chinese and the Arabs in Surabaya. 
This Chinese-Arab conflict was repeated in other cities in 
Java; the most destructive, apart from Surabaya, were in 
Tuban, Bangil and Cirebon.
Before I continue discussing the October 1912 riot in 
Surabaya, I must return to Batavia, to show how different 
that city’s social conditions were from those in Surabaya. 
The largest Chinese community in Batavia, the majority of 
whom were peranakan, were found in both urban and rural 
areas. This was due to the land status of the Batavia 
residency, of which the largest part comprised 'particuliere 
landerijen ', or private landed estates, owned mostly by 
Chinese and Europeans. Looking at the demographic profile 
in 1900, there were 26,817 Chinese residents in the city of 
Batavia, compared with 62,247 living on the outskirts, or 
Omm elan den.192 By 1905, when the Chinese residents in the 
Batavia residency were 4.5% of the total population,193 the 
number of city-dwellers and those living on the outskirts 
were even bigger, 28 ,150 and 74 ,370 .194 This meant that 
more than two-thirds of the Chinese preferred to settle in 
the Ommelanden. This explains why Chinese-Arab conflicts
192 See Bijlagen A, "Algemeen Overzicht van de Getalsterkte der Bevolking 
van Nederlandsch-lndie, met Uitzondering van het Personeel van Leger en 
Vloot bij het Begin van 1901" (hereafter Bijlage A), Koloniaal Verslag van 
1902.
193 H L van Sandick, De Chineezen Buiten China. Hunne Beteekenis voor de 
Ontwikkeling van Zuid-Oost-Azie Speciaal van Nederlandsch-lndie (1909. 's 
Gravenhage: M van der Beek's Boekhandel), p. 184.
194 Bijlage A, Koloniaal Verslag van 1907; and "Batavia in 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, p. 1421.
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occurred only sporadically, and were limited to the city of 
Batavia, for the Arab community was mainly urban.
Given that the earliest settlement of the Chinese in this 
part of Java pre-dated the arrival of the Dutch, the 
peranakan community of Batavia had long developed its own 
characteristics that enabled it to resist the aggressive 
singkeh element. These characteristics and the social 
conditions in Batavia, backed by the strength of the Chinese 
officers, on whom the Dutch relied to keep the peace, 
secured order in the area.
The riot that occurred in October 1912, involving Arabs 
and Chinese, in Surabaya was due to economic rivalry. It 
was reported that when the Chinese closed their shops 
during the February riot, the city suffered a shortage of 
staple food. The Arab traders then sold rice to the 
indigenous population at a higher price, hoping to break 
Chinese domination of the rice market during the short 
period when Chinese retailing was suspended. However, 
these expectations were dashed, since no Chinese would 
allow the Arabs to stockpile rice or take control of the 
market. The Arabs became increasingly frustrated, as they 
had thought that public anger over the scarcity of rice 
would bring benefits to them.195 Combined with a general 
discontent at their unfair treatm ent by the Dutch, who 
favoured the Chinese, this frustration drove the Arabs 
towards violence.
On 27 October 1912, an embittered group of about 200  
Arabs ransacked the Chinese quarter and plundered their 
shops.196 Many Chinese fled and hid in the city. The 
following days saw the destruction of Chinese shops, and 
fights between Arabs and Chinese. Other parties became 
victims of the disturbances; one European was murdered and 
four Japanese were wounded.197 It was reported that in
195 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Oktober-November 1912", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p. 333.
196 See "Chineezen en Arabieren", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1913, p. 107; 
"Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Oktober 1912", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 
vol. II, 1912-1913, p. 203.
197 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers", op.cit., p. 205.
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general the indigenous inhabitants of Surabaya were not 
involved in the riot,198 although some were attacked by 
Chinese who mistook them for Arabs because they wore a 
fez.1"  Five Chinese and two Arabs were killed during this 
conflict. According to the official report, eight Chinese 
were wounded, five Arabs and one Indonesian.200 The 
Chinese-Arab conflict appears to represent an eruption of 
Arabs economic discontent. The social conditions of 
Surabaya must also have contributed to the outbreak.
Peace between these two elements of the V reem de  
Oosterlingen  was concluded on 2 November 1912. It is 
interesting to note that the Arabs and Chinese of Batavia 
sent delegates to confirm the peace agreement.201 However, 
it was unlikely that the agreement could settle the problem, 
for social discontent, particularly on the Arab side,202 
would not be eliminated by a paper agreement. Arab feelings 
against discrimination by the Dutch ran deep, and this was 
indicated by conflicts in cities all over Java. In cities 
where Arab community matched that of the Chinese, such 
outbreaks were often unavoidable.
Due to the unavailability of official reports on the urban 
population during the first decade of the twentieth  
century,203 we must work solely from the statistical data 
for 1905. Although the conflicts between Chinese and Arabs 
took place in 1912, it is acceptable to use the data from 
1905.
In the city of Tuban in East Java, there were 4,611 
Chinese and 558 Arabs in 1905. It was reported in the 
Chinese press that on 9 May 1912, hundreds of Arabs and 
Indonesians gathered in a public meeting place, threatening
198 Ibid., p. 203.
199 Ibid., p. 205.
200 Koloniaal Verslag van 1913, p. 3.
201 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Oktober-November 1912", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, pp. 321, 322, 331.
202 "Chineezen en Arabieren", p. 107.
203 Prior to 1899 the Koloniaal Verslag regularly included annual 
statistical data on the Netherlands Indies population. However, after 1900 
this was abandoned, except in the Koloniaal Verslag of 1902, 1907.
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to kill the Chinese. Only the action of the police prevented 
those threats from being carried out.204
Bangil in East Java and Cirebon in West Java showed a 
similar demographic balance. In 1905 Bangil had 856  
Chinese and 844 Arab residents; in Cirebon there were 
3,476 Chinese and 1,104 Arabs.205 Riots in Bangil occurred 
on 4 September 1912, and again on 24-25 October, in which 
two Chinese were killed. In Cirebon three Chinese were 
killed and twenty-three injured, during a Chinese-Arab 
conflict on 26 October 1 9 1 2 .206 Only six Arabs were 
wounded, none were killed.207
My observation that the Chinese community in Batavia 
was both rural and urban suggests why no serious Chinese- 
Arab conflict occurred in that city. And the Chinese vastly 
outnumbered the Arabs, 28 ,150 Chinese to 2 ,054 Arabs 
living in the city, with only 147 Arabs living in the 
extensive outskirts, the O m m elanden .208 In 1912 the 
Chinese residents of the city of Batavia numbered 
29 ,96 3 ;209 the Arabs, I presume, were no more than 4,000 in 
number.
In contrast, the Chinese and Arabs in Surabaya were both 
urban communities. In addition the economic position in this 
second city of Java appears to have been even more tense. 
Competition between the Chinese and the Arabs, and even 
among the Chinese - that is between peranakan and singkeh 
- was becoming sharper, particularly by the early 1920s. In 
the 1930s, a peranakan from Surabaya, who later became a 
notable political leader during the Sukarno era, witnessed 
the declining power of the peranakan in the textile trade, as 
it became dominated by singkeh.210 European companies also
204 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Mei-Juni 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p. 842.
205 Bijlage A, Koloniaal Verslag van 1907.
206 "persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Oktober 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, p. 185.
207 Koloniaal Verslag van 1913, p. 3.
208 Bijlage A, Koloniaal Verslag van 1907.
209 "Batavia in 1912", p. 1421.
210 Siauw Giok Tjhan, Lima Jaman. Perwujudan Integrasi Wajar (1981. 
Amsterdam-Jakarta: Yayasan Teratai), pp. 49-50.
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favoured peranakan intermediary traders in the distribution 
of their goods, and this fuelled Arab resentment towards 
the Dutch.
If we look again at the population data for Surabaya for 
1905, it indicates a more balanced position than was found 
in Batavia. There were 8 ,066 European, 2 ,482 Arab and 
14,847 Chinese residents, most of whom were engaged in 
commerce. Since the data does not distinguish peranakan 
from singkeh, I assume that although the former were in a 
majority, their economic power declined in the second 
decade of the twentieh century.211 The increasing number of 
singkeh migrants made the economic situation in the city 
more tense. Moreover, the great majority of Europeans in 
Surabaya were engaged in business.212 This was a somewhat 
different situation from that in Batavia, where most 
Europeans were government officials or professionals, and 
in 1905, the number of European merchants was only 
13,085.213
The city's environment also encouraged social conflict 
for, unlike Batavia, Surabaya had no distinct lines of 
demarcation between the business and residential 
quarters.214 Furthermore, the policy of the local authorities 
in handling the conflict reflected the relationship between 
the Resident and the Chinese and Arab officers in Surabaya. 
It is interesting to note that after the peace treaty to end 
the Chinese-Arab conflict was signed in Surabaya on 2 
November 1912, the Arab captain of Batavia held a 
reconciliation party with the Chinese officers.215
Due to my lack of access to either Dutch government 
records or sources on Chinese public opinion in Surabaya, 
there is little to say about the relationship between the 
city's resident and the Chinese officers. A similar problem
211 Djie Ting Ham, "Enkele Opmerkingen over de Economischen Toestand van 
de Chineezen op Java", p. 49.
212 See Arnold Wright (ed) ,Twentieth Century Impressions o f Netherlands 
India, pp. 520-545.
215 Bijlage A, Koloniaal Verslag van 1907.
214 Arnold Wright, op.cit., p. 515.
215 "Chineezen in Botsing op Java", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1912, p. 1657.
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also makes it difficult to throw light on the relationship 
between the Chinese officers and their people. It can only be 
noted that an article in a European newspaper, the 
Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, blamed the Chinese officers for 
being rude and arrogant in responding to the grievances of 
their people.216
Lea E Williams, examining Chinese public opinion through 
the mostly socialist-oriented Chinese press of Surabaya, 
notes that the Chinese leadership, after the first decade of 
the twentieth century, was no longer in the hands of the 
Chinese officers, but in the hands of the presidents of Siang 
Hwee and Soe Po S/a.217 Williams1 argument may be correct 
for Surabaya, but is not valid for Batavia.
The certain involvement of Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia in 
the Chinese riots of February 1912 indicates the intention 
of both these China-influenced organizations to take over 
the leadership of the Chinese community in Surabaya. 
Furthermore, the riot that occurred during the Chinese New 
Year celebrations lasted more than a week, clearly 
demonstrating the weakness of the Chinese major and his 
inability to handle the situation. Since his residence and 
that of the Chinese captain were vandalized by non- 
peranakan Chinese gangs, there is little doubt that the 
peranakan Chinese officers had control over the non- 
peranakan Chinese community in Surabaya. This further 
indicates the socio-political estrangement between these 
two elements of Chinese society in Surabaya, which 
resulted in destructive clashes with the local authorities.
The weakness of the Chinese officership in Surabaya was 
due to the vulnerability of its structure, for the institution 
was totally dominated by peranakan officers, having no 
representative of the non-peranakan element in Surabaya. 
The fact that many Chinese looked to the Presidents of
216 Noted in "De Chineezen-opstootjes te Soerabaja", De Indische Gidst vol. I, 
1912, p. 658.
217 Lea E Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, p. 183; see also Pewarta 
Soerabaia, 10 September 1929, quoted in the letter of the Governor of East 
Java to Governor-General, 9 January 1930, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 
184x71930.
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Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia for advice and guidance, both 
were singkeh dominated organizations, confirms the 
Chinese officers* lack of authority.
The relationship between the Resident of Surabaya, 
representing the local authority of Surabaya, and the local 
Chineesche Bestuur, performed by the Chinese officers, was 
probably not as close as that in Batavia. The fact that after 
1924 the position of Chinese major remained vacant,218 
appears to confirms this. This could have been due to a lack 
of interest on the part of the local authorities in 
maintaining the city’s Chinese Administration, or to a 
scarcity of qualified candidates. Had the local authorities 
considered the Chinese majorship sufficiently important, 
the a lack of candidates would surely have been overcome.
Complaints from the Chinese regarding the excessive 
police force used in quelling the riot also indicates 
'rassenhaat\ racial hatred between the Europeans and the 
Chinese.219 This could be seen as a lack of cooperation 
between the Resident and the Chinese officers. Had the 
Chinese major of Surabaya possessed influence over his own 
people - both peranakan and singkeh - and been on good 
terms with the Resident, these events may not have got out 
of hand. This was very different from Batavia, where the 
Chinese major had taken immediate action to calm the 
Chinese community.220 It seems that the local authorities in 
Surabaya took the responsibility for dealing with the 
Chinese since both the major and the captain were helpless. 
However much the Chinese press, which was hardly 
impartial, mocked the Chinese officers, here was one of 
many cases which showed that the institution was of value. 
Particularly in Batavia, the Chinese officers could not be 
disregarded; there were benefits in retaining them.221
218 Noted in the letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Director of Home 
Affairs, 6 February 1930, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 184x /1930.
2 1 9 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Februari 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, pp. 363-364.
220 Ibid., p. 365.,
221 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juli 1914", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 
vol. Ill, 1913-1914, p. 1406.
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The leadership of the Chinese officers was again tested 
during the anti-Chinese incidents, provoked by the emerging 
Sarekat Islam movement.222 Although there is no reliable 
evidence for indigenous involvement in the conflicts 
discussed above, between Chinese and Arabs, harassment 
against the Chinese continued.
The Indonesian novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who 
wrote a series of historical novels on the Indonesian 
nationalist movement, suspected that in the early years of 
the Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah, a Muslim trade association 
which preceded the SI, the Arab members cunningly directed 
the movement into an anti-Chinese action. His debatable 
argument for Arab influence on this religious economic 
movement should be taken into consideration. He pointed out 
that the influence of Arabs in the Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah 
were intended to use it against the Chinese traders.223
The Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah, founded by H Samanhudi in 
1905, had purely economic goals, and was later transformed 
into the Sarekat Islam which had a religious political basis. 
It is not my intention here to analyse the suspected anti- 
Chinese characteristics of the SI,224 for this attitude, 
which often erupted into riots, stemmed from a complex 
problem, resulting from the segregation policy of the 
colonial regime. Nevertheless, the anti-Chinese riots, 
particularly those in the early years of the SI, 1912-1913, 
indicated a mass indigenous response to colonial 
suppression. The SI movement expressed a native revival of 
political consciousness, tied by religious brotherhood. The 
Chinese were outsiders, connected to colonial domination. 
However, if we look further into the native responses of
222 Koloniaal Verslag van 1914, p. 3.
223 P A Toer, Jejak Langkah (1986. Malaysia Edition. Petaling Jaya: Wira 
Karya), p. 350. Many Arabs joined the Sarekat Islam in the early twenties; 
see also J M van der Kroef, "The Arab Minority", in Indonesia in the Modern 
World (1954. Bandung: Masa Baru), part I, p. 257.
224 See Kartono Sartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java. A Study on 
the Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1973. 
Singapore: Oxford University Press), pp. 151-157, points out that one of 
the prominent features of the SI movement was its anti-Chinese character.
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those early days of 1 9 1 2 -1 9 1 3 , they were more a 
spontaneous reaction than organized action. It was only 
later that these spontaneous reactions were transformed 
into organized anti-Chinese action, as in the Kudus riot of 
1918.225
Native solidarity, expressed through the religious 
brotherhood of Islam, was unavoidably xenophobic in 
character. Such feelings were often heard at the mass- 
meetings held by the SI, called 'vergadering', translated as 
political rally. During the rallies the common people were 
introduced to words and concepts which they had never 
before heard. Through the speeches of the SI leaders, the 
common people learnt about solidarity, brotherhood, 
nationalism, colonialism and much else. For them, the 
experience of attending a rally was entirely novel, 
extraordinary and e x c i t i n g . 2 2 6  The fact that these feelings 
were later channelled into anti-Chinese action can probably 
be explained by the provocative speeches of their leaders.
Given the high level of illiteracy among its followers, the 
SI movement depended on the militancy of its leaders and 
their ability to stir up the masses. Metaphors and symbols 
were commonly used to transmit political aspirations. 
There is the example of one SI leader in Bandung who at a 
party meeting warned the indigenous population to be 
cautious and watchful in order not to allow the white and 
yellow mosquitoes to suck their b l o o d . 2 2 7  Mosquitoes were a 
metaphor for colonial exploitation, the bloodsucker of the 
people, while white and yellow were identified with the 
Dutch and the Chinese respectively.
As I noted earlier, anti-Chinese feeling among the 
indigenous people in the early years of the SI was more 
likely to have been expressed in forms of unorganized 
response than in well-planned political action. Most
225 For a study of the anti-Chinese riots in Kudus, Central Java, in 1918, 
see The Siauw Giap, "Group Conflict in a Plural Society", Revue du sud-est- 
asiatique, no. 1, 1966, pp. 1-31.
226 j  Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, p. 66.
227 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, September-Oktober 1913", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. Ill, 1913, p. 108.
incidents in those days were caused by a personal - and 
often trivial - row between a Chinese and an Indonesian. For 
example, a Chinese landlord in Bekasi, on the eastern 
outskirts of Batavia, was beaten by his Indonesian tenant 
who was offended by the landlords boasting about his 
Christian fa ith .228 On another occasion, a group of 
Indonesian buyers threatened a Chinese shopowner into 
selling groceries at a lower price, which resulted in 
looting.229 Or there was the case of the Chinese wardmaster 
in Meester-Cornelis who was severely beaten by a group of 
Indonesians, because he had discovered that about 1,000  
suspected SI members were secretly planning an anti­
government action.230
A rather serious incident occurred in February 1913 in 
Tangerang, the western division of the Batavia residency, 
during a cockfighting party organized by a European. Both 
Chinese and Indonesians were enjoying this traditional folk 
amusement when about 2 ,000  suspected SI members 
assaulted them. The Indonesians were released without 
injury, but the Chinese were brutally beaten, to the extent 
that they were forced to kneel down, begging for mercy, and 
thirteen were later hospitalized.231 The outskirts of 
Batavia, particularly the Tangerang and Meester-Cornelis 
areas, which mostly comprised private landed estates or 
the 'particuliere landerijen' , were then no longer peaceful 
for their Chinese residents.
The Chinese press frequently reported the misery of the 
peranakan Chinese, who experienced severe beatings, 
ransacking and assaults from their indigenous neighbours. 
This situation was deeply regretted by both the Dutch local 
authorities and the Chinese, as the hitherto warm 
relationship between the indigenous Indonesians and the
228 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Augustus-September 1912", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, p. 1618.
229 "persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juni-Juli 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, p. 1329.
230 "persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, September-Oktober 1913", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. Ill, 1913, p. 100.
231 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, April-Mei 1913", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, p. 1190.
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Chinese deteriorated into enmity.232 The Chinese trade 
associations demand government protection for the Chinese 
traders who worked in the village areas; and Dutch business 
groups sent a plea to the Governor-General to protect these 
Chinese residents. They were concerned about the possibly 
ruinous effect on European business.233
The Chinese argued that as Netherlands subjects they 
were entitled to protection from the Dutch government.234 
On the other hand, this situation overwhelmed the Chinese, 
who could not face the fact that the indigenous Indonesian 
hated them more than they hated the Europeans.235 The 
Chinese press vehemently blamed the Dutch government, not 
only for providing no protection to Chinese inhabitants236 
but also for its indecisive measures, and in particularly for 
the way it had dealt with the attitude of some indigenous 
officials.237
Some Chinese suspected that the Dutch government had 
been deliberately indecisive towards the Sarekat Islam, in 
order to channel the militant mass movement into an anti- 
Chinese action.238 This opinion was later shared by 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who in his biography of R A 
Tirtoadisuryo, the first chairman of Sarekat Dagang 
Islamiyah, noted the role played by D A Rinkes, the Dutch 
Advisor for Native Affairs, in directing the SI towards an 
anti-Chinese goal.239 This argument needs further research.
232 See also footnote 179.
233 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, April-Mei 1913", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, p.1192.
234 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juli-Augustus 1913", Koloniaal 
Tijdcshrift, p. 1331.
235 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Maart-April 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911 -1912, p. 623.
236 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Mei-Juni 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdcshrift, p. 1330; "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juli-Augustus 
1912", Koloniaal Tijdcshrift, pp. 1475,1476.
237 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, April-Mei 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, p. 1192.
238 "persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Januari-Februari 1912", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, p. 750,756; "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, 
Mei-Juni 1912", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, pp. 1331, 1332. See also P A Toer, 
Sang Pemula (1985. Jakarta: Hasta Mitra), p. 155.
239 P A Toer, op.cit., p. 154.
Much of the writing on the anti-Chinese riots has 
examined the relationships between the Chinese and the 
indigenous Indonesians, their religious, cultural, socio­
economic differences,240 but none has attempted to retrace 
Dutch policy in handling the riots. Most aspects of the anti- 
Chinese actions go back to colonial regime's segregation 
policy.
The present common opinion that the Chinese owe their 
advanced economic position and social advantages to the 
privileges given them by the colonial regime is incorrect. 
My research indicates that at no time did the Chinese 
receive privileges from the Dutch regime and that, in terms 
of their economic position, they were even used as a buffer 
between the regime and the mass of the indigenous people. 
In terms of social advantages, the Chinese were even more 
deprived than the indigenous people.
To return to the Chinese press criticism of the Dutch 
authorities' handling of the disturbing situation in the 
Ommelanden of Batavia. The Chinese press also referred to 
the Indonesian officials' dilemma, for some also became 
victims of the situation. It was reported that an Indonesian 
police chief was brutally beaten by his own people as he 
performed nightwatch duty around private land belonging to 
the Chinese captain in Tangerang.241 Here is an interesting 
point to explore - how the Dutch authorities responded to 
the dilemmas faced by its Indonesian officials and the 
Chinese demand for protection.
Since the Native and Chinese Administrations were 
separate, the link was through the local the Dutch officials. 
In the nineteenth century, a Chinese captain would 
commonly deal with the native wedana in handling a dispute 
between their people.242 Yet it was impossible for such an
240 See for example, The Siauw Giap, "Group Conflict in a Plural Society"; 
and "The Chinese in Indonesia: a Review article", Kabar Seberang, no. 7, July 
1980, pp. 114-130; J A Mackie, The Chinese in Indonesia; Five Essays 
(1976 . Melbourne: Thomas Nelson in association with the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs).
241 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, April-Mei 1913", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. II, 1912-1913, p. 1188.
242 See Chapter III.
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arrangement to continue in the twentieth century, because 
of the rapid development and change within these two 
societies. The Chinese officers' responsibilities did not go 
beyond their own community; similarly with the native 
(Indonesian) officials. Unlike disputes among the Chinese, or 
between Chinese and Arabs where community leaders could 
exercise authority and responsibility, the anti-Chinese 
riots provoked by the indigenous people presented a more 
delicate problem for the Dutch. Since the indigenous 
Indonesians formed the great mass of the population, it was 
not a question of taking sides but of managing the problem 
impartially.
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6  THE CHINESE ECONOMY OF BATAVIA
Despite its title, this chapter is not concerned with the 
economic history of Batavia. Instead it aims to describe 
Chinese economic activity in the area, activity in which the 
Chinese officers were very much involved. As a certain 
level of financial standing was necessary to attain an 
officership, the position was clearly linked with economic 
competence.
In chapter 3, I pointed out that wealth became the most 
important criterion in selecting candidates for Chinese 
officership. Therefore positions were available only to 
those who were engaged in commercial activities. It is 
hardly surprising, then, that the strongest candidates were 
important merchants or landowners. However, for Chinese 
officers, financial problems sometimes endangered their 
position and led to resignation.
Although Batavia and its environs were exempt from the 
Cultivation System, the Dutch looked for other ways to 
profit from the region. In other words, despite being 
relieved from that burden, Batavia was not free from 
colonial pressures. As the greater part of the region 
consisted of private lands, the Dutch could not impose the 
of the cultivation system in this area. However, major 
financial returns were enjoyed by the colonial authority in 
the form of land rent paid by the Batavian landowners, and 
from the lease of revenue farms.
I will divide this chapters into four parts: Batavia 
revenue-farms; the officers and revenue farming; Batavia’s 
private lands; and Dutch policy towards private land 
repurchases.
With respect to Batavia revenue-farms, my concern is 
primarily with the historical background, operation and 
financial returns, rather than with their long-condemned
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excessive practices.1 It should be noted that Batavia was 
the first region in which revenue farming was imposed.
In the sub-chapter on the revenue-farming activities of 
the Chinese officers, I will not deal with its practices and 
abuses. My discussion will focus on the correlation between 
the officership's dependence on such business, and their 
financial losses. James Rush has paid great attention to the 
powerful economic link between the Chinese officers and 
the opium farmers.2 Since his extensive study excludes 
Batavia, presumably because opium farms in the western 
part of Java were less important, I intend to examine the 
effect of the losses rather than discuss the impressive 
financial returns.
Opium might not be important in Batavia revenue farming, 
yet this region yielded abundant revenue from its private 
lands. This will be discussed in the third sub-chapter, 
attention being given to the historical background, living 
conditions and agricultural production. The last sub-chapter 
will discuss the government's plan to repurchase private 
lands.
Batavia Revenue-Farms
Soon after Batavia was nominated as the seat of the VOC, 
the first taxes were levied on the city's population. The 
first tax, widely known as the hoofdgeld der Chineezen, or 
capitation tax for the Chinese living in the city, was 
imposed on 9 October 1620.3
1 Many contemporary Dutch writings identify the excessive practices of 
Chinese revenue-farms as the cause of the poor economic conditions of the 
indigenous population. See also Peter Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions 
of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825", Indonesia, no. 
37, April 1984, pp. 1-47.
2 James Rush, "Social Control and Influence in Nineteenth Century Indonesia: 
Opium Farms and the Chinese of Java", Indonesia, no. 35, April 1983, pp. 
53-64; and also his Opium to Java. Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise 
in Colonial Indonesia, 7860-7970(1990. Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
3 See W E van Mastenbroek, De Historische Ontwikkeling van de 
Staatsrechtelijke Indeeling der Bevolking van Nederlandsch-lndie (1934. 
Wageningen: H Veenman & Zonen), p. 43.
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The imposition of this tax accorded with the appointment 
of the first Chinese captain, Souw Beng Kong (or Bencon to 
the Dutch) on 16 October 1619. Tax collection was 
undertaken by Souw Beng Kong, and on the first day of every 
month a flag was raised in front of the captain’s residence 
to remind his people to fulfill their obligation.4 If we look 
into the regulations concerning the capitation tax, it 
appears to have been the result of an agreement between 
the VOC and the Chinese community. Unlike other members 
of the city’s population, such as the freeburghers and the 
natives, the Chinese were released from civic guard duty, or 
schutterijen , by paying the capitation tax.5 It was in the 
interests of the VOC to encourage the Chinese money­
making activities. Additionally, to keep the Chinese away 
from military training and weapons would be a valuable 
precautionary measure.6
Each healthy Chinese between the ages of 14 and 60 was 
liable to pay 1.5 real a month.7 A stamp, or hoofdbriefje, 
was provided when the Chinese had paid the tax.8 The ever 
growing number of Chinese in the city meant that by the 
1630s, the capitation tax yielded half of the total income of 
Batavia’s administration.9 Government revenue from the tax 
relied to a great extent on Chinese immigrants. The arrival 
of Chinese junks loaded with fresh migrants meant a higher
4 See "Chronologische Geschiedenis van Batavia door Een Chinees", 
Tijdschrift voor Neerlands-lndie (hereafter TNI), vol. II, 1840, pp. 16- 
17.
5 "Hoofdgeld der Binnen Batavia Woonachtig Chineezen", in Piakaatboek van 
Nederlandsch-lndie (1885. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), vol. I, 1610-1624, 
pp. 76-77; see also "Chronologische Geschiedenis van Batavia door Een 
Chinees", p. 17.
6 L Blusse, Strange Company. Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch 
in VOC Batavia (1986. Dordrecht: Foris Publications), p. 68.
7 Piakaatboek van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. I, 1614-1624, p. 76; L. Blusse, 
Strange Company, p. 58.
8 E de Waal, Aanteekeningen over de Koloniale Onderwerpen (1865. 's 
Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff), vol. V, De Kleine Verpachten Middelen, part 
II, p. 406; and also W E van Mastenbroek, De Historische Ontwikkeling van de 
Staatsrechtelijke Indeeling, p. 23.
9 F de Haan, Oud Batavia (1930. Bandung: A C Nix & Co), vol. I, p. 61, quoted 
in L Blusse, Strange Company, p. 58.
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income from the capitation tax, returning Chinese 
diminished this potential revenue.
I assume that in the 18 0 0 fs, the 'hoodfgeld' was also 
imposed on the Malays, as they were still considered at that 
time to be 'vreemde oosterlingen', foreigners from the 
eastern part of the archipelago.10 Later, in 1824, the 
capitation tax was applied in regions where there was a 
large Chinese community, such as Pamekasan, on the island 
of Madura, and in Semarang.
There were many Chinese who tried to escape the 
capitation tax, either by moving to Bantam or Mataram or by 
converting Islam, to becoming Muslim Chinese or 
peranakanJ 1 It should be noted here that until the mid­
nineteenth century, the term peranakan was widely used for 
the Muslim Chinese who cut off their pigtails, whom the 
Dutch called geschoren Chinees, or shaven Chinese.12 By the 
1 830s, the term peranakan was no longer applied to the 
Muslim Chinese, as the Dutch closed the office of 
kommandant der Parnakkans.13
The introduction of bedrijfsbelasting , or income tax, in 
1851 for non-agriculturists, or niet-landbouwerst meant 
that the Chinese of Batavia should have been released from 
the hoofdgeld der Chineezen. Yet until 1860 the Batavia 
population was excluded from the bedrijfsbelasting, as the 
indigenous non-agriculturists paid a retail trade tax, or 
pachten der neringen.^4 Following the unification of 
taxation across the whole Netherlands Indies in the first
10 See Batavia, no. 322 /1 , Arsip Nasional, Jakarta. For changing definition 
of 1vreemde oosterlingen' from VOC times, see W E van Mastenbroek, De 
Historische Ontwikkeling van de Staatsrechtelijke Indeeling, particularly pp. 
22-23.
11 F de Haan, Oud Batavia, vol. I, p. 394-396; L Blusse, Strange Company, p. 
83; W E van Mastenbroek, op. cit, p. 26.
12 F de Haan, op. cit, p. 394; see also Onghokham, "Chinese Capitalism in 
Dutch Java", in Yoshihara Kunio (ed), Oei Tiong Ham Concern; the First 
Business Empire of Southeast Asia (1989. Kyoto: Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Kyoto University), p. 52; W E van Mastenbroek, op. cit., p. 26.
13 From 1823 it was planned to replace the office of kommandant for each 
ethnic group with a district base. By 1828 the office of kommandant der 
Parnakkans had disappeared; see Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch-lndie 
van het jaar 1828 (1829. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), p. 42.
14 A de Waal, Aanteekeningen over de Koloniale Onderwerpen, pp. 408-409.
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decade of the twentieth century, the Chinese capitation tax 
was replaced by the bedrijfsbelasting , or income tax for 
non-agriculturists.
Another old tax imposed on the Chinese of Batavia 
concerned gambling, the lease later being bonded to the 
wayang or folk entertainment. According to a Chinese 
writing on Batavia, in 1639 captain Gan Dji Ko requested 
the permission of the VOC to open a gambling house.15 This 
was not the first lease for Chinese gambling; gambling- 
farms were already in operation during the first years of 
Chinese settlement. Both L Blusse and M S de Vienne note 
1620 as the year in which the first gambling-farm was 
leased to a Chinese captain.16 The gambling lease was later 
extended to Semarang and Surabaya, the two other main 
cities of Java with large Chinese communities. The 
wayangpacht was specifically given only to Batavia.17
According to A de Waal, the government decided not to 
extend the wayang lease to other regions as a precaution 
against damaging side-effects. He notes that wherever 
wayang was being performed, crimes were committed and 
children were kidnapped,18 and this was probably true. 
However, the British, during their short rule of 1811-1816, 
blamed gambling for crime and murder committed by the 
Chinese and indigenous peoples. Driven by Christian 
morality, the British abolished gambling and cockfighting 
soon after their arrival in November 1811 -19 
Within a few decades of the establishment of the VOC 
regime, Batavia was exploited by seven kinds of revenue, 
namely the Chinese capitation tax, gambling, hawking, 
butchery, fishing, rice-distribution, and liquor.20 More taxes 
were later imposed, indicating the growth of the city and
15 "Chronologische Geschiedenis van Batavia door Een Chinees", p. 18.
16 L Blusse, Strange Company, p. 53; Marie-Sybille de Vienne, "La Part des 
Chinois dans les Fermes Fiscales de Batavia au XVIIeme Siecle", Archipel, no.
22, 1981, p. 126.
17 A de Waal, Aanteekeningen over de Koloniale Onderwerpen, vol. IV, De 
Kleine Verpachte Middelen, part I, p. 452.
18 Ibid., p. 453.
19 See Proceedings, 1 February 1812, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
20 See "Chronologische Geschiedenis van Batavia door Een Chinees", p. 26.
210
its inhabitants, as the VOC expanded in terms of its 
territorial and political power.
By 1743 Governor-General Baron van Imhoff had managed 
to impose a total of 16 taxes on the city population, each 
leased to the Chinese. Leases were granted for three years; 
most were taxes on consumption (liqour, tobacco, candles, 
rice, sugar), taxes on gambling, transportation (toll bridges, 
river passes), and on services such as weights and 
measures, certificates, permits for fishing and sugar- 
milling.21 M S de Vienne has arranged the leased-taxes into 
several groups, namely Chinese capitation tax, bazaar 
activities, and commercial activities, under which were 
shops and liqour sales, transportation, sugar-mills and a 
tax on games.22
The VOC appears not to have categorized these taxes, as 
the term kleine verpachte middelen, or small farms, was 
adopted later. Under the Netherlands Indies administration, 
the revenue from small farms was arranged separately from 
that of opium, particularly after the 1860s when the latter 
became the main source of government revenue. In fact,
during the British period in Java, a separation had been
made between general revenue farms and small farms.23 
Small farms were imposed on transportation, such as 
horses and carriages, river passes, toll bridges. The figures 
for tax collection show that the largest amounts were
received from the general revenue farms. For example, in
1812, general revenue farms yielded 8 2 ,8 0 0  Spanish 
dollars; small farms yielded only 22,935 Spanish dollars.24
As I noted earlier, the Dutch decided not to extend the 
wayangpacht to parts of Java other than the Batavia region. 
In contrast to the Dutch, the British saw gambling and 
cockfighting as the main cause of murder among the natives 
and the Chinese, with arak consumption as an additional 
factor. Thus on 28 November 1811, in their first year in
21 Ibid.
22 M S de Vienne, "La Part des Chinois dans les Farmes Fiscales de Batavia au 
XVIIeme Siecle".
23 See Engelse Tussenbestuur, no. 77, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
24 Ibid.
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Java, the British abolished gambling and cockfighting, and 
imposed restrictions on the sale of arak.25 Christian 
morality must have been important in this matter, since it 
was admitted "that the pecuniary loss sustained by the 
Government in consequence of these farms not being 
continued amounts to 100,000 Spanish dollars annually".26 
Moral satisfaction was probably achieved, albeit at a 
financial loss. According to the Landdrost of Batavia, in the 
three months following the abolition of these vices, there 
was only one victim of violent crime.27 Nevertheless, this 
did not mean that everything ran smoothly.
In November 1811, the Landdrost of Batavia was already 
busy with measures against illicit gambling. In one case, 
some Chinese wardmasters were discovered among the 
gamblers. It was reported that a certain Li Peng Ko, who 
worked with the opium kongsi, had given permission to 
these Chinese law-breakers to open gambling houses. The 
police investigation discovered that Li Peng Ko had illegally 
used the Chinese captain's authority: they extended their 
enquiries to establish the extent to which the captain was 
involved. The Chinese captain, Li Tjie Ko, was able to prove 
himself innocent.28 As for other infringements of the law, 
such as the sale of arak to European soldiers, the Chinese 
potia, who had responsibility for the leases, was detained.29
In examining the repercussions of revenue-farming, for 
which the Chinese were vehemently blamed, I will exclude 
the notorious opium farm.30
Certain Dutch blamed the Vreemde O osterlingen , 
particularly the Chinese, for their economic activities in
25 See letter of the Landdrost of the Batavia region to the Lieutenant- 
Governor of Java, 20 December 1811, in Engelse Tussenbestuur, no. 79; 
also quoted in Proceedings, 1 February 1812, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
26 Proceedings, 1 February 1812.
27 See letter of the Landdrost of Batavia to Lieutenant-Governor of Java, 29 
January 1812, in Engelse Tussenbestuur, no. 91.
28 See Engelse Tussenbestuur, no. 96.
29 See letter of the Landdrost of Batavia to Lieutenant-Governor of Java, 5 
November 1811, in Engelse Tussenbestuur; no. 79.
30 For the opium farming business, see James Rush, Opium to Java. Revenue 
Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 7 860-1910.
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the interior, which were said to damage native welfare. In 
the 1894 survey conducted under F Fokkens, the Inspector of 
Cultivation from the Home Affairs Office, it was discovered 
that the natives suffered most from the revenue farms 
leased to the Chinese. These allegations, raised in the Dutch 
Parliament in The Hague, referred to the Chinese as the 
1 bloedzuigers derJavanen', bloodsuckers of the Javanese.31
A lengthy article by L. Vitalis in T ijdschrift van 
Nederlandsch-lndie in 1851 discussed the excessive and 
abusive practices connected with revenue farming, and with 
taxes on bazaars, butchery and money-lending.32 Vitalis 
pointed out that the bazaarspacht, or bazaar tax, extended 
to money-lending, because the impecunious native had 
already sold his agricultural produce before harvest. 
Moreover, in selling their agricultural produce at the 
bazaars, they also paid bazaar tax.33
Taxation on butchery increased cattle stealing. Thefts 
occurred mainly during periods of drought, when natives in 
desperate need of money had already disposed of their 
buffalo in order to meet their meagre daily requirements. 
Cattle theft was also rife after the harvest, when meat 
consumption increased for feasts and ritual offerings. The 
stolen cattle were secretly taken to other villages, to be 
sold or exchanged. The Chinese pachter who levied the tax 
on butchery paid less for stolen cattle, using fake 
witnesses during transactions to  d ivert police 
investigations.34 The fact that the tax on butchery led to 
cattle stealing was due to the fact that the butchers or 
Chinese farmers would purchase stolen livestock because it 
was cheapest.35
31 See "Sedert Wanneer het Gouvernement zoo anti-Chineesch Geworden?", 
Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch-lndie (hereafter TNI), vol. I, 1857, pp. 169- 
171.
32 L. Vitalis, "Over de Pachten in het Algemeen, de Onzedelijkheid van 
Sommige, en de Verdrukking Waaraan de Overmatige Misbruiken van Andere 
de Javaansche Bevolking Blotsellen", 7M, vol. II, 1851, pp. 365-386.
33 Ibid., pp. 366-367.
34 Ibid., pp. 376-377.
35 Ibid., p. 377; see also A de Waal, Aanteekeningen over de Koloniale 
Onderwerpen, vol. IV, part I, p. 335. For this practice in Batavia, see "Hoe
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Money-lending at high interest was a notorious practice 
by which the shrewd Chinese cunningly drew the natives 
into debt. Although the weak and ignorant natives were 
certainly the main victims, this practice also affected the 
European. It was said that goods stolen from Europeans 
could be found in the hands of Chinese money-lenders. Since 
most European households employed native servants, 
intrigue between Chinese money-lenders and poverty- 
stricken servants was not uncommon. Police investigations 
sometimes ended in failure, and the stolen goods would 
later go to auction.36
Vitalis also notes that native officials were not always 
ignorant of such abuses, and in cattle th e ft their 
involvement was even conspicuous.37 He criticizes the 
Dutch for ignoring the many abuses of the revenue farming 
system. The colonial authority, hardly unaware of these 
matters, pursued a grab-as-much-as-you-can policy. As 
long as the government increased its annual income, local 
subordinates could do as they wished. With a fear of 
diminishing public revenues, the oppressive practices of 
revenue farms were inevitable.38 No Dutch resident or 
assistant-resident would allow his position to be damaged 
by poor revenues. Furthermore, Vitalis argued that there 
were the dubious practices not only of the shrewd Chinese 
but also of the native regents, who enjoyed a tremendous 
incomes for their extravagant expenditures.39
It seems likely that Batavia's native population were 
most affected by the bazaar tax. The tax was levied on any 
item purchased at a government bazaar. However, as most of 
the Batavia region consisted of private lands belonging to
men, in de Ommelanden van Batavia, Karbouwen Steelt", TNI, vol. I, 1860, 
pp. 197-199.
36 L. Vitalis, "Over de Pachten in het Algemeen, de Onzedelijkheid van 
Sommige, en de Verdrukking", p. 380.
37 Ibid., p. 376.
38 Ibid., pp. 371, 373.
39 Ibid., p. 365. Victor Purcell defended the Chinese revenue-farming 
practices, arguing that it was Dutch policy which led to abuse; see V Purcell, 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia (1966. London: Oxford University Press), p. 
444.
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Chinese and Europeans, the landowners were permitted to 
open private bazaars. To establish a particuliere bazaar, the 
landowner would supply stalls or kiosks and propose a 
market day, which was then approved by the government.40 
A bazaar tax was demanded by the landowner, who in turn 
paid an annual rent to the local authority. The abuse of the 
bazaarpacht led to great increases in the price of common 
items of native consumption.41 In addition, there were many 
opportunities for bribery in the revenue farms leased to the 
Chinese. This was particularly true of the bazaar tax since 
it was operated at the lowest level of the local 
bureaucracy, where government control was often weak.
Criticism against the excessive practices of the 
bazaarpacht grew stronger in the 1850fs. In December 1851 
the Dutch abolished the lease of the bazaar tax in Java and 
Madura, with the exceptions of Batavia, Buitenzorg and 
Krawang.42 By 1853 the bazaarpacht was no longer imposed 
in Krawang. It was proposed that Batavia and Buitenzorg 
would soon follow. The Governor-General of the Netherlands 
Indies pointed out that the tax farm for bazaars in Batavia 
and Buitenzorg could no longer be maintained due to the 
large numbers of private bazaars. To control these 
particuliere bazaars, separate regulations were needed; but 
the intention was to reduce or close those private bazaars.
It was understood that such a proposal meant the loss of 
124,000 guilders per year for the Dutch government.43
40 See for example, the proposal from major Tan Eng Goan on 13 August 
1860, naming Thursday as market day. The bazaar was located on his private 
land, and was approved by Gouvernementsbesluit, 18 December 1860, no.
60, in Verbaal, 14 February 1861, no. 41, ARA, The Hague. His earlier 
proposal, for an additional market day in Serpong, was refused; see 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 9 January 1855, no. 6, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta. As 
early as 1829, for bazaars in Batavia, Buitenzorg and Krawang, the Dutch 
decided the market day; see "Reglement en Tarief voor de Onderscheidene 
Bazaars, Gelegen in de Stad en Voorsteden en Ommelanden van de Baljuwage 
Batavia, Alsmede in de Afdeelingen Buitenzorg en Krawang", in Batavia, no.
10, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
41 A de Waal, Aanteekeningen over de Koloniale Onderwerpen, vol. IV, part I, 
p. 312.
42 Ibid.
43 Letter of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies to Minister of 
Colonies, 26 November 1853, no. 712 /14 , in Verbaal, 11 April 1854, no. 
1/260, ARA, The Hague.
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Higher officials in the Ministry of the Colonies could not 
deny that the vulnerable native inhabitants of Batavia were 
the main victims of the bazaarpacht. However, due to 
financial considerations, it was decided to give more
protection to the natives by increasing the local police 
force.44 The leased-bazaar tax for Batavia and Buitenzorg 
was later abolished, in 1855.
Financial loss was obviously the main reason for Dutch 
reluctance to abolish many of the revenue-farms, mostly 
those on consumption, particularly before the opium boom 
of the 1 860fs. The annual income of the small farms might 
be modest in comparison with the opium-farm revenue; yet 
any measures to abolish the small farms still cut
government revenue.
There were also proposals to abolish the taxes on 
butchering and meat-selling, which were usually held by one 
revenue farmer. It was suggested that they should be
replaced by a meat-consumption tax. Those opposed said 
that abolition would lead to illegal abattoirs, which in turn 
would affect the availability of meat, particularly pork. 
Scarcity of meat would cause great annoyance to members 
of the European community. Moreover, abolishing the tax 
would affect price more than quality of meat.45 As the 
natives consumed very little  meat, the plan was
abandoned.46 In fact, a tax on meat consumption would be 
effective only in cities with large European and Chinese 
communities, particularly Batavia. However, regulations 
were adopted which put an end to the revenue farmers 
monopoly on meat-selling.47 In Batavia, this regulation was 
imposed from 1864.
I have given a lengthy description of the small farms in 
order to consider in what ways they were subject to 
government legislation, particularly in Batavia. I assume
44 Verbaal, 11 April 1854, no. 1/260.
45 See "Resume der Antwoorden op de Circulair van den Directeur der 
Middelen en Domeinen", 11 March 1863, no. 996, in Verbaal, 8 February 
1864, no. 13/130.
46 See Verbaal, 3 February 1864, no. 26.
47 A de Waal, Aaanteekeningen over de Koloniale Onderwerpen, p. 331.
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that Batavia was excluded from James Rush’s study of 
opium farms simply because opium-farming was much less 
important there than in other parts of Java. Government 
restrictions did not encourage opium farming in West-Java; 
Preanger, in particular, was defined as the 'verboden  
kringen', or forbidden ring. These regulations also stipulated 
that in Batavia, Bantam, Krawang and Lampung, the opium 
farms were to be leased as one area of operation.48
Despite smaller financial returns from opium farming, 
Batavia had compensation with the revenues from the small 
farms. In 1874 Batavia's small farms earned 578 ,700  
guilders; its revenue from the opium farms amounted to 
856,800 guilders. Semarang and Surabaya yielded 1,027,200  
and 889,200 guilders from opium. Their revenue from small 
farms was much less than in Batavia - 67,560 and 230,448  
guilders respectively.49 For the year 1874, Batavia's total 
financial return from the two categories of farm, opium and 
small farms, was 1 ,435 ,500 guilders. The corresponding 
figure in Semarang was 1 ,0 9 4 ,7 6 0  guilders, and in 
Surabaya, 1 ,019,648 guilders. Even before 1874 Batavia 
received more that the other two cities from revenue 
farms.50 For example, in 1835 Batavia received a total of 
1,098,732 guilders from the opium and small farms.51
In the 1870s, the main source of Dutch revenue was 
opium, which was boosted despite its harmful effects on 
the Javanese. In the meantime, Batavia managed to maintain 
its revenue from the small farms. While there were twelve 
kinds of small farms tax imposed in Batavia, Semarang and
48 See "Staat van den Uitslag der Verpachtingen van's Lands Middelen voor 
het Jaar 1873", in Mailrapport, no. 8 7 6 /1 8 7 2 ; see also Bijlage JJ, 
"Statistiek der Opium-pacht op Java en Madoera van 1888", in Koloniaal 
Verslag, 1889.
49 Compilation from Bijlage CC for opium farms and Bijlage EE for small 
farms, Koloniaal Verslag, 1875.
50 Koloniaal Verslag, 1872, p. 133.
51 Compilation from "Aantooning van het Bedrag der Onderstaande Middelen 
en Bevolking op Java per Ziel, 1835", in Ministerie van Kolonien Archief, 
no. 3040, ARA, The Hague.
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Surabaya had only eight and nine respectively.52 This was 
another reason why the Dutch would not abandon the small 
farms in the Batavia region. In addition, because Batavia had 
the largest Chinese population, consumption taxes were 
levied there as compensation for the opium revenue.
If we look into the various kinds of consumption tax found 
in Batavia, it is clear that the majority of taxpayers were 
Chinese. The most striking was undoubtedly the Chinese 
capitation tax, which in 1900 was incorporated into the 
bedrijfsbelasting , or income tax. Others were taxes on 
butchery and pork, liqour and tjioe (Chinese arak), Chinese 
to b a cc o ,53 and on folk entertainment. Judging by the 
applications sent to the local authorities in the Batavia 
region, most wayang groups were owned by Chinese.54
Although only 10% of Batavia's population resided in the 
inner city, about 30% of the Chinese lived there, with the 
remainder in the outskirts or Ommelanden.s5 From these 
figures, I assume that the Chinese also made up the large 
audiences found at folk entertainments such as the wayang.
By April 1902 the wayangpacht on wayang performances 
was replaced by a permit,56 an arrangement which also 
applied to Chinese gambling. However, the Chinese 
suspected that government regulations here were intended 
to favour the Europeans. In 1904 all gambling houses run 
under the revenue-farm were closed.57 Rumour spread that 
after this an association, led by Europeans, would be given 
permits to open licensed gambling houses.58
In addition to the small farms, the Batavia region also 
had a ground tax, or verponding, paid on private lands. The
52 See "Vergelijkend Overzigt der Verpachtingen op de Eilanden Java en 
Madoera tusschen de Jaren 1842,1843,1844 en 1845", in Ministerie van 
Kolonien Archief, no. 3210.
53 This small farm was leased together with the Javanese tobacco farm; see 
"Politiek Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het jaar 1871", in Batavia, 
no. 18, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
54 See Tangerang, nos. 155/2 , 172/b, 240/b, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
55 Compilation from Bijlage A, Koloniaal Verslag, 1889.
56 C R Bakhuizen van den Brink, "Memorie van Overgave van de Residentie 
Batavia, 16 September 1901 - 9 May 1906", ARA, The Hague.
57 Ibid.
58 "Chineesche Dobbelspelen", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1912, p. 91.
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following figures show how much revenue the government 
gained from this source in 1887.59 In total, Batavia had 322 
private lands, 98 of which were owned by Europeans, 186 by 
Chinese; the remaining 38 were the property of either other 
Vreemde Oosterlingen or natives. The total ground tax paid 
by private landowners was 39 ,982,307 guilders.60 About a 
decade later this figure had increased to 4 9 ,5 4 6 ,7 0 6  
guilders.61
To show how much the Chinese of Batavia contributed to 
Dutch government revenue, I will focus on the year 1899. My 
reason for this, apart from the availability of Dutch 
sources, is because by the early 1900s revenue farming by 
the Chinese was diminishing. I will also make a sketchy 
comparison between Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya in 
order to demonstrate Batavia's contribution.
I have limited myself to the revenue farms and non­
leased taxation. The revenue farms consisted of opium and 
small farms; the non-leased were the property tax, or 
personeele belasting, income tax, or bedrijsbelastingt and 
the ground tax, or verponding.
Table 1.
Income of Revenue Farms and Non-leased Taxation in the Main 
Cities of Java, in 1899
Item Batavia . Semarang Surabava
f 453,516.00  















(in guilders) f 40,746,203.435 f 5,577,403.50  
Sources: Koloniaal Verslag, 1899, 1900.
f 301,344.00  
f 1,324,455.40  
f 475,379.39
f 147,529.10 5 
f 3,376,500.00
f 5,625,207.89'
59 The year 1887 was taken simply because of the availability of Dutch 
sources.
60 Compilation from Koloniaal Verslag, 1889.
61 See Kolonial Verslag, 1899, 1900.
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The bulk of Batavia's revenue came from the ground tax on 
private lands. To show that the Chinese of Batavia 
contributed more than the Chinese in the other cities, one 
has to take into consideration income, property and ground 
taxes. Income tax was levied only on the non-agriculturist, 
non-European, members of Dutch East Indies society. 
Europeans paid their income tax on a different basis. In 
Batavia, only natives living on government land paid income 
tax. Income tax was paid only by those natives who lived in 
the inner city and in the Blubur region in the eastern part of 
Batavia residency. This meant that the number of native 
taxpayers was small, although by January 1900, all natives 
in the residency of Batavia were in theory liable to income 
tax.62
In terms of the property tax, only the European and the 
Vreemde Oosterlingen were liable. The fact that Chinese 
considerably outnumbered other Foreign Asiatics in Batavia 
strongly suggests the scale of their contribution. Although 
most of Batavia's private lands were personal properties, 
some were in corporate ownership, managed by land estate 
companies. After 1900 there was a tendency for Chinese 
individual landownership to be transformed into corporate 
property, with the estates being managed by Chinese 
business partnerships. However, Chinese private  
landownership still made up most of the Chinese tax 
contribution in Batavia.
The following table shows the contribution of Batavian 
Chinese in 1899, from non-leased means of revenue, 
specifically income, property and ground taxes.
62 Koloniaal Verslag, 1900, p. 134.
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Table 2.
Tax Contribution of Chinese in the Main Cities of Java, in 1899
Item Batavia Semarang Surabava
income tax f 161,274.90 f 70,306.24 f 133,486.55s
property tax3 f 69,765.26 f 34,934.265 f 60,555.36
ground tax f 9,956,676.00 f 1,950,408.00 f 2,821,874.00
Total
(in guilders) f 10,187,716.16 f 2,055,648.50s f 3 ,015,915.91s
(a) This figure was taken from the total payment of Vreemde Oosterlingen, 
not purely the Chinese. I am assuming that the Chinese accounted for about 
90% of the total, the other 10% being the Arabs share. The figures for 
Semarang are similar, those for Surabaya a little higher, but with the 
Chinese still as the major property taxpayers. Sources : Koloniaal Verslag, 
1899, 1900.
Looking at these figures, one can hardly deny Bataviafs 
vast contribution to the government treasury. I have chosen 
the 1870s for my discussion of Bataviafs small farms, for it 
was a time when other parts of Java were experiencing a 
boom in the opium farms and agricultural production. The 
1 890's were chosen to underline Batavia's constantly high 
financial returns, even when revenue-farming was coming 
to an end.
Given that the Chinese were dominant in revenue-farming, 
and that by 1885 they had to pay 4% of their income63 
(together with ground tax in Batavia), it is hard to disregard 
their vast financial contribution. Considering that their 
share of non-leased revenues reached about 20%, it is safe 
to say that the Chinese of Batavia contributed roughly 40%  
of total tax revenues in the residency.
From the early years of colonial rule until the turn of this 
century, the only possible opportunities for the Chinese 
were in commerce, particularly in revenue farms. They were 
not blameless for this situation, but the figures show that 
they paid for what they gained in commerce.
63 Letter of Director of Finance to Governor-General, 4 September 1886, in 
Mailrapport, no. 603x /1886, ARA, The Hague.
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The foregoing may explain why the exemption of Batavia 
from the harsh practices of the Cultivation System was not 
without clear reason. Because the greater part of Batavia 
was under private ownership, except the small area of the 
inner city belonging to the government, it is obvious that 
the Cultivation System could not be imposed. A similar 
situation arose in the V o r s t e n l a n d e n , or Javanese 
Principalities of Yogya and Solo. Had Batavia been unable to 
find compensation for the potential financial losses arising 
from exemption from the Cultivation System, would the 
Dutch policy have been different?
The Chinese Officers and Revenue Farming
In approaching the subject of the Chinese officers and their 
involvement in revenue farming, I will not focus on their 
significant financial returns.
As wealth became the most basic criterion for 
officership, positions were open only to those of certain 
economic status, namely leading merchants and landowners. 
What is interesting to note is that hardly any of the 
candidates mentioned their status as revenue-farmer in 
their applications. Being a revenue farmer was an element 
in the network of Chinese business. Not only were 
candidates required to be rich prior to becoming officers, 
but the position often lead to additional wealth. In a few 
cases this did not occur.
In considering applications for Chinese officership, it is 
likely that the Dutch ignored, or avoided mentioning, the 
candidate’s status as a revenue farmer. According to the 
official sources, the only occasion on which a candidate’s 
status as a revenue farmer was raised was when the 
Resident of Batavia and the Director of Finance supported 
Liem Goan Tjeng. As he was not Batavia-born, his chances of 
gaining the lieutenantship were not high. Nevertheless, his 
family background undoubtedly helped him, for his two 
brothers were the Chinese captains of Semarang and
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Gresik.64 But it was his financial status rather than his 
family background which were taken into consideration, for 
by the 1870s the Dutch avoided family connections in the 
appointment of Chinese officers in Batavia. This is shown 
by the letter of the Director of Finance in support of Liem 
Goan Tjeng, which noted favourably that he was an opium 
farmer in the Batavia, Bantam and Krawang areas.65 Liem 
Goan Tjeng gained the lieutenantship in November 1883, 
although in February 1889 he retired due to sickness. It was 
suspected that his reason for retiring was because of a 
hectic period in his opium business.66
Liem Goan Tjengfs appointment could be related to an 
earlier case involving his relative, Liem Goan Sioe. Whether 
these two Liems were brothers is still unclear, although 
they were related as both came from Gresik. Liem Goan Sioe 
was the son-in-law of the famous Chinese major of 
Semarang, Be Biauw Tjoan. Having settled in Batavia for 
three years, Liem Goan Sioe applied for the lieutenantship 
in 1872. The Chinese Council had no objections, but the 
Dutch rejected Liemfs application, either because he was 
considered too young (he was eighteen at the time) or 
because of his lack of familiarity with Batavia.67 Liem Goan 
Sioe gained the lieutenantship in 1876. However, he was 
kept under surveillance. He may have been promoted to 
captain in 1877, and as the son-in-law of the powerful Be 
Biauw Tjoan, he would have been in fluentia l.6 8 
Nevertheless, he was under suspicion of being involved in 
the illicit opium trade. His case was raised in 1879, causing
64 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 23 October 
1883, no. La.L2, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 18 November 1883, no. 13, 
Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
65 Letter of Director of Finance to Governor-General, 2 November 1883, no. 
2, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 18 Novemner 1883, no. 13.
66 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 6 December 1888, no. 
6544, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 14 February 1889, no. 20.
67 For the arguments, see A g e n d a ,  no. 1 7 7 4 5 /1 8 7 2 , in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 31 October 1872, no. 11.
68 Letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 8 September 1877, no. 
5714, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 21.
223
a serious debate between the Resident of Batavia and the 
Director of Finance.
During the period 1876 to 1878 the Director of Finance 
noticed that the opium farms in Batavia, Bantam and 
Krawang, .for which Liem Goan Sioe was the farmer, were 
experiencing financial difficulties. In addition the increase 
in the opium bid was less than usual, and suspicion grew 
that this might be connected with smuggling. During a trial 
involving the confiscation of illegal opium, held in 
Tangerang on 11 February 1879, Liem Goan Sioe was 
frequently mentioned by two witnesses.69 There were 
allegations that Liem Goan Sioe was the ringleader of an 
opium smuggling operation. When the Director of Finance 
asked him about the case, Liem retorted that the opium 
trade would produce huge profits if smuggling continued, 
for the henchmen of the smugglers were also the henchmen 
of the opium revenue farmers.70 Knowing that he was 
favoured by the Resident of Batavia, Liem Goan Sioe was 
certain that he would be safe. The Resident defended him 
over the case of the illegal opium confiscated in Tangerang, 
saying that it was Liem Goan Sioe who had discovered and 
reported it .71 According to the Resident, as an opium 
farmer, Liem had achieved large profits. And in view of his 
wealth and influential family background, the Resident of 
Batavia proposed him for captaincy.72 Of course this 
proposal was rejected, as the Director of Home Affairs 
sided with the Director of Finance.73 Liem Goan Sioe never 
achieved the captaincy, and his name lost its significance in 
Batavia. He was presumably encouraged to resign soon after 
the case.
69 Letter of Secretary of Department of Finance to General Secretary, 5 May 
1879, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 27 June 1879, no. 38.
70 Quoted in strictly confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor- 




73 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 4 April 1879, 
no. 3379, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 27 June 1879, no. 38.
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Semarang is well-known in the history of the Chinese in 
Java, in that two Chinese majors who were famous for their 
particular wealth and material possessions were from 
Semarang - Be Biauw Tjoan in the nineteenth century and 
Oei Tiong Ham in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Besides his legal opium trading network, Be Biauw Tjoan 
also played a key role in the illicit trade.74 After a thorough 
government investigation in 1864, he was forbidden to 
participate in the opium farms. But although Be Biauw Tjoan 
was now out of business, there was still Liem Goan Sioe in 
Batavia. Since he was the son-in-law of Be Biauw Tjoan, it 
is possible that Liem Goan Sioe's application for Chinese 
officership was in some way connected with the opium 
business, either legal or illegal. It seems safe to say that 
Liem Goan Sioe was planning to supervise an illicit business 
arrangement, while at the same time controlling the local 
authority in Batavia. He failed. His lieutenantship was too 
short for him to operate illegal activities in Batavia, where 
Dutch control was easily exercised.
Unlike Liem Goan Sioe, Tan Eng Goan, the captain who 
became major in 1837, maintained his position despite his 
ill fortune in revenue farming. During his captaincy he 
gained the Chinese capitation tax in the vicinity of Batavia, 
the Ommelanden.7S Later, he applied for the opium farm 
leases for Batavia, Bantam, Buitenzorg and Krawang. But his 
experience was not a lucky one. In 1833 the lease-tax, or 
pachtschat, he owed to the government came to 50,400  
guilders. According to the Director of Public Means and 
Domains, Tan Eng Goan should have been fined 10,500  
guilders, but he was exempted; instead he was required to 
settle his debt in monthly instalments.76 His misfortunes 
extended to the revenue on liquor and tobacco sales in 
Batavia and Buitenzorg. He requested more time to settle 
his lease debt of 1855, offering to pay part of the money in 
January 1856 and the remainder in February. This was
74 See James Rush, Opium to Java, pp. 76-77.
75 See Resolutie, 11 October 1831, no. 18, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
76 See Resolutie, 16 March 1833, no. 3; and 12 August 1833, no. 14.
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refused because the Dutch said that a delay in payment 
would disturb the management of the government 
treasury.77 Even Tan Eng Goan's bazaar revenue farm in Luar 
Batang, located in the inner city, was running at a loss. 
From 1847 to 1848 he received restitution of 5 ,462.37  
guilders;78 in 1850 he recieved only 1,742.37 guilders.79
As early as 1844, Tan Eng Goan required a government 
loan of 250 ,000  guilders to boost his revenue farming 
business. Seeing that he owned huge areas of Kramat, 
Tanjung Burung and Rawa Kidang, all located in the western 
division of the Batavia residency, this request was granted, 
particularly since sugar production on his land yielded 
7 6 9 ,5 0 0  guilders per year,80 and its ground tax was 
assessed at 479,000 guilders.81
However, despite 25 years experience in revenue farming, 
good fortune did not come his way. Since the 1850s the 
Dutch had been privately dissatisfied with major Tan Eng 
Goan's business.82 The Director of Public Means and Domain 
considered ordering a public declaration of his debts, but 
this was refused by the Resident of Batavia.83 The question 
whether Tan Eng Goan should maintain his position as 
Chinese major was raised. Again the Resident rejected the 
proposal; Tan Eng Goan's performance of his duty was 
entirely satisfactory. When the Director of Public Means and 
Domain suspected him of inventing a fake loss of revenue on
77 Letter of Director of Public Means and Domains to Governor-General, 22 
October 1855, no. 2794, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 6 November 1855, no. 
11.
78 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 13 July 1849, no. 5.
79 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 April 1851, no. 16.
80 Note of the Chief Constable of the western quarter of Tangerang to Resident 
of Batavia, 26 October 1844, no. 551, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 29 
November 1844, no. 3.
81 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 29 November 1844, no. 3.
82 Letter of Director of Public Means and Domains to Governor-General, 16 
April 1851, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 10 June 1851, no. 16.
83 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 19 May 1851, no. 
2736, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 10 June 1851, no. 16.
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liquor and tobacco sales, the Resident again defended him, 
saying that the financial loss was genuine.84
Tan Eng Goan carried on as major until April 1866, when 
he retired due to old age and fragile health. Not only had he 
fallen into poverty, but he was physically unable to earn a 
living.85 From then he received a pension of 150 guilders per 
month.86
However Tan Eng Goan could be considered lucky compared 
to two lieutenants, Tan Boen Sok and Gouw Eng Hoey, and the 
retired captains, Tan Kam Long and Oey Tjeng Yan. The 
resignations of lieutenants Tan Boen Sok and Gouw Eng Hoey 
were obviously connected with their failures in business, 
while the cases of the two retired captains demonstrates 
again the prestige and respect accorded to Chinese officers.
The career of lieutenant Tan Boen Sok as a Chinese 
officer started in 1856, when he was second secretary to 
the Chinese Council. By February 1861 he was appointed 
lieutenant. Almost a decade later, on 5 August 1870, by 
order of the Council of Justice he was declared bankrupt, in 
debt to 3,000 guilders. To pay off his debt, Tan Boen Sok 
spent four months in jail. It was customary for those who 
were imprisoned to be temporarily relieved of their 
position, but Tan Boen Sok was sacked.87 Not only was he 
not restored to his position, but to make his future even 
more bleak he was considered as having a 'v i jandig  
gezindheicf, hostile inclination, towards the authorities.88 A 
higher official of Division C, who supervised Chinese 
Affairs, suspected that Tan Boen Sok was merely a victim 
of the antagonism of the Batavia authorities. During the
84 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 17 October 1855, 
no. 3179, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 6 November 1855, no. 11.
85 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 12 March 1867 no. 
9 0 0 /1 1 ;  and also letter of Tan Eng Goan, 4 April 1867 , in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 31 May 1867, no. 5.
86 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 31 May 1867, no. 5.
87 Letter of Tan Boen Sok, 16 October 1871, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 3 
February 1872, no. 26; and also mentioned in "Politiek Verslag van de 
Residentie Batavia van het Jaar 1870", in Batavia, no. 18.
88 Mentioned in letter of Government Secretary, 19 April 1871, no. 654, 
quoted in letter of the Division C to Governor-General, 15 December 1871, 
in Gouvernementsbesluit, 3 February 1872, no. 26.
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final years in which Tan Boen Sok had been a Chinese 
lieutenant and member of the Chinese Council, he frequently 
encountered difficulties in his dealings with the Assistant- 
Resident. As a senior lieutenant, Tan Boen Sok was entitled 
to captaincy, but instead the Resident proposed that he 
should resign.89 The antagonism of the Batavia authorities 
could be observed right from the moment of Tan Boen Sok's 
appointment as lieutenant in 1861. The Resident of Batavia 
did not support his candidacy, for the reason that !I....he does 
not belong to the group from which the Chinese officers 
were usually e lected ...11.90 In other words, the local 
authority in Batavia doubted his financial status.
Since Tan Boen Sok was defended by a higher official of 
Division C, while the decision of the Batavian local 
authority to sack him was supported by the Director of 
Home Affairs, a row between these Dutch officials was 
unavoidable. This row became a debate concerning over the 
selection of Chinese officers. The officials of Division C 
were mainly concerned with the question why only wealthy 
Chinese could become officers. I have discussed this 
subject in chapter 3.
Although he argued that his debt was due to family 
expenditures, the marriages of his two daughters, and not 
because of business failure, Tan Boen Sok suffered extreme 
embarrassment on being the focus of debate. And seeing 
that the Resident of Batavia kept pressing his case for 
either financial status or moral values in the Chinese 
officership, Tan Boen Sok gave up the fight, saying that he 
had no more interest in the position. Furthermore, he said 
that the debt was a private matter. To describe him as 
having hostile inclinations was a stain on his name to which 
he strongly objected.91
89 Mentioned in letter of Division C to Governor-General, 15 December
1871, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 3 February 1872, no. 26; and in "Politiek 
Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het Jaar 1871", in Batavia, no. 18.
90 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 29 January 1861, 
no. 325, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 17 February 1861, no. 9.
91 See Agenda, no. 21553 /1870 , in Gouvernementsbesluit, 3 February
1872, no. 26.
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Gouw Eng Hoey achieved the lieutenantship in 1866, and in 
addition he was a member of the Chinese Council. His 
circumstances became a matter of discussion among Dutch 
officials when a vacancy for Chinese captaincy arose. As a 
senior lieutenant, Gouw Eng Hoey was entitled to the 
position, yet the main consideration was, again, financial 
status. In the previous few years, Gouw Eng Hoey had been 
severely in debt, particularly in his opium farming business. 
He was the sub-farmer for the Bantam, Batavia, Krawang 
and Lampung areas. He was unable to cover the loss on the 
opium farm lease for 1873 for Tan Kam Long, the main 
farmer, and his brother-in-law.92 According to the Director 
of Finance, Gouw Eng Hoey had a debt of 27 ,700 guilders, 
owing to the Collegie van Boedelmeesteren, or Heritage 
Chamber, despite rumours that he had pawned his lands in 
Parungpanjang, Cinere and Citayam which were the security 
for the debt.93
Since the Director of Home Affairs supported Gouw Eng 
Hoey for the captaincy, stating that his financial condition 
was improving, the Resident of Batavia could hardly reject 
him.94 However, the Director of Finance supplied a further 
argument, saying that although Gouw was not without 
means, his lease debts had been settled by his partners, Oey 
Ek Kiam and Khouw Tjing Kie.95 It was then obvious that the 
Director of Finance could not accept Gouw Eng Hoey, and 
therefore the Resident of Batavia could no longer support 
him.96 In March 1878, lieutenant Gouw Eng Hoey retired 
after being in service for some twelve years.97
92 Confidential letter of Government Secretary to Resident of Batavia, 1 
October 1877, no.68, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 21.
93 Mentioned in aletter from Tjiong Pa Long, 10 September 1877, in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 21.
94 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 8 September 1877, 
no. 5714, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 21.
95 Confidential letter of Director of Finance to Governor-General, 22 
September 1877, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 21.
96 Confidential letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 20 
October 1877, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 December 1877, no. 21.
97 See Agenda, no. 4174 /1878 , in Gouvernementsbesluit, 13 March 1878, 
no. 39.
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The following two cases show some differences in terms 
of the status of the Chinese officership itself. Both 
lieutenants Tan Boen Sok and Gouw Eng Hoey were forced to 
resign because of their failure in business. Because they 
were no longer men of means, it was no longer possible for 
the Dutch to keep them. On the other hand, both Tan Kam 
Long and Oey Tjeng Yan were already retired. But their 
involvement in law-breaking meant that their standing, 
although now only honorary, was put into question by the 
Dutch.
Tan Kam Long retired in 1872 and was granted the 
honorary title of captain. His officership had begun in 1844 
and he was the brother-in-law of lieutenant Gouw Eng Hoey. 
After his retirement, Tan Kam Long worked as a senior 
cashier for the opium kongsi in Batavia. The operational 
areas of this kongsi covered Bantam, Batavia, Krawang and 
Lampung. In 1873 a deficit of 160,000 guilders in the kongsi 
funds was discovered, for which Tan Kam Long should take 
responsibility. According to the Landraad, or Native Council 
of Justice, in Batavia, his sentence was five years unpaid 
forced labour for abuse of trust. However, his case was 
brought to the Higher Court of the Netherlands Indies where 
it was dismissed.
It was understood that any Chinese officer involved in a 
legal case, particularly if he were imprisoned, should be 
removed from his officership, regardless whether he was 
active or non-active. As his legal case had been dismissed, 
Tan Kam Long appealed for rehabilitation. This raised 
questions in Dutch circles about the titular ranks being 
granted to Chinese officers. Should an honorary title be 
maintained where its bearer was involved in disreputable 
conduct?
The Director of Home Affairs had no objection to 
restoring Tan Kam Long's titular rank, since it was only 
honorary and implied no real influence. In addition, his 
misconduct had occurred when he was cashier of the kongsi 
rather than during his officership. The Chinese, to whom 
such European legalities were unknown were astonished to
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learn that Tan Kam Long would lose his title. Given that 
within the Chinese quarter, Tan Kam Long was still regarded 
as a rich man, there was no point in withholding this 
meaningless title. And as he had promised to settle the 
deficit,98 the Dutch appear to have bothered no further with 
Tan Kam Long's case.
While Tan Kam Long was allowed to retrieve his titular 
rank, Oey Tjeng Yan's experience was a bitter one. Having 
been in service for about 19 years, Oey Tjeng Yan was 
retired in May 1879 and granted the titular rank of major. 
The case of his retirement was rather interesting, since it 
took place just after a vacancy for major had been filled by 
Lie Tjoe Hong. Presumably this offended Oey Tjeng Yan, as 
he must have felt uncomfortable at being surpassed by a 
younger colleague. He immediately asked for retirement due 
to sickness and poor financial status.99 In addition, he 
requested that he be granted the titular rank of major in 
order to maintain the respect of his Chinese 
contemporaries, after being overtaken by Lie Tjoe Hong.100 
The Resident of Batavia was somewhat amazed by Oey Tjeng 
Yan's request, since during the election of Lie Tjoe Hong for 
the majorship, Oey Tjeng Yan had looked healthy and strong. 
Now he was suddenly appealing for retirement on grounds of 
sickness and old age.101 Neither the Resident nor the 
Director of Home Affairs saw any reason to grant him a 
titular rank on his retirement.102 Nevertheless, Oey Tjeng 
Yan did receive a titular majorship on his retirement. 
Unfortunately he lost it in 1888 after a case involving a 
cattle epidemic.
Oey Tjeng Yan owned land in Petojo Sawah where he ran a 
vast cattle-breeding operation. In August 1888 an epidemic
98 Advice of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 21 December 
1876, no. 12448, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 11 January 1877, no. 23.
99 Mentioned in confidential A g e n d a , no. 3 1 3 / 1 8 7 9 ,  in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 21 May 1879, no. 1.
100 Ibid.
101 Confidential letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 15 
April 1879, no. La.H, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 21 May 1879, no. 1.
102 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 18 April 1879, 
no. 3871, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 21 May 1879, no. 1.
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spread among his livestock, yet his manager, Lie Tek Tjoan, 
made no report to the local authorities. He even sold eight 
sick buffaloes to a native. Five buffaloes were seized and 
put under the surveillance of a government veterinary 
surgeon. Oey Tjeng Yan pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 
one month unpaid forced labour by the Batavia Landraad. To 
make matters worse, he still sold another twelve sick 
cattle to a nearby landowner of Grogol, an Indo-European, 
which caused the epidemic to spread even wider. The 
Resident of Batavia said that Oey Tjeng Yan should lose his 
titular majorship,103 although the Director of Home Affairs 
preferred to let the Governor-General decide this seemingly 
petty case.104 The final decision decreed that Oey Tjeng Yan 
should lose his honorary title.
So far I have focussed on cases in which Chinese officers 
lost their position and prestige. My purpose is, again, to 
underline how shaky their positions were, even down to the 
lowest rank of lieutenant. Moreover, we can observe that 
even in the establishment of the Chinese officership, the 
Dutch never abandoned their central principle of loss and 
profit.
Enforcement against fraud in revenue-farming was 
criticized by F Fokkens, the Inspector of Cultivation. He 
argued that since revenue-farming involved government 
policy, legal cases involving Chinese officers should be 
conducted in the residency council of justice, as was the 
case with Europeans. Being prosecuted in the native 
Landraad  under the police roll system, and particularly 
being subjected to the physical penalty of unpaid forced 
labour, brought bitter degradation to their position and 
prestige. But the Director of Justice argued that in cases of 
misdemeanour and fraud in revenue-farming, Chinese
103 Confidential letter of Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 1 
November 1888, no. La. S5, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 14 November 1888, 
no. 42.
104 Confidential letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 8 
November 1888, no. 6224, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 14 November 1888, 
no. 42.
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officers were not on trial in their capacity as government 
officials, but as p a c h te r  or revenue-farmers. For this 
judicial reason, they were entitled to be prosecuted under 
the pachtreglementen, or revenue-farming laws,105
All this demonstrates the insecurity of the Chinese 
officers position owing to the uncertainty of Dutch policy. 
There was no accepted fundamental concept for the 
institution of the Chinese officers, although the Dutch could 
be extremely determined if a case threatened government 
revenues.
I suspect that worldly considerations were behind the 
offer of the lieutenantship to Souw Siauw Tjong, whose 
father and grandfather were also Chinese lieutenants in 
Batavia. Souw Siauw Tjong was one of the richest Chinese 
in Batavia, a leading figure in the rice-market,106 and owner 
of various private lands located in Tangerang in the western 
division. He was highly praised for his assistance to the 
local authorities in Batavia and Tangerang. His philanthropic 
deeds included setting up schools for native children, taking 
care of poor tenants and contributing foodstuffs and 
building materials when a serious fire damaged 
neighbouring areas. The Resident of Batavia was extremely 
impressed, describing him as a virtually flawless person 
and a most respectable Chinese.107 Naturally, the Resident 
then proposed that Souw Siauw Tjong be given a Chinese 
officership, a suggestion endorsed by the Director of Home 
Affairs who praised him as a fine example for other Chinese 
officers to follow.108 Because the duties of Chinese officer 
would demand his full concentration and he could not 
neglect his business, Souw Siauw Tjong graciously declined
105 For discussion on this aspect, see note of Director of Justice, 7 May 
1895, no. 3353, in Mailrapport, no. 13/1896, ARA, The Hague.
106 Arnold Wright (ed), Twentieth Century Impressions o f Netherlands- 
India (1909. London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company Ltd.), p. 
482.
107 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 10 April 1877, 
no. 2096, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 7 May 1877, no. 18.
108 Letter of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 13 April 
1877, no. 3796, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 7 May 1877, no. 18.
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the offer. However, the Dutch then granted him the titular 
rank of lieutenant in May 1877.109
Similar reasons were cited when Phoa Keng Hek declined 
the Dutch offer of a Chinese majorship in 1908.110 I suspect 
there were also political motives in his refusal, which I 
have discussed in chapter 5. Had Souw Siauw Tjong and Phoa 
Keng Hek not been well-off members of the Chinese 
community, the Dutch would not have offered them such 
respectable positions. In other words, it was all a matter of 
financial status and wealth.
In the case of Phoa Keng Hek, whose father was also a 
Chinese lieutenant in Meester-Cornelis in the eastern 
division, the Dutch offer concealed a political motive. 
Observing the movement of the Chinese in the early 1900s 
towards modern political ambitions, begun under Phoa's 
leadership, the offer was probably intended to direct the 
Chinese towards Dutch interests. As Phoa Keng Hek declined 
the offer, yet managed to arrange for his son-in-law Khouw 
Kim An to achieve this office, I suggest that the Dutch had 
political reasons for favouring HHKan. But, as HHKan was 
also a rich landowner in Batavia with a long-established 
family background, one wonders why he was not offered the 
Chinese officership?
Batavia's Private Lands
As noted in the first part of this chapter, the particuliere 
landerijen, or private lands, were the jewel of the Batavia 
economy.
Chinese properties, particularly in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, counted for almost 40%  of total 
landownership in the residency. Even after the Dutch 
proposal to repurchase these private domains was 
implemented in 1910, the Chinese still possessed 10% of all
109 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 7 May 1877, no. 18.
110 Confidential letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs, 6 April 1908, 
no.27; and of the Resident of Batavia, 9 June 1908, no. 109, to Governor- 
General, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 29 June 1908, no. 41.
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the private lands in the region in 1920. While the Chinese 
economy in Java decreased in power after the abolition of 
revenue-farming, the Chinese of Batavia managed to retain 
a handsome investment in land. This meant that their 
economic situation was better than that of Chinese in other 
parts of Java.111
As the Agrarian Law of 1 870 forbad natives from selling 
their land to non-natives, how did the Chinese come to 
possess such huge areas of land in the Batavia region? To 
answer this question we have to trace the origins of 
Chinese landownership back to the early nineteenth century. 
A description of colonial practice in the sale of land may 
help to explain the situation.
In 1619, when the Dutch seized the settlement that was 
later called Batavia, the area was uninhabited. The 
indigenous population left the area and dispersed into 
remote corners of the hinterland. To populate and develop 
the city and its environs, the VOC regime under Governor- 
General J P Coen brought in various native groups and 
others, particularly the Chinese, to settle in Batavia and the 
surrounding area, known as the Ommelanden. To cultivate 
the outskirts, the VOC placed these various natives under 
their own chiefs, called Inlandsche kommandant. It was also 
for security reasons that these groups were given land 
settlements in the vicinity of the Intramuros, as war with 
Bantam and Mataram continued.
Each native commandant was granted land as fief, but had 
no right of landed property.112 They were liable to forced 
delivery of the products of the land, paid at fixed prices. For 
example, the rates for coffee and pepper were six Spanish 
dollars per picol; indigo fetched between 18 and 30 stuivers
111 Djie Ting Ham, "Enkele Opmerkingen over den Economischen Toestand 
van de Chineezen op Java", De Chineesche Revue, October 1928, p. 49; also 
"Jaarverslag over 1927 Betreffende de Werkzaamheden van het Kantoor voor 
Chineesche Zaken", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 129, Arsip Nasional, 
Jakarta.
112 "Geschiedkundig Onderzoek naar den Oorpsrong en den Aard van het 
Partikulier Landbezit op Java", TNI, vol. I, 1849, p. 251; and "Het 
Partikulier Landbezit in de Bataviasche Ommelanden to t 1857", TNI, vol. I, 
1855, p. 333.
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(one stuiver = five cents) according to the species.113 The 
Chinese were encouraged to cultivate the region, 
particularly by establishing sugar mills and arak 
distilleries on the land they leased.
Besides these non-Europeans, many Dutch agriculturists 
were sent to the colony to develop land. They came without 
their families and were given leases for five or eight 
years .114 Another type of agriculturist was the retired 
Dutch soldier who was allowed to apply for a lease in order 
to cultivate the land.115
To manage this growing system of land leasing, in 1684  
the VOC established the Collegie van Heemraden, or College 
of Aldermen. The collegefs function was later extended to 
caring for dikes, canals, rivers, bridges, roads and other 
matters related to land development.
The peace treaty concluded with Bantam in 1685 allowed 
the VOC to ease its policy regarding security in the 
Ommelanden, and a few years later, the VOC allowed its 
citizens to purchase land. It was said that the first private 
landowner in Batavia was Cornelis Chastelein, a member of 
the Indies Council, or Raad van Indie, who bought lands in 
Srengseng and Depok, in the southern part of the Batavia 
region in 1695 and 1696. In 1701 another member of the 
Indies Council, Abraham van Riebeeck, bought the land of 
Pondokpucung.116 It should be noted that as early as April 
1639, the fief status of those who cultivated land in the 
Batavia region was transformed into a property right, called 
eigendom.i17
Although land sales had begun in the last decade of the 
seventeenth century, the VOC sold very few lands until 
1744. One notable land purchase occurred in 1745 when
113 "Geschiedkundig Onderzoek naar den Oorsprong en den Aard van het 
Partikulier Landbezit op Java", p. 250.
114 "Het Partikulier Landbezit in de Bataviasche Ommelanden", p. 332.
115 Ibid.
115 L van der Hoek, "De Particuliere Landerijen in de Residentie Batavia", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. IX, 1922, p. 40.
117 Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-lndie (1919. 's Gravenhage: Martinus 
Nijhoff), vol. Ill, p. 345.
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Governor-General Baron van Imhoff bought the land of 
Kampung Baru in Buitenzorg. This became a property that 
was the seigneurial right of the Dutch Governor-General, 
possession being transferred following succession to this 
office.
In the history of the particuliere landerijen, the term of 
office of Daendels from 1809 to 1811 marked the second 
phase of public land sales. As Holland was dragged into the 
Napoleonic Wars, Daendels, assigned to protect the Eastern 
colony, needed extra financial support. Seeing that public 
funds had already been exhausted, the sale of land became 
one means of filling the empty purse.
According to the decree of 22 March 1808, all public land 
sales were authorized by the Collegie van Heemraden. Most 
buyers were Europeans, although some Chinese bought land, 
particularly in the western district, as from the early days, 
most Chinese had settled in this part of the Batavia region. 
Later Chinese settlers on the western bank of the Great 
River expanded throughout the western part of the region as 
far as Tangerang; the city developed westwards. This may 
explain why, two centuries later, private land in Tangerang 
was practically all in the hands of the Chinese.118
While the major part of Chinese landownership was 
concentrated in Batavia’s western regions, Europeans 
preferred to possess land located in the eastern district, 
from Meester-Cornelis - Buitenzorg up to the Krawang 
region. In Buitenzorg and Krawang, in particular, public land 
sales occurred during Raffles1 term of office. It is 
interesting to note that British owned land in Pamanukan 
and Ciasem in Krawang were, in fact, the largest private 
land estates in Java. They covered an area of 330 ,000  
bouws,119 or 485,100 acres. These extensive private lands 
will be discussed later.
118 See "Staat der Partikuliere Landerijen in de Afdeeling Tangerang", in 
Tangerang , nos. 1 5 0 /1 2 , 240 /A , Arsip Nasional, Jakarta; and also 
"Partikuliere Landerijen en de Openbare Veiligheid in de Residentie Batavia", 
De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1904, p. 1074.
119 Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. Ill, p. 275.
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Having given the background to private landownership in 
Batavia, we can now look into Chinese property.
The Chinese might have been the earliest non-indigenous 
settlers in this area, the people who developed and 
cultivated the region, yet they did not own the land they 
tilled until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. This 
does not mean that there were no Chinese landowners. 
Indeed, some notable Chinese were privately permitted to 
buy land, for example the first captain, Bencon, and his 
successor, Bingam, who owned the lands of Mangga Dua and 
Tanah Abang. It was said that Bingam was instrumental in 
opening up the area; on his initiative the Molenvliet canal 
was constructed, and this was later used to transport the 
products of his sugar mills in Tanah Abang to the city.120
Thus Chinese landownership, which began in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century when public land sales by 
the VOC commenced, grew slowly until the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.
In 1811 only seven private lands in the western district 
belonged to Chinese, while fourteen were owned by 
Europeans.121 Almost twenty-five years later, in 1836, the 
Resident of Batavia noted that of the 187 private lands in 
the region, 83 were owned by Chinese.122 In 1879 Chinese 
landownership had grown to 1 50 out of the total of 286  
particuliere landerijen in the whole region of Batavia.123 
Within the next decade, Chinese lands increased to 163 out 
of the total of 338 private lands. Chinese-owned lands 
covered an area of 336,060 bouws, or almost 40% of the 
total area of 849,710 bouws.124
The last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed a 
diminishing number of Chinese landowners as the Agrarian 
Law of 1870 closed the opportunity for non-natives to buy
120 Phoa Kian Sioe, Sedjarahnya Souw Beng Kong, Phoa Beng Gan, Oey Tamba 
Sia (1956. Djakarta: Penerbit Reporter), p. 37.
121 See Schepenen, no. 115, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
122 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 27 December 1846, no. 7.
123 See "Staat der Partikuliere Landerijen in 1879", in Regeeringsalmanak 
voor Nederlandsch-lndie, 1880, pp. 350-358.
124 See Koloniaal Verslag, 1891, p. 220.
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new land. In addition, Dutch government plans to repurchase 
private lands affected the expansion of Chinese 
landownership. Nevertheless, under the Dutch liberal policy, 
launched in 1870, the Chinese managed to transfer their 
private lands into enterprises operating as limited 
agricultural companies. In the following years there were 
increasing examples of private lands belonging to 
naamlooze vennotschappen , or limited companies, in 
agricultural production. Despite this transfer of ownership, 
the Chinese of Batavia still managed to own 14% of the 
total private land domains in 1910, and 10% in 1920.
These figures were calculated in terms of estates; in 
terms of actual area, Chinese ownership was much less than 
European. In other words, although the number of European 
private lands was less than Chinese, their area was far 
greater. For example, in 1898, Europeans owned 75 private 
lands, of 273,831 bouws; the Chinese had 137 lands, of 
2 5 7,1 41 bouws. What is more interesting is that the 
population on Chinese private lands outnumbered that on the 
European domains, 410 ,044  to 3 0 4 ,9 3 7 .125 Chinese land 
properties tended to be divided into small lots, and the 
native population preferred to settle on private lands 
belonging to Chinese rather than Europeans. Moreover, this 
indicates that the Chinese concentrated on medium-scale 
activity, as they did in many other sectors of the colonial 
economy.
The main crop on these Chinese private lands was rice, 
cultivated particularly in the western district of Tangerang 
and in the eastern part of Meester-Cornelis. From a report 
of 1899, rice cultivation covered almost 31% of the total 
area of 229,214 bouws, and yielded 4 ,640 ,100  picols.126 
Other crops were sugar, nuts, coffee, tobacco and indigo. 
Sugar and indigo were produced in Tangerang for domestic 
consumption. On the other hand, private lands in the
125 Bijlage YY, "Opgave Betreffende de Particuliere Landerijen op Java, 
1898", Koloniaal Verslag, 1899.
126 Bijlage XX, "Padi-beplantingen op de Particuliere Landerijen in Java van 
het Jaar 1899", Koloniaal Verslag, 1900.
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Buitenzorg region were mostly owned by Europeans, 
cultivating for European markets in tea, coffee, cinchona 
and later rubber.
By the 1910s, sugar and indigo were no longer cultivated 
in Tangerang, leaving the whole area for rice. In 1913, the 
area given over to rice increased to 295,741 bouw s , 
yielding 5,782,331 picols.127 A further report of 1918-1919  
notes new agricultural products on the Tangerang and 
Meester-Cornelis private lands belonging to Chinese, 
cassava, coconuts and corn.128
The fact that the crops on Chinese private lands were for 
dom estic consumption suggests B atavia's self- 
s u ff ic ie n c y .129 In addition we can see the Chinese 
contribution to Batavia's local economy, in the private lands 
located in the western district of Tangerang and in the 
eastern district of Meester-Cornelis, owned and managed by 
Chinese.
The medium-scale cultivation of these lands required 
more labour than the large plantations of the Europeans. 
This may explain the greater number of native inhabitants 
there compared to those living on the European private lands 
in the southern and further eastern areas of the residency. 
The Dutch local authorities observed that the natives 
preferred to settle on private lands belonging to the 
C h in e s e .130 This situation was, of course, most 
unacceptable to Dutch officials, and fear of Chinese 
penetration into the native village economy grew.
127 Bijlage NN, "Opgave Betreffende de Particuliere Landerijen op Java en de 
Huurlanden in Soerakarta en Djokjakarta over 1912 en 1913", Koloniaal 
Verslag, 1914.
128 Bijlage CC, "Opgave Betreffende de Particuliere Landerijen op Java en de 
Huurlanden in Soerakarta en Djokjakarta over 1918 en 1919", Koloniaal 
Verslag, 1920.
129 See "Algemeen Verslag van het Zuider en Ooster Kwartier der 
Ommelanden van Batavia over 1860", in Residentie Archieven, no. 55, Pasar 
Ikan Collection, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
130 See "Bijdrage voor het Politiek Verslag der Residentie Batavia over 
1871, Afdeeling Tangerang", in Batavia, no. 357 /1 ; and also "Politiek 
Verslag van het Jaar 1870, Afdeeling Tangerang", in Tangerang, no. 133/5; 
and Gouvernementsbesluit, 27 December 1846, no. 7.
240
Many Dutch suspected that as the practice of revenue- 
farming spread, the Chinese used usury to lead the natives 
into ever increasing debt. Unpaid debts would later become 
the obvious way in which native land was disposed to the 
Chinese,131 and this could explain why Chinese private lands 
mostly comprised smaller plots. In addition, their limited 
financial capacity would restrict them to smaller plots of 
land.
In the implementation of colonial policy, the Dutch 
probably realized that the gap between European ruler and 
native ruled was too wide to bridge.132 The Chinese, for a 
variety of reasons, were therefore an indispensable element 
in the relationship between ruler and ruled. Yet, however 
much the Dutch needed the Chinese to deal with the native 
majority, fear and dependency meant that the Chinese could 
never be more than scapegoats. The Dutch argued that it was 
the Chinese who had ruined native welfare; it was the 
Chinese, as revenue-farmers, who were the bloodsuckers of 
the Javanese. However, the Dutch did admit that Chinese 
landowners were more flexible than Europeans in dealing 
with native tenants.
The Resident of Batavia noted differences between the 
two types of landlord. He observed that Europeans were 
stric tly  law-abiding when it came to the legal 
arrangements between landowners and native tenants, under 
the 1836 Government Regulations which concerned the 
private lands located on the western bank of the Cimanuk 
river. They also kept their distance from their native 
tenants, an attitude which gave the native majority an 
uncomfortable feeling of inferiority.
Unlike the Europeans, Chinese landlords were rather 
indulgent in dealing with their native tenants. They tended 
to accommodate the domestic needs of their tenants;133 it 
was common practice for Chinese landlords to loan money
131 "De Chineezen in de Ommelanden van Batavia", TNI, vol. II, 1855, pp. 
416-417.
132 See Verbaal, 22 March 1862, no. 15/311 , ARA, The Hague.
133 Mentioned in Gouvernementsbesluit, 27 December 1846, no. 7; also in 
Batavia, no.357/1.
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to their native tenants when necessary. Unfortunately, 
native ignorance of, and weakness in, financial management 
meant that ever-increasing loans led to continual debt, and 
in this way Chinese landownership gradually expanded. It 
was also noted th a t Chinese landlords were less 
demanding134 because private lands depended heavily on 
native labour.
We can also see a divergent attitude between landlords 
with respect to labour, particularly slavery which was still 
practiced during the first-half of the nineteenth century. 
For European landlords, the possession of slaves was a 
means of displaying their wealthy status. Amazed with the 
exotic life of the Eastern colony, most rich European 
families indulged themselves by collecting slaves for daily 
household services. On the other hand, slaves belonging to 
Chinese were put to work in sugar mills, arak distilleries 
and other profit-making employment. Female slaves of the 
Chinese were trained to be wayang dancers,135 as their 
masters held the w a y a n g p a c h t , or taxation for folk 
entertainment. European masters, on the other hand, 
preferred to have a domestic orchestra, comprising slave 
music players to en terta in  the ir guests; this 
slavenmuzietf3Q was, again, a symbol of wealthy status.
Observing the com paratively more agreeable  
circumstances of the natives on private lands belonging to 
the Chinese, the Dutch could hardly deny that their native 
subjects received better treatment there.137 Can it be said 
that the living condition of the native population on the 
European estates was in general bad in comparison to that
134 "Algemeen Verslag over de Afdeeling Tangerang in 1876", in Residentie 
Archieven, no. 47, Pasar Ikan Collection, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
135 Susan Abeyasekere, "Slaves in Batavia: Insights from a Slave Register", 
in A J S Reid (ed), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia 
(1983. New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 299.
136 F de Haan, Oud Batavia, p. 531; V I van de Wall, Indische Landhuizen en 
Hun Geschiedenis (1932. Batavia: G Kolff & Co), pp. 83-84.
137 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 27 December 1846, no. 7; Victor Purcell, 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 408; Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest 
Movements in Rural Java. A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieh Centuries (1973. Singapore: Oxford University Press), p. 
47.
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on the Chinese private lands?138 Both the Chinese 
agriculturists and native labourers peacefully coexisted on 
the private lands belonging to the Chinese. This was later 
shattered as both societies changed, particularly the 
native,139 due to the emerging nationalist movement in the 
second decade of the twentieth century.
The government regulation of 1836 concerning the private 
lands located on the western bank of the Cimanuk river 
formally ordered relations between landlords and their 
tenants, in respect of rights and obligations. This regulation 
codified long-established unwritten agreements.140
As a result of Daendels1 policy on public land sales, as 
early as 1809, a regulation was issued regarding semi- 
feudal rights exercised on private lands. It stated that the 
landlord was entitled to the delivery of tjoeke , which 
should not exceed 1 /5  of the rice produced; pajeg was paid 
in kind, i.e., 1 /5  of non-rice produced. Labour service for the 
landlord, called kerja kompenian; all male inhabitants 
between the ages of 14 and 60 were liable for one dayfs 
service a week, not to exceed 52 days in a year. Although in 
general, the so-called heerendiensten, or labour service for 
government, was unknown on these private lands, labour 
service for digging canals, building roads, bridges and other 
public works was arranged between the local authority and 
the land lo rd .141 Those who were liable for the 
heerendiensten could arrange a financial payment with the 
landlord. Many Chinese tenants tried to escape this forced 
obligation, particularly if the landlord was of a different 
race. This frequently gave rise to bad feelings, and to
138 d W van Welderen Rangers, The Failure o f a Liberal Colonial Policy; 
Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1830  (1947. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 
p. 138.
139 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, November 1915", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. V, 1916, p. 230; see also Chapter V.
140 E van Delde, De Particuliere Landerijen op Java (1911. Leiden: S C van 
Doesburgh), p. 93.
141 Ibid., pp. 42-43; for the practices of this arrangement, see Schepenen, 
no. 115.
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proceedings in the Landraad. 142 The inhabitants of private 
lands were excused from the land rent introduced by 
Raffles. Yet, the pajeg, which means taxation, was paid to 
the landowner in place of the land rent.
Because the Cultivation System was mostly unknown in 
the private lands, the heerendiensten became more common 
th e re . This was because cultivation on the private 
properties relied upon tenant labour, and the once-weekly 
service of heerendiensten  could be used to increase 
cultivation for European markets.143 In some cases, this 
abuse led to rural protest and unrest.
As native inhabitants were better treated on the private 
lands belonging to Chinese, while cultivation on European 
private lands concentrated on production for European 
markets, most peasant uprisings occurred in the eastern and 
southern regions of the Batavia Residency. In 1864 there 
was unrest in Pondok Gedeh as a result of abuse of the 
cuituurdiensten. A notorious case was the 'T jiom as-zaak' 
of 1886, when exploitation greatly increased under the 
ownership of de Sturler.144
The oppression and exploitation of the natives on the 
private lands had been public knowledge for some time. With 
the Ciomas affair, the Dutch set up a committee to 
investigate. The Ciomas case marked the first move by the 
Dutch government to repurchase private lands. This took 
place in 1887, a year after the uprising, when the Ciomas 
land was returned to the government. The second phase of 
private land repurchase took place in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. I will discuss this later.
The description above has provided the historical 
background to Chinese landownership and the relationship 
between Chinese landlords and their native inhabitants or
142 See, for example, the case of eleven Chinese residents in Bazaar 
Tangerang who tricked an Arab landlord in avoiding the kerdja kompenian in 
July 1897; see Tangerang, no. 150/14.
143 E van Delde, De Particuliere Landerijen op Java, p. 53.
144 "Onlusten op het Particuliere Land Tjiomas (Buitenzorg)in 1886", De 
Indische Gids, vol. II, 1886, p. 941; see also Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest 
Movements in Rural Java, p. 26.
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tenants. Attention is now directed towards the position of 
various Chinese officers as landowners, and the extent to 
which this affected their official position. Not only was the 
status of landlord required for official candidacy, but the 
location of private lands might be taken into consideration 
in granting an officership. This was particularly the case 
for posts on the outskirts of Batavia.
One case showed how a majorship was won by a candidate 
who did not become involved in private land transactions. 
Another petty case, concerning the lease of a small plot 
belonging to a Chinese captain, led to his downfall. My 
research indicates that the private lands of most Chinese 
officers were located in the western district of Tangerang. 
Tangerang was practically a Chinese private domain.
The first to be noted here was Tan Eng Goan, the first 
Chinese major of Batavia, who owned the lands of Kramat, 
Kapuk, Tanjung Burung and Rawa Kidang. Kramat and Kapuk 
were later purchased by his successor, major Tan Tjoen 
Tiat, for by the 1860s Tan Eng Goan was almost financially 
ruined. Major Tan Tjoen Tiat (1 8 6 5 -1 8 79 ) also owned an 
area called Pasir Putih. Kramat was later bought by Be 
Biauw Tjoan,145 and this was presumably managed by his 
son-in-law, lieutenant Liem Goan Sioe.
Captain Lie Tjoe Tjiang owned the lands of Sepatan, 
Karang Serang Laut, Karang Serang Dalam and Rajeg.146 
Lieutenant Tan Boen Peng, whose candidacy for captainship 
in 1877 was rejected by the Director of Home Affairs and 
the Resident of Batavia but endorsed by the Director of 
Finance,147 was the owner of various lands: Bojong Renget, 
Pangkalan, de Qual (presently known as Pesing) and 
Tegalangus. The well-known titular lieutenant, Souw Siauw 
Tjong, who graciously declined the position of active 
service officer, possessed the lands of Parungkuda,
145 See "Staat der Partikuliere Landerijen in 1879", Regeeringsalmanak 
voor Nederlandsch-lndie, 1880, p. 356.
146 Ibid.; see also letter of the Assistant-Resident of Tangerang to Resident of 
Batavia, 14 October 1877, no. Litt. A.M.IV, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 12 
December 1877, no.21.
147 See Chapter III, particularly p. 94.
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Kedaung-East and Ketapang, where he opened primary 
schools for the children of his native tenants.148
These were the landowners who experienced no problems 
concerning their officership. But there were cases in which 
the position of the Chinese officer led him into personal 
difficulties, as the Dutch unwisely took this into serious 
consideration. It is possible to see this in operation in the 
placement of Chinese officers in the western division in 
Tangerang. Of the many regions of the Batavia area, 
Tangerang had the largest Chinese population. In 1888 it 
numbered about 27,996 persons, dispersed throughout the 
three districts of Tangerang, Balaraja and Mauk. The 
division usually had one captain and one lieutenant posted in 
the city of Tangerang, and another two lieutenants for the 
districts of Balaraja and Mauk.
On one occasion, when the lieutenant of Mauk retired, it 
was found difficult to find a successor. This was due to a 
scarcity of properly qualified on acceptable candidates. The 
Dutch persisted in their stipulation that candidates should 
have a good financial standing, meaning that they were 
wealthy merchants or landlords. It was not easy to find 
leading Chinese merchants residing in a small city like 
Tangerang, since most of them preferred to live in Batavia. 
The problem was compounded by the fact that despite their 
huge landownings in the area, most Chinese landlords did 
not reside in Tangerang.149 Those who did settle in the city 
had either been in service or were retired. To the Resident 
of Batavia, the only likely candidate was lieutenant Nie Ek 
Tjiang, who was then posted in Batavia's southern district 
of Kebayoran. The Resident put forward his name because 
Nie Ek Tjiang was familiar with the region; he was formerly 
the leasee of various lands there. Nie Ek Tjiang told the 
Assistant-Resident of Tangerang of his intention to be 
posted to the city, although he did not refer to the district
148 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to the Inspector of Native Education, 2 
April 1877, no. 719, in Batavia, no. 352 /3 , Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
149 Confidential letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 15 
May 1888, no. La.F.2, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 19 June 1888, no. 7.
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of Mauk.150 In January 1888, Nie Ek Tjiang was transferred 
from his post in Kebayoran to Tangerang.
During his eleven year term of office in Tangerang, Nie Ek 
Tjiang was very popular among the Chinese community. 
Indeed, various letters signed by members of the Chinese 
community were sent to Batavia proposing that he should be 
promoted to captain instead of captain Oey Giok Koen of 
Meester-Cornelis, who was to  be transferred to  
T a n g e r a n g .151 Due to the inaccessibility of the 
correspondence, I was unable to discover the objections to 
Nie Ek Tjiang's promotion to captain. But he was passed 
over, and Oey Giok Koen was installed as captain in 
Tangerang in July 1899. Oey Giok Koen was the owner of the 
land of Pasar Baru in Tangerang, which previously had been 
leased to Nie Ek Tjiang.152
It is quite likely that Oey Giok Koen was unhappy with his 
post in Tangerang. His residence and family were 
established in Meester-Cornelis but to commute between 
the two in those days was obviously unlikely. Being a 
landowner in Tangerang would not necessarily mean that he 
wished to reside in that area, yet this was required for 
Chinese officers. After an eight year term Oey Giok Koen 
sought for retirement,153 which was granted in November 
1907.
It is interesting to observe that his successor, Oey Djie 
San, began his career as a captain without having held the 
post of lieutenant. This was rather exceptional, since 
captains were generally selected from among the lower 
ranks, such as lieutenant. I suspect that this unusual 
appointment was due either to the scarcity of Chinese 
landlords in the Tangerang area or to the limited 
availability of Batavian officers in active service.
150 Ibid.
151 Those letters are kept in Gouvernementsbesluit, 2 July 1899, no. 22; 
see also Tangerang, no. 150/15.
152 Ibid.] see also "Staat der Partikuliere Landerijen in 1879", 
Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch-lndie, 1880, p. 355.
153 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 16 March 1907, 
no. 105, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 1 November 1907, no. 7.
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Despite his status as a private person with no experience 
of lieutenantship, Oey Djie San came from a family of 
Chinese officers as far back as his great-grandfather. He 
was director of the private estate of Karawaci-Cilongok, 
where he resided. He was admired for his Dutch education 
and fluency in the language.154
Thus we observe how Dutch principles regarding the 
Chinese officers kept in line with economic interests. 
Tangerang was unable to provide candidates who were 
either well-off merchants or landlords. This resulted, as we 
have seen, in the posting to Tangerang of a Chinese officer 
whose family residence was elsewhere, thereby creating 
extreme inconvenience. Furthermore, similar reasoning was 
behind the appointment of Oey Djie San, which again broke 
with the convention that a captain should be selected from 
among the available Chinese lieutenants.
Another case concerns Tio Tek Ho who gained his 
majorship because he disassociated himself from a dispute 
over land transactions between members of the Chinese 
Council. There was some embarrassment among the officers 
regarding the Chinese Council's decision to purchase lands 
belonging to major Lie Tjoe Hong. The major, appointed in 
February 1879 and the third to hold his post in Batavia, 
owned much land spread over the western and eastern 
districts: Pesing, Jelambar, Asem, Cakung, Jengati and 
Pasilian. As the major was not engaged in revenue-farming 
or local trading, his financial resources came mainly from 
his landownership. During his term of office he sometimes 
insisted that the Chinese Council buy parts of his land. The 
Chinese Council already owned land and had no need to 
purchase more. Major Lie Tjoe Hong's insistence created a 
difficult situation for the lower ranking members. 
However, as the major was also the chairman of the 
Council, it was unlikely that the other officers would dare 
to reject his proposals. The only member of the Chinese 
Council who managed to disengage himself from these 
frequent embarrassing situations was captain Tio Tek Ho,
154 Ibid.
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and this behaviour gave him credit in the eyes of the 
Batavia’s authorities.155 In August 1896 major Lie Tjoe 
Hong died. He and the first major, Tan Eng Goan, were noted 
for their poor performance in the management of Chinese 
affairs, and the administration of the Chinese Council. As 
the Dutch wanted to avoid the bad influence of the late 
major, the new major should be someone who was free from 
the spell of major Lie Tjoe Hong.156 The choice thus fell on 
captain Tio Tek Ho, who was promoted to major on 22 
September 1896.
Unfortunately, Tio Tek Ho was a rather weak organizer, 
and in the final days of his term of office he was plunged 
into an embarrassing dispute concerning mismanagement of 
the Chinese Council funds. He became seriously ill and died 
in January 1906.
However, none of the cases above can compare with that 
of captain Oey Ek Kiam, who became a victim of Dutch 
arrogance and injustice. Oey Ek Kiam, a captain in Meester- 
Cornelis, began his officership as a lieutenant in 1880. 
Before that he had been a revenue farmer for Chinese and 
Javanese tobacco.157 He was also engaged in opium farming, 
and during the 1879 trial of lieutenant Liem Goan Sioe 
concerning illicit opium trading, allegations had been made 
against Oey Ek Kiam. The Dutch records on this case are 
unavailable, but it is safe to say that Oey Ek Kiam managed 
to clear his name.
Oey Ek Kiam owned the lands of Tanah Rendah and 
Manggarai, located in the eastern division of Meester- 
Cornelis.158 One day he was approached by a certain Lim Kim 
Soey who wanted to lease a plot of his land located opposite 
the military school in Manggarai. Oey Ek Kiam replied that 
he needed that plot for his own use but offered Lim Kim
155 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 20 August 1896, 
no. 106, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 September 1896, no. 33.
156 See Agenda, nos. 800 /1896 , 805 /1896 , in Gouvernementsbesluit, 22 
September 1896, no. 33.
157 See "Politiek Verslag van de Residentie Batavia van het Jaar 1871", in 
Batavia, no. 18.
158 See "Staat der Partikuliere Landerijen in 1879", Regeeringsalmanak 
voor Nederlandsch-lndie, 1880, p. 351.
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Soey a piece of land in the backyard of the nearby military 
camp. Lim could store there the goods and supplies he 
needed for military use. Another option was an empty lot 
next to a Chinese shop in Solitude Street, which could be 
rented by Lim for 1 5 guilders a month. However, they were 
unable to obtain official consent for the transaction from 
the Assistant-Resident of Meester-Cornelis. Lim Kim Soey 
came back to Oey Ek Kiam, inquiring about the lot in the 
military camp, saying that he had already approached the 
Military Commissioner who had agreed to rent it if the local 
authorities in Meester-Cornelis had no objection. Again the 
Assistant-Resident would not give consent. According to a 
spokesman from his office, the Assistant-Resident 
mentioned a plot near a corn field for which consent would 
be given. After checking this plot, Lim Kim Soey decided to 
rent an empty lot near the river, next to the brick field, and 
this was agreed by the Assistant-Resident. But Oey Ek Kiam 
could not let the plot as it was used for his own storage. 
Moreover, his family often went to the brick field, and it 
would cause them inconvenience, particularly the female 
members, as this nearby plot would be used as a military 
warehouse and there would therefore be many soldiers in 
the area. Oey Ek Kiam did not object to letting the empty lot 
near the corn field; this was not accepted by the Assistant- 
Resident. Another plot was also rejected.
On 9 December 1892 Oey Ek Kiam was called to meet the 
Assistant-Resident at his office. The Dutch official 
reprimanded Oey by asking, "do you not want to give your 
plot to be rented?" Oey Ek Kiam said that he did, but that he, 
the Assistant-Resident, had rejected every location and 
would not give his official consent. As a row became 
inevitable, the Assistant-Resident furiously scolded Oey Ek 
Kiam, warning him that the Chinese captain was under his 
command. Oey Ek Kiam indignantly answered that he knew he 
was under the command of the Dutch Assistant-Resident. 
But since the Assistant-Resident then accused him of being 
uncooperative, Oey Ek Kiam answered, "Apa saja mesti toetoep 
moeloet saja tida boleh menja'oet?" [should I shut my mouth and may
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not answer you?] He added that if the Assistant-Resident so 
disliked him, he would apply to be released from his 
position as Chinese captain, so that "....t/'da oesa Kandjeng Toean 
bikin begitoe mara sama saja seperti satoe koelie...."^59 [you will not 
need to be so furious with me as if I was a servant.]
It goes without saying that this row became a major 
talking point among Dutch officials. To the Advisor for 
Chinese Affairs, Oey Ek Kiam's attitude was quite 
understandable, since in an official relationship in which a 
Chinese officer was subordinate to a Dutch official it would 
be foolish for the Chinese to rebuke his superior.160 Oey Ek 
Kiam highly valued his self-esteem, and his response would 
not have been so indignant had he not been provoked. On 
examining the one-sided report made by the Chinese captain 
(the Dutch Assistant-Resident did not care to elaborate) the 
Advisor for Chinese Affairs saw that it would be difficult 
to achieve an acceptable outcome.161 In the meantime, the 
Assistant-Resident continued to defend what he had said in 
an earlier report to his superior, the Resident of Batavia, 
that the Chinese captain had answered him in a high-pitched 
voice, shouting and using ugly expressions.162
Although the Advisor for Chinese Affairs showed his 
approval of Oey Ek Kiam's dignified courage, discussion of 
the case among Dutch officials concentrated on the question 
of behaviour. Meanwhile the main point in question, granting 
permission to lease land and the bureaucratic arrogance of 
the Dutch Assistant-Resident, was put aside. It was clear 
that the Dutch officials saw in Oey Ek Kiam's case an 
offence against the prestige of Dutch officials. They agreed 
to sack him. Conventionally, the official retirement of a 
Chinese officer was expressed as an honourable discharge, 
or eervol ontslag; but Oey Ek Kiam would receive his
159 Letter of Oey Ek Kiam written in Malay, 24 January 1893, in 
Gouvernementsbesluit, 3 March 1893, no. 36.
160 Letter of the Honorary Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 
27 January 1893, no. 1, in Gouvernementsbesluit, 3 March 1893, no. 36.
161 Letter of the Honorary Advisor for Chinese Affairs, 10 May 1893, in 
confidential Agenda, no. 506 /1893.
162 See his letter to the Resident of Batavia, 30 April 1893, no.La.P.III, in 
confidential Agenda, no. 506 /1893.
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retirement as 'ontslag niet eervo/1,163 discharged without 
honour.
According to the Advisor for Chinese Affairs, it would be 
easier for Meester-Cornelis to find a Dutch Assistant- 
Resident than a good Chinese captain.164 Yet the damage was 
done and Oey Ek Kiam was granted a discharge but with 
honour in March 1893. It should be noted that the Dutch 
Assistant-Resident was not popular among the people of 
Meester-Cornelis. He was notoriously rude, and his ill- 
behaviour matched his unfair legal rulings. It was said that 
he collected monkeys to harm people, and used these 
animals as a means of punishment. One of many complaints 
called him a madman who had become a figure of authority, 
[satoe orang kapala miring boeat djadie kapala neger/].165
However, Oey Ek Kiam’s official career was not brought to 
an end by his retirement from the Chinese officership. A 
few months later, in August 1893, he was offered the 
position of advisor to the Dutch government in establishing 
the opium-regie, as opium farming was to be replaced by a 
state monopoly.166 This explains my argument that the 
allegations against Oey Ek Kiam brought out during the 1879 
opium trial were unfounded. This was widely seen as a 
rehabilitation, as some Dutch officials admitted that Oey Ek 
Kiam had been unfairly treated.167
163 Letter of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 17 
December 1892, no. 7; and Agenda , 22 February 1893, no. 121, in 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 March 1893, no. 36.
164 Letter of the Honorary Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 
27 January 1893, no. 1, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 3 March 1893, no. 36.
165 A native letter, dated 19 March 1893, and other complaints, kept in 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 24 August 1893, no.6.
166 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 24 August 1893, no. 6.
167 Letters of Chief Inspector for Opium Affairs, 3 August 1893, no. 15462; 
of the Vice-President of the Indies Council, 6 August 1893, to Governor- 
General, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 24 August 1893, no. 6.
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Dutch Policy of Private Land Repurchase
In the previous sub-chapter, I suggested that the first phase 
in private land repurchase took place in 1887, as a solution 
to the Ciomas case. This was not the first step.
As early as 1819, a few years after the colony was 
returned to the Dutch, Governor-General Van der Capellen 
set up an investigation into social conditions on the private 
lands. Its conclusion did not favour the landlords,168 and 
eventually a plan to repurchase the private lands was 
forwarded to the Ministry of the Colonies.
Van der Capellen's plan was probably intended to address 
the situation of the private lands located in the Preanger 
and Krawang areas. Large areas in those regions had been 
sold during Raffles' time, large-scale cultivation being 
developed there. This private agriculture was managed by 
British shareholders and conformed with the forced 
cultivations of the Preanger-cultuur system imposed by the 
Dutch government. Undoubtedly it was irksome to the Dutch 
that these plantations were in non-Dutch ownership, 
especially as they constituted the largest portion, in terms 
of area and production, of the private lands on Java.
The largest of these were the Pamanukan and Ciasem 
lands located in Krawang, which covered an area of 300,000  
bouws. British shareholders also owned the lands of 
Nanggung in Buitenzorg, Kandanghaur and Indramayu-West in 
Cirebon, while the land of Jasinga in Buitenzorg belonged to 
French. In the early years of the twentieth century, the 
Dutch government launched the idea of repurchasing these 
private lands in order to curb the expansion of non-Dutch 
interest in the colony.
Van der Capellen's initial plan, implemented in 1821, 
faced difficulties particularly in Sukabumi, an area located 
between the Buitenzorg and Preanger regions. It had been 
bought in 1813 by Raffles, MacQuoid, N Egelhard and A de 
Wilde. This matter became notorious when Colonel Gillespie
168 H T Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis (1926 . 's Gravenhage: 
Martinus Nijhoff), vol. Ill, p. 160.
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used the land purchase in a personal attack on Raffles 
during a legal dispute. The case lasted for three years, and 
the Dutch government offered 800,000 guilders to regain 
the land.169
The following years did not see any further advance in the 
private land repurchasing plan. The attitude of the next 
Governor-General was quite different, and he even sold the 
lands of Cikandi Udik and Cikande llir in Bantam in 1828 and 
1829. It was said that these were the last public land sales, 
the Cikande area being in addition the only private domain in 
the Bantam residency.
J van den Bosch, the mastermind of the Cultivation 
System, endeavoured to bring an end to private land sales. In 
1831 he set up an investigation into the p a rtic u lire  
landerijen. Its report, completed in 1835, became the basis 
of a government regulation issued the following year 
concerning the private lands located on the west bank of the 
Cimanuk river. The greatest area of private land in Java as 
in the Batavia, Buitenzorg and Krawang regions, located on 
the west bank of the Cimanuk river; the private domains in 
the Cirebon and Semarang areas, and further into east Java 
were far fewer. The Cimanuk river, which lies between 
Krawang and Cirebon, was the geographical boundary 
between these areas.
The regulation of 1836 concentrated on the arrangement 
of the private lands on the west bank of the Cimanuk. It set 
out the conditions to be met by landlords and tenants, and 
mainly dealt with the rights for cultivation. Moreover, it 
said that the landlords1 tithe should not exceed 1 /5  of the 
agricultural produce and 1 /5  of rice, 52 days a year of 
labour service for the landlord and 52 days for the 
government. It further regulated the landlords* obligation 
for ground and income taxes.170 Many saw this legal 
arrangement as simply a codification of the unwritten
169 £ S de Klerck, History o f the Netherlands East Indies (1938. Rotterdam: 
W L & J Brusse), vol. II, p. 126.
170 E van Delde, De Particuliere Landerijen op Java, p. 48.
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agreements that had existed between landlords and tenants 
since the time of Daendels.171
Public opinion generally regarded socio-economic 
conditions on the private lands as poor, due to the harsh 
burdens imposed on its inhabitants, who were mainly 
indigenous. Most Dutch officials blamed the excessive semi- 
seigneurial rights practiced by landlords, over which there 
was little government control. Peasant unrest in 1886 on 
the Ciomas private lands seemed to justify this view. It 
was reported that the imposition of tjoeke and pajeg by a 
landlord who wanted to intensify production became 
unbearable for the poor tenants. Despite some accounts 
defending the landlord,172 the case convinced the Dutch that 
they should proceed with the repurchase of the land, and the 
Ciomas estate was returned to the government in 1887.
It should be noted that despite prohibiting land sales to 
non-natives, the Agrarian Law of 1870 permitted long lease 
tenure of 75 years. Consequently the expanding agricultural 
industry was hardly hindered; indeed, the numbers of 
western plantations increased.
An official report showed that in 1898 there were 75 
private lands under the management of private agricultural 
enterprise, covering an area of 829,929 bouws.173 The 
largest, conspicuously located in the Krawang region, as the 
lands of Pamanukan and Ciasem, owned by Anglo-Dutch 
Plantations of Java Ltd.174 It was said that the 300,000  
bouw plantation owned by the British consortium  
represented one-fourth of the total private land on Java. It 
produced coffee, tea, rubber, cinchona, pepper and palm 
sugar, mainly for European markets. The other big private
171 lbid.t p. 93
172 "Onlusten op het Particuliere Land Tjiomas (Buitenzorg) in 1886", De 
Indische Gids, vol. II, p. 1886, pp. 941-942.
173 Bijlage YY, "Opgave Betreffende de Particuliere Landerijen op Java van 
het Jaar 1898", Koloniaal Verslag, 1899. Before 1890, those private 
agricultural enterprises, or cultuur maatschappijen, were not included in 
the report.
174 Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. Ill, p. 275; E van Delde, De 
Particuliere Landerijen op Java, p. 15.
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land, whose shareholders were also British, was Nanggung 
in Buitenzorg, which concentrated on tea cultivation.
By 1909, when the private land domains held by Europeans 
were diminishing, the number of private agricultural 
enterprises was, surprisingly, growing. There were 171 
companies with an area of 1,208,844 bouws. Significantly, 
these companies were concentrated in the Batavia 
residency, which in the early part of the twentieth century 
included Buitenzorg and Krawang.175
During the 1910s the Dutch government implemented its 
policy of repurchasing these private lands, particularly 
those belonging to non-Dutch shareholders. However, by 
1919 the numbers were still impressive. Of the total of 138 
agricultural enterprises in Java, 127 were located in 
Batavia residency. The total number of private lands in 
Batavia in 1919 was still an impressive 311, compared to 
the 465 in 1909.175
We must assume that transactions between existing 
owners were not affected by the 1870 Agrarian Law. L. 
Suryadinata notes on the landlord status enjoyed by 
HHKan,177 the prominent peranakan leader who kept his seat 
on the People’s Council for the whole period 1918-1942 may 
be useful here. The Agrarian Law of 1870 did not affect the 
status of private landownership in Batavia; therefore 
HHKan’s status as a landlord in Batavia reflected the 
peculiar situation found there.
In 1890 another government investigation was carried out 
into the private lands, within the framework of a survey 
into the welfare of the native population. The results were 
not to the Dutch government's liking, and a new regulation 
was issued in 1912, based on a 1902 report.
From this report, it seems that the Dutch government 
could find no better way to improve native welfare than to 
reduce private landownership. The only solution was
175 Bijlage MM, Koloniaal Verslag, 1900.
175 Bijlage CC, Koloniaal Verslag, 1920; Bijlage MM, Koloniaal Verslag,
1910.
1 77 L Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China 
(1986. 2nd edition. Singapore: Heinemann Asia), p. 99, footnote 37.
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repurchase or expropriation. So the issue of the 1912  
regulation concerning private lands meant reinforcement of 
the plan for terugkoop , repurchasing, and onteigening, 
expropriation. The argument was that although the 1870  
Agrarian Law could prevent non-natives from becoming new 
landowners, it was powerless to deal with existing private 
landownership. In addition, Dutch fear of growing European 
agricultural industries, particularly those owned by British 
shareholders, encouraged repurchase and expropriation. 
Rivalry between European capitalists in exploiting the 
colony meant that the issue of private land domain became a 
pressing problem.178 Considering the amount of capital 
invested - the Pamanukan and Ciasem lands had a turnover 
of just under 18 million guilders - the non-Dutch private 
estates could well be seen as a threat by the Dutch.179 They 
were even considered a threat to public security, since the 
performance of local officials in dealing with the 
management of private lands was far from adequate.180
The initial step taken by the Dutch to repurchase private 
lands was directed at plantations owned by British 
consortia. The private land of Nanggung in Buitenzorg was 
repurchased in 1906; Kandanghaur and Indramayu-West in 
Cirebon followed in 1910. The largest, the Pamanukan and 
Ciasem lands, were returned to government domain in 1918. 
These were the main large private lands in Java, for which 
the Dutch government paid 26 0 ,0 0 0 , 3 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  and 
17,000,000 guilders respectively.181
The expansion of British-owned agricultural industries on 
private lands justified Dutch fears. Favourable reports on 
the welfare of the indigenous population did not accord with
178 F Fokkens, "De Beteekenis van den Terugkoop der Particuliere Landen op 
Java", De Nederlanders, nos. 5272-5275, p. 2.
179 H T Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, vol. Ill, p. 162; E van Delde,
De Particuliere Landerijen op Java, p. 15; "Partikuliere Landen in Handen 
van Vreemdelingen", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1910, p. 228.
180 "Partikuliere Landerijen en de Openbare Veiligheid in de Residentie 
Batavia", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1904, pp. 1078-1079; "De Partikuliere 
Landerijen in en om Batavia", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p.
804.
181 L van der Hoek, "De Particuliere Landerijen in de Residentie Batavia", 
pp. 59-60.
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public opinion which suspected that there were dangers in 
the domination of Chinese landownership. The 1902  
Committee on the Economic Condition of the Native 
Population in Java and Madura, chaired by Mr C Th van 
Deventer, did not discover sufficient evidence to support 
the allegations of Chinese domination and maltreatment of 
natives on private lands. Despite the fact that most 
previous investigations into the private lands on Java had 
indicated the poor condition of the indigenous population 
living there, the Van Deventer Committee claimed that in 
general that conclusion was incorrect.182 It was said that 
there were many good landlords, and this was, of course, 
true. The report also argued that there was no evidence to 
support the view that native welfare on government lands 
was better than that on private lands.183
In Batavia itself, it was reported that in 1901 the natives 
had secured a loan of 13,000 guilders from the Bataviasche 
Landbouwcredietbank, on condition that it was guaranteed 
by their landlords. This demonstrated that many landlords 
assumed responsibility for their tenants1 good. Another 
argument was that the growing number of retail-trading 
houses for imported goods in Batavia did not indicate that 
native purchasing power was declining. Another pertinent 
point was that Batavia residency, despite the fact that it 
comprised mainly private lands, never experienced a 
shortage of food,184 let alone famine.
It therefore seemed that the Chinese would escape being 
the only scapegoat, despite their domination of private 
landownership in Batavia residency. This did not mean that 
the Chinese were suddenly paragons of virtue in the eyes of 
the Dutch. Colonial prejudice was still there. It meant that 
in terms of foreign landownership in the colony, the threat
182 C Th van Deventer, Overzicht van den Economischen Toestand der 
Inlandsche Bevolking van Java en Madoera (1904. 's Gravenhage: Martinus 
Nijhoff), p. 128.
183 Ibid.
184 "Particuliere Landerijen en de Openbare Veiligheid in de Residentie 
Batavia", pp. 1074-1075.
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was coming not from the Chinese but from Europeans. This 
reduced public criticism of the Chinese.
The government plan to repurchase private lands in the 
vicinity of Batavia, that is Tangerang and Meester-Cornelis, 
was primarily moved by the idea of progress. These lands 
were to be returned to the government domain in order to 
facilitate city development, where space was needed for 
transportation networks, railways, roads, bridges and an 
irrigation system.185
As a substantial part of the private lands in the Batavia 
area belonged to Chinese and comprised small lots of land, 
repurchasing proceeded gradually. From 1912 to 1918, an 
area of 78,416 bouws was returned to the government 
domain. In 1919, a significant repurchase claimed 224,389  
bouws of Batavia’s private lands.186 By 1930 the Dutch 
government had spent 81,334,489 guilders in the repurchase 
of 911,140 bouws of private lands.187 Now government 
land, the inhabitants were liable for taxes: land rent, 
income tax and capitation tax, which was paid in place of 
the former labour service, or heerendiensten.
Due to financial restrictions in the years 1931 to 1935, 
land repurchasing was postponed. The Dutch government set 
up a semi-official body in 1935, the Javasche Particuliere 
Landerijen Maatscahppij, 188 or the Java Private Lands 
Company Ltd, to take responsibility for repurchasing land.
The transfer of private lands to government ownership 
came to pose some administrative difficulties for the local 
authorities of Batavia. Under private landownership, the 
landlords had selected village headmen to supervise local 
administration. The landlord took care of the salaries of the 
village headmen. The Batavia local authority, whether the
185 J D Hunger, "Memorie van Overgave van het Bestuur over het Gewest
Batavia, 3 Maart 1922", ARA, The Hague; L van der Hoek, "De Particuliere
Landerijen in de Residentie Batavia", p. 60; Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch- 
Indie, vol. Ill, p. 348.
186 Koloniaal Verslag, 1920, p. 51.
187 Indisch Verslag, 1931, vol. I, p. 403.
188 Indisch Verslag, 1936, vol. I, p. 329.
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Assistant-Resident of Tangerang or of Meester-Cornelis, 
simply approved the appointment of village headmen.189
After 1905, the administration of the main cities on Java 
became municipal in form: city administration was arranged 
under the wijkenbestuur, or administration of a particular 
neighbourhood. In line with these reforms, it was proposed 
that the landlord’s privilege in selecting his own headman 
should be changed to avoid conflict with the politioneel 
macht, or police responsibility for headman in the private 
lands. The Resident of Batavia suggested terminating this 
privilege, and this was agreed by a Decree of 21 November 
1914, no. 17.
Nevertheless, there was still a problem with the practice 
of w i j k e n b e s t u u r  in the private lands. While the 
wijkenbestuur  was in place in the main towns of the 
residency, the surrounding villages were administered under 
the desa-bestuur, or village administration. The difficulties 
faced in the d e s a - b e s t u u r  were mostly due to the 
authorities’ poor knowledge of its organization, particularly 
on the part of the indigenous officials. The Resident 
compared the situation in his area with that in Preanger. He 
said that the Preanger region had been familiar with the 
desa-bestuur for 50 years, and was served by a better 
transportation and communication network.190 For the 
Resident of Batavia, the return of private lands to the 
government meant additional work for his undermanned 
office, which would now have responsibility for tax 
inspection, agricultural surveillance, transportation  
maintenance, irrigation supervision and many other 
duties.191
A sudden political change in the colony postponed the 
completion of private land repurchasing. The war in Europe 
followed by the Japanese occupation of the East Indies left
189 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 2 September 
1913, no. 17222/10, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 21 November 1914, no. 
17.
190 P de Roo de la Faille, "Memorie van Overgave bij de Nederlegging van het 
Bestuur over het Gewest Batavia, op 3 Februari 1919", ARA, The Hague.
191 Ibid.
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no room for that economic measure. The turbulent period of 
the Indonesian Revolution (19 45 -1949 ) was not conducive 
to reform. In 1953, the new Republic took a radical step to 
settle the question of private landownership. Law no. 9 of 
the 1953, Necessity to Return the Private Land Properties 
to the Government [Undang-Undang Tentang Pernjataan 
Perlunja Beberapa Tanah Partikulir Dikembalikan Mendjadi 
Tanah Negeri] involved the confiscation of Chinese private 
lands. This was a bitter end for the Chinese, considering the 
long history of their settlement in Batavia.
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7 THE END OF THE CHINESE OFFICERS
While the institution of the Chinese officers was a 
prominent feature of Indonesian colonial life, it was in 
reality weak and vaguely formulated.
The instituut de Chineesche Hoofden [institute of the 
Chinese Headmen] which formed the Chineesche Bestuur, or 
Chinese local administration, was dependent on relations 
between the Dutch government and the Chinese community. 
Any change on either side would affect the Chinese officers. 
As has been shown in various studies of the Chinese of Java, 
it is hard to deny the Chinese contribution to the 
development of the island during colonial times, amid the 
great changes within their own community. The changes 
that forced the Chinese to adapt to new situations were 
partly caused by the changing policies of the Dutch 
government, in economics, law and politics. Those changes 
also reflected the Chinese and the Dutch government's 
responses to influences from China.
The fact that the Chinese officers became the focus of 
attention in the early 1920s reflects the collision of the 
three parties - the peranakan, the Dutch, and the China- 
backed singkeh. The debate was mainly between the 
peranakan and the Dutch. However, singkeh interests, 
particularly political rivalry for Chinese leadership in the 
colony, inevitably invited Chinese government interference.
For almost twenty years, the Chinese officers institution 
was the subject of debate within Dutch government circles, 
the press and the Chinese public. It focused on the question 
of whether it should be allowed to continue.
The Heart of the Matter
The emergence of the modern Chinese movement in the early 
twentieth century raised many questions regarding Chinese
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in the colony. The movement accommodated Chinese notions 
of progress, self-consciousness, nationalism, through which 
they reviewed their relationship with the Dutch. The modern 
movement did not accept that the Chinese officers would fit 
into its plans. As one Chinese writer explained the 
institution was out of date, and did not reflect the spirit of 
the times, for "..../a ada satoe boentoet jang katinggalan dari Oost Indische 
Compagnie dan dari despotisme Tionghoa k o e n o [it was like a tail 
left from the VOC times and the despotism of ancient 
China.]
This comment should be viewed in the context of the 
changing economic policy of the Dutch. The early twentieth 
century saw the dependence of the Dutch colonial state on 
revenue-farming decrease. A further aspect of economic 
dependence came to an abrupt end in 1916, with the 
abolition of the passport and residence system imposed on 
the Chinese.
With regard to the legal systems, government plans for 
unification by 1918, in which the European judicial process 
would be applied to Chinese, made the Chinese officers even 
less relevant. The Chinese civil registry, or Chineesche  
Burgerlijke Stand, based on the European model was 
introduced in 1917. These were the circumstances in which 
a Dutch Jesuit said that the glorious days of the Chinese 
officers were almost over.2
It is not my intention to linger on the many criticisms of 
the Chinese officers, as these come up again and again in 
this chapter. It is undeniable that by the turn of the century 
the institution was more-or-less out of date, and could 
never have continued without sweeping reform. It would be 
valuable to examine first the position of the Chinese 
officers within the framework of Dutch administration of 
the colony.
At the end of the nineteenth century, discussions were 
held on administrative reform for the whole of the
1 Kwee Hing Tjiat, Doea Kapala Batoe (1921. Berlin: n.p.), p. 58.
2 J Moerman Jz., In en Om de Chineesche Kamp (1932. Batavia: G Kolff & 
Co), p. 55.
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Netherlands Indies: this favoured decentralization. The core 
of colonial administration was carried out by the Inlandsch 
Bestuur, or Native Administration, under the supervision of 
the European Administration, on which the decentralization 
plan was mainly focussed. Yet the third substantial element 
that could not be ignored was the Bestuur over Vreemde 
Oosterlingen  [Administration over Foreign Asiatics], in 
which the Chinese played the most significant role. This 
might be comparatively small, but was important.
As the Chineesch Bestuur, exercised by the Chinese 
officers, ran on parallel lines to the Inlandsch Bestuur, any 
reform of the latter should extend to the former. Thus 
during discussions on the administrative reform of the 
Native Administration, the question came up: where to place 
the Chinese Administration within this reform? Such a 
question had never been put before, as the Dutch had been 
quite content not to bother with the Chinese local 
administration. For centuries the Dutch had practiced 
segregation, which had saved them the trouble of 
unnecessary involvement in the ruled majority. This 
practice was no longer workable.
Within the framework of decentralization, by 1905 city 
administration had been developed into municipal 
government, exercised by the w ijk b e s tu u r ,  or 
administration of the individual neighbourhood. Given that 
the largest Chinese communities were in the three main 
cities of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, the issue of 
Chinese local administration became unavoidable. Yet the 
Dutch authorities could reach no decisions on the position 
of this administration and its officers. To place the Chinese 
officers under European administration might offend the 
Native Administration corps;3 but to put them under the
3 Letter of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 29 June 1894, 
no 3722, in M ailrapport, no. 1 3 /1 8 9 6 , ARA, The Hague; see also 
confidential letter of the same office, 10 December 1915, no. 685G/B, in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
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Native Administration was equally unthinkable, although 
there were those who felt this might work.4
The inability to resolve this problem lay in the origins of 
the Chinese officers institution. Having been created by the 
Dutch-VOC, the institution lacked a basic fundamental 
principle, or stelselloos,5 and was always open to dispute 
among Dutch higher officials.
For centuries the Dutch authorities tried to keep the 
institution of the Chinese officers intact, which posed 
serious problems when the colonial administration later 
faced reform. Despite the changing policies of the Dutch 
regarding the Chinese, the main body of the Chineesch 
Bestuur was left unchanged. This may have been deliberate 
or simply an ommision. It is quite likely that the Dutch 
authorities did not want to bother with an institution that 
took care of a people who, in terms of their numbers and 
political ambitions, were not as challenging as the native 
majority under the Inlandsch Bestuur. Indeed, the only 
active reason to retain the institution was the economic 
dependence of the Dutch on the Chinese. However, as the 
introduction of a new taxation system lessened this 
economic dependency, the fact that the institution remained 
unchanged may not have been deliberate on the part of the 
Dutch. The only notable change, which took place in 1878, 
was a modification in Chinese Council membership, to 
accommodate an emerging new element in the Chinese 
community in Batavia, namely the non-Hokkien.
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese themselves regarded 
the officers institution as out of date, and felt that it did 
not facilitate the progress of the Chinese community, 
although the criticism was partly untrue.6 Within the Dutch 
government framework, the issue of the officers institution 
focused on its administrative complexity; but for the 
Chinese it was primarily an issue of political meaning,
4 Confidential letter of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 10 
December 1915, no. 685G/B, in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4406.
5 See "Het Bestuur over Vreemde Oosterlingen", Indisch Verslag, 1931, vol. 
I, p. 447.
6 See chapter V.
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especially the problem of Chinese leadership. This political 
aspect, in fact, gave the issue an even wider scope, in which 
the rivalries between Indies-born peranakan and singkeh- 
totok Chinese invited the interference of the Chinese 
government.
The Dutch Government's View and Plan
Within the framework of administrative reform, a newly 
developed municipal government, called G em eente , was 
introduced in the main cities of the Netherlands Indies. This 
reform strongly affected the Chinese Administration, for it 
was introduced in the main cities where most Chinese 
resided in their own separate neighbourhoods, known as 
Chineesche wijken.
On the other hand, those Chinese residing outside the 
w ijken , or those living on the outskirts, were already 
attached to the Native Administration.7 The issue was thus 
concentrated on the city-dwelling Chinese rather than those 
living in the surrounding areas.
However, it was admitted that in order to complete the 
adm inistrative reform of the Netherlands Indies 
government, a review of the Chineesch Bestuur and the 
Chinese officers was unevitable. What should be the place 
of the Chinese officers? Should they be put on a level with 
European officials? This was extremely unlikely, as it 
might offend the native officials who formed the basis for 
colonial rule.8
Observing that the Chineesch Bestuur was exercised by 
Chinese officers mainly in the Chinese neighbourhoods, or 
w ijk e n , a plan was developed to attach it to the 
wijkbestuur in the main cities. As the wijkbestuur were to 
be under the municipal governments supervised by European 
officials, the Chinese of the main cities would be directly 
under the European administration.
7 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 29 June 1894, no. 
3722, in Mailrapport, no. 13/1896.
8 Ibid.
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Given that the main Chinese communities were in Batavia, 
Semarang and Surabaya, the local authorities there were 
heavily involved in the reorganization of the Chinese 
Administration. From long discussions held in 1914-1915, 
it was concluded that the officership of these Vreem de  
Oosterlingen should be terminated. The reasons were as 
follows. First, the scarcity of qualified persons meant that 
many offices were left vacant.9 Second, it was observed 
that the Chinese officership was no longer popular among 
the Chinese community.10 Yet decision was taken.
The Government Secretary suggested improving the 
Chinese officers* position by providing fixed salaries,1 1 
although this idea did not receive unanimous support. The 
Resident of Manado in North Sulawesi preferred a system of 
unpaid Chinese headmen, so that the budget could be 
assigned for office expenditure.12 Even the issue of 
government-paid Chinese officers, discussed in chapter 3, 
did not find a decision, for the more crucial point was their 
position as part of a thorough administrative reform. 
Nevertheless, the idea of reform was gathering momentum 
and, despite the complexity of the matter, the issue of 
reorganization of the Chineesch Bestuur was kept to the 
fore. Eventually the decision was reached that the Chinese 
would be placed directly under the European administration, 
exercised through the wijkbestuur.
As the system of municipal government would be the 
basis of the wijkbestuur, it was argued that the position of 
the Chinese w ijkm eesters  should be strengthened. In
9 Confidential letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 10 
December 1915, no. 685g/B, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406; see also 
"Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Maart-April 1914", koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. Ill, 1913-1914, pp. 957-958.
10 "Chineesche Officieren en Wijkmeesters", De Indische Gids, vol. II, 1913, 
p. 1473; "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juli-Augustus 1913", 
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1912-1913, p. 1482; vol. Ill, 1913-1914, p. 
1686.
11 Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406; also Pertja Timoer, February 1912, 
quoted in "Persoverzicht: De Inlandsche Pers", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 
1911-1912, p. 487.
12 Letter of the Resident of Manado to Director of Home Affairs, 25 May 
1917, no. 100a, in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 2193.
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addition an advisory body for Chinese affairs would be set 
up.13 Pilot schemes plan would be carried out in Batavia, 
Semarang and Surabaya, and a budget of 50 ,000 guilders 
was allocated.
Further discussions were held. The Indies Council [Raad 
van Indie] said that the role of the wijkmeesters needed 
further clarification, and that attention should be given to 
the qualifications and salaries of the present 
w ijkm eesters , since this would influence the quality of 
their work.14 The Resident of Batavia stated that Batavia 
would require an annual budget of 16,320 guilders for the 
wijkmeesters salaries.15 He said that in his dealings with 
the Chinese community, he had learnt that the work mainly 
involved the Chinese major and Chinese wardmasters, while 
other officers were, in practice, of minor importance. The 
Resident agreed that a good wijkbestuur could take over the 
work, thus leading to the abolition of the Chinese 
officers.16
The reorganization of the Chinese administration placed 
Chinese in a dual position; those living in the main cities 
would be under European supervision while those residing in 
the surrounding areas would be subject to native 
administration. In this context, the Resident of Batavia 
drew attention to the large Chinese communities that 
existed outside the three main cities of Java. He pointed out 
that under the new local administration, these large 
communities, such as those in Tangerang and Cirebon, would 
require a wijkhoofden, or chief wardmaster, to replace the 
Chinese officers.17 This was noted by the Resident of 
Batavia in connection with the plan to set up an advisory 
body to handle Chinese affairs. Seeing that such a body
13 See "Reorganisatie van Chineesch Bestuur", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 
4406.
14 Confidential letter of the Indies Council to Governor-General, 19 
February 1916, no. 109a, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406.
15 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 19 June 




would be established only in Batavia, Semarang and 
Surabaya, the authorities needed to be reminded of the large 
Chinese communities outside them.
In addition, the Indies Council was not even certain that 
such an advisory board would work, particularly if it was to 
be chaired by a European official, even if assisted by 
respected members of the Chinese community. The argument 
was that to limit the reorganization to the three cities 
might open still wider the differences in administrative 
institution between different parts of Java. Furthermore, to 
establish such a body might lead to a situation in which the 
existing Government Advisor for Chinese Affairs would 
become m achteloos ,18 or powerless. Since 1905, the 
Advisor for Chinese Affairs had had offices in Semarang, 
Surabaya, Tanjung Pinang (Riau), Medan and Makassar.19
The Resident of Batavia expressed his feelings bluntly 
over the proposed advisory body. If it was to be chaired by a 
European official and placed under the European 
Administration, it meant modifications would need to be 
made to the European Administration itself. He argued that 
although the body might take over the duties of the Chinese 
officers, it would not have a real administrative function. 
Yet it would have to work closely with the present office of 
the Advisor for Chinese Affairs. In short, the Resident of 
Batavia considered an advisory body to be redundant.20
Nevertheless, after heated debate at a meeting held on 1- 
2 September 1917, it was decided to carry out the plan. The 
government’s intention to place the Chinese under European 
administration was strengthened by the unsuitability of the 
Chinese officership to current conditions, and its increasing 
lack of influence over the Chinese community, as reflected 
in the strong feelings expressed in the Chinese-Malay
18 Confidential letter of the Indies Council to Governor-General, 19 
February 1916, no. 109a, in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4406.
19 Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. I, p. 478.
20 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 19 June 
1916, in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4406.
269
press.21 Another aspect was the presumption that since 
most Chinese desired equal status with Europeans, placing 
them under the European Administration might be 
welcomed.22 This assumption was later proven wrong. The 
Chinese vehemently rejected the idea, and turned to support 
the existing institution of the Chinese officers.
As for strengthening the wijkbestuur, the Resident of 
Surabaya proposed unification, seeing that other minorities 
lived in each neighbourhood. He pointed out that a few 
Chinese and Europeans resided in native neighbourhoods and 
Chinese in Arab quarters, although few natives lived in 
European neighbourhoods. While agreeing with his colleague 
over unification, the Resident of Batavia anticipated 
practical difficulties. He questioned how these new 
wardmasters would f it  into the local administrative 
hierarchy. Would they function in place of, or parallel to, 
the existing assistant-wedana [the native district chief], 
particularly those in the main cities? The Director of Home 
Affairs saw financial difficulties. The ideas was dropped.
Finally, the meeting agreed to draw up detailed plans for 
reorganization of the Chinese administration in Batavia, 
Semarang and Surabaya as a test case. Within the local 
administration, the duties of the Chinese officers would be 
taken over by notable Chinese, functioning as Chineesche 
Commissie van Advies [Chinese Committee for Advice], who 
would be regarded as intermediaries. The local police would 
now supervise security in Chinese neighbourhoods; the 
Chinese civil registry would under the wardmasters, while 
public ceremonies were to be organized by Chinese 
associations. The former Chinese officers would no longer 
sit on various government committees, such as those 
concerned with immigration and taxation, or the local
21 Note of the Director of Home Affairs, 31 January 1917, no. Ill/B, in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406; see also "De Regeling van het Bestuur over 
Chineezen en Andere Vreemde Oosterlingen na het Verdwijnen van Wijken 
voor Ingezetenen van die Landaarden", Mailrapport, no. 34 2 6 /1 9 2 2 , in 
Verbaal, 10 March 1923, no. 5, ARA, The Hague.
22 Confidential letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 10 
December 1915, no. 685G/B, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406.
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council of justice. In their place, notable non-officer 
Chinese would be appointed.23 As a guide to the working 
practices of the new wijkbestuur, new instructions would 
be issued on 1 January 1918.
The undoubted aim of this plan was to make the Chinese 
officers defunct. While the meeting agreed this, it could not 
decide whether officers would be permitted to continue to 
use honorary titles. This was because the administrative 
experiment might not work. The decision was that all 
Chinese officers in active service should be relieved of 
their title.
Nevertheless, a final decision on the institution of the 
Chinese officers took a further seventeen years. This gave 
the Chinese considerable opportunity to consider their 
opinion.
The Chinese Response
The establishment of the first modern Chinese association, 
the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK) in 1900 was soon followed 
by that of others. Unlike the pioneering work of the 
peranakan Chinese of Batavia, which was directed towards; 
socio-cultural goals, other Chinese organizations, such as 
Siang Hwee and Soe Po S/a,were preoccupied with economic 
and political aspirations.
It is important to repeat the distinction between the two 
elements of the Chinese community in the Netherlands 
Indies, the Indies-born peranakan and the singkeh-totok 
Chinese. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the 
Chinese political movement in the colony saw harsh 
rivalries between the two: the issue of the peranakan 
dominated officers institution entered these rivalries. It is 
easy to see how the Chinese officers became an easy target 
for attack by the singkeh-totok and the China-oriented 
peranakan.
23 Note of Director of Home Affairs, 31 January 1917, no. Ill/B, in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406.
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Before the emergence of the Chinese modern movement at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese 
officers, despite their ambiguous position, were at least 
considered the leaders of their community. In the sense of 
political inspiration and prestige, they might not be true 
leaders; but within the colonial context, the Dutch 
officially named them the Chineesche Hoofden, Chinese 
headmen.
When the institution lost its economic importance in the 
early twentieth century, some progressive Chinese officers 
pushed their community to thrive in terms of a modern 
development. Such idealism was born with the formation of 
the THHK, pioneered by the peranakan of Batavia. I have 
already shown, in chapter 5, that criticism of the Chinese 
officers for their lack of encouragement towards the 
Chinese movement was in many ways unjustified. Yet there 
was indifference in the part of the peranakan officers 
towards singkeh-totok associations such as Soe Po Sia and 
Kuo Min Tang.
The influence of the Pan-Chinese movement was seen as 
early as the 1910s, when singkeh activity became strong. 
The early Chinese turbulence of 1912-1913, which occurred 
all over Java, the changing policy of the Dutch, favouring 
the peranakan, Chinese representation in the Peopled 
Council, and the issue of the Netherlands-subject law, all 
became targets for singkeh attacks and for interference by 
the Chinese government in the Chinese problems of the 
colony. There was vehement singkeh antagonism towards 
the Chinese officers, who were mostly peranakan.
Fierce criticism of the Chinese officers was at its peak 
in the 1910s. Clearly the singkeh would never accept the 
officers, considering that these positions were occupied 
mainly by rich peranakan; yet singkeh influence managed to 
stir up anti-officer feeling even among the peranakan, as 
was demonstrated in the Chinese-Malay press.
The strongest criticism was found in the daily Pewarta  
Soerabaia, although it is not clear whether the peranakan 
majority in Surabaya's Chinese community shared the
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hateful opinions expressed in the press. This newspaper 
decried the Chinese officers as 'yes-men', who were 
unrepresentative of their own people, merely 'comedians',24 
simply figureheads of formality.25 They were condemned as 
'de tweede pest van Java'zs [the second plague of Java]. The 
bitter complaint of the Surabayan Chinese was that they 
were severely underrepresented within the officership. It 
was also said that the Chinese officers should be 
intermediaries, rather than weapons of the Dutch 
government, and that their appointment should involve 
selection by members of all Chinese ethnic groups.27 This 
was undoubtedly the voice of the non-peranakan element. A 
strong anti-Western feeling was also evident: the same 
newspaper accused the officers of being slaves of the 
whites and traitors to their own race.28
The fierce criticism of the Chinese officers seeing in the 
two China-oriented peranakan dailies, the P e w a r t a  
Soerabaia and Sin Po of Batavia, the Dutch took it for 
granted that the Chinese majority no longer wanted the 
institution.29 If Pewarta Soerabaia and Sin Po both bore 
the influence of the Pan-Chinese nationalist element, the 
other extreme was represented by the Perniagaan o f 
Batavia. The Perniagaan was probably the single fighter for 
the officers in the battle of words with Sin Po and Pewarta 
Soerabaia.
The two important Semarang dailies, Djawa Tengah and 
Warna Warta, appear to have followed a middle course,
24 Quoted in "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Mei-Juni 1912", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1911-1912, p. 847.
25 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juli-Augustus 1912", ibid., p. 
1134.
26 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Maart-April 1914", op.cit., vol. Ill, 
1913-1914, p. 957.
27 Ibid., p. 958.
28 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, December 1914", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. IV, 1914-1915, p. 395.
2 9 Note of Director of Home Affairs, 31 January 1917, no. Ill/B, in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406; "Bijstand van aan Gewestelijk Bestuur voor 
de Behandeling van Chineesche Aangelegenheden, December 1923-Januari 
1924", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 2065; this is also mentioned in Geheim 
Mailrapport, no. 184x /1930.
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which very much reflected the sentiments of Semarangfs 
Chinese population. Being the smallest of the three main 
Chinese communities in Java, Semarang sometimes let 
itself be drawn towards the socialist influence of Surabaya, 
despite being the seat of an important branch of the 
peranakan Chung Hwa Hui party. The Djawa Tengah and 
Warna Warta might voice the anti-officer feeling of the 
Semarang Chinese, but the expression was far less hostile. 
The main complaint was that the officers position were 
much too remote from their own community.30 Furthermore, 
the papers accused the officers of being untrustworthy 
Dutch public relations officers for Chinese affairs.31 Yet, 
despite such criticism, Semarang was a strong voice in 
Chinese public opinion in Java when it swung round to 
support the Chinese officers at the end of 1914. That shift 
took place as the Dutch sought to place the Chinese under 
direct European administration, in order to pave the way for 
the end of the Chinese officers.
The Perniagaan persistently pointed out the value of the 
officers, particularly during the current political turmoil. 
The Dutch observed that only the Perniagaan of Batavia 
made efforts to back the Chinese officers.32 In response to 
the criticism that the officers were foolish, the Perniagaan 
indignantly replied that it was not the officers but the 
Dutch government regulations which were foolish.33 The 
Perniagaan was owned by several Batavia Chinese 
officers.34
By the time the Dutch plan to place the Chinese under 
European administration was publicly known, majority 
opinion, previously against the officers, had turned to
30 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Juni 1914", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 
vol. Ill, 1913-1914, p. 1265.
31 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, Januari-Februari 1914", ibid., p. 
527.
32 See "Beschouwingen over Chineesch-Maleische Pers van Mei 1918", and 
"Chineesch-Maleisch Persoverzicht van Juli 1918", in Binnenlands- 
Bestuur, no. 4390.
33 Perniagaan, 22 June 1918, quoted in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4390.
34 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 23 January 
1917, no. 74/B, in Verbaal, 31 March 1919, no. 52.
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support them. The Dutch were taken by surprise when the 
Chinese so vehemently rejected the plan. The Chinese never 
wanted to be under European officials, let alone subordinate 
to Native administration.35 Even the Perniagaan, of 25 June 
1918, made the provocative statement that the Chinese 
would have no objection towards the abolition of the 
Chinese officers, if that meant full equal status with 
Europeans.36
The Chinese-Malay press began to show moderation. But 
not the Sin Po of Batavia, which simply ignored the 
discussion. The majority of the Chinese-Malay press 
suggested allowing the Chinese to select their own 
officers; and it sought more understanding of the 
authorities' problem in finding qualified persons for these 
positions.37
Kan Hok Hoei (HHKan), the notable Chinese representative 
in the People's Council, pointed out during a meeting on 19 
November 1918 that the Chinese officers in the colony were 
lumps in the throat of the awakening nationalist groups. 
They were used as scapegoats. HHKan regretted the way in 
which the government had taken account only of the anti­
officer criticism; this was unwise, since the officers 
themselves had no objections to reform. The Dutch should be 
reminded that for centuries they had taken the officers for 
granted without giving financial compensation. As Chinese 
voting rights for local councils were not yet in place, to 
dismantle officer representation would be premature. He 
pointed out that, for the time being, the Dutch still needed 
Chinese representation in various offices to accommodate 
Chinese public interests.
During the meeting, the Director of Home Affairs raised 
the issue of the scarcity of qualified persons for Chinese
35 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, December 1914", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. IV, 1915, pp. 395, 1541-1542.
36 Quoted in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4390; see also Djawa Tengah, 24 
September 1918, quoted in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. VIII, 1919, p. 117.
37 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, November 1914", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. IV, 1915, p. 250; for press review in April 1917, see 
ibid., vol. VI, 1917, p. 1254; see also Perniagaan, 22 June 1918, quoted in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4390.
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officership. As the policy of racial segregation was no 
longer workable, and yet there were large numbers of 
Chinese in the three main cities in Java, this scarcity posed 
a major problem. The Dutch government now realized that to 
place the Chinese under European Administration was not 
feasible, since Europeans could not be intermediaries 
between these two non-indigenous communities. This was 
why the government now strongly urged the adoption of the 
system of w i j k b e s t u u r  in the three main cities, a 
cooperation between the Chinese, the native wardmasters 
and the Dutch local authorities.
However, HHKan argued that the Chinese were not 
satisfied, for voting rights were based on quotas, which 
would leave the Chinese with just 13 votes. This would be 
insufficient to influence events and, in any case, did not 
reflect reality. In his opinion, placing a Chinese wardmaster 
in a Chinese neighbourhood was nothing more than an 
administrative formality.
As for the core of the problem, HHKan blamed the 
government for emphasizing abolition rather than 
encouraging people to consider maintaining the institution. 
Apparently he had received thirty cables and twenty letters 
from Chinese associations urging him to maintain the 
officers; why had the Dutch government never thought to 
consult those groups? When it came to other matters, such 
as administrative reform or the Indies militia, why did the 
Dutch authorities issue official s ta tem ents and 
explanations; but not in this case? Surely not because they 
thought of the Chinese as an insignificant minority.
HHKan complained that the official discussions had not 
involved any Chinese members of the People's Council, and 
that advice had been taken only from Dutch officials who 
could hardly comprehend Chinese expectations. His 
criticism underlined the crucial point - that of equal rights 
for every group in the colony.38
38 For these arguments, see Verhandelingen van den Volksraad van 1918 
(1919. 's Gravenhage: Algemeen Landsdrukkerij), pp. 274-277, 280- 
281, 288-289, 292-293, 296.
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If HHKan was outspoken in his support of the Chinese 
officers of whom he had a deep knowledge and 
understanding, the other representative from the Chung Hwa 
Hui party, Han Tiauw Tjong, introduced a broader context. 
While HHKan, who believed that democracy should be 
adopted in the Netherlands Indies government, insisted on 
equal rights for every group, Han Tiauw Tjong felt that the 
basic problem lay with the civil status of the Chinese. 
Nevertheless, he could not deny that over the course of time 
the Chinese officers had lost prestige in their own 
community, and that their authority continued to decline. To 
many Chinese, the title 'hoofden hunner natie \ chiefs of 
their nationals, was mockingly interpreted as Slavish 
servants of the European Administration1.39
Han Tiauw Tjong's criticism of Dutch policy was that 
despite Chinese being Netherlands subjects, they were not 
released from their Vreemde Oosterlingen status. In terms 
of their status as Netherlands subjects, the Chinese, in 
Rousseau’s concept of a social contract between the state 
and the people, were sujets but not citoyens.40 In other 
words, the Netherlands subject law as applied to the 
Chinese in the colony, provided only for territorial ties but 
did not extend to them personal rights as full members of 
the community.
The points made by Han Tiauw Tjong at the meeting of the 
People's Council on 16 June 1924 were in fact the reasons 
given by the Chinese government for interfering in the 
Chinese question in the Netherlands Indies. It was the 
Netherlands-subject issue that invited China's interference 
in Chinese political matters in the colony; its previous 
intervention had been on the safer ground of Chinese 
education. Much to the displeasure of the Dutch, the new 
government of China could justify its actions in terms of a 
foreign policy of protecting its overseas subjects, including 
Chinese residents in the Netherlands Indies. Chinese
39 See the fifth meeting of the People's Council, 16 June 1924, in 
Verhandelingen van den Volksraad van 1924, p. 54.
49 Ibid., p. 56.
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grievances could be used as a weapon for political 
interference, particularly as the government of China was 
familiar with the unfavourable condition of the Chinese in 
the colony. Many Chinese members of various associations 
paid visits to the mainland to meet Chinese higher 
officials.41 These delegations included peranakan members 
who were attached to Chinese-singkeh organizations.
The government of China viewed the question of the 
Chinese officers in the context of its diplomatic goals, 
which were directed towards international equality for the 
Chinese. The official opinion was that as soon as the 
Chinese government promulgated new civil rights, the 
Chinese of the Netherlands Indies would be given equal 
treatment with Europeans. Eventually the Chinese officers 
system would be abolished, to minimize impediments to the 
equal treatment of the Chinese.42 The idea of equal status 
was shared by the government of China and by the Indies- 
born peranakan, albeit with different aims and perceptions. 
It would be interesting to explore the different attitudes of 
the peranakan and the singkeh in the Netherlands Indies, 
despite their shared desire to be treated on equal terms.
The Dutch were somewhat narrow-minded in keeping the 
issue within the limits of administrative reform. This was 
particularly so, since their patronizing attitude as well as 
their ambiguity towards the Chinese and lack of insight 
invited external interference.
Despite its changing policy on the Chinese, now favouring 
the peranakan in the hope of avoiding an uneasy 
confrontation with singkeh-totok, the Dutch sought to 
consider the Chinese question as a whole. Their behaviour 
was ambivalent - policy and practice fell apart. Indeed, 
their error in failing to differentiate between peranakan 
and singkeh43 - due to unwillingness or ignorance - 
exacerbated the problem.
41 See Verbaal, 29 October 1920, no. 52.
42 Quoted in the letter of Dutch Ambassador in Beijing to Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 11 November 1931, in A dossier, no. 7797, Ministry of Colonies 
Archives, ARA, The Hague.
43 "Onze Chineezen-politiek", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1907, p. 97.
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The office of Advisor for Chinese Affairs should take part 
of the blame, because of its unbalanced interest in the 
singkeh and China-oriented peranakan groups. It assumed 
that the aggressive singkeh were the real threat to Dutch 
authority. In their obsessiveness with the singkeh Kuo Min 
Tang movement, their reports stated that the peranakan 
regarded the singkeh-totok as semi-alien44 and, later, that 
the estrangement between the two had became still more 
distinctive.45
As the office of Advisor for Chinese Affairs paid such 
attention to the China-oriented movement, its advice to the 
government did not reflect the real circumstances in the 
Chinese community. That their information was misleading 
was shown when the Chinese public vehemently rejected the 
government's plan to abolish the Chinese officers. It is 
interesting to observe how this Chinese question created an 
embarrassing row between Home Affairs and the Advisor 
for Chinese Affairs. I will elaborate later. The D j a w a  
Tengah  daily of Semarang reported that at a Chinese 
meeting held in the city in 1915, attended by 7 ,000  
representatives from various organizations, a petition in 
support of the Chinese officers was sent to the Governor- 
General. But the Advisor for Chinese Affairs, who had been 
present, stuck to his opinion that the majority of Chinese 
desired their abolition.46 A t another meeting, held in 
Bandung, the THHK declared its opposition to the 
government plans for the Chinese officers. But the Advisor 
for Chinese Affairs did not accept this, for the government 
plan had been its response to Chinese complaints against 
their officers. Why did the Chinese now reject the plan? The 
Chinese claimed that their dissatisfaction lay with a 
system in which the officers were not selected by their 
own community, and in which the officers frequently
44 Note of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 9 January 
1924, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 43x /1924.
45 "Overzicht over de Chineesche Beweging in Nederlandsch-lndie, Maart 
1930", in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 120x /1930.
46 "Persoverzicht: De Chineesche Pers, November 1916", Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift, vol. VI, 1917, p. 248.
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decided matters in a way that did not benefit the Chinese. 
The Advisor argued that his understanding of the situation 
had been taken from the Chinese-Malay press. He was then 
told that the Chinese press, despite being published and 
managed by Chinese, should not be seen as the voice of the 
Chinese in the Netherlands-lndies.47 The Bataviaasch  
Nieuwsblad, a Dutch newspaper published in Batavia, argued 
that the situation had been created by incomplete, confusing 
and misleading official information. In addition, there had 
been no explanation by the Dutch of their administrative 
reorganization.48 The government belief that the Chinese 
majority favoured abolition of the officers was clearly 
wrong.49
In the face of these objections, the Dutch were obliged to 
reconsider the plan to place the Chinese directly under 
European administration.
Measures for Measures
The office of Home Affairs observed that as the Chinese 
desired equal status with Europeans, to put them under 
European administration would certainly be accepted.50 In 
addition, Chinese officers in certain large cities such as 
Semarang and Surabaya were no longer involved in the 
administration of their communities as such duties were 
now handled by the local authorities. Tax collection was 
carried out by the wardmasters, while religious, cultural 
and charitable work were taken care of by Chinese 
associations.51 But for the Chinese the question of the
47 Ibid., p. 249.
48 Quoted in "Hervorming van het Chineesch en Inlandsch Bestuur", De 
Indische Gids, vol. I, 1919, p. 495.
49 Ibid., p. 496.
50 Confidential letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 10 
December 1915, no. 685G/B, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406.
51 Letter of the Resident of Semarang to Director of Home Affairs, 8 June 
1915, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406; see also letter of Governor of 
East-Java to Governor-General, 9 January 1930, in Geheim Mailrapport, 
no. 184x71930.
280
officers would not have arisen had the Chinese been given 
equal status with Europeans.
The Advisor for Chinese Affairs had long been 
discontented with the Chinese officers because of their 
failure to communicate. Complaints were often raised that 
the government received little information on Chinese 
political matters.52 A report made during an official visit 
to Central Java in 1929 indicated how poor communication 
was. It said that most Dutch local officials received almost 
no information from the officers on Chinese affairs in their 
area.53 Whether this was because the officers were ignorant 
of many of these problems, the visiting official from the 
office for Chinese Affairs was uncertain. He assumed that 
in delicate circumstances the Chinese officers preferred to 
stand aside and not favour any party.54 He was referring to 
the competitive political struggle among the Chinese, for by 
1928 Kuo Min Tang followers had launched their anti- 
Japanese campaign which made the peranakan even more 
uneasy.
The Advisor for Chinese Affairs also suggested that any 
Chinese political action was a reflection, however small, of 
Chinese government action. To the dismay of the officials of 
Chinese Affairs, the Dutch residents hardly thought about 
the political meaning of such movements. This was the 
starting-point for the conflicting views between the 
offices of Chinese Affairs and of Home Affairs.
The office of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs considered 
Chinese problems in the colony to reflect the Chinese 
governments policy regarding its overseas subjects. It was 
therefore not surprising that the office paid greater 
attention to the singkeh Kuo Min Tang movement in the 
colony and to non-peranakan activities in general. This
52 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Director of Home Affairs, 21 
August 1923, no. 464 /23 , in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 2065.
5 3 "Verslag van een Dienstreis Ondernemen door den Ambtenaar voor 
Chineesche Zaken, AHJ Lovink naar Tjilatjap, Poerwokerto, Pekalongan en 




suggests a rather Sino-phobic attitude, which was not 
shared by most local officials. The officials for Chinese 
Affairs disapproved of the attitude of Dutch local officials 
who were inclined to favour the peranakan.
Many Dutch local authorities, particularly those in areas 
with large Chinese communities, saw that the Indies-born 
peranakan were integrated into the local society.55 To the 
Resident of Batavia, most Chinese inhabitants in the area 
had been absorbed into native life, partly because they had 
been agriculturists for centuries.56 After the anti-Chinese 
incidents of 1912-1913, the Chinese appeared to become 
even more appeasing, so that the hostile outrage of the 
natives could be avoided. This helped to reduce tension.57
However, most local officials1 observations were based 
on their understanding of the Indies-born Chinese nature 
which, according to the offices for Chinese Affairs, was too 
narrow on insight. It said that the local residents and their 
subordinates had a knowledge of the Chinese that belonged 
to the past. Later the Chinese would feel that the local 
authorities judged them only on external appearance, and 
knew nothing of the inner workings of the communities. 
These local authorities knew little of events in China, and 
that political events on the mainlaind had direct 
repercussions on the Chinese in the colony. It was difficult 
to achieve real understanding if the global Chinese 
movement was ignored.58
Unlike the office for Chinese Affairs, the Home Affairs 
office adopted an inward-looking attitude towards the 
Chinese problems. Given the long-established Chinese 
settlement in the colony, every Chinese movement should be 
the concern of Netherlands Indies domestic policy. The 
office of Home Affairs was convinced that the Indies-born 
peranakan majority were steadfast in their orientation
55 "Onze Chineezen-politiek", De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1907, p. 98.
56 H Rijfsnijder, "Memorie van Overgave van den Residentie Batavia, 28 Juli 
1911-2  Augustus 1916", ARA, The Hague.
57 Ibid.
58 H J Borel, "De Chineesche Kwestie en de Ambtenaren van 't Binnenlandsch 
Bestuur", Koloniaal Tijdschrift, vol. I, 1912-1913, pp. 41-42.
282
towards the country of their birth rather than towards 
China. It believed that problems in politics, education, the 
economy, the issue of Netherlands subject status and voting 
rights should be solely the government’s concern.59 It said 
that while the office for Chinese Affairs might focus on the 
external influences from China, the most important element 
was the internal politics of the local Chinese population. 
Not all Chinese were captivated by the nationalist sparkle 
from China, particularly those born and bred in the colony. 
Most never thought to return to the mainland, and their 
desire for equal status with Europeans showed that their 
concern was mostly with the social and economic 
development of their local society.60 Chinese grievances and 
expectations in regards to political rights, legal status, 
civil rights, education and separate local administration, 
were the most important issues.61 The two offices, then, 
held very different views on Chinese problems: and the 
climate of disagreement began to affect their working 
performance, particularly that of the office for Chinese 
Affairs.
Many local officials were not happy with the frequent 
visits by officials from the office for Chinese Affairs to 
survey the Chinese situation in their area. Yet the office for 
Chinese Affairs rejected the idea that local authorities 
should take over the work, arguing that it was their duty to 
provide information on the local Chinese situation and its 
connection with global Chinese jingoism.62 The office 
persisted in its opinion that all activities undertaken by the 
Chinese movement in the colony were reflections of what 
was taking place in China, that there was almost no genuine 
political action taking place at the local level, except in 
Batavia. If any political danger came into the colony it
59 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 23 January 
1924, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 68x /1924.
60 "Bijstand van aan Gewestelijk Bestuur over de Behandeling van Chineesche 
Aangelegenheden, December 1923-Januari 1924", in Binnenlands-Bestuur, 
no. 2065.
61 Ibid.
62 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 22 
December 1923, no. 715 /23 , in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 2065.
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would enter through Batavia, and this could easily be 
detected.63
Much to the dismay of the Chinese Affairs office, the 
subsequent administrative reform and government proposal 
to reorganize the Chineesch Bestuur, led to questions about 
its status within the government. If this office should 
mainly be occupied with the internal affairs of the Chinese 
in the Netherlands Indies, the Director of Home Affairs 
argued that it should be under his supervision, not only in 
terms of administrative hierarchy but also in terms of 
policy.64 The office of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs 
strongly rejected this idea on the grounds that their 
functions covered foreign political issues and was not 
concerned merely with the internal observation of the 
Chinese in the colony. The Advisor said that even in the near 
future, with growing political tension among the Chinese, it 
was not internal but external politics that would be of 
serious concern to the government. Therefore it was not 
appropriate for his office to be supervised by Home 
Affairs;65 he preferred the present status in which it was 
responsible to the Governor-General. Although the Director 
of Home Affairs might admit the importance of foreign 
influences on the local Chinese, he believed that it had no 
bearing on this office's function, since it was the 
responsibility of Dutch embassies and consulates in China 
and in other parts of Asia, under the Foreign Affairs office. 
The Director repeated that the concern of the Chinese 
Affairs office was with Chinese matters in the Netherlands 
Indies.
Many local officials in Java faced problems in carrying out 
the reorganization of the Chinese Administration, 
particularly as the Dutch had not issued a clear plan. Since
63 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Director of Home Affairs, 21 
December 1923, no. 464 /23 , in Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 2065.
64 Letter of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 24 Janauary 
1924, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 68x /1924.
65 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 22 
December 1923, no. 715 /23 , in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 2065.
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the Chinese had rejected the idea of being administered by 
European officials as early as 1914, the Dutch simply 
abandoned the plan. The implementaion of the wijkbestuur, 
particularly in the three main cities, was no simple matter 
either.
The idea behind the wijkbestuur was to abandon the 
segregation practice of wardmastership, and replace the old 
regulation of March 1828 under which each nationality had 
its own wardmaster. For the Chinese, this regulation had 
allowed the formation of Chinese neighbourhoods consisting 
of 25 households.66 It is likely that the Chinese had no 
objection to this change of administrative system, provided 
that those living outside the Chinese wijken were placed 
under native wardmasters. In fact, the objection came from 
Arab residents. They refused to be supervised by a Chinese 
wardmaster if this new model of wijkbestuur was adopted 
by the local authorities.67 However, this objection was 
considered to be of minor importance; the main obstacle in 
reality was finance.
Under this new model, in which wardmasters would 
receive government salaries, the local authority of Batavia, 
for example, was expected to pledge about 72,141 guilders 
a year.68 At that time, Batavia's city administration 
employed 74 native, 25 Chinese and 3 Arab wardmasters. 
Under the old system they received 8% of tax revenues and 
fees from the 'wacht-en rondadiensten' , a compulsory vigil 
service in the neighbourhood. As wardmasters were to 
become government staff, they would be relieved from 
providing this security service; this meant that it would be 
necessary to improve and expand the local police force. The 
Resident of Batavia estimated that it would be necessary to
66 Noted in the letter of the Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 9 
September 1912, no. 10118/3, in Missive Gouvernement Secretaries 13 
May 1914, no. 1197, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
67 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 25 
September 1918, no. 18327/1, in Agenda, 30 September 1918, no. 31028, 
Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
68 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Director of Home Affairs, 9 September 
1912, no. 10118/3, in Missive Gouvernement Secretaries 13 May 1914, 
no. 1197.
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employ 330 second class police which, at twenty guilders a 
month, would add 79,200 guilders to the annual budget.69 
Although under the reorganization scheme, the local 
authority of Batavia would reduce the number of 
wardmasters to 48 by 1915, the total number of local 
wijkbestuur was still 253, whose salaries amounted to 
71,940 guilders a year.70
In addition to the financial restrictions which delayed the 
implementation of the wijkbestuur, there were complaints 
regarding the poor working performance of the Chinese 
wardmasters. It was agreed that while waiting for a further 
decision on the reorganization of Chinese local 
administration, the existing officers should be released 
from office to pave the way for the introduction of 
effective wijkbestuur.
To his dismay, the Resident of Central Preanger found the 
current two Chinese wardmasters to be of poor quality, 
unable to carry out their duties without guidance. This had 
been particularly so in the previous few years, when on so 
many problems, political issues, security and taxation 
matters, the Resident had been obliged to consult the ex­
lieutenant, Tjan Djin Tjong.71 His complaint was supported 
by the Inspector of Finance, who had discovered that the 
two wardmasters had lacked the ability to handle 
complicated duties.72 The view that the Chinese officers 
should be retained was therefore not at all unreasonable.
Although the Chinese in Surabaya were accustomed to the 
absence of a Chinese major, the office had been vacant 
since 1924, the need for a Chinese intermediary was clearly 
acknowledged. The Resident also admitted the poor 
performance of the city's Chinese wardmasters.73 As the
69 Ibid.
70 See Gouvernementsbesluit, 13 January 1915, no. 36.
71 Letter of the Resident of Central Preanger to Governor of West Java, 2 
November 1928, in Mailrapport, no. 3366/1929.
72 Quoted in the letter of Resident of Central Preanger to Governor of West 
Java, 29 June 1929, in Mailrapport, no. 3366/1929.
73 Noted in the letter of Governor of East Java to Director of Home Affairs, 
13 December 1928, in Mailrapport, no. 2501/1929.
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aim of improving the wijkmeesters was to enable them to 
take over the duties of the Chinese officers, the Governor of 
East Java did not see any difference if the Chinese 
intermediary were to be appointed.74 But the Advisor for 
Chinese Affairs underlined the distinctive features of the 
wardmasters1 duties, noting that while they might give 
information to the local authorities on Chinese affairs, this 
should not extend to giving political advice.75 The plan to 
appoint Chinese intermediaries attached to local 
authorities, so that the Chinese officers could be 
terminated, was not a simple matter.
Dutch government records show how the plan was often 
thwarted by local circumstances. In the city of Bandung, 
where 1 3,000 Chinese resided without any representatives 
on the city or regency councils, the Resident urged the 
appointment as captain of the ex-lieutenant, Tjan Djin 
Tjong.76 This was not granted. In Kediri in East Java, the 
Resident sought the appointment of the old wardmaster, 
Kwee Siong Khoen, to lieutenant: this was granted in 
1923.77 A government decree of October 1924 agreed to the 
appointment of Sie Biauw Gwan as Chinese lieutenant of 
Banyuwangi, East Java.78 In the same year, Riau and its 
adjacent areas were allowed to appoint one captain and 
eight lieutenants.79 It was planned to reorganize the 
Chinese administration in the residency of W est 
Kalimantan, by reducing the number of officers while paying 
better salaries to those who remained. In Palembang, it was 
suggested th a t the current Chinese institution be 
maintained,80 based on the Residents adamant statement of
74 Letter of Governor of East Java to Director of Home Affairs, 13 July 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 704x /1932.
75 Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 21 July 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 704x /1932.
76 Letters of the Resident of Central Preanger to Governor of West Java, 2 
November 1928, 29 June 1929, in Mailrapport, no. 3366/1929.
77 Letter of the Resident of Kediri to Governor-General via Director of Home 
Affairs, 18 October 1923, in Mailrapport, no. 1334/1924.
78 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 10 October 1924, no. 40.
79 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 24 May 1924, no. 44.
80 See Geheim Mailrapport, nos. 624x/1924, 647x/1924.
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his need for a separate administration for the Chinese. He 
argued that essential contact with the Chinese population 
could be maintained only through the Chinese officers.81
It is noteworthy how local authorities delayed the 
reorganization of the Chinese officers, and how in many 
cases, in Banyuwangi and Kediri in East Java and even, in 
1931, in parts of Central Java (Pekalongan, Kudus, Klaten 
and Surakarta), new officers were still being appointed.82 
The Resident of Central Preanger, whose request to appoint 
a new Chinese officer had been declined, became frustrated 
with indecisive government policy, and blamed the office 
for Chinese Affairs for paying too much attention to the 
Chinese-Malay press. The fact that the Chinese did not agree 
among themselves made the situation even more 
complicated.83
The Resident of Batavia remarked on the ’double- 
standards' of the Dutch administration in reorganizing the 
Chinese administration by terminating their offices and at 
the same time launching another institution, the Chineesche 
Commissie van Advies [Chinese Committee for Advice] to 
cooperate with the local authorities. He said, "the present 
situation is entirely strange".84 Seeing the delay of more 
than ten years, the Chinese, who kept questioning the 
reorganization plan, rebuked the government for its 
inertia.85
Finally, in 1929, explaining that they had given ’serious 
consideration’ and 'scrupulous study’ to the issue, the Dutch 
arrived at their decision. This was to restore the Chineesch 
Bestuur of Batavia to its 1913 formation, namely one
81 Letter of the Resident of Palembang to Governor-General, 11 September 
1924, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 775x /1924.
82 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 31 December 1932, no. 6, giving consent to 
the promotion of some previous wardmasters to lieutenant.
83 Letter of the Resident of Central Preanger to Governor of West Java, 29 
June 1929, in Mailrapport, no. 3366/1929.
84 J D Hunger, "Memorie van Overgave van het Bestuur over het Gewest 
Batavia op den 3 Maart 1922", ARA, The Hague.
85 See Liem Ting Tjay, "Het Instituut der Chineesche Officieren", De 
Chineesche Revue, July 1928, p. 76.
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major, two captains and four lieutenants;86 the Chinese 
officership in other parts of Java and Madura would be 
allowed to  decay n a tu ra lly ,87 a ' n a t u u r l i j k  
afstervingsproces ' .88 The government pledged 265,512  
guilders to hasten this process; the current Chinese 
officers, except for those in Batavia, would be given either 
a lower allowance or early retirement. Most older officers, 
such as the elderly captains in East Java (Purwadadi, Kediri, 
Tuban and Sumenep in Madura), willingly accepted 
retirement.89 A reduced budget allocated 11,156 guilders as 
the annual allowance for the remaining Chinese officers, 
excluding those in Batavia. It was agreed that by early 
1934, the institution of Chinese officers in Java and Madura 
would come to an end.90
Batavia: The Exception
In the previous sub-chapter, it was noted that the Chinese 
nationalists saw no future for the officers. As this 
sentiment was stirred up by the China-oriented nationalist 
movement, and was behind the growing criticism in the 
Chinese-Malay press, it gave the impression that the 
Chinese community no longer favoured, possibly even 
disliked, their own officers. As the office for Chinese 
Affairs concentrated on the singkeh and the China-oriented 
movement, the opinion of the press guided the Dutch 
perceptions. This misunderstanding was the basis for the 
abolition of the Chinese officership.
86 See Verhandelingen van den Volksraad van 1927 /1928 , p. 21; the 
formation was approved by Gouvemementsbesluit, 4 January 1913, no. 27.
87 "Het Bestuur over Vreemde Oosterlingen", Indisch Verslag, vol. I, 1931, 
p. 447.
88 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to all Chiefs of Local Administration in 
the Netherlands Indies, 8 January 1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 
603x/1932.
89 Letter of Governor of East Java to Director of Home Affairs, 9 March
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603x /1932.
90 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 13 November
1933, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 1409x/1933; and Gouvemementsbesluit, 
30 March 1934, no. 2.
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In accordance with administrative reforms which 
abandoned separate local administration for the Vreemde 
Oosterlingen, it was planned to place the Chinese in the 
large cities under European administration. It was this plan 
that was the turning-point in Chinese opinion. Now the 
Chinese started fighting for self-determ ination, not 
wanting to be directly ruled by Europeans. The Dutch were 
taken by surprise when the Chinese rejected the plan. They 
now proposed maintaining the officers, who should be 
elected by their own community. And if they could not avoid 
being placed under European administration, they would 
bargain for equal status with Europeans. Here can be seen 
the feeling that the Chinese could never trust the Dutch, let 
alone be ruled by them. For centuries they had been left to 
be self-sufficient, with occasional interference in their 
affairs, which had so far been tolerated.
The Chinese distrust was particularly evident over the 
question of the Chinese Council, for this was the central 
element in Chinese self-sufficiency. In Batavia, the Chinese 
Council not only carried out the daily work of the Chineesch 
Bestuur but also managed Chinese properties, for which it 
was granted proprietary rights.91 On the other hand, the 
Semarang Chinese Council now had virtually no involvement 
in Chinese affairs, except for religious matters, while in 
Surabaya, the Council had long been defunct, due to the lack 
of members.92 Thus it was the Chinese Council of Batavia 
that needed serious consideration.
The fact that the Chinese now supported the officers 
(albeit with strong proposals for reform) indicates how the 
peranakan, again, managed to resist singkeh influence. Again 
the Dutch mistake was the failure to distinguish adequately 
between the two elements of the Chinese population in the
91 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 31 January 
1917, no. Ill/B, in Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406; "De Regeling van het 
Bestuur over Chineesche en Andere Vreemde Oosterlingen na het Verdwijnen 
van Wijken voor Ingezetenen van die Landaarden", M ailrapport, no. 
3 42 6 /1 922 , in Verbaal, 10 March 1923, no.5; see also P de Roo de la 
Faille, "De Chineesche Raad te Batavia en het door dit College Beheerde 
Fonds", BKI, vol. 80, 1924, pp. 305-323.
92 See Binnenlands-Bestuur, no. 4406.
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colony. This error can be attributed to the long rivalry 
between the Department of Home Affairs and the office of 
the Advisor for Chinese Affairs. Because each office took a 
different view and approach, reflecting their poor 
understanding of the Chinese situation, the Dutch 
authorities were never able to construct a coherent policy. 
The effect was felt by the peranakan in particular.
It is clear that for the singkeh-totok Chinese, the 
peranakan officers were simply unacceptable. To expect 
these officers to act as intermediaries between the singkeh 
and the European administration was a serious 
misjudgement. These eminent and wealthy peranakan 
officers, many of whom no longer spoke a Chinese dialect, 
had little compassion for the poor uneducated singkeh.93 
However, for the Chinese of Batavia, this did not apply.
The non-peranakan were represented in Batavia's Chinese 
Council. The ordinary Chinese favoured the officers. "Djikaloe 
djabatan off icier Tionghoa telah dihapoeskan, begitoepeon Raad Tjiena 
ditiadakan, maka bagi orang orang Tionghoa jang miskin dan bodo adalah nanti 
mendjadi soesa boeat sampekan sagala maksoed dan hal halnja kapada 
Pamarenta, kema itoe orang orang Tionghoa jang miskin dan bodo kebanjakan 
jang tiada berani aken sampekan maksoednja, kaloe boekan dengen ia orang 
poenja kapala bangsa sendiri, apalagi bagi orang Tionghoa totok jang dengen 
bitjaranja jang blon begitoe pande bahasa Melajoe; dengen begitoe soeda 
mendjadi kapiran segala hal hal jang mendjadi kapentingan bagi hamba 
berame, begitoepen bagi Pamarenta"94 [had the Chinese officership 
been abolished, and the Chinese Council as well, it would be 
difficult for the poor and uneducated Chinese to present 
their expectations and problems to the Government, because 
those poor and uneducated Chinese mostly did not dare to 
air these unless to their own headmen, let alone those 
singkeh-totok Chinese who were not so articulate in the
93 Liem Ting Tjay, "Het Instituut der Chineesche Officieren", p. 74; that all 
Chinese officers in Surabaya were peranakan, was also note in the letter of 
the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to the Governor-General, 1 August 1912, no. 
248, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 4 January 1913, no. 27.
94 Letter sent by the Chinese inhabitants of Batavia and Weltevreden 
districts, 23 July 1918, in Agenda, 14 January 1919, no. 1635.
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Malay language; all of which would be a waste to our 
interest as well as to the Government].
The Chinese of Batavia were, in many respects, an 
exceptional case. They had the longest contact with the 
Dutch, from the time of the VOC through the British 
interregnum to the present. They also had the longest 
history of Chinese officership. Being members of the 
largest Chinese community in Java, and being both urban and 
rural, their interests were too significant to ignore. This 
was even more so since the city, as well as being the seat 
of Dutch power, owed much to the Chinese for its 
establishment and growth.95 It is quite understandable that 
the Dutch paid more attention to this Chinese community.
Unlike the non-peranakan in other parts of Java, 
particularly those in Surabaya who condemned the 
peranakan officers for having no interest in their problems, 
the Chinese of Batavia had no reason to feel resentful. The 
non-peranakan element had been represented on the Chinese 
Council since 1878. And by the first decade of the twentieth 
century, when the city had 16,000 peranakan, 7,000 Hakkas, 
4,000 singkeh-Hokkiens and 1,200 Macaos,96 there were two 
Hakka officers, one singkeh-Hokkien, and one Macao 
lieutenant; one of the Hakka officers was later promoted to 
captain. Later, in 1912, as a result of the reorganization of 
the Batavia local administration, the Chinese officership 
was reduced to one major, two captains and four 
lieutenants. The two captains represented the peranakan and 
the Hakka, the main elements in the city's Chinese 
population.97
Despite its shakiness, its unevenness and the 
unsystematic way in which it had been established, the 
Chinese officership of Batavia had proven to be steadier and 
longer lasting than its counterparts in other parts of Java.
95 See Leonard Blusse, Strange Company. Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women 
and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (1986 . Dordrecht: Foris Publications), 
particularly chapter V.
96 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor-General, 18 October 1912, 
no. 319/C, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 4 January 1913, no. 27.
97 Ibid.
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Resulting from Dutch negligence towards the officership in 
Semarang and Surabaya, the Chinese riots of 1912 clearly 
demonstrated the need for a workable understanding 
between the Dutch local authorities and the Chinese 
officers. On the other hand, the turbulent years of 1912 and 
1913 kept the local authorities alert to the disputes 
between singkeh and peranakan, and to the conflicts 
between singkeh Chinese and Arabs, and between the 
Chinese and the indigenous people. They also coloured the 
opinion of the Resident of Batavia towards the established 
peranakan community in his residency.
The Dutch local authorities of Batavia believed that the 
Chinese majority in the residency, in other words the 
peranakan, were in general quiet and peaceful citizens, with 
few criminals among them.98 The inclination on the part of 
the Dutch to favour the peranakan was quite understandable, 
since the peranakan political party, the Chung Hwa Hui, 
focused on the Dutch East Indies rather than on China.
The longevity of the Batavia officers smoothed the way 
for Batavia to launch test case. By 1919 all Chinese 
officers in Batavia had been released from their 
administrative positions. At a meeting on 1-2 September 
1917 between the Director of Home Affairs and the 
Residents of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, it was 
considered whether the temporarily annulled officers could 
retain their titles, even on an honorary basis. As the Dutch 
were uncertain about the result of the test case, it was 
decided to grant them honorary titles and express official 
appreciation for their services.99
On 24 March 1919, major Khouw Kim An was officially 
retired while remaining a titular major. Yet, in waiting for 
the final reorganization, the local authorities of Batavia
98 "Politieke Verslagen van de Residentie Batavia, 1851-1880", in Batavia, 
no. 10; see also "Overzicht van de Chineesche Beweging in Nederlandsch- 
Indie", in Geheim Verbaal, 11 February 1933, no. R.2.
99 Note of the Director of Home Affairs, 31 January 1917, no. Ill/B, in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4406.
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asked him to continue to carry out his major duties.100 
Furthermore, the test case led the local authorities in 
Java's three main cities to adopt the new institution of the 
Chineesch Commissie van Advies, with positions to be given 
to notable Chinese. Batavia again encountered no dificulties, 
since the ex-major Khouw Kim An was simply the most 
suitable person for that position.101 It might be anticipated 
that the end of the Chinese officers and of the major in 
particular would have affected the organization of the 
Chinese Council. As the Chinese major was identified with 
the chairmanship of the Council, the question was whether 
other members would prefer a new chairman to ex-major 
Khouw Kim An. To the Resident's relief, the members agreed 
that the ex-major should continue in his leading position on 
the Council.102
By September 1927, the reorganization of the Chineesch 
Bestuur in Batavia was complete, with the return to the old 
composition of 1912, namely one major, two captains and 
four lieutenants.103 In the vicinity of Batavia, Tangerang 
had only one captain and one lieutenant,104 while Buitenzorg 
was able to keep one captain and two lieutenants.105 Four 
years later, a further reorganization reduced the officers to 
one major, one captain and one lieutenant. From the existing 
captains, Lie Tjian Tjoen and Yo Heng Kam, the latter was 
released from his position.106
100 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 24 March 1919, no. 15; and 12 November 
1926, no. 9.
101 J D Hunger, "Memorie van Overgave van het Bestuur over het Gewest 
Batavia op den 3 Maart 1922"; also noted in the letter of Director of Home 
Affairs to Governor-General, 22 December 1923, in Geheim Mailrapport, 
no. 66x/1924; and in the letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to 
Governor-General, 22 December 1923, no. 7 1 5 /2 3 , in Binnenlands- 
Bestuur, no. 2065.
102 See letter of the Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 27 June 
1923, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 70 4 x /1 9 2 3 ; and also noted in 
Gouvemementsbesluit, 12 November 1926, no. 9.
103 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 27 September 1927, no. 2; and also PH 
Willemse, "Memorie van Overgave van de Residentie Batavia, 26 October 
1931", ARA, The Hague.
104 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 28 September 1928, no. 19.
105 See Gouvemementsbesluit, 30 September 1927, no. 21.
106 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor of West Java, 21 January 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603x /1932.
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As Yo Heng Kam was then Chinese representative on the 
People's Council and also a member of the Provincial 
Council of West Java, his political influence would not be 
disadvantaged by his discharge. As a Chinese captain, Yo 
Heng Kam was also a member of the Chinese Council in 
Batavia: it would therefore be more appropriate if this 
position was held by another Chinese officer. Moreover, it 
was thought that to release Yo Heng Kam would not 
discomfort his peers.107 At first Yo Heng Kam was rather 
reluctant to relinguish his captainship, preferring to keep 
the honorary title although he had no permission to do so. 
Eventually the Resident managed to discourage him, saying 
that it would be pointless to maintain the title with the 
introduction of the new local administration system, and Yo 
Heng Kam subsequently withdrew his request.108
The choice of whom, among the four lieutenants, should 
be retained, was Lie Boen Sien. He was already in charge of 
taxation matters, supervising the administration of the 
Chinese wardmasters, and inspecting articles published in 
the Chinese-Malay press. In addition, unlike the other 
Chinese officers, Lie Boen Sien was not a rich man. His work 
was very much appreciated by the Departments of Home 
Affairs and Finance. Releasing him from his position could 
well leave him in financial difficulties.109
Nobody would object to Khouw Kim An, who was restored 
to his majorship in February 1927. He was a man of means, 
from the well-known Khouw family of Meester-Cornelis. As 
a good Chinese officer, Khouw Kim An was well-informed 
about events in Batavia, particularly within the Chinese 
community.110 The Dutch authorities of Batavia were very
107 Letter of the Governor of West Java to Director of Home Affairs, 14 
November 1929, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 12x /1930.
108 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor of West Java, 10 March 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603x /1932.
109 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor of West Java, 21 January 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603x /1932.
110 J D Hunger, "Memorie van Overgave van het Bestuur over het Gewest 
Batavia op den 3 Maart 1922".
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pleased with his services and trusted him.111 On the other 
hand, the non-peranakan or singkeh-totok were very hostile 
towards him. Owing to his alertness, the 1912 Chinese 
riots, the Chinese reaction to the China-Japan conflict, and 
the boycott against Japanese goods in Batavia, did not 
culminate in serious situations. It was during these crises 
that the local authorities in Batavia found the Chinese 
officers to be a source of good advice.112 It demonstrated 
how the local authorities could rely on the peranakan 
officers in facing the stormy singkeh in the colony. In 
addition, many Dutch officials admitted that without the 
Chinese officers the European civil administration would 
have to take on numerous extra tasks.
Thus far I have discussed the political and administrative 
reasons for maintaining the institution of Chinese officers 
in Batavia. Another factor that made the Dutch very 
cautious was the internal structure of the Chineesch  
Bestuur itself. As the daily work of the Chinese officership, 
was undertaken by the Chinese Council, change would be 
certain to affect the Council. All matters regarding the 
Chinese community, including schooling for children of the 
Chinese poor, orphanages, charities and mass ceremonies, 
were taken care of by the Council. Moreover, the Council 
administered Chinese properties, land, cemeteries, temples 
and hospitals, together with their funds.113
Knowing that the Dutch government intended to terminate 
the Chinese officers, the Chinese of Batavia became 
anxious, fearing that the Dutch might also terminate the 
Chinese Council and confiscate its properties. Although the 
government gave an assurance that this would not happen, 
the distrust among the Chinese could not be immediately 
assuaged. The reorganization plan would place Chinese 
properties under the Committee for Management of the
111 Letter of the Resident of Batavia to Governor of West Java, 21 January 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603x /1932.
112 Letter of Governor of West Java to Director of Home Affairs, 31 May 
1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 704x/1932.
113 Yo Heng Kam, "Reorganisatie van den Chineeschen Raad", De Chineesche 
Revue, July 1928, pp. 79-80; see also Chapter IV.
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Properties of the Former Chinese Council, which would 
probably be chaired by a European official,114 possibly from 
the office of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs. This made the 
Chinese even more uncomfortable, for they never felt at 
ease with this office. As HHKan noted, the Chinese wished 
that the office of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs was more 
a friend than a Dutch government spy.115 To allow the 
management and disposal of their community funds to slip 
out of their hands and be administered by Europeans was 
obviously unacceptable.116
Given that particular concern of the Batavia Chinese 
Council, it was then proposed that the Council be 
reorganized in negotiation with the remaining Chinese 
officers. For the reasons given above, the local authorities 
in Batavia, supported by the Governor of West Java, resisted 
the idea of abolishing these Chinese institutions; yet they 
were opposed by the Director of Home Affairs and the 
Advisor for Chinese Affairs. Both officials found no reason 
to exclude Batavia, particularly as other cities such as 
Semarang and Surabaya posed no problem.117
In the end it was the status of the Batavia Chinese 
Council as a corporate body that led the Dutch to make it an 
exception. The properties managed by the Council were in 
bank deposits, mortgages, company shares and in 28 plots of 
land. Its income was derived from interest, rents, services 
for Chinese cemeteries and hospitals, and from land 
leases.118 This financial position could be understood only 
by the local authorities, a point which officials in the 
offices of Home Affairs and the Advisor for Chinese Affairs
114 Note of Director of Home Affairs, 31 January 1917, no. Ill/B, in 
Binnenlands-Bestuur; no. 4406
115 See Verhandelingen van den Volksraad van 1918, p. 277.
116 See "De Regeling van het Bestuur over Chineeezen en Andere Vreemde 
Oosterlingen", Mailrapport, no. 3426 /1922 , in Verbaal, 10 March 1923, 
no. 5.
117 Letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 25 April 1932, 
in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603x/1932.
118 "Verslag van de Commissie voor het Financieel Beheer van den 
Chineeschen Raad", 17 November 1927, in Gouvemementsbesluit, 5 
November 1929, no. 17.
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failed to see. This meant that both the Chinese officers and 
the Chinese Council of Batavia would be maintained, in a 
new form.
To match the reorganized Chinese officers in Batavia, the 
membership of the Chinese Council was also rearranged. 
After 1928 the Chinese Administration consisted of one 
major, two captains and four lieutenants, all of whom were 
members of the Council. In addition, Chinese public opinion 
demanded that Council membership be open to private 
persons representing Chinese associations. To meet this 
demand, the Dutch agreed to allocate two seats on the 
Council to private persons,119 and in December 1928 the 
THHK nominated Tan Pia Teng and Nio Peng Liang as the first 
non-officer members of the Chinese Council.120
In 1931 the Chinese officership was again reformed, to 
comprise one major, one captain and one lieutenant. The 
Council was now composed of two officers and two non­
officers, under the major’s chairmanship. As it was agreed 
that there would be six seats on the Council, who would 
occupy the remaining seat? For the Dutch, to appoint 
another officer was simply out of the question, after their 
long efforts to reorganize the institution in Batavia. The 
Chinese also preferred to appoint another private person to 
the Council, for the present arrangement meant that the 
three officer members including the major as chairman, 
outnumbered the two non-officers. This inequality was 
undesirable, as it could lead to possible abuses in the 
working of the Council.121 It was therefore agreed to give 
the remaining seat to a third non-officer member. The third 
private member was Dr Tjiong Boen Kie, the only member of 
the Chinese Council in pre-independent Indonesia who was
119 Noted in the letter of Director of Home Affairs to Governor-General, 25 
April 1932, in Geheim Mailrapport, no. 603 x /1 932 ; Yo Heng Kam, 
"Reorganisatie van den Chineeschen Raad", p. 77; Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40- 
Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Batavia 1900-1939  (1940. Batavia: THHK),
p. 181.
120 Nio Joe Lan, op.cit
121 Yo Heng Kam, "Reorganisatie van den Chineeschen Raad", p. 85.
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an academic. His appointment is dated 9 March 1940.122 It is 
unclear why it took almost nine years for the Chinese to 
nominate him.
Two years later, the Chinese community was shattered by 
the Japanese occupation. The arrival of the Japanese army 
was welcomed by the Indonesians, who hoped that it would 
assist in the achievement of independence from the Dutch. 
Unlike their Indonesian fellows, the Chinese were plunged 
into anxiety; during the China-Japan conflict, the local 
Chinese had launched anti-Japanese campaigns and boycotts. 
Many Chinese were taken into concentration camps, 
especially prominent members of the community. Among 
them was major Khouw Kim An who found no escape.123 He 
died in a prison camp in 1945.
The end of the Netherlands Indies government also meant 
the end of the Chinese officers. The new Indonesian Republic 
could not accommodate that institution.
122 See "Residentie Batavia", in Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch-lndie 
van het jaar 1941, vol. II, p. 291.
1 23 Nio Joe lan, "Sepuluh Tahun Terachir dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan di 
Djakarta", in Hari Ulang Tahun ke-50 Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, Djakarta 3 
Djuni 1900 -3 Djuni 1950 (1950. Djakarta: THHK), p. 29.
299
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The thesis has considered the Chinese officers in Batavia in 
the period 1837-1942. Given that Batavia was the home of 
the largest Chinese community, did Batavia provide an 
accurate representation of Dutch policy towards the 
Chinese in Java? Did the Dutch attitude towards the 
Batavian Chinese, who were mainly peranakan, reflects its 
general Chinese policy.
As Batavia is still underrepresented in the study of the 
Indonesian Chinese, that question is still difficult to 
answer completely. Being favoured in practice, the 
peranakan of Batavia and their officers showed up Dutch 
ambiguity and indecisiveness; not only in the nineteenth 
century, when the Chinese became indispensable in the 
colonial economy, but also in the early twentieth century, 
when their political aspirations grew.
In the last decades, Chinese issues had to be viewed not 
only through the peranakan-singkeh-China triangle but also 
in the context of the growing Indonesian nationalist 
movement. Favouring the peranakan could be seen as the 
Dutch response to the threat of Chinese government 
interference and to rising Indonesian nationalist demands.
The characteristics of the peranakan may themselves 
have contributed to Dutch ambiguity and indecisiveness. 
Seeing that many peranakan cherished their sentimental 
ties with China, yet eagerly showed themselves to be 
children of Indonesia, the country of their birth, Dutch 
policy towards the Chinese was understandably often 
inconsistent. This was clearly shown in the application of 
the 1910 Netherlands-subject Law.
The ambiguity was also seen in the decision to abolish 
the Chinese officers yet establish a Chinese advisory 
committee to act as an intermediary between the Dutch 
authorities and the Chinese. Exempting Batavia from the
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abolition of the Chinese officers further shows the lack of a 
comprehensive Dutch policy regarding the Chinese in the 
Indies.
I am acutely aware that further research would refine 
my argument, although it would not, I believe, overthrow my 
main conclusion. There is need for comparative studies of 
the Chinese officers in Semarang and Surabaya; study of the 
relationships of the Chinese officers with other public 
figures in the community; of the two peranakan political 
parties, the Chung Hwa Hui and the Partai Tionghoa 
Indonesia; Chinese participation in the People’s Council and 
in colonial government; and Dutch economic policy as far as 
it affected the Chinese.
Comparative studies of the Chinese officers in Semarang 
and Surabaya would confirm the different practices of 
Dutch policy with respect to Chinese local administration in 
the different cities in Java.
A study of the relationships of the Chinese officers with 
other public figures in the community would further 
illuminate the political dimensions of Chinese officership 
and the struggle for Chinese leadership.
A detailed study of the Chung Hwa Hui and the Partai 
Tionghoa Indonesia would further demonstrate the 
vulnerability of the peranakan within the context of the 
rising Indonesian nationalist movement.
Study of Chinese participation in the People’s Council 
and in colonial government might illustrate the peranakan 
view concerning their status as members of the Dutch East 
Indies community.
Examination of Dutch economic policy as far as it 
affected the Chinese might explain the roots of anti- 
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